

# THE POLITICS OF COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL REFORMS



Cleavages and Coalitions

**KATHARINA SASS**



## The Politics of Comprehensive School Reforms

Why are school systems structured differently across countries? *The Politics of Comprehensive School Reforms* examines this question through an in-depth analysis of education politics in Germany and Norway during the postwar period of educational expansion. Using a Rokkanian theoretical framework, the book argues that education politics can only be understood in light of the cleavages, or political divides, that shape actors' interests, ideologies, and inclinations for who they want to cooperate with – or not. The book analyzes crosscutting cleavages connected to religion, geography, language, anti-communism, and gender and demonstrates how Norwegian social democrats and German Christian democrats built successful coalitions by mobilizing support from different social groups. Extensively researched and expansively applicable, this book contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on the politics of education and to the field of comparative welfare and education regime research. This book is also available Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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*Cleavages and Coalitions*

KATHARINA SASS

*University of Bergen*



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Finally, I thank all future readers. I hope this book will be of use to you in some way. Maybe reading about education politics in the past can even inspire you to dream about a future in which all people can develop their creative capacities and live and learn together in solidarity and peace.

## Introduction

The politics of education shape the lives of millions of schoolchildren, teachers, and families all over the world. They are related to the quality of a country's democracy, to the character of its welfare state regime, and to the structure and development of the economy. Yet, comparative-historical knowledge about why school systems developed differently in different places remains limited. This holds especially for primary and lower-secondary education – possibly the most relevant and formative parts of the education system (Moe/Wiborg, 2016b, 11).

This book thus sheds light on an under-researched field. It provides a comparative-historical analysis of comprehensive school reform processes in Norway and Germany and proposes a Rokkanian theoretical framework to make sense of the conflicts and compromises that have shaped such reforms. By doing so, it explores the roots of a major difference between Nordic and continental school systems: their unequal degree of comprehensiveness. The term comprehensiveness refers to the extent to which all students of an age cohort attend the same educational institutions, independent of their abilities or social background. The more comprehensive a school system is, the less separation of students by means of parallel schooling, tracking, or ability grouping takes place. Because school systems always differentiate between students somehow, it makes sense to see comprehensiveness as a continuum, with the most comprehensive systems differentiating late and little and the least comprehensive systems differentiating early and in multiple ways. The opposite of comprehensiveness is segmentation, “the division of educational systems into parallel segments or ‘tracks,’ which differ both in their curriculum and in the social origins of their pupils,” as defined by Ringer (1987, 7; 1979). The degree of

comprehensiveness is related to systems of evaluation. Grades are often used for selection to parallel schools, tracks, or ability groups, while more comprehensive systems require less grading in primary and lower-secondary schools. Another criterion for the degree of comprehensiveness is the age of first selection of students to parallel schools or tracks (Figure 1.1). From sociological and educationalist research, we know that earlier selection increases the reproduction of social inequality (OECD, 2010a, 35f). However, we know little about why school systems' comprehensiveness varies so greatly among developed countries.

The Nordic countries have been forerunners with regard to comprehensivization of their school systems. Over time, highly comprehensive school systems were formed in which children of all backgrounds attend primary and lower-secondary schools together until they are sixteen years old (Wiborg, 2009). Norway was the first country to introduce five years of comprehensive education in 1896 and seven years in 1920. During the 1950s to 1970s, comprehensive schooling was prolonged to nine years with the introduction of the youth school (*ungdomsskole*). This lower-secondary school type replaced two former parallel school types, the middle school (*realskole*) and the continuation school (*framhaldsskole*)




FIGURE 1.1 Age of first selection of students to parallel schools or tracks in selected countries

Source: European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2020.






FIGURE 1.2 The Norwegian general public school system in 1954




FIGURE 1.3 The Norwegian general public school system in 1979

(see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). The *realskole* was academically oriented and led to upper-secondary schooling and then potentially to university. The *framhaldsskole* was more vocationally oriented but did not award any formal qualifications.

The youth school initially consisted of two tracks, which resembled these older school types. Gradually, tracking was replaced with more flexible ability grouping and finally with mixed-ability classes. The reform was connected to the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling and to the abolition of grades in the first six years, which were called children's school. The Norwegian Labor Party also wanted to abolish grades in the youth school, but this proposal incited much opposition and failed. In the 1990s, the school enrolment age was lowered by one year, prolonging comprehensive education further. The Norwegian school system today provides ten years of comprehensive and obligatory schooling in the seven-year children's school (*barneskole*), followed by the three-year youth school (*ungdomsskole*). Tracking sets in at the upper-secondary level.

In the continental welfare states, selection and separation continue to be exercised earlier in children's life courses.<sup>1</sup> The German school system is

<sup>1</sup> English-speaking and Mediterranean countries are placed in between these two poles (see West/Nikolai, 2013). They have comprehensive lower-secondary schooling to a certain

among the least comprehensive. In 1920, four years of comprehensive primary schooling was introduced in the Weimar Republic. In the 1950s, the comprehensive primary school (*Grundschule*) still made up the lower stage of the so-called people's school (*Volksschule*). The majority of students continued to the upper stage of the *Volksschule* and then to vocational training or the labor market. Only a minority received secondary schooling either in a middle school (*Realschule*) or in the prestigious academic secondary school, the *Gymnasium*. In the 1960s, the number of *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* was increased in many West German federal states, including the largest federal state of North Rhine–Westphalia (NRW). In addition, a new school type was introduced: the integrated comprehensive school (*Integrierte Gesamtschule*). Despite its name and the intentions of reformers, it was not comprehensive because the other school types were not abolished. The primary school was separated from the upper stage of the *Volksschule*, which was turned into an independent lower-secondary school type, the *Hauptschule*. Nine, and later ten, years of obligatory schooling were introduced (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). During the late 1970s, the social democratic–liberal government coalition of NRW suggested the introduction of a so-called cooperative school, meant to be a combination of the three traditional school types as tracks under one roof. In 1978, this reform was stopped by an alliance of reform antagonists, who collected over 3.6 million signatures. Today, most federal states in Germany still separate students to




FIGURE 1.4 The North Rhine–Westphalian general public school system in 1954

extent, but this is often undermined by ability grouping, school choice, or private schooling.




FIGURE 1.5 The North Rhine–Westphalian general public school system in 1979

hierarchically ordered secondary school types at age ten.<sup>2</sup> Grading is usually introduced at the end of the second grade of primary school.

This book analyzes the political processes behind these school reforms comparatively and historically. [Chapter 2](#) provides an overview of the development of the Norwegian and the German school systems up to the 1950s. The book then proceeds to analyze in detail the period from around 1954 to 1979. During this period, educational expansion reached an unprecedented peak all over the world, as increasing numbers of youths stayed on in the school system after having completed obligatory schooling ([Meyer et al., 1977](#)). In Western Germany, it was the last period when the creation of a ten-year comprehensive school system briefly seemed possible, at least in the eyes of social democratic and liberal reformers. In Norway, as in many other countries, the period also saw “detracking” reforms that were more far-reaching than anything attempted later ([Österman, 2017a](#)). The period was a critical juncture that shaped school systems until the present day. In Norway, comprehensive schooling until age sixteen became an almost self-evident feature of society, while it was never introduced in Germany but remained a highly contested issue.

The question this book tries to answer is why the paths chosen in education politics during this period were so different in these two cases.

<sup>2</sup> Only three of the sixteen federal states, Berlin, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, separate students a little later: at age twelve ([Helbig/Nikolai, 2015](#), 81). East Germany reintroduced parallel schooling including the *Gymnasium* after reunification ([Herrlitz et al., 2009](#), 238ff; [Nikolai, 2019](#)).

Why was the abolition of parallel schooling, tracking, ability grouping, and grading effectively carried out in Norway, while comparable reforms attempted in West Germany during the same period remained limited in scope? Why were the reforms strongly contested in Germany but not in Norway? The book provides historically and case specific answers to these questions but also tries to develop our general understanding of cleavage structures and cross-interest coalition-making in education politics.

The main argument of the book is that the differences in historical school development should be attributed to how cleavage structures, in the Rokkanian sense, facilitated or hampered cross-interest coalitions. The rural and religious population, many primary schoolteachers, and sections of the women's movement were integrated into different kinds of coalitions in education politics: a coalition of social democrats and center parties in the Norwegian case and a Christian conservative coalition in the German case. The book thus advocates Rokkanian cleavage theory as a fruitful theoretical lens for comparative-historical analyses of education politics. [Rokkan's \(1999\)](#) work provides a multidimensional and historically grounded perspective on political agency and coalition-making that is well worth returning to.

In the following, I first give an overview of the comparative literature on education politics and comprehensive school reforms. In the [next section](#), the theoretical framework of this book is laid out. To this end, I introduce Rokkanian cleavage theory as well as another major perspective often applied in comparative political sociology, power resources theory. I then present the main argument and structure of the book. This introductory chapter ends with a note on the book's history, including a reflection on case selection and methodology.

## THE LITERATURE

Most comparative research in the field of education has focused on the distributional effects of education systems rather than on how reforms have come about.<sup>3</sup> There are good reasons for this. Inequality of educational opportunity and outcomes is an important topic. However, the lack of comparative analyses of education politics is a problem.

Consider, for example, the German case: For decades, German sociologists of education and educationalists have been almost obsessed with

<sup>3</sup> For some examples, see [Breen et al. \(2010\)](#), [Haim and Shavit \(2013\)](#), [Shavit and Blossfeld \(1993\)](#), or the many OECD studies on education.

studying the reproduction of inequality in the German education system.<sup>4</sup> Much research shows that sorting students into parallel schools at the age of ten (re)creates strong social inequalities (Maaz et al., 2008, 242f). Variation in learning outcomes between schools is high in Germany because the different secondary school types have such unequal curricula and student bodies (OECD, 2016, 226). In contrast, Norway has fared comparatively well in international comparisons of the equity of education systems (OECD, 1972, 2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2016). Its comprehensive school system comprises fewer points of transition. Variation in students' performance is lower than in Germany and almost all of this variation is within-school variation (OECD, 2016, 226).

These research findings have made little difference for German education politics. Researchers' conclusion that early selection in the German system is conducive to the reproduction of inequality has not led to comprehensive school reforms. On the contrary, the multi-tier school system has persisted. German politicians and representatives of teachers' organizations regularly express their desire for equality of opportunity, but few of them support far-reaching comprehensive school reforms. Why is this so? This question has received little scholarly attention. In consequence, we know a lot about the reproduction of inequality in the German education system but little about why the system's presumably most inequality-enhancing feature – selection and parallel schooling from the age of ten – has never been successfully reformed.

A few studies do try to tackle the question of why comprehensive school reforms were successfully implemented in some places but not in others. Baldi (2012), in his comparison of postwar education policy discourses in Britain and Germany, points out that German academics were slow in revising their ideas about ability, which he attributes to ideational and structural legacies from the Nazi era. An earlier, similar contribution is Heidenheimer's (1974) work, in which he tries to explain the "different outcomes of school comprehensivization attempts in Sweden and West Germany." He gives examples of more elitist attitudes prevalent among German experts on pedagogy, teachers, politicians, and parents. He also compares the role of teachers' associations and finds that the German *Gymnasium* teachers had greater influence than their Swedish counterparts. This is attributed to the fact that they were part of a strong anti-reform coalition with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),

<sup>4</sup> See for example Becker and Lauterbach (2016), Berger and Kahlert (2008), Hopf (2010), or Krüger et al. (2011). This is only a small selection of numerous studies on the topic.

conservative bureaucrats, and middle-class parents' associations. Heidenheimer (1974) concludes that the German left was not united enough to overcome this challenge and points to internal conflicts. In Sweden, no party ever declared itself clearly against comprehensive reform and the Swedish secondary schoolteachers were left on the sidelines politically. Both Baldi (2012) and Heidenheimer (1974) point out important ideological differences. However, they do not provide an explanation for why conservative ideas on schooling remained so powerful for so long in Germany, even among lower- and middle-class groups who could have profited from comprehensive school reforms.

Another argument that has been brought forward to explain the German case is that the federalist structure is conducive to the institutional stickiness of the school system (Baldi, 2012; Ertl/Philipps, 2000; Hahn, 1998). Federalism can be considered to produce veto points in the decision-making process because it creates an additional institutional level on which reforms must be negotiated (Huber/Stephens, 2001; Immergut, 1992). However, a study by Erk (2003) indicates that German federalism tends to develop unitary characteristics in education and that standardization is high despite federalism. Moreover, the present book focuses on one federal state, NRW. In theory, North Rhine–Westphalian school politicians could have introduced comprehensive lower-secondary schooling even though other federal states did not. This would have been legally possible because school policy falls under the responsibility of federal state governments. It would potentially have entailed conflicts in the bodies in which federal states' school policies are coordinated. This possibility of conflict with other federal states, however, played no significant role in the reform debates in NRW, as demonstrated in the empirical chapters of this book.

The most important comparative contribution so far is the work of Wiborg (2009, 2010), which focuses on the history of comprehensive schooling in Scandinavia, Germany, and England. Wiborg's findings are that (1) intensive processes of state-building were related to education reforms but cannot explain why the level of vertical differentiation differs so strongly between Scandinavia and Germany (Wiborg, 2009, 47). She demonstrates further that (2) "the relative homogeneity of Scandinavian societies was propitious for the development of a ladder system of education" from the nineteenth century onward but that the difference in class structures cannot account entirely for the lack of a similar development in Prussia (Wiborg, 2009, 215). She emphasizes (3) the importance of liberal parties in the creation of comprehensive education in Scandinavia,

through the introduction of comprehensive primary schools and middle schools, which were – in theory – open to all (Wiborg, 2009, 75ff; 2010, 546ff). Wiborg's (2009, 231; 2010) final hypothesis is that (4) “it was ultimately the nature and strength of social democracy that explains the divergent development of comprehensive education in Scandinavia, on one hand, and Germany and England, on the other.” In Scandinavia, social democratic parties forged alliances with the liberal peasantry and later with the emerging white-collar middle class, which allowed them to introduce ten years of comprehensive education. German and English social democracy did not manage to build similarly strong alliances.

These are convincing findings. Wiborg's historical account is highly sophisticated and useful. However, her claim that German postwar social democrats were ideologically “rooted in the past” and therefore did not manage to convince middle-class voters is not supported by the empirical analysis in the present book (Sass, 2015; Wiborg, 2010, 554). German social democrats were ideologically less radical than Norwegian social democrats, but they were deeply split. Some leading figures in the party never supported comprehensive schooling wholeheartedly. Furthermore, the different roles played by conservatives and Christian democrats in Norway and Germany and the salience of crosscutting cleavages are important factors for the political outcomes, as shown in this book.

Several comparative doctoral theses have focused on aspects of comprehensive “detracking” reforms (Haberstroh, 2016; Österman, 2017b). Österman (2017a, 157f) demonstrates that the age of first selection was reformed in many countries during the 1960s and 1970s and has remained rather stable since then. Based on a quantitative analysis of this development in thirty-one developed countries, he concludes, “social democrats are clearly more likely to carry through detracking reforms than any of the other major parties” (Österman, 2017a, 168). Dominance of Christian democratic governments “is related to heavier tracking through early selection,” while the role of conservatives and liberals remains unclear in his results (Österman, 2017a, 171). As he points out, “detailed case studies” are needed to understand “how political coalitions are formed around tracking reforms” (Österman, 2017a, 172). His main finding that social democrats have been protagonists of comprehensive school reforms, while Christian democrats have opposed such reforms, is valid for many cases. However, one should be careful in concluding that Christian democrats *always* oppose comprehensive school reforms. In the present book, it is shown that the small Norwegian Christian democratic party (the Christian Democrats) did not. In fact, the Norwegian

minister of education who finalized the introduction of the youth school in 1969 was a Christian democrat, Kjell Bondevik.

One of the newest contributions to the field is [Busemeyer et al.'s \(2020\)](#) study of public opinion and education reform in Western Europe, in which the authors demonstrate, among other things, that public support of comprehensive schooling seems to be high in all their cases. Even in Germany, 84 percent of the study's respondents agree that "all children, regardless of their social background, should be taught in the same schools so that everyone can learn from each other," while only 28 percent agree that "children with different social backgrounds should be taught in different schools in order to provide more targeted support."<sup>5</sup> They also find that voters for left-wing parties are more supportive of comprehensive schooling and that voters for right-wing parties, wealthier, and more highly educated respondents, but also the respondents belonging to the poorest quintile, are more skeptical ([Busemeyer et al., 2020](#), 135ff).

Besides these few studies, not much comparative work is concerned with the history and politics of comprehensive education. [Hörner et al. \(2015\)](#) provide a useful overview of European education systems, but without analyzing the differences in the politics of comprehensive schooling in detail. Classic studies like those by [Ringer \(1979\)](#), [Müller et al. \(1987\)](#), [Archer \(2013 \[1979\]\)](#), or [Green \(2013 \[1990\]\)](#) help us to understand the formative periods of education systems and have laid the foundations for the field but are less explanatory regarding development after the Second World War. There are many excellent historical and sociological single case studies, which are useful also as secondary sources for comparisons but which do not provide explanations for the diverging development in different countries.<sup>6</sup> A range of studies have analyzed education politics in OECD nations comparatively, but with a focus

<sup>5</sup> This finding might in part be due to the way comprehensive schooling is operationalized in the survey. Many supporters of the *Gymnasium* agree that students from lower social backgrounds should in principle have access to this school type and that selection should be based on achievement rather than on social background. Of course, selection to German parallel schools is based on social background to a large extent, but many respondents might not be entirely aware of or acknowledge this fact.

<sup>6</sup> For the German case, see for example [Friedeburg \(1992\)](#), [Hahn \(1998\)](#), [Herrlitz et al. \(2009\)](#), [Ringer \(1969\)](#), or [van Ackeren and Klemm \(2011\)](#). For analyses of the major education-political conflict in NRW in the 1970s, see [Blumenthal \(1988\)](#), [Rösner \(1981\)](#), and [Seifert \(2013\)](#). For comparisons between German federal states, see [Edelstein \(2010\)](#), [Edelstein and Nikolai \(2013\)](#), or [Hartong and Nikolai \(2016\)](#). For the Norwegian case, see [Dokka \(1966, 1986, 1988\)](#), [Jarning \(1993\)](#), [Myhre \(1971\)](#), [Rust \(1989\)](#), [Seip \(1990\)](#), [Sejersted \(2011\)](#), [Telhaug \(1969, 1974, 1979\)](#), [Telhaug and Mediås \(2003\)](#), or [Volckmar \(2016\)](#). For an analysis of Norwegian party manifestos, see [Kjøl and Telhaug \(1999\)](#). For



on upper-secondary schooling, vocational schooling, higher education, education spending, or teachers unions (Busemeyer, 2007, 2014; Garritzmann, 2016; Schmidt, 2007; Thelen, 2004, to name a few). Some studies of the politics of vocational and higher education, such as Busemeyer (2014), rightly emphasize the role of Christian democratic parties for the development of the continental education systems, but without spelling out the implications for primary and lower-secondary schooling.

In a contribution on teachers' unions and education systems around the world edited by Terry M. Moe and Susanne Wiborg (2017a), Moe and Wiborg (2017b) point out that focusing on teachers' unions is a good entry point for comparative analysis because such unions have been key players almost everywhere. This is certainly the case in Norway and Germany (Nikolai et al., 2017; Wiborg, 2017). The present book adds to these analyses by providing a theoretical explanation for why upper-secondary schoolteachers were more successful politically in Germany than in Scandinavia. The book includes organizations of lower-secondary and primary schoolteachers with Christian roots in the analysis of the German case. These have often been ignored even though they have played important roles. Splits between social democratic and Christian teachers are at the root of German primary schoolteachers' comparable lack of influence.

Several authors have advocated including education politics to a higher degree in comparative welfare state analysis, because the education-political paths of Western nation states coincide with typologies of welfare state regimes based on other policy fields (Iversen/Stephens, 2008; West/Nikolai, 2013; Willemse/de Beer, 2012). One attempt at this has been made by studies of party preferences in education politics based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)<sup>7</sup> (Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2013). This dataset provides quantitative information on party manifestos over time and includes a variable dubbed "educational expansion." This variable does not distinguish between policies but includes almost all statements on education, no matter what their exact content is.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, Ansell (2010) and Jakobi (2011) have employed the CMP data only on an aggregated level in their analyses. As pointed out

case studies on other countries, see for example Greveling et al. (2015), Henkens (2004), Husén (1986), Nieminen (2018), Pultar (2021), or Rubinstein and Simon (2007).

<sup>7</sup> See <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu>.

<sup>8</sup> See the criticism of this dataset in Busemeyer et al. (2013, 528ff).

by Busemeyer et al. (2013, 526), “country contexts and policy legacies [...] play a crucial role in shaping the political competition over educational expansion,” which entails that studies based exclusively on aggregated data might “blend [...] over major variation on a less aggregated data level (i.e. the country level) as well as changes across time.” For example, Jakobi’s (2011) finding that educational expansion is today supported by all mainstream parties, and should be considered a consensual issue, can only be upheld if one does not differentiate between the suggested educational policies, which can vary immensely. As demonstrated for example by Busemeyer et al. (2020), heated debates about the age of first selection, ability grouping, school choice, or private schooling still characterize education politics in many places.

One can conclude that both variable- and case-oriented studies will be necessary for the further development of the research field. There is a particular lack of case-oriented, comparative-historical studies that take the historical, political, and institutional environment of political actors into account in analyses of the politics of education. The present book is a step in this direction. It informs current scholarly and education policy debates by shedding light on how coalitions and conflicts in education politics come about.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The empirical analysis in this book is guided by two classic theoretical perspectives: power resources theory and Rokkanian cleavage theory. While both approaches are useful for the analysis of the politics of education, this book demonstrates that education politics are shaped by more than class conflict and material interests, so the focus of power resources theory is somewhat too narrow.<sup>9</sup> Rokkanian cleavage theory provides a more nuanced understanding of how cross-interest coalitions come about. In the following, both approaches are discussed.

### Power Resources Theory

Power resources theory was developed by Walter Korpi (1974, 1978, 1983, 1985), John D. Stephens (1979), and Gøsta Esping-Andersen

<sup>9</sup> A similar argument could be made regarding related theories that focus on the left/right dimension of politics and economic interests, such as theories about partisanship (Ansell, 2010; Hibbs, 1977; Schmidt, 1996).

(1985, 1990). In short, they argue that different forms of welfare state development result from the distribution of power resources between socioeconomic classes and class fractions. They also look at cross-class coalitions to explain the outcomes of social struggles. A central assumption is that “employers and other interest groups that control major economic resources are likely to prefer to situate distributive processes in the context of markets, where economic assets constitute strategic resources and [...] tend to outflank labor power” (Korpi, 2006, 173). In response, those who have no large amounts of capital at their disposal need to organize in parties and unions, which have sought to remove some activities from the market to achieve social citizenship and decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 35ff; Korpi, 2006).

Traditionally, this strand of literature has not paid much attention to the education system. However, the concept of social citizenship was first defined by T. H. Marshall (1950, 11) as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” Marshall (1950, 11, 25f) held that “[t]he institutions most closely connected with [social citizenship] are the educational system and the social services” and argued that the first step toward the establishment of social rights in the twentieth century was the expansion of public elementary education in the nineteenth century. In line with Marshall’s thinking, the post-Second World War educational expansion and reforms can be considered an extension of social citizenship.

Power resources theory is an actor- and conflict-oriented theory. Korpi (2006) provides a useful conceptualization of different kinds of actors. Protagonists are defined by Korpi (2006, 182) as “agenda setters” in the extension of “social citizenship rights.” Consenters are actors who either decide to switch from opposition to consent “for fear of voter reactions” or “attempt to modify policies to accord with their second-best or even lower levels of policy preferences and, if successful, can consent to a revised proposal” (Korpi, 2006, 182). In other words, consenters are willing to compromise. Antagonists are actors who oppose a policy throughout the policy-making process. It is important to remember that protagonists of one policy, for example comprehensive schooling, may be consenters, or even antagonists, as far as another policy is concerned, for example decentralized countryside schooling.

To understand why some actors are more successful than others in asserting their political program it is helpful to consider the distribution of

power resources between them. Korpi (1985, 33) defines power resources “as the attributes (capacities or means) of actors (individuals or collectivities), which enable them to reward or to punish other actors.” This means that power resources are defined in a relational way and are relevant even when not activated. Korpi (1985) also holds that indirect power strategies help managers of power resources avoid the mobilization and application of their resources, which would incur costs and increase uncertainty. One such strategy would be the attempt to influence the creation and shape of institutions. Institutions are conceptualized by Korpi (1985, 38) as “residues of previous activations of power resources, often in the context of manifest conflicts which for the time being have been settled through various types of compromises.”<sup>10</sup> Another strategy discussed by Korpi is the attempt to influence ideologies and beliefs of other actors. Korpi (1985, 34) speaks of normative power resources, which have lower costs than coercive power resources: “Attempts to develop and to spread ideologies and to cultivate legitimacy can be regarded as conversion techniques for decreasing the costs of power” (Korpi, 1985, 39). The present book analyzes power resources and ideologies of collective actors in conflicts in education politics. It examines their internal ideological unity as well as the question of which ideological arguments became hegemonic in the two cases.<sup>11</sup>

In power resources theory, it is assumed that collective actors such as parties “perform the crucial mediating role” with respect to the political articulation of class interests (Huber/Stephens, 2001, 17). Korpi (2006, 174) defines class as “categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions, or situations, in labor markets and in employment relations.” He contends that it is an empirical question to what extent categories of similarly placed individuals organize themselves through

<sup>10</sup> See Thelen (1999, 2003) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) for related discussions of institutional change.

<sup>11</sup> In the rest of this book, I employ the more common term “ideology” instead of “normative power resources.” The term ideology, in “the worst sense of the word,” has often been understood to mean “a dogmatic system of eternal and absolute truths” (Gramsci, 1972, 407). Gramsci rightly criticized such a conception. Most social scientists of the twentieth century have agreed that the term refers more matter-of-factly to a coherent set of ideas (Knight, 2006). The term hegemony has been defined by Gramsci (1972, 161, 182) as a strategic praxis of leadership aimed at engineering consent and based on coalition-building between a ruling group and subaltern groups, which involves a certain degree of compromise (Opratko, 2012, 43). In this sense, the term is compatible with this book’s focus on cross-interest coalition-making in education politics.

collective action or develop group identification. However, as [Korpi \(2006, 173\)](#) points out,

Socioeconomic class constitutes [only] one of the multiple lines of potential cleavages (including such others as religion, ethnicity, occupation, and economic sectors) around which collective action [...] can be mobilized. The extent to which crosscutting cleavages are mobilized is affected by structural factors, but distributive strife is also focused on influencing the relative importance of these competing lines of cleavages.

For this reason, it would be too simplistic to assume that collective actors, such as parties, always represent class interests in a clear way. They also must position themselves in relation to crosscutting cleavages. This can lead to internal splits or consolidate broad cross-interest alliances, depending on actors' strategies in response to the cleavage structure. The key to understanding the development of welfare states lies in understanding what kind of cross-interest coalition existed in a country ([Esping-Andersen, 1990, 30](#)). As demonstrated by [Esping-Andersen \(1990\)](#), the coalition between the Scandinavian farmers and the labor movement was central in Scandinavia. The development of continental welfare states, such as Germany, is strongly related to the strength of Christian democratic parties and the Catholic Church ([Huber/Stephens, 2001, 16ff](#); [Manow/van Kersbergen, 2009](#)). However, as pointed out by [Manow and van Kersbergen \(2009, 14ff\)](#), power resources theory does not provide a systematic explanation for why the middle classes sided with social democracy in some countries but with Christian democratic parties in others.

### Rokkanian Cleavage Theory

[Stein Rokkan's \(1999\)](#) cleavage theory can help us to develop a more nuanced understanding of how such political coalitions come about. [Rokkan \(1999, 276\)](#) holds that political conflicts can result from many interactions in a social structure, but only a few will lead to polarization and thereby to cleavages. Rokkan never defined the term cleavage. His understanding of the concept remains implicit and linked to grounded historical analyses. However, a close reading of his work reveals what the term refers to. In short, cleavages are long-standing, highly polarized political conflicts, or, in [Flora's \(1999, 7, 34–39\)](#) words, “fundamental oppositions within a territorial population” characterized by comparable importance and durability. Cleavages have structural, ideological, and

organizational dimensions. They are composed of different “social constituencies,” “cultural distinctiveness,” and “organizational networks” (Bartolini, 2000, 25; Bartolini/Mair, 1990, 212–249).

In the literature on cleavages, it is not always clear to what extent the term refers to constraining structures transmitted to us from the past or to changeable ideological and political configurations of today, constituted by political action. In this book, cleavages are seen as both, because they link structure and action over time. They have historical roots and represent constraints for the political, collective actors of today, in the sense that they have shaped institutions, identities, and ideologies – and thereby also have shaped the actors themselves. Yet, they only exist through action. In other words, they are continuously recreated in ongoing political conflicts and are therefore to some extent open for change (Lipset/Rokkan, 1967, 6). In terms of the ideological expressions of cleavages, this means that while current social movements, parties, and organizations are ideologically linked to their forerunners, it is up to each generation to define political interests and thus the content of cleavages in new terms. As structural and material conditions change, actors strategically adapt their views, aims, and forms of organization, but not without reference to the long-standing oppositions which have formed their political identities and understandings. During critical junctures, actors’ decisions and strategies become particularly meaningful and can to some extent set the course for future events (Mjøset, 2000, 392).

Cleavages can mutually reinforce, superpose onto, or cut across each other. They can vary in intensity, so that some become more salient than others. Cleavages should never be analyzed on their own since territorial areas are characterized by a set of interdependencies between cleavages (Lipset/Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1999, 309). Rokkan uses the term “cleavage structure” to describe a combination of cleavages characterizing an area’s social structure and political system (Flora, 1999, 7, 34–35). He identifies several critical historical junctures that have resulted in cleavages and shaped political systems (Rokkan 1999, 303–319; Table 1.1).

Regarding the organizational articulation of cleavages, Rokkan (1999) pays most attention to political parties. In his writing, it becomes clear that parties can be based on several cleavages to varying degrees (Sass, 2020). Even if based primarily on one cleavage, they must position themselves in relation to other cleavages, which might be overlapping or cross-cutting. Besides the electoral channel, Rokkan (1999, 261–273) points to the corporatist channel of decision-making as another form of articulation of cleavages. He discusses for example the role of unions, farmers’ and

TABLE 1.1 *Salience of cleavages in Norway and Rhineland/Westphalia/North Rhine–Westphalia up to the postwar reform period*

Cleavage	Salience in Norway	Salience in Rhineland/Westphalia/NRW
State-church	Low	High
Center-periphery	High	Low
Rural-urban	High	Low
Worker-owner	High	High
Communist-socialist	Medium (high during the 1920s)	High
Not discussed by Rokkan: Men-women	Medium	Low

fishermen's organizations, and employer organizations. Rokkanian cleavage theory should not be considered a theory pertaining to the party system only.

The oldest cleavages, in Rokkan's view, are the center-periphery and the state-church cleavage. The center-periphery cleavage was especially salient in the Protestant North. In Norway, it came to expression in the establishment of the Liberal Party, which was a broad opposition movement of farmers, peripheral ethnic groups, and urban outsiders to urban elites, who organized themselves in the Conservative Party (Rokkan, 1999, 375; 1966). The state-church cleavage was less salient because Protestant state churches were integrated into nation-building processes. Dissenting groups of Protestant minorities were integrated into peripheral movements. Neither these dissenting groups nor the Protestant state churches fought the state's attempts to control the education system (Rokkan, 1999, 286ff). In 1933, a small Christian democratic party (the Christian Democrats) was founded in Norway, representing rural Christian laymen, and from this point on the state-church cleavage became somewhat more salient.

The religiously mixed areas on the continent saw the rise of peripheral movements of Protestant dissidents and Catholic minorities. This led to the development of a dominant state-church cleavage and bitter conflicts, not least about education. In Germany, Catholics founded the ultramontane Center Party, which stood in opposition to the Protestant Prussian state. It was supported by Catholic workers and the Catholic middle classes and was strong in the provinces of Rhineland and Westphalia.

The German Catholic movement comprised many organizations, including teachers' unions. After the Second World War, the CDU followed in the Center Party's footsteps and, while aiming to unite Protestants and Catholics, remained the main representative of Catholic interests in Germany (Schmitt, 1989).

In addition, in Europe's Protestant North, a rural-urban cleavage developed, dividing producers of primary goods in the countryside and the middle classes in the cities. In some cases, this led to the founding of agrarian parties. In Norway, the agrarian Center Party broke out of the periphery coalition within the Liberal Party in 1920 (Rokkan 1999, 375). In economies dominated by large-scale landed property, such as Prussia or the United Kingdom, agrarian interests were integrated into conservative alliances (Flora, 1999, 40f). In religiously mixed areas, Catholic parties organized Catholic farmers and aggregated agrarian interests. Political Catholicism tended to superpose on the center-periphery and later the rural-urban cleavage (Rokkan, 1999, 309). The rural-urban cleavage within Rhineland and Westphalia was also not that salient, since these were densely populated, industrialized areas with only a few rural spots. As demonstrated in this book, rural interests were integrated into the CDU's agenda.

The class cleavage between workers and capital owners became highly salient and led to the formation of labor parties almost everywhere, bringing European party systems closer to each other (Rokkan, 1999, 290). Labor movements were often characterized by splits based on conflicting ideas about nationhood and international solidarity. Rokkan (1999, 307, 334ff) concludes that this communist-socialist cleavage was greatest in countries where conflicts over national identity remained unsolved. The German labor movement was deeply split after 1918. Norway also had deep internal conflicts within the labor movement, at least during the 1920s, when the Norwegian Labor Party became radicalized.<sup>12</sup> In 1961, the Socialist People's Party was founded in Norway, so internal splits of the labor movement remained relevant. In Germany, the Communist Party (KPD) was forbidden in 1956. A new Communist Party (DKP) was founded later but remained insignificant in

<sup>12</sup> The Norwegian Labor Party of the 1920s represented the radical current and joined the Comintern, which led to the short-term founding of a minority social democratic party. A weak Communist Party was founded later. In the German labor movement, the mother party represented the moderate, social democratic current, while minorities were excluded or left the party to form radical or communist alternative parties.



terms of election results. The communist-socialist cleavage remained relatively salient in Germany due to the country's separation into a communist East and a capitalist West. The labor movement was split into an anti-communist, right-wing current and a current of radical, often younger leftist reformers.

One final cleavage has not been theorized by Rokkan: the gender cleavage. Gender is a politically divisive issue of significant importance and durability that should be included in a modernized theory and analysis of cleavage structures (Sass/Kuhnle, 2022). Structurally, the gender cleavage was and remains to some extent based in women's legal, political, social, and economic subjugation. Ideologically, it has been expressed by narratives legitimizing this subjugation and by the development of counter-identities and demands by women activists and their male sympathizers. Finally, it has been politically articulated by organizations of the women's movement, including organizations of female teachers, and by their opponents. These opponents were often conservatives but could be found among liberals, social democrats, or unionists, illustrating the crosscutting nature of this cleavage.<sup>13</sup>

The historical origin of the gender cleavage should be dated to the first wave of the organized women's movement, which took place roughly from the last decades of the nineteenth to the first decades of the twentieth century. It became less salient during the 1930s to 1950s but gained salience again during the second wave of women's political mobilization, from around the 1960s to the 1980s. As Therborn (2004, 71f) points out, "[t]he further south and east one ventured from northwest Europe, including within Europe itself, the more rigid were the patriarchal rules one would find." In Scandinavia, women's rights were enforced significantly earlier than in the rest of Europe and women's movements were comparatively more influential and united (Therborn, 2004, 79ff). The Protestant state churches in Scandinavia accepted the state's right to regulate family matters, which was not the case with the Catholic Church (Therborn, 2004, 78). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the gender cleavage played

<sup>13</sup> Today, political parties feel increasingly compelled to position themselves in relation to the gender cleavage. The cleavage is also reflected in the founding of feminist parties in Sweden and Norway (called *feministisk parti*), and more importantly, in the growth of far-right parties and movements with antifeminist agendas. As has been examined by a growing body of research on gender and voting, men are more likely to vote for such parties than women, while women are turning increasingly to the left (Abendschön/Steinmetz, 2014; Campbell, 2017; Immerzeel et al., 2015; Iversen/Rosenbluth, 2010, 110ff).

a role in education politics, even though it was not among the most salient cleavages. It was comparatively more salient in Norway.

### **The Politics of Comprehensive School Reforms: Reflections and Expectations**

In this book, power resources theory and Rokkanian cleavage theory provide the main frames of reference. These theories are not so much opposed to each other; rather, the Rokkanian perspective represents a widening of focus. While power resources theory has concentrated primarily on the class cleavage and has considered cross-class coalitions in relation to this, Rokkan (1999) directs our attention to the importance of additional cleavages. Some final remarks are necessary on how these theoretical perspectives can guide the analysis of education politics and comprehensive school reforms. What do they lead one to expect and to look for in the empirical cases? To get a clearer idea of this, it is necessary to reflect on how the school as an institution, and its reforms, can be conceptualized based on these two perspectives.

From a power resources perspective, the current school system is the result of previous class conflicts and cross-class coalitions. The working class has long been excluded from secondary and tertiary education. Against this background, comprehensive schooling can be considered a tool for the extension of social citizenship and decommodification, as it implies that students of all classes are taught together with the declared aim to give them equal access to a longer education and to foster solidarity. For this reason, power resources theory would lead one to expect that the social democratic parties of the postwar decades embraced and supported comprehensive school reforms, while their opponents on the political right opposed them. The success or failure of such reform attempts could then be attributed to the distribution of power resources between the left and the right or between reform protagonists and antagonists. Power resources theory also suggests that it is important to examine the role of consenters and the coalition-making between potential consenters, protagonists, and antagonists.

From a Rokkanian perspective, the school as an institution is also a residue of historical conflicts. However, these conflicts involve numerous collective actors, whose oppositions are not exclusively based on class relations or economic interests. For example, as Rokkan (1999) points out repeatedly, the education system was originally controlled by the Church. As the central state gradually took over more responsibility, this entailed

state-church conflicts but also conflicts over peripheral territorial identities, language, or centralization. Even though the class cleavage was highly salient during the postwar reform period, state-church, center-periphery, rural-urban, communist-socialist, and gender cleavages also continued to come to expression in education politics. The school mirrored all social relations, and its development was therefore of interest to many. Rokkanian cleavage theory thus leads one to expect that reforms of the school system were a result of complex interactions between a range of actors who had to strategically navigate cleavages to build stable coalitions.

Both perspectives suggest that it is important to analyze actors' power resources and position with respect to the class cleavage. Both traditions also emphasize the relevance of coalition-making. However, Rokkanian cleavage theory points toward coalitions that are not only *cross-class* but *cross-interest coalitions* based on the entire cleavage structure. For the case analysis, this implies that one should look for interactions between class conflict and other oppositions in education politics. In this book, this is done by examining not only comprehensive school reforms but also other major school reforms and debates of the time.

A crucial question then becomes, to what extent different packages of reform represented compromises between different social groups that served to integrate them into pro- or anti-reform coalitions. The extension of comprehensive schooling implied that not only working-class youths but also some middle-class youths, especially those with rural backgrounds, and girls would receive a longer education than had been usual before. In this sense, these groups benefitted from the reforms. Some form of cross-interest pro-reform coalition between the rural population, farmers, the women's movement, and social democracy should therefore be considered a historical possibility.

On the other hand, we must consider that these same groups possibly had other concerns, based on other cleavages, which might have been more important to them than access to secondary schooling for their offspring. For example, it is possible that they wanted to strengthen Christian education and private schooling or demanded a pushback against what they considered excessive centralization, wrong language politics, or communist ideology in the schools. It is also possible that they considered a prolongation of obligatory schooling and an increase in secondary schools sufficient and saw no urgent need for comprehensive schooling. All this could have created opportunities both for comprehensive school reform protagonists and antagonists to build coalitions around

these or similar issues. To what extent this happened in different cases is an empirical question that should be answered by examining political conflicts with an open mind.

To sum up, the cleavage structure can also be considered an opportunity structure for political actors of the left and the right. By designing policy packages and compromises that cater to the interests and ideologies of different social groups, actors can try to mobilize support based on several cleavages at the same time. Actors who do not manage to integrate different interests related to crosscutting cleavages might end up on the sidelines, ideologically and organizationally divided and comparatively powerless. The cleavage structure does not predetermine the outcomes of such attempts at coalition-making, as different kinds of compromises remain historically possible, but it can facilitate or hamper specific coalitions.

#### THE ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

The main argument of this book is thus that coalitions, oppositions, and outcomes in education politics can only be understood in light of the cleavage structure as a whole because additional cleavages besides the class cleavage shape actors' interests, ideologies, and inclinations for who they want to cooperate with – or not. Norwegian social democrats and German Christian democrats both managed to build successful coalitions in education politics by mobilizing support from several social groups based on additional cleavages besides the class cleavage. In the Norwegian case, social democrats managed to include peripheral, rural, and women's interests in their comprehensive school reform packages. In the German case, Christian, especially Catholic, and rural interests were integrated by the CDU. In this process, relatively similar social groups turned into consenters to comprehensive schooling in the Norwegian case but into antagonists in the German case. Norwegian conservatives and German social democrats also attempted to build cross-interest coalitions with these groups but did so less successfully. The different cleavage structures were crucial for these historical outcomes.

The book arrives at this argument step by step. First, [Chapter 2](#) gives an overview of the development of Norway's and Germany's school systems up to the 1950s, with the aim to set the scene for the analysis of the postwar reform period. The historical narrative focuses on comprehensive and other much-debated reforms of primary and secondary schooling. It shows how dominant cleavages came to expression in education politics

over time and provides the necessary context to understand the conditions actors faced during the postwar period.

In [Chapter 3](#), the political playing field of the postwar reform period is analyzed with a focus on the structural and organizational dimensions of cleavages. To shed light on the distribution of power resources, I compare election results, government participation, financial resources, and membership numbers of the main actors. Even though the Norwegian political left was somewhat more powerful, the differences in the distribution of power resources between the left and the right do not seem great enough to preclude a more similar political development in the two cases. The social base of the relevant political parties and teachers' organizations is also examined. The analysis illustrates that many of the social groups organized by the Norwegian center parties, such as farmers, the rural population, and people with a strong Christian identity, including religious women, were found within the ranks of the CDU in Germany. Primary schoolteachers in Germany were divided into different organizations by denomination, while primary schoolteachers in Norway were more united. These findings can only be understood against the backdrop of the cleavage structures. The dominance of the state-church cleavage in Germany and of the center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages in Norway led to the development and consolidation of different party systems and organizational structures, in which rural and Christian interests were represented in different ways. In Norway, this meant that social democrats and conservatives had to build cross-interest coalitions with the parties of the political center. In Germany, social democrats and Christian democrats also competed for support from the Liberal Party, but from the point of view of the CDU, it was at least equally important to uphold its intra-party coalition of rural, Christian, and cross-class interests.

[Chapter 4](#) examines how actors navigated these conditions in the conflicts over comprehensive schooling. It discusses chronologically how coalitions came about for or against the most significant comprehensive school reforms of the time. [Chapter 4](#) focuses primarily on the ideological expressions of the class cleavage, and thus on how actors grouped into camps along a political left-right axis, into protagonists, consenters, and antagonists of these reforms. For the Norwegian case, it focuses on the youth school reform, including the failed abolition of grading in the youth school. For the North Rhine-Westphalian case, the conflicts over the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school and the attempted cooperative school reform are discussed.

The final section of [Chapter 4](#) compares the two cases, concluding that conflicts over comprehensive schooling can be considered an expression of the class cleavage in both cases. However, there are differences regarding the hegemonic consensus and the coalitions which came about. The political right was ideologically more united in Germany, while the political left was more united in Norway. Comparatively radical and leftist arguments became hegemonic in Norway but not in Germany. Finally, the religious and rural population consented to the reforms in the Norwegian case and opposed them in the North Rhine–Westphalian case. While Norwegian primary schoolteachers for the most part supported the reforms, some of the German primary schoolteachers' organizations at best consented to or even opposed comprehensive schooling.

How can we understand this outcome? How did Norwegian social democrats manage to build such a successful, hegemonic pro-reform coalition and why did German social democrats fail to do so? Or, to put it differently, what bound rural and Christian groups to the CDU and made them oppose comprehensive school reforms in Germany, while similar social groups in Norway became consenters to the reforms? To shed more light on these dynamics of coalition-making, [Chapter 5](#) focuses on other struggles in education politics that influenced coalitions for and against comprehensive school reforms. These struggles were not ideological expressions of the class cleavage but of other cleavages.

In the first part of [Chapter 5](#), struggles over religion are at the center of analysis. For the Norwegian case, debates about Christian education, Christian private schools, and the Christian preamble of the school law are analyzed. For NRW, the conflict over denominational schooling, which was related to the introduction of the *Hauptschule* as an independent lower-secondary school type, is discussed. The second part of the chapter focuses on struggles over the centralization of rural schooling. Such struggles took place in both cases but were fiercer in Norway. The third and fourth parts of the chapter focus on two country-specific conflicts, namely the Norwegian language struggle and West German anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage in German education politics. Neither of these conflicts have an equivalent in the other case but both have influenced the alliances between actors. The chapter then analyzes struggles related to gender, with a focus on debates about girls' education and coeducation and on the role played by female teachers' organizations. The last section discusses and compares how crosscutting cleavages contributed to a weakening or strengthening of comprehensive school reform alliances in the two cases.

Chapter 6 develops an overall conclusion. In the first part of the chapter, the main results of the comparative-historical case studies are summarized. It can be said that the Norwegian Labor Party compromised on several of the crosscutting school-political issues mentioned above, which made it difficult for the Conservative Party to build up a strong oppositional camp to comprehensive school reforms. The *center-periphery cleavage* and the *rural-urban cleavage* were the most salient and influential crosscutting cleavages. These cleavages coincided, which strengthened alliances between social democracy and the political center. For example, the center parties' dislike of centralization meant that they were interested in providing rural communities with good local schools, which in many cases were so small that ability grouping or tracking would have been too costly. The state-church cleavage overlapped with the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages and did not threaten the hegemony of social democracy. Christian education and private schooling were much-debated topics, but there was no agreement among the nonsocialist parties. The gender cleavage also split the four nonsocialist parties and thus strengthened the position of the Labor Party further. From the 1950s to the 1970s, social democratic reform ideas shaped Norwegian education politics to a large extent. This applied even during the center parties/conservative government of 1965 to 1971, which continued the social democratic youth school reform. Only from the 1970s onward was social democratic dominance somewhat weakened.

In NRW/Germany, the *state-church cleavage* and the *communist-socialist cleavage* especially weakened comprehensive school reform coalitions and a much more stable conservative antagonist alliance developed. The communist-socialist cleavage came to expression in splits within the German left. Anti-communist arguments against comprehensive schooling played a vital role for the internal unity of the antagonists' camp. Rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages mostly overlapped with the dominant state-church cleavage, which came to expression in fierce debates about denominational schooling. The state-church cleavage crosscut the class cleavage and strengthened the internal alliance of the CDU, rather than offering the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) any means to weaken it. The gender cleavage remained somewhat latent beneath state-church and class cleavages and did not threaten the dominance of the CDU, which had the support of Catholic women's and female teachers' organizations. SPD and FDP managed to undermine the hegemony of the CDU in education politics for a short period from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, during



which they pushed through centralization reforms, reforms of denominational schooling, reforms of girls' schooling, and the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school. During the mid-1970s Christian democratic ideological hegemony was restabilized.

The second and third part of the [final chapter](#) discuss some general conclusions that can be drawn from this work and open questions that would merit further research. Most importantly, the book demonstrates the fruitfulness of considering crosscutting cleavages. The analysis also shows that political parties can be founded on more than one cleavage and that several parties can give voice to the same cleavages. In addition, cleavage theory can help us to understand intra-party splits, because currents within parties are also related to parties' positioning in the cleavage structure. With regard to future research on education politics, the Rokkanian approach could be useful for a wide array of research questions.

Finally, the concluding chapter discusses in brief how legacies of the postwar reform period influence the current situation in Norway and NRW/Germany and what similarities can be found in education politics between now and then. Even though the political playing fields and debates have changed, different cleavages still come to expression, with consequences for political coalition-making.

#### A NOTE ON THE BOOK'S HISTORY, METHODOLOGY, AND CASE SELECTION

This book is the result of a long period of intense comparative-historical and case-oriented research begun in 2012. The two cases were researched in depth, based on a wide array of primary sources including party manifestos, parliamentary documents, documents of teachers' organizations, and twenty-three expert interviews with people who have been active in education politics during the postwar reform period (see Annex for lists of the studied manifestos, parliamentary documents, and biographical introductions of the interviewed experts).<sup>14</sup> The book also builds on a wealth of secondary sources, such as single case studies of

<sup>14</sup> There are numerous methodological issues to be taken into consideration when working with expert interviews. These will not be dwelled upon here. Let it just be said that experts from the entire range of political standpoints were interviewed. For discussions of the methodological challenges of expert interviewing, see [Aberbach and Rockman \(2002\)](#), [Berry \(2002\)](#), [Gläser and Laudel \(2006\)](#), [Leech \(2002\)](#), or [Woliver \(2002\)](#).



Norway and Germany.<sup>15</sup> Triangulation of data served to crosscheck validity and reliability of the book's sources. For example, memory lapses and factual errors in the interviews could be identified by studying parliamentary documents, while the interviews provided insights into the political processes that were not necessarily available in the written sources.

However, the origin of this book should be dated further back in time to my personal experience as a German student and later as university student in Norway. Why, I wondered, had my home country never introduced comprehensive education beyond the age of ten, while the Scandinavian countries, which at first glance seemed culturally not so dissimilar, had taken a different route? I found it intriguing how much Scandinavian and German perspectives on schooling differed. My intuition that a systematic comparison could help me to understand these differences eventually became the motivation to embark on this work. A few more words on my case selection are necessary.

In some strands of political science, choosing one's cases because they seem interesting and intrinsically relevant is not considered a wise choice. Rather, one is required to choose one's cases based on assumptions, proclaiming for example that they are "most similar,"<sup>16</sup> meaning that they are as similar as possible except for the occurrence of the phenomenon to be explained – in this case, comprehensive schooling. It is possible to argue that Norway and Germany make up most-similar cases. Both have electoral systems based on proportional representation, there is institutionalized vocational education, and tertiary education is free. Public education has been comparatively dominant both in Norway and in Germany (OECD, 2010a, 2010b, 2012). Before the postwar reforms, historical similarities of the two school systems were mirrored in the terms used for different school types (Norwegian: *folkeskole/realskole/gymnas*, German: *Volksschule/Realschule/Gymnasium*). During the 1960s and 1970s, a spirit for reform made itself felt in both countries. Nine years of obligatory schooling were introduced. Even though the character of the Norwegian and the German welfare states differs in many respects, the provision of free, high-quality education at least for a significant proportion of the population was in both cases associated with economic growth

<sup>15</sup> All quotes from Norwegian and German primary and secondary sources in this book were translated by the author.

<sup>16</sup> See for example George and Bennett (2005). Using a different terminology, Skocpol and Somers (1980, 179) term such cases "maximally-different cases."

along a high-road path, based on specialized, well-educated workers able to cope with technological progress.

It could also be argued that the choice of the federal state NRW is a good one because NRW mirrors the denominationally mixed character of the German nation, having long been one of the most denominationally mixed areas within Germany.<sup>17</sup> NRW is the most populated of all federal states; during the postwar decades, around a third of West German students went to school there. In education politics, NRW belongs to the more reform-oriented federal states, as opposed to the more conservative and Catholic southern federal states, though it has not been as reform-oriented as some of the Northern federal states or the city state of Berlin.<sup>18</sup> Norway, on the other hand, was the first country to introduce primary comprehensive education and has stayed true to this course to a higher degree than for example its neighboring country Sweden, where reforms have led to changes (Wiborg, 2012, 2015).

These are relevant considerations backing up the case selection of this book. However, it would be dishonest to claim that the cases were chosen because of these considerations. Rather, they were chosen because I had a desire to understand these cases better and felt that they contrasted fruitfully. In my discipline, historical sociology, this is considered a good reason. What is most important for historical sociologists, however, is to make sure that they know their cases well. The case-oriented research strategy implies that theory is not “tested” in the variable-oriented sense but that one aims at a dialogue between theory and evidence over time, as one delves into one’s cases and compares them (Ragin, 1987). During this process, empirical findings enter into a dialectical relationship with theoretical, analytic frames, inspiring new perspectives on data and theory alike (Mjøset, 2000; Olsen, 1994, 76; Ragin, 1987; Ragin/Amoroso, 2011, 57ff).

In the case of this book, this dialogue meant that I corrected my original power resources theory–fueled assumption that the outcomes of comprehensive school reforms were mostly a result of conflicts between the left and the right. As I studied the historical material and got to know my cases better, I realized that my understanding had been too heavily influenced

<sup>17</sup> Comparing a federal state like NRW with a national state like Norway can be seen as a problem with regard to empirical inferences. However, if one wants to study German education politics qualitatively, it is necessary to focus on the federal state level. National development is considered as a contextual factor in this book.

<sup>18</sup> For a comparison and overview of the federal states’ education politics, see Helbig and Nikolai (2015).

by German research on educational inequality. Based on my “rediscovery” of Rokkanian cleavage theory, which clearly resonated with the empirical data, I developed the argument set forth in the remainder of this book: that the different outcomes can only be truly understood in light of the cleavage structure as a whole because crosscutting cleavages decisively shaped actors’ preferences for coalition-making.

## Back to the Roots

This book is concerned primarily with the school reforms of the 1950s to 1970s. However, historical legacies shaped the conditions actors faced during the postwar reform period. This chapter therefore summarizes the evolution of national education systems, meaning “system[s] of formal schooling at least partly funded and supervised by the state” and providing “universal education for all children of school age” in Norway and in Prussia (later North Rhine–Westphalia, NRW) up to the 1950s (Green, 2013, 297). It sheds light on how political playing fields and cleavages developed, forming the school as an institution. As we shall see, differences in cleavage structures contributed to differences in school policy from an early date. However, there are also similarities: by the 1950s, both school systems consisted of comprehensive primary schools, followed by segmented lower- and upper-secondary schooling. The focus lies on general primary and secondary education, so the development of postsecondary and vocational education is not discussed.

### SCHOOLING IN NORWAY UP TO THE 1950S

#### The Formation of the Norwegian State and Education System

The Christian education of Norwegian children was originally controlled by the Danish-Norwegian church. A national education system developed gradually from the eighteenth century onward. In 1739, the Danish-Norwegian King Kristian VI (1730–46) issued an ordinance to schools in the countryside (*allmueskoler*) that stipulated that all children between seven and ten to twelve years of age should go to school for at least three

months of the year. Throughout the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth century, the only subject taught to the majority of students was Christianity, meaning the memorization of scripture, prayers, and learning to read (Tveit, 1991, 95ff). The pietist *allmueskole* built on the idea that the population in its majority was “lazy and stupid” (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 36). The *allmueskole* teachers were among the poorest of the population. The *allmueskole* was forced on the population from above and was meant to teach the common people respect for church and king. However, the reforms did lead to the eradication of illiteracy by around 1800 (Tønnessen, 2011, 23).

Besides the *allmueskole*, *latinskoler* (Latin schools) developed as a school type for the elites. They originally prepared students for church services, but gradually also for civil service. *Realskoler* or *borgerskoler* were founded as another type of lower-secondary school with a modern curriculum, inspired in part by the ideas of the Enlightenment (Myhre, 1971, 27). These schools were driven mainly by representatives of the new class of merchants. They wanted their children to have a different kind of education than the Latin schools could offer. The lower-secondary schools taught not only religion and reading but also arithmetic, history, geography, and drawing. These subjects were also open to girls. Boys received additional education in subjects such as German, English, French, mathematics, bookkeeping, letterwriting, navigation, or declamation. By the early 1800s, these schools had three times as many students as the Latin schools (Tønnessen, 2011, 21f).

In 1809, mathematics, modern languages, and natural sciences were introduced to the curriculum of all secondary schools. The new regulations made it possible to combine lower-secondary schools and Latin schools so students who did not intend to go to university could receive a secondary education without Latin (Myhre, 1971, 28f). In this period, Norwegianness was not a topic in the schools. The textbooks were all written in either Danish or German. Telhaug and Mediås (2003, 52) therefore claim that “Norwegian schools during pietism belonged to a uniform Christian-Latin European culture.” Pietism in education remained hegemonic until around the 1840s (Tveit, 1991, 113; Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 54).

After the Napoleonic wars, Denmark was forced to cede Norway to Sweden. This was unpopular among the Norwegian elites. A group of 112 Norwegian civil servants, businessmen, farmers, and a few aristocrats assembled on April 10, 1814, to draft a Norwegian constitution. On May 17, 1814, the constitution was signed. It granted all male farmers,

civil servants, and the small urban middle classes voting rights for the Norwegian parliament. Most of the population consisted of poor crofters, farmhands, and the lumpenproletariat (Bull, 1969, 32ff). After Norway's independence was declared, Sweden attacked Norway, so that the union with Sweden and the Swedish king eventually had to be accepted by the Norwegian government. While Sweden dominated the foreign politics of the union, Norway was relatively independent in domestic policy. In 1821, all privileges were taken from the small Norwegian aristocracy (Bull, 1969, 9). In 1833, farmers obtained a near majority in the Norwegian parliament for the first time; from 1836 to 1837, municipal government was democratized.

### The School As a Nation-Building Institution

In the years 1848 to 1851, a mass movement of workers, crofters, journeymen, and servants was formed, but this *Thraniter* movement, named after its leader, Marcus Thrane, was broken up (Bull, 1960, 26ff). From around 1860, industrialization set in and the middle classes grew. A liberal movement began to develop that opposed the old regime of senior civil servants and the union with Sweden. The movement was named *Venstre*, literally “the Left,” due to its seating on the left side of parliament. It was kept together mainly by a shared desire for national independence (Sejersted, 2011, 52). In 1883–4, the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) was founded and remained dominant in Norwegian politics for many decades. The liberals formed a majority in parliament and came to power in 1884. In the same year, the Conservative Party (*Høyre*, literally “the Right”) was founded, which represented higher civil servants and the upper ranks of the church. From the 1870s on, unions sprang up in various trades. In 1887, the Norwegian Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*) was founded, followed by the foundation of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen*) in 1899. In 1903, the population of the northern provinces Finnmark and Troms voted the first four representatives of the Labor Party into parliament (Bull, 1969, 70).

The ethnic community of the Norwegian people became a major topic. Center-periphery and urban-rural divisions became more pronounced. Important figures, such as the farmer's son Ivar Aasen, argued that rural Norwegian culture and language represented the true Norwegian soul, while the culture of the cities was Danish by origin, fake and elitist. From the 1840s to the 1870s, Aasen and others developed a written language form based on Norwegian dialects and Old Norwegian; it was called

*landsmål* (later called *nynorsk* [New Norwegian]). Others, such as Marcus Jacob Monrad and Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, thought that culture was of a transnational nature and had come to Norway through the urban elites. Bjørnson suggested naming the Norwegian variety of Danish *riksmål* (later *bokmål* [Book Language]) (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 57). In 1885, the Norwegian parliament decided that the new *landsmål* should be put on a par with *riksmål* as an official written language in schools and within the state. From 1892, both written forms of Norwegian were allowed as teaching languages in the primary school, and it was stipulated that children should learn to read both. By 1900, around 250 school districts, especially in central, western, and some parts of northern Norway, had introduced *landsmål* as their main written form used in schools (Haugland et al., 2002, 87f).

During the 1850s and 1860s, an educational reform movement developed. It was influenced by ideas from the Enlightenment tradition and romantic idealism, originating from Germany and Denmark. A more optimistic view of humanity replaced pessimistic notions associated with pietism (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 55f). The position of primary school-teachers was strengthened, teacher seminaries were set up, and wages increased (Tønnessen, 2011, 35f). The gradual democratization of Norwegian society meant that the population no longer consisted of mere subordinates but of citizens, who had to be educated accordingly (Dale, 2008, 47f; Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 59ff). With the law on the *allmueskole* in the countryside (*lov om allmueskolen på landet*) from 1860, history and geography became part of the curriculum. The laws on the *folkeskole* (primary school) from 1889 continued this trend by turning history, geography, and natural science into obligatory subjects, and by increasing the number of hours of schooling. From 1889 onward, school directors (*skoledirektørene*) became the only supervisory authority for the schools. Bishops and the presidents of the dioceses (*stiftsamtmenn*) no longer had a say. Many school directors were politically active in the major movements of the time: the temperance movement and the *nynorsk* language movement (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 85ff). The replacement of the term *allmueskole* with the term *folkeskole* represented new ideas. From then on, schooling would contribute to creating national identity, culture, and pride. Elementary schooling would be for all people (Mediås, 2010, 28).

Overall, teachers and laymen acquired increased influence from 1850 onward, while the influence of the church weakened. State regulation and financing grew slowly but steadily. Christianity remained an important

subject, but teachers replaced theologians in central positions (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 78ff).

### Educational Expansion and the First Comprehensive School Reforms

Besides contributing to nation-building, education was now also considered a means for equalization and social integration. In the cities, three parallel school types had developed up to the 1850s and 1860s: first, the *allmueskole*, also called *fattigskole* (poor school), which taught Christianity, reading, writing, and numeracy to about 70–80 percent of each age group; second, the *borgerskole/real skole*, which taught modern languages, history, geography, and natural science in addition to the subjects taught in the *allmueskole*; third, the *latinskole*, which taught Latin, Greek, and sometimes Hebrew, leading to university.

This system was differentiated by social status and class and came under criticism in the 1840s and 1850s. In 1869, parliament attempted to create a universal three-year comprehensive primary school, but the law (*lov om offentlige skoler for den høiere Almendannelse*) did not have the intended effect. The quality of the *allmueskole* was so low that the upper class could not imagine sending their children there (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 68ff). The standard improved considerably in the ensuing decades. In the cities, schools with separate classes for the different age groups became usual. The *allmueskoleloven* from 1860 stipulated that all school districts with at least thirty children of school age had to build permanent school buildings, leading to the construction of several thousand school-houses. However, until the 1930s some children in Norway still only received irregular schooling in schools that did not have permanent school buildings but moved from village to village (*omgangsskoler*) (Tønnessen, 2011, 34). This was due to Norway's sparse population in some areas (Tables 2.1 and 2.2).

In 1896, the law on secondary schooling (*lov om den høyere skole*) stipulated that a four-year lower-secondary school and a three-year upper-secondary school (*gymnaset*) should build consecutively on the first five years of the *folkeskole*, which lasted seven years. The first five years of the *folkeskole* thus became comprehensive, except for private preparatory classes. Lower-secondary schooling was no longer stratified into different tracks. This meant that the *borgerskole* and the *latinskole* merged into one school type at the lower-secondary level, now called *høyere skole* (higher school), which was more influenced by the *borgerskole* than by the Latin schools. The upper-secondary level, *gymnaset*,



consisted of a natural science track, a linguistic-historical track, and a linguistic-historical track with Latin. The Latin school only survived as a track at the *gymnas*, and even this Latin track was under political pressure from the Liberal Party and the teachers at the *folkeskole*. They did not consider Latin a necessary component of upper-secondary education. The Conservative Party and the teachers of the *gymnas* only just managed to protect the track from abolition in 1896. The lower-secondary school remained popular among the middle class and the daughters of civil servants (Tønnessen, 2011, 48f).

The development of comprehensive schooling from 1865 to 1896 was influenced by four main motives (Telhaug, 1974; Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 69ff). First, comparisons with the United States served as inspiration for a new kind of democratic school adjusted to modern needs. Second, comprehensive schooling was less costly than parallel schooling, especially for small municipalities. Finances were the main reason why some municipalities implemented comprehensive primary schools even before it was stipulated by law. Third, it was argued that comprehensive schooling

TABLE 2.1 *Population in Norway, 1735–2015*

Year	Population
1735	616 109
1800	881 499
1850	1 384 149
1900	2 217 971
1920	2 616 274
1940	2 963 909
1950	3 249 954
1955	3 410 726
1960	3 567 707
1965	3 708 609
1970	3 863 221
1975	3 997 525
1980	4 078 900
2000	4 478 497
2015	5 165 802

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB).

TABLE 2.2 Norwegian resident population in densely and sparsely populated areas and per km<sup>2</sup>, 1845–1970

Year	Total	Densely populated areas	Sparsely populated areas	Population in urban municipalities	Percentage of population in densely populated areas *	Population per km <sup>2</sup> **
1845	1 328 471	206 338	1 122 133	161 875	15.6	4.3
1855	1 490 047	252 308	1 237 739	197 815	16.9	4.8
1865	1 701 756	333 485	1 368 271	266 292	19.6	5.5
1875	1 806 900	440 273	1 366 627	326 420	24.4	5.9
1890	2 000 917	625 417	1 375 500	474 129	31.3	6.5
1900	2 240 032	800 198	1 439 834	627 650	35.7	7.3
1910	2 391 782	921 382	1 470 400	689 228	38.5	7.7
1920	2 649 775	1 200 020	1 449 755	785 404	45.3	8.6
1930	2 814 194	1 330 217	1 483 977	800 514	47.3	9.1
1946	3 156 950	1 581 901	1 575 049	884 097	50.1	10.2
1950	3 278 546	1 711 628	1 566 918	1 054 820	52.2	10.6
1960	3 591 234	2 052 634	1 538 600	1 152 377	57.2	11.6
1970	3 874 133	2 554 913	1 319 220	1 641 315	65.9	12.6

\* Densely populated areas comprise urban municipalities as well as densely populated areas in rural municipalities. “The definition of a densely populated area has varied from time to time [...]. In the censuses 1960 and 1970 a densely populated area was defined as a population cluster with at least 200 resident persons, where the distance between the houses generally did not exceed 50 metres” (SSB, 1978, 22).

\*\* Svalbard and Jan Mayen not included.

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB, 1978, 33).

in the first five years would increase the quality of schooling at the *allmueskole/folkeskole*. What it would do to the quality of secondary schooling was not a key concern. It was assumed that the influx of children from the upper and middle classes would increase school quality. All social classes would have an interest in the quality of the *folkeskole*; they would start to regard it as “their school” and would therefore be more willing to support it politically. Fourth, liberal supporters of the comprehensive school argued that parallel schooling led to a lack of respect and understanding between classes. This “class hate” was seen as a threat to national unity and solidarity (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 77). Only differences stemming from innate abilities were deemed legitimate. Social mobility had to be increased to mobilize the hidden talents of the population. Adversaries of school reforms also put forward arguments based on social class, but from a more moralizing perspective. They assumed that poverty was partly related to bad morals, worrying that children from “bad homes” would have a bad influence on the children of the upper and middle classes. They also argued that class differences would become more visible once children of different classes attended school together.

Besides the increased emphasis on education for the lower classes, there was a trend toward opening secondary schooling up for girls and women. In 1878, girls’ access to the lower-secondary school exam was regularized. From 1882, women could take the upper-secondary school exam (*examen artium*) and attend university, and from 1884, coeducation in lower-secondary schools was made possible (Mediås, 2010, 32). Female teachers could be employed as assistants in primary schools from 1860, and from 1872, they could take female teacher exams. After 1889, teacher seminaries were opened to women and they could be employed as regular teachers in the *folkeskole* (Mediås, 2010, 32).

Furthermore, special schools were introduced for disabled and neglected children. In 1881, a law on *abnormskoler* (“abnormal” schools) was passed (Tønnessen, 2011, 46f). These schools also served to make the *folkeskole* more acceptable to the upper class, since they excluded some of the most difficult students from general schooling.

Finally, two additional school types were introduced. Specific to the Nordic context is the tradition of the *folkehøyskole* (people’s high school). These schools gave a general introduction to the national intellectual traditions but also offered practical training. Teenagers who had completed *allmueskole/folkeskole* could attend the *folkehøyskole*, usually for six months. Around the turn of the century, another school type

developed, called *framhaldsskole* in the countryside and *fortsettelsesskole* (continuation school) in the cities. These schools gave teenagers who had finished *folkeskole* another option to prolong their education and taught both practical skills and general civic knowledge. Many female teachers supported this school type as an ideal secondary school for girls. In contrast to the *folkehøyskole*, these schools were not boarding schools and they were less ideological (Tønnessen, 2011, 50f).

### The Introduction of the Seven-Year Comprehensive School

In 1905, the union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved and Norway became independent. The early twentieth century was characterized by a range of reforms implemented by the Liberal Party government. The Liberal Party was still the largest one in parliament, but in 1912 the Labor Party received 26.5 percent of votes and became the second largest party.

In 1911, a committee (*enhetsskolekomiteen*) was put in place by the government to discuss comprehensive school reforms and a better inter-connection between primary and secondary schooling. In 1913, the committee presented its proposal. The majority of the committee was of the opinion that comprehensive schooling entailed all children having the possibility to proceed to a secondary school. The minority contended that the competition between the *folkeskole* and the lower-secondary school in grades six and seven would have to be abolished to achieve fully comprehensive schooling throughout the *folkeskole*. The majority further suggested that if a model were to be introduced with seven years of *folkeskole* followed by two years of lower-secondary school, the curriculum of the *folkeskole* would have to be improved, notably with the introduction of a foreign language in grades six and seven (Dokka, 1988, 115ff; Mediås, 2010, 35f). In the following years, this was discussed further. The law on rural primary schools was changed in 1915 and the law on city primary schools in 1917. The minimum number of weeks of schooling was increased (Mediås, 2010, 36). The laws now stipulated that teaching should be conducted in students' natural dialect and introduced local polls to choose the language form within a school district (Almenningen, 2002a, 102).

The Labor Party became more active in education politics. Socialists and liberals cooperated in their attempt to prolong comprehensive schooling. There were two currents in Norwegian social democracy: the moderate Gjøstein current was concerned with opening the school system

for the children of the working class and considered comprehensive schooling a step toward overcoming class divisions in education. Already in 1904, O. G. Gjølsteen suggested a ten-year comprehensive school. The other, more radical current, represented by Edvard Bull, was skeptical of the existing educational traditions and aimed at a more practical, alternative education, which should serve to create solidarity and be closer to the workers' own culture (Slagstad, 2001, 388f; Tønnessen, 2011, 57). The Bull current dominated prior to the Second World War. However, the Labor Party representative Johan Gjølstein, O. G. Gjølsteen's brother, managed in 1920 to convince the Norwegian parliament to give financing only to lower-secondary schools that built upon seven years of *folkeskole*. This decision, which was taken against the votes of the Conservative Party and sections of the liberals, effectively prolonged comprehensive schooling by another two years, apart from a few private schools (Slagstad, 2001, 389). The parliamentary decision did not contain any details concerning the length of the lower-secondary school. In most municipalities, the lower-secondary school now lasted three years, but a proposal for shortening it to two years was debated (Dokka, 1988, 120ff; Mediås, 2010, 37). Seven years of comprehensive schooling were thus introduced in Norway at an early point compared to other Western countries.

### The Reform Movement of the 1920s and 1930s

From the 1920s, an economic crisis set in and unemployment grew. The Labor Party became more radical and joined the Comintern for some years, leading to a party split. In 1920, the Farmers' Party (today *Senterpartiet*, the Center Party) was founded. A time of political instability was ushered in, with shifting Liberal Party and Conservative Party governments. In 1933, the party of the Christian Democrats was founded as an additional party competing for the voters of the Liberal Party. In the 1930s, the Labor Party oriented its strategy more clearly toward parliamentary power. In 1935, the Labor Party and the Farmers' Party formed a coalition government, which was based on an agreement including agricultural subsidies and investments to increase employment. This government remained formally in office until 1945. However, Norway was occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940. The five years (1935–40) of the first stable social-democratic government in Norway can be considered a transitional period from the Liberal Party regime to a social-democratic order (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 95ff).

In 1920, a parliamentary school commission was formed; it was short-lived. It had been put in place by a conservative government, and as a result, parliament refused to finance its work. In 1922, a new commission was created, this time with fewer conservative and more leftist members. This commission produced several proposals in the years from 1922 to 1927, which laid the ground for the school laws of the 1930s. The most important suggestion regarding comprehensive schooling was to reshape the secondary schools by introducing a three-year *realskole* and a five-year *gymnas*, both building on the comprehensive seven-year *folkeskole*. The two first years of *realskole* and *gymnas* should be combined, while the third year of *realskole* should be more practically oriented (Myhre, 1971, 96).

In 1935, a law on secondary schooling (*lov om høiere almeneskoler*) was passed (Myhre, 1971, 97). The law regularized the seven-year *folkeskole*. Some secondary schoolteachers had wished for differentiation after the fifth or sixth grade, but this proposal failed (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 122). The lower-secondary *realskole* had its own final examination but also led to upper-secondary schooling in the *gymnas*. Secondary schools with common *realskole* and *gymnas* classes on the lower-secondary level were made possible. Two-, three-, and four-year *realskoler* existed, as well as five- and six-year *gymnas*. Most municipalities introduced five-year secondary schooling, consisting of two common years in *realskole* and *gymnas*, and then a more practical third *realskole* year, or three academically oriented *gymnas* years. In the cities, a nine-year comprehensive school was thus beginning to take shape. In the countryside, the two-year continuation school (*framhaldsskole*) still existed as a parallel school type (Seidenfaden, 1977, 8).

In 1936, laws on primary schools in the countryside and in the cities were passed (*landsskuleloven* and *lov om folkeskolen i kjøpstædene*). These laws introduced stricter rules regarding the division of age groups, minimum standards with respect to the curriculum, and a higher number of school hours. Centralization of schools became an important aim. The number of schools without any division into age groups was lowered from 1060 to 601 between 1935–6 and 1945 (Myhre, 1971, 100). This development created some urban-rural tension, as it led to longer journeys to school for students in sparsely populated areas (Seidenfaden, 1977, 10; Table 2.2).

From 1935, a planning committee (*plankomité*) consisting of representatives of the primary and the secondary school sector worked on a range of pedagogical questions. In addition, a committee was put in place to devise a new general curriculum (*normalplankomiteen*) from 1936 to

1939. Reformers were influenced by the ideas of the German *Arbeitsschule* movement. To them, there should be practical activity, individualized teaching, and teamwork in schools. The children's interests should be considered (Myhre, 1971, 95ff). Use of grades was greatly reduced, and grades were abolished entirely in the first three years of the *folkeskole* (Tønnessen/Telhaug, 1996). The aim became to foster intrinsic motivation (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 18f). Subjects such as physical education, needlework, or housekeeping, the latter of which were taught only to girls, were strengthened (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 111ff).

The curriculum of 1939 was in accordance with a positivistic approach to science and was the only curriculum in Norwegian history to be written almost like a science report (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 125ff). The curriculum was made binding for all municipalities, meaning that they could no longer decide freely how many hours to allocate to the different subjects. The geographical variation that had developed during the period of Liberal Party government was now regarded as undesirable (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 132ff).

The leaders of the primary schoolteachers' organizations became central advisors to the ministry and were among the architects of the new curriculum and laws (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 111). The abolition of private teachers' colleges was an important aim of the labor movement, also because many of them were run by Christian organizations. In 1938, only one private teachers' college remained (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 120f). There was also a relative decrease in private schools. Around 1900, 8 percent of the students went to private schools. In 1940, it was less than 1 percent (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 121; Tønnessen, 2011, 54).

In 1937, a language reform bill was passed by the Labor Party, the Farmers' Party, and the Liberal Party, against the votes of the Conservative Party and a few Christian democrats; this brought the two written language forms closer to each other (Ramsdal, 1979, 17ff). The aim of the Labor Party and the center parties was now to work toward the merging of the two forms into a common standard, known as *sammorsk*, which would be based on people's actual way of speaking. There was no agreement about this within the language movement. The reform led to an increase in school districts using *nynorsk*. By 1944, 34.1 percent of Norwegian schools were teaching in *nynorsk* – the highest percentage ever (Almenningen, 2002b, 125).

Overall, the reforms show that for the Labor Party and Farmers' Party government formed in 1935 educational expansion was an important aim. The state took over more and more of the education sector. The

amount of financing from central government kept rising. In exchange, the government claimed increased influence.

### **Warming Up for New Reforms: The 1940s and Early 1950s**

During the German occupation from 1940 to 1945, the reform processes were disrupted. The country was governed by German Nazis and a fascist minority of Norwegians (Olstad, 2010, 111). In 1942, Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian fascist party *Nasjonal Samling*, became prime minister. Many civic organizations and the state church refused to cooperate with the Nazi regime. Teachers played an important part in the resistance. In 1942, the *Gleichschaltung* (forced political alignment) of teachers' organizations and the introduction of a national youth service led to parent and teacher protests and arrests. The Quisling government had to give up its attempt to introduce a Nazi teachers' organization (Dokka, 1988, 149ff; Mediås, 2010, 42). When the war was over, Norwegians' relationship with Germany had suffered massive damage.

After the war, a group of young Labor Party leaders came to office under Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen. They started their work with optimism and boldness. The common program signed by all parties after the war (*Fellesprogrammet*) underlined the importance of cooperation and national integration. Industrialization, economic growth, equal opportunities, rights, and security for everyone became major goals. The new government aimed at strong regulation of the economy, but opposition from the political right and from international bodies contributed to moderation. However, the state remained strong and corporatist channels became important (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 138ff).

The debate on school structure started again immediately after the war. The common program of 1945 stated that the whole education system should be coordinated so that all elements should interlock naturally (Mediås, 2010, 42). This was related to developments abroad. In 1944, the British Butler Act introduced compulsory schooling for five- to fifteen-year-olds. The French Paul Langevin Commission in 1947 discussed the introduction of compulsory schooling up to age nineteen. In Sweden, a school commission, founded in 1946, suggested in 1948 creating a nine-year comprehensive school, the introduction of which was decided by the Swedish parliament in 1950 (Telhaug, 1969, 23f). The Norwegian Labor Party politician Helge Sivertsen, who was state secretary at the Ministry of Education from 1947 to 1956 and minister of education from 1960 to



1965, was present at the Swedish parliament during this debate (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 175).

In 1947, a commission (*Samordningsnemnda for skoleverket*) was put in place to discuss the internal coordination of the education system (Telhaug, 1969, 24ff). The first minister of education after the war, Kåre Fostervoll from the Labor Party, was none too keen on far-reaching changes. His successor, Lars Moen, who was minister until 1953, also belonged to the “old school” of the Labor Party and supported the reforms of the 1930s (Telhaug/Mediås, 2003, 147). However, in 1949 the commission suggested making the first year of the *framhaldsskole* obligatory for students who did not attend the *realskole* (Telhaug, 1969, 25).

From 1951 on, the Ministry of Education supported reform of lower-secondary schools, involving a weakening of organizational differentiation. In 1952, the commission of 1947 published its last report (*Sammenfatning og utsyn*), in which it drafted the possibility of creating a new lower-secondary school with parallel tracks for vocational and general education (*linjedelt ungdomsskole*). The report stated,

No other institution has meant as much as the *folkeskole* in terms of the equalization of status and class differences within the Norwegian people and to create togetherness and comradeship between children of different layers of society. [...] The community in the children’s school is an important social and national factor that should be strengthened by letting this community continue during the time of youth which is so decisive for the attitude towards life. (Samordningsnemnda for skoleverket, *Sammenfatning og utsyn*, 1952, quoted in Telhaug, 1969, 26)

The report was not clear with respect to the fate of the older school types. One of the commissions’ members, Principal Heli, made it clear that he thought that these old school types should be replaced (Telhaug, 1969, 27).

By 1952–3, the Labor Party started working toward a new, internally tracked youth school (*ungdomsskole*). Its manifesto from 1953 stated that the short-term goal was to strengthen the *folkeskole* in the countryside as well as the *framhaldsskole*, so that eight years of education would become the rule. The next step would be to create a comprehensive youth school to replace the old school types of *framhaldsskole* and *realskole*. To facilitate this, municipalities should build common school buildings for different school types (Telhaug, 1969, 28ff).

In 1953, Birger Bergersen became minister of education. He had been an ambassador in Sweden and had witnessed the reform movement there. From this point on, the ministry began arguing for a comprehensive

school policy, as expressed in its white paper on measures to strengthen the school system (*St. meld. nr. 9* [1954], *Om tiltak til styrking av skoleverket*).<sup>1</sup>

In the fall of 1954, this white paper (*St. meld. nr. 9*) was discussed in parliament. Telhaug (1969, 32) points out that “the relations between the minister and the political opposition were still characterized by an amount of cordiality one would normally not associate with parliamentary debates.” The chair of the Church and Education Committee in parliament, Smitt Ingebretsen, a member of the Conservative Party, called the minister of education a “wise man” and thought it meant much “to be able to dream together.” The minister in turn found listening to the opposition’s speakers “encouraging and stimulating” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, October 12, 1954, 2249, 2265f). However, parliament was not decided on the question of a new comprehensive lower-secondary school. Everyone agreed that experiments were a good idea, and some members of the Labor Party argued for a new *ungdomsskole*, but the details of such a school were not discussed. Telhaug (1969, 33) is of the opinion that parliament’s position was rather hesitant. Most representatives were worried about the bad condition of the *folkeskole*, especially in the countryside. Parliament was less unhappy with the *realskole* and *framhaldsskole*. Nonetheless, the minister, Birger Bergensen, as well as the state secretary, Helge Sivertsen, were enthusiastic about reforms (Telhaug, 1969, 33ff). The changes they ushered in are discussed in detail in the rest of this book.

## SCHOOLING IN PRUSSIA/NORTH RHINE–WESTPHALIA UP TO THE 1950S

### Prussian State-Building and the Education System

After the Congress of Vienna, the Rhineland and Westphalia became Prussian provinces (Nonn, 2009, 17ff). In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Prussia, *Volksschulen* (primary schools) were an element of state-building and mostly forced onto the population from above (Friedeburg, 1992, 29ff). Secondary schooling was also linked more clearly to the interests of the state through the introduction of state exams and of the Prussian *Abitur* exam in 1788 (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 33f).

<sup>1</sup> All parliamentary sources are listed in the Annex.

The defeat administered by Napoleon's army in 1806–7 led to reforms in the Prussian state. The aim was controlled modernization from above (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 29; Hohendahl, 1982). Education became an important political field. Herrlitz et al. (2009, 33ff) identify three main tendencies in the Prussian education reforms of the early nineteenth century. The first was the linkage of tertiary education to the functions of the state. In 1810, the philosophical state exam for secondary schoolteachers was introduced. In 1817, hierarchically ordered career paths based on educational qualifications were introduced within the state bureaucracy (*Laufbahnwesen*).

The second tendency was the increased institutional separation of elementary and secondary schooling. In 1810, ninety-one Latin schools, now called *Gymnasien*, were recognized as upper-secondary schools – among a mass of different institutions of varying quality. In 1834, the *Abitur* exam was made obligatory for civil servants. The old status

TABLE 2.3 *Population in the area of today's NRW, 1816–2013*

Year	Population
1816	3 057 000
1864	5 150 000
1910	9 574 716
1925	10 964 398
1939	11 935 336
1950	13 197 008
1958	15 459 265
1960	15 852 476
1965	16 735 736
1970	17 004 851
1975	17 129 615
1980	17 058 193
1990	17 319 651
2000	18 009 865
2014	17 638 098

Sources: Statistisches Reichsamt, 1914, S.2 (data from 1816 and 1864, numbers include the governmental districts of Trier and Koblenz, which do not belong to NRW today); Statistisches Reichsamt, 1930, S.6 (data from 1910 and 1925, own calculations); IT.NRW, 2022a, 2022b (data from 1939 and 1950 censuses); Statistisches Bundesamt (data from 1958 to 2014).

privileges of the nobility were thereby restricted, but the regulation had a social closure effect on the sons of the lower classes. Social exclusivity was expressed through a focus on classical languages, which made up at least 40 percent of the curriculum (Herrlitz et al., 2003, 36ff).

The third tendency was the development of separate status groups among teachers. Primary schoolteachers (*Volksschullehrer*) received a two- to three-year education from teacher seminaries, for which final exams were introduced in 1826. Secondary schoolteachers studied at a university for at least three years and developed into a respected group of civil servants. The two groups were far removed from each other socially (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 40ff).

The liberal Prussian reformer, Johann Wilhelm Süvern, introduced a reform proposal in 1819. It suggested a ladder system of education consisting of a primary stage and a lower- and an upper-secondary stage. All public schools should impart general humanist education and infuse Prussian youth with a “devout love for king and state” (Süvern, 2003 [1819], 21). Süvern assumed that the primary stage would be sufficient for the educational needs of the lower class. The lower-secondary stage would lead up to a point where youths would either start training in a trade or continue their academic education in upper-secondary schooling at a *Gymnasium* (Süvern, 2003 [1819], 22). Ludolph von Beckedorff, who took over the primary school department (*Volksschulreferat*) at the Prussian Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs in 1820, criticized Süvern’s proposal, arguing that separate schools were needed for children of peasants, townspeople (*Bürger*), and scholars (*Gelehrte*). These status groups, he claimed, were “different, but equally honorable” (Schweim, 1966, 229). Pretending anything else would only create discontent. All children should be taught the same in terms of religion and morals but not in terms of knowledge (Schweim, 1966, 222ff). In other words, Beckedorff argued that political stability could only be safeguarded if educational opportunities remained restricted. Süvern’s proposal failed (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 61).

Despite the change in the political climate after 1819, the primary school system continued to expand. Compulsory schooling was enforced gradually, and enrolment rates were higher than in many other Western countries (Herrlitz et al., 2003, 49ff; Nonn, 2009, 42f; see critical remarks in Leschinsky/Roeder, 1983, 139).

TABLE 2.4 *Percentages of Protestants and Roman Catholics in the German population, 1871–1987*

Year	Area	Protestants	Roman Catholics
1871	Westphalia	45.4	53.5
	Rhineland	25.3	73.4
1910	Westphalia	47.2	51.4
	Rhineland	29.5	69.0
1925	Westphalia	47.3	49.8
	Rhineland	30.1	66.8
	Prussia	65.0	31.3
	German Reich	64.1	32.4
1950	NRW	41.4	54.8
	Federal Republic	51.2	45.2
1961	NRW	42.8	52.1
	Federal Republic	50.5	44.1
1970	NRW	41.9	52.5
	Federal Republic	49.0	44.6
1987	NRW	35.2	49.4
	Federal Republic	41.9	42.9

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1980, 62; 2000, 61; Statistisches Reichsamt, 1880, 13; 1914, 9; 1930, 16; 1954, 43; 1970, 39.

### State-Church Conflicts in Prussian Education Politics

A major conflict between the Prussian government and its western provinces of Westphalia and Rhineland was based on the denominational divide. The majority of the population in these provinces was Catholic, while Prussian civil servants were mainly Protestants (Table 2.4; Reulecke, 1995, 111). The Prussian state had been defined as a Protestant state, and Catholics were discriminated against in the state administration (Schmitt, 1989, 37). In 1871, the German Reich was formed under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck. The German Reich was a federal state, dominated by its largest member, Prussia. Most men over twenty-five received the right to vote for the new parliament of the German Reich, the *Reichstag*. Within this new state, the Catholics represented a minority, consisting mainly of Catholic workers and the old Catholic middle classes, who were opposed to the Protestant state and business elites. The denominational divide thus coincided with territorial,

social, and cultural divides (Schmitt, 1989, 49). In 1870, the ultramontane Center Party (*Zentrum*) was founded, which was strong in the Rhineland and Westphalia. The Center Party was a workers' party to some extent, but more importantly it defended the rights of the Catholic Church and milieu against the Protestant state (Mann, 1973, 421ff). Political Catholicism was opposed to liberalism, capitalism, and socialism, which were all seen as expressions of Protestantism. As Schmitt (1989, 49) points out, this "political Protestantism" was, however, "a Catholic myth." There was no foundation for a united political Protestant movement. Rather, Protestants were divided internally into liberal and conservative, and later also social-democratic, currents.

During the 1870s, the conflicts between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church culminated in the *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle) (Mann, 1973, 441ff; Nonn, 2009, 60f). Bismarck, supported by Protestant conservatives and nationalist liberals, fought the Catholic Church and its party fiercely for about ten years. He abolished the Jesuit order, closed church seminaries, and deposed the bishops of Cologne, Paderborn, and Münster from office. He aimed at introducing state supervision of schooling with the school supervision law of 1872 (*Schulaufsichtsgesetz*). On the curriculum, religious education was reduced in 1871, and subjects such as history, geography, and natural sciences were increased (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 104ff). In 1876, a regulation was passed according to which Christian education could only be taught by state-licensed teachers or priests. Bismarck wanted to overcome denominational schooling by introducing *Simultanschulen* (simultaneous schools), in which children of different denominations were taught together. These attempts were hugely unpopular with the Catholic Church and the Center Party. They were also unsuccessful: between 1886 and 1906, 90 percent of Catholic children and 95 percent of Protestant children were still taught in *Volksschulen* of their own denomination (*Bekennnisschulen*). School supervision remained largely in the hands of clergymen and was regulated inconsistently until 1918 (Kuhlemann, 1991, 184).

The effect of the cultural struggle was the opposite of what was intended: the Catholic milieu was welded together more strongly, and the majority of the Catholic population stood behind the Center Party (Nipperdey, 1991, 439ff; Nonn, 2009, 61; Reulecke, 1995, 112; Schmitt, 1989). It received the most votes of all parties in Westphalia and the Rhineland until 1933 (Figure 2.1; Nonn, 2009, 60). In 1878, Bismarck relented, and in the following years, many anti-Catholic regulations were




FIGURE 2.1 Results of the elections to the German Reichstag in 1898  
 Note: The dark gray shading shows the areas where the Catholic Center Party (*Zentrum*) received the highest percentage of votes of all parties.  
 Source: *Statistisches Reichsamt, 1899*.

withdrawn. During the 1880s and 1890s, several Catholic mass organizations were founded, including teachers' organizations. The relations between the denominations continued to be characterized by mistrust (Reulecke, 1995, 113ff; Tymister, 1965).



### Educational Expansion: Liberal and Social-Democratic Demands

Protestant liberals and early socialists had their political center in Cologne (Elkar, 1995, 64f). On March 3, 1848, 5000 people gathered in front of Cologne city hall, asking for civil liberties and for the “complete education of all children at the public’s expense” (Elkar, 1995, 69). Many cities in the region became staging grounds for violent conflicts (Elkar, 1995, 69ff). In the aftermath of the revolution, Prussia introduced universal suffrage, but under a three-class system of voting (Mann, 1973, 260).

In September 1848, the General German Teachers’ Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Lehrerverein*) was established in Eisenach. Liberal primary schoolteachers demanded a ladder system of education, in which the *Volksschule* would be the first link. They were against tuition fees and private schools and for the opening of secondary schools to the sons of the lower class. They asked for better wages, working conditions, education, and social security for teachers, and they thought that clergymen should no longer have the right to supervise the schools (Herrlitz et al., 2003, 22f; Tymister, 1965, 31f). In response, the Prussian Ministry issued the Stiehl regulations of 1854. These aimed at putting a stop to teachers’ organizations and demands. Teacher seminaries were strictly regulated and teaching any “abstractions” or “pedagogy” was banned (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 60f). Nevertheless, primary schoolteachers continued to organize and to support comprehensive school reforms, including the abolition of preparatory primary schools (Kuhlemann, 1991, 191).

The introduction of modern secondary education created debates. *Realschulen* had been officially accredited during the 1830s (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 63ff). After the revolution, the *Realschulen* were considered a “tool of destructive liberalism” by the bureaucracy (Wiese, 1886, 214, quoted in Herrlitz et al., 2009, 64). However, the *Realschule* had many advocates from the economic section of the middle and upper classes (*Wirtschaftsbürgertum*). In 1859, the nine-year *Realschule 1. Ordnung* (from 1882 called *Realgymnasium*) was introduced. Most *Realschulen* taught Latin. Only the capacity to speak Latin would give one “the feeling of belonging to the recognized educated class,” as one deputy put it in the House of Deputies (Haus der Abgeordneten, 1882, quoted in Herrlitz et al., 2009, 64). Until the 1880s, the humanist *Gymnasium*, which had the support of the academic elite and civil servants (*Bildungsbürgertum*), kept its leading position. This school type was attended by 60–70 percent of secondary school students (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 63ff). During the 1880s, educational expansion was channeled by



TABLE 2.5 *German population in rural and urban municipalities (in percentages) and per km<sup>2</sup>, 1875–2000*

Year	Area	Rural municipal- ities (fewer than 2 000 people)	Urban municipal- ities, total (more than 2 000 people)	2 000–5 000	5 000–20 000	20 000–100 000	100 000 and above	Population per km <sup>2</sup>
1875	Westphalia	46.7	53.3	27.5	16.7	9.1		94.3
	Rhineland	39.7	60.3	17.8	21.6	20.9		141.0
	German Reich	61.0	39.0	12.6	12.0	14.4		79.2
1910	Westphalia	19.8	80.2	16.8	23.8	27.1	12.6	202.3
	Rhineland	20.8	79.2	11.8	17.7	16.9	32.9	266.3
	German Reich	40.0	60.0	11.2	14.1	13.4	21.3	124.2
1925	Westphalia	16.5	83.5	13.8	21.0	31.2	17.6	236.7
	Rhineland	18.0	82.0	11.0	15.0	14.8	41.2	297.2
	German Reich	35.6	64.4	10.8	13.1	13.7	26.8	134.3
1939	Westphalia	14.3	85.7				30.5	257.7
	Rhine Province	15.5	84.5				49.4	311.2
	German Reich	30.9	69.1				29.0	132.1
1954–5	NRW	8.6	91.4	9.3	17.8	21.3	43.0	420.0
	Federal Republic	26.1	73.9	12.9	16.2	15.6	29.2	201.0
1970	NRW	2.8	97.2	4.3	18.1	32.1	42.6	497.0
	Federal Republic	18.4	81.6	11.2	19.1	18.7	32.6	244.0
2000	NRW	0	100.0	0.1	12.9	41.2	45.8	528.0
	Federal Republic (without Eastern states)	5.3	94.7	8.6	26.5	27.7	32.0	270.0

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1954, 31, 34–38; 1971, 34; 1980, 51; 2002, 46, 57; Statistisches Reichsamt, 1880, 1, 6; 1914, 4–6; 1930, 5–9; 1942, 8, 23.

the expansion of Latin-free *Realschulen* and *Oberrealschulen* (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 79f).

In 1900, a compromise was reached between the supporters of modern and classical education. *Realgymnasien*, *Oberrealschulen*, and *humanistische Gymnasien* were put on equal terms, and their final *Abitur* exams were granted the same entitlements (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 74ff). The humanist *Gymnasium* lost its leading position, and its share of secondary boys' schools dropped from 59 percent in 1900 to 39 percent in 1918, and 29 percent at the end of the Weimar Republic (Albisetti/Lundgreen, 1991, 246). The percentage of eleven- to nineteen-year-old boys attending secondary schools increased from around 5 percent to over 10 percent from the 1890s to the 1930s (Nath, 2001, 28).

Another liberal demand was access to public education for girls and women. From the late 1880s until 1908, more than thirty educational institutions were founded by the women's movement in the German Reich to prepare girls for the *Abitur* exam as external examinees. Many girls of the middle and upper classes attended private *Mittelschulen*. These were *Volksschulen* with at least five ascending grades, a maximum of fifty students per class and an obligatory foreign language. These private middle schools often offered several foreign languages, in some cases even Latin and Greek. The state did not cover the financing of the middle schools (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 109; Kuhlemann, 1991, 188ff, 199ff). In the Rhineland and Westphalia, many girls attended Catholic private schools that had been developed by Catholic female orders (Sack, 1998, 30). In 1908, a regulated public-school path to the *Abitur* was finally created for girls. The ten-year girls' school was termed *Lyzeum* and prepared girls for an upper-secondary education as teachers, for general "women's education" at a *Frauenschule* (women's school), or for a three-year preparatory course for the *Abitur* exam. The introduction of a track to the *Abitur* exam was only possible if the same institution also offered a *Frauenschule*. Many schools could not afford to offer all tracks; as a result, in 1912, only 3.6 percent of the students at the *Lyzeum* was taken into the tracks preparing girls for university (Kraul, 1991, 289).

State expenses for primary schooling increased, but there were large urban-rural differences. Between 1886 and 1911, the number of schools separating the age groups expanded, but in the countryside, 39 percent of the *Volksschulen* were still one-class schools in 1911, compared with 8 percent in the cities (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 105). In 1883, in the rural East Westphalian district of Minden, one teacher had to teach between 120 and 200 children in 71 percent of the primary schools (Kuhlemann,

1991, 195ff). From the 1880s, the Prussian state attempted to combat the differences by introducing maximum requirements for class size, namely eighty students per class. A “school compromise” between the conservatives, the national liberals, and the Center Party in 1906 ended the landed property owners’ exemption from paying for school financing (Kuhlemann, 1991, 181). *Volksschule* teachers’ wages increased substantially (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 106). In 1885 and 1890, primary teachers’ pensions and survivors’ pensions were regulated, so elementary schoolteachers could now be considered a “consolidated stratum of lower civil servants” (Nipperdey, 1991, 543; see also Herrlitz et al., 2009, 106).

Rhineland and Westphalia were among the most industrialized, urbanized, and populated Prussian provinces (Tables 2.3 and 2.5; Nonn, 2009, 47ff; Reulecke, 1995, 87). Until the 1890s, socialist ideas gained little ground, as many workers preferred the Catholic and Protestant associations (Reulecke, 1995, 103). In 1875, the Socialist Workers’ Party was founded in Gotha (Walter, 2011, 13f). Bismarck’s anti-socialist law criminalized social-democratic organizations until 1890 (Mann, 1973, 444ff). From 1890, the party called itself *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany) and started to grow. By 1912, it had become the largest party in Germany, receiving 34.5 percent of the vote in the *Reichstag* elections (Walter, 2011, 27). The party was strongest in the northern cities and in some central industrial areas but weak in the east and south, and in Westphalia and the Rhineland (Walter, 2011, 28, 38). The Center Party remained strong in the region (Reulecke, 1995, 117).

Education was important for the social democrats (Walter, 2011, 35). They used the term “comprehensive school” (*Einheitsschule*) from 1903 on. Heinrich Schulze, member of the *Reichstag* and primary schoolteacher, developed social democracy’s school program. Published in an extended version in 1911, it suggested preschools for all four- to seven-year-olds, followed by a comprehensive school for the eight- to fourteen-year-olds, and the abolition of private primary schools (Schulze, 2003 [1911], 29).

Some social democrats also supported experiments with the *allgemeine Fortbildungsschule* (general further education school) (Kuhlemann, 1991, 191). These schools were suggested by the liberal school reformer Georg Kerschensteiner and were an attempt to get fourteen- to eighteen-year-old working class youths off the streets (Kerschensteiner, 1901). Kerschensteiner later contributed to the

development of *Berufsschulen* (vocational schools) and to the *Arbeitsschule* principles: the *Arbeitsschule* should include practical training and students should be encouraged to think for themselves and be active and creative learners. Toward the end of the German Reich, many new ideas came into circulation (Kuhlemann, 1991, 191f).

### Reform Struggles during the Weimar Republic

Although no battles took place in the Rhineland and Westphalia, the First World War greatly affected the region. From 1916 to 1917, food shortages worsened and “hunger demonstrations” became frequent (Brunn, 1995, 130ff). The social democrats, the majority of whom had supported the war credits financing Germany’s participation in the First World War, were split. In 1917, a group of social democrats who had been expelled from the SPD founded the Independent Social Democratic Party (Walter, 2011, 46ff; Wehler, 2003, 110ff).

The November Revolution of 1918 was initiated by a mutiny in the German navy. On November 9, 1918, a republic was declared by the social democrat Philip Scheidemann. From November 10, 1918, until February 11, 1919, Germany was governed by the Council of People’s Deputies, consisting of politicians of both social-democratic parties, and supported by the workers’, soldiers’, and farmers’ councils (Wehler, 2003, 190ff). The SPD won the first elections and a coalition government consisting of the SPD, the second-largest Center Party, and the social liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) was created.

From the outset, the Weimar Republic was destabilized by the fact that the power bases of the old elites remained largely intact. In addition, many workers turned their backs on the SPD and joined more radical socialist, communist, or syndicalist organizations (Bluhm, 2014). The early 1920s were characterized by political instability and violent struggles (Brunn, 1995, 141ff; Wehler, 2003, 397ff). The Dawes Plan of 1924 brought some stability to the Rhineland and Westphalia (Brunn, 1995, 142ff).

The administrative elites of the education system retained their positions. Few of the civil servants in the Prussian Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs were social democrats. The most important reforms of the Weimar Republic were completed during the first half of 1920; the elections of June 1920 weakened social democracy and the liberal parties. The SPD stood for the separation of church and school, the introduction of a comprehensive school with a minimum of eight years, and the abolition of private schools and tuition fees. Only a fraction of this could be

included in the articles pertaining to schools in the new constitution (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 118ff).

An important milestone was the primary school law (*Grundschulgesetz*) of April 1920, which abolished public preparatory primary schools from 1924 to 1925 and private ones from 1929 to 1930 and introduced the four-year obligatory and comprehensive primary school for all. The law was passed with the votes of all parties, except for the conservative *Deutschnationale Volkspartei* (German National People's Party). In the following years, opponents of comprehensive primary schooling fought for exemptions. In 1925, the law was changed so that "particularly capable children" could begin their secondary education after just three years. The SPD, the DDP, and the organization of primary schoolteachers fought these exemptions. The Center Party consented to the four-year primary school (Bölling, 1978, 138f). By 1931, 95.8 percent of secondary school students had completed the public primary school (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 118ff). In 1936, the National Socialists eliminated the last of the private preparatory institutions (Zymek, 1989, 168, 194).

The state-church conflict about the abolition of denominational primary schools "surmounted any other school-political conflicts in intensity and extent" (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 126). The clergy's right to supervise the *Volksschule* was abolished, but the separation of school and church was not achieved. The Weimar school compromise entailed that a *Simultanschule*, a Christian school for children of both denominations, should become the rule, while denominational schools would be possible as an exception. The SPD opposed the *Simultanschule* and preferred a complete secularization but had to make do with the possibility of establishing secularized *Weltanschauungsschulen* (worldview schools). The Center Party, Catholic and Protestant parents' associations, the conservative parties, and the churches opposed the abolition of denominational schools. The German National People's Party and the nationalist liberal German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei*) attempted several times to pass a law that would make denominational schools the rule again. The ongoing conflict led to the preservation of the status quo and the *Simultanschule* was not introduced at a general level (Bölling, 1978, 137ff; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 126f).

Prussian girls' education was reformed further in 1923 with the introduction of the *Oberlyzeum*. By 1931, one-fourth of the Prussian *Abitur* graduates were female (Zymek, 1989, 172). Differentiation into separate higher secondary school types continued among the boys' schools. With the *Gymnasium*, the *Realgymnasium*, the

*Reformgymnasium*, the *Reformrealgymnasium* of the new and old type, the *Oberrealschule*, and the *Deutsche Oberschule*, the number of school types was now confusing, even for contemporaries. These school types differed mainly with regard to which languages were taught for how many hours and in which order. Mixed forms were common (Zymek, 1989, 172f).

### Nazi Politics of Educational Restriction

Toward the end of the Weimar Republic, Chancellor Brüning's austerity measures led to a deterioration in teachers' socioeconomic conditions. Unemployment among young primary schoolteachers grew and wages decreased by up to 28.8 percent (Bölling, 1978, 200). Teachers began to turn against the democratic state. Like other white-collar and middle-class groups, they were overrepresented in the membership of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP) (Bölling, 1978, 204). When the Nazis came to power in 1933, there was not much opposition to forcible coordination (*Gleichschaltung*) of teachers' organizations. The National Socialist Teachers' Union organized 95 percent of the teaching force by December 1933 (Brunn, 1995, 166; Müller-Rolli, 1989, 253). Some courageous resistance was shown by members of the Communist Party, socialists and social democrats, and some representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches, but by 1936 most resistance was broken (Brunn, 1995, 163ff; Nonn, 2009, 66).

Within the cultural ministries and the schools administration, the NSDAP made sure to secure its position, and many school inspectors were fired straightaway. National Socialist teacher schools were created. These were boarding schools characterized by strict discipline and ideological indoctrination (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 145ff).

Despite the National Socialist claim that education should become independent of social background, the opposite was the case. In 1933, the law against overcrowding of the German schools and colleges (*Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung der deutschen Schulen und Hochschulen*) was passed. The law excluded Jewish *Abitur* graduates from the universities and limited the share of female university entrants to 10 percent (Zymek, 1989, 188f). National Socialist elite schools were created to produce the future cadres for the party (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 148). In 1938, the *Reichsschulpflichtgesetz* made schooling obligatory from age six to eighteen – first in the *Volksschule*, then in vocational schools. New

curricula turned the *Oberschule* into the main higher secondary school type and shortened it to eight years but left the humanist *Gymnasium* intact. The lower-secondary, or middle, school system was also consolidated. Already in March 1931, the *Mittlere Reife* had been introduced as a school-leaving certificate after the tenth school year, with relevance for entrance to middle positions in administration, trade, and industry (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 127ff). In 1938, various lower-secondary school types were subsumed under two remaining types: the six-year Prussian middle school and a four-year upper middle school that built on the sixth grade of the *Volksschule* (Zymek, 1989, 197ff).

In accordance with the National Socialist concordat with the Vatican of 1933, denominational schooling was at first left intact. However, religious education in schools was restricted, the clergy's influence was curtailed, and by 1941 most denominational schools had been turned into *Gemeinschaftsschulen* (common schools) for both denominations. The abolition of private schools was another element of these anti-church politics (Zymek, 1989, 200f).

Jewish children were gradually excluded from public education. After the pogroms of November 9–10, 1938, Jewish emigration accelerated, and the number of Jewish schoolchildren shrank by two-thirds within a year. Deportations of Jews to concentration camps began in November 1938 and accelerated from 1942. From July 1942, all remaining Jewish schools were shut down (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 149ff; Zymek, 1989, 199f). On April 17, 1945, the National Socialist regime in Rhineland and Westphalia finally broke down (Brunn, 1995, 174f).

### Restoration or Reform? The Late 1940s and 1950s

The initial postwar years were hard. Millions of refugees were looking for shelter and food (Brunn, 1995, 176ff; Nonn, 2009, 72ff). There was a great lack of usable schools and politically trustworthy teachers. Denazification attempts were conducted in a pragmatic way. Many civil servants of the Nazi regime kept their jobs (Brunn, 1995, 176ff).

On August 23, 1946, the federal state of North Rhine–Westphalia was founded by a British ordinance. It comprised Westphalia and the northern part of the Rhineland, which were part of the British occupation zone; in January 1947, the small Lippe region was added. The SPD, the Center Party, and the Communist Party (KPD) were re-founded. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) were newly founded parties.



After the first federal state elections in 1947, Karl Arnold from the CDU, a former Center Party member, became *Ministerpräsident*, meaning the head of the government of NRW (Brunn, 1995, 188ff). Arnold remained in this position until 1956. At first, he governed in a coalition including the Center Party, the SPD, and, until 1948, even the KPD. From 1950 to 1956, the CDU formed a coalition with the Center Party, which from 1954 to 1956 included the FDP. Arnold was a representative of the wage-earner wing of the CDU. He preferred a coalition with the SPD to a coalition with the FDP, but due to different opinions about denominational schooling the early coalition with the SPD broke down. Later, a CDU-SPD coalition in NRW was impeded by disagreements on the national level (Düding, 2008, 291, 313; Nonn, 2009, 84f).

In 1945, the SPD and the KPD published a declaration for a comprehensive school system and the separation of church and school. In 1947, the Allied Control Council published Directive No. 54, which was inspired by the American Zook Commission and suggested the introduction of a ladder system of education with comprehensive schooling at the lower-secondary level and better civic education (Alliierte Kontrollbehörde, 2003 [1947]). Germans' predisposition for National Socialist ideology was partly explained with the division between primary education and elitist secondary education (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 158f).

Between 1947 and 1948, several German federal states attempted to reform the school system. A prolongation of the comprehensive primary school to six years was suggested by a Christian democratic minister in Württemberg-Baden and implemented in Hamburg, Bremen, and Schleswig-Holstein by social-democratic ministers – it was later withdrawn by conservative-liberal governments. In Hessen and Niedersachsen, there were plans for comprehensive schools, and in Berlin a twelve-year comprehensive school was suggested. However, the reformers were mainly remnants of the Weimar reform coalition and had been scattered by emigration, oppression, and war. The division of Germany and the intensification of the Cold War weakened them further. Most of the suggested reforms were not carried through. Instead, the Weimar school system was restored. The Düsseldorf Agreement of 1955 confirmed this development. In this agreement, the ministers of education of the federal states agreed that all school-leaving certificates would be recognized in all of Germany. Higher secondary schools should now all be called *Gymnasien*, and future school experiments should not threaten the parallel school structure (Friedeburg, 1992, 321ff; Furck, 1998a, 248; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 160f).



The denominational separation of teacher training and primary schooling remained a contested topic. When the NRW constitution was passed in 1950, denominational schooling was restored (Düding, 2008, 267ff; Furck, 1998b). The churches played an important role in legitimizing the anti-reform stance of the 1950s. The secularization of the *Volksschule* and attempts to integrate the school system were labeled equally “un-Christian” as the Nazi reform proposals (Furck, 1998a, 249; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 158ff; Chapter 5).

The 1950s witnessed careful attempts to put educational expansion and reform on the agenda. It was now asserted more frequently that the education system did not produce enough qualified labor. The idea of equality of opportunity gained ground (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 173). In 1951, the *Mittelschule* was renamed *Realschule* by the CDU minister of culture of NRW, Christine Teusch, who argued that it should not be mistaken for a school for those with “a middle amount of talent” but should impart its graduates with increased competencies (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1951, 38). In 1958, a short-lived SPD-FDP government passed a law on the administration of schools (Düding, 2008, 398). The law did not question the parallel school system but specified that representatives of the churches should only have an advisory function on the school boards (Fälker, 1984, 114f). Other education policy measures of the first SPD-FDP government were investments in school buildings and experiments with the introduction of a ninth grade at the *Volksschule* (Düding, 2008, 398).

In 1953, the Ministry of the Interior and the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the federal states put in place an unsalaried advisory body, the German Committee for the Education and School System (*Deutscher Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen*), which was supposed to make suggestions for the development of the system. In 1959, this body published a recommendation called “framework plan for the remodeling and standardization of the general school system” (*Rahmenplan zur Umgestaltung und Vereinheitlichung des allgemein bildenden Schulwesens*), which marks a turning point in education policy discussions (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 166). As discussed in the next chapters, new conflicts were on the horizon.

COMPARISON: SETTING THE SCENE  
FOR THE POSTWAR REFORM PERIOD

In Germany, the political situation at the end of the Second World War is sometimes referred to as the *Stunde Null* (zero hour). The term implies that, at that moment, a new Germany was born: a democratic, stable nation that had little in common with its historical forerunners. In Norway, the immediate postwar period was also dominated by the motto that one would now be “building the country” to create a new and better nation. It is understandable that contemporaries had a need for such images, but of course nothing social is built up from scratch.

Quite to the contrary, postwar education politics were not a radical new beginning but embedded in long-term processes. In both countries, education reforms had been an element of state- and nation-building already during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This implied a gradual secularization of schooling, as the state took over responsibility and control from the church. In Norway, this process was not as conflictual as in Germany because the upper ranks of the Norwegian state church were integrated into the conservative national elites. In Germany, the Catholic Church stood in opposition to the Protestant Prussian state, especially in education politics. Many Catholics, not least in rural areas, identified with the Center Party and with denominational schooling. Political Catholicism was to some extent open to the social demands of the lower classes. Nevertheless, the state-church cleavage stood in the way of stable coalitions between Catholics, social democrats, and liberals. This conflict became foundational for German education politics.

In Norway, the early Liberal Party was highly influential, giving expression to center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages alike. It represented a broad movement of rural and urban outsiders belonging to the periphery, who stood in opposition to the conservative elites representing the political, cultural, and geographical center. This opposition came to expression in the language struggle, which was staged not least in schools. It also contained a conflict between ideas of ascription and achievement (Rokkan, 1999, 288ff). Norwegian liberals introduced the five-year comprehensive primary school in 1896. In addition, they supported modern instead of classical secondary education and created the modern lower-secondary school in 1896. They saw educational expansion and prolonged comprehensive schooling as means to create an enlightened, united citizenry and aimed at reducing social, economic, and geographical inequality. Many primary schoolteachers were involved in the liberal

movement. The fact that Latin almost disappeared from the curriculum of the secondary schools in 1896 illustrates that conservative urban elites had weak influence on school reform processes even at that early stage. The Norwegian women's movement of the nineteenth century was also well-connected to the liberal movement and had achieved full access to secondary education for girls already in 1882.

In nineteenth-century Prussia, debates over comprehensive schooling took place too, and social liberals and primary schoolteachers were the main bearers of reform ideas. A connection of all school types in a ladder system was demanded during reform-oriented times. However, in contrast with Norway, there was no equally strong peripheral, agrarian, liberal movement. The center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages were largely superposed by state-church and class cleavages. Liberalism was comparatively less radical, and nationalist liberals sided with the conservative state elites rather than with the growing working class (Rokkan, 1999, 289). As a result, the conservative supporters of classical elite education were more influential than in Norway. Primary schooling was expanded but remained far removed from secondary schooling for the privileged few, which was connected to the state bureaucracy. Even though school types with modern curricula developed, they did not become a link between these two worlds of education. The liberal supporters of modern education only achieved placing modern and classical secondary schools on a par with each other in 1900. Liberal and Catholic women founded private educational institutions for girls during the nineteenth century, but girls first received access to public secondary education in 1908, and in 1923 without restrictions. Nevertheless, nineteenth-century Norway and Prussia both had rather open secondary schools in terms of students' social background, and some educational expansion took place during the nineteenth century (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 251ff; Nath, 2001; Titze, 2004; Wiborg, 2009, 64ff).

The class cleavage gradually became highly salient in both cases, and social democracy became an important political player. The political left was highly split in both countries during the 1920s, but communist-socialist divisions were historically more significant in Germany and weakened the left considerably. For social democrats, the most important aim in education politics was to give working-class children access to better and longer education. Many social democrats became supporters of comprehensive schooling and joined forces with the liberals in this respect. As a result, the seven-year comprehensive primary school was introduced in Norway in 1920, when the Labor Party representative,

Gjøstein, managed to convince parliament not to finance secondary schools that started earlier than in the eighth grade. In the newly founded Weimar Republic, the four-year comprehensive primary school was introduced in the same year. The reform succeeded because social democrats, liberals, and Catholics managed to cooperate, and this illustrates that attempts at comprehensivization were not necessarily doomed to fail in Germany.

The economic crisis of the 1930s, the Second World War, and Nazism affected both countries. Nazism became powerful in Norway because of the German occupation and a minority of Norwegians joined Nazi organizations. But, as in earlier times, much of Norwegian civil society remained united behind the demand for Norwegian national independence and opposed the Nazi regime. Teachers were among the most outspoken opponents. In Germany, teachers belonged to the most outspoken supporters of Nazism, like other lower-middle-class groups who felt threatened by economic crisis and educational expansion. In Rokkanian terms, the German nationalist socialist movement represented the lower ranks of the dominant, Protestant national culture, who defined themselves primarily in opposition to cultural outsiders but also in opposition to the Catholic Church and its organizations, to the labor movement, and to business and state elites (Rokkan, 1999, 292ff). This movement's ideology built on theories of biological "race" and endowment, which justified the exclusion and mass murder of Jews and other cultural outsiders.<sup>2</sup>

In other words, the situation of school reformers in postwar Germany and Norway was similar, yet unequal at the beginning of the reform period. In both cases, secondary education was segmented, meaning that parallel schools with different social status existed. Recurring reform cycles had occurred in both countries and ideological transfers had taken place. For example, the Norwegian term *enhetsskole* (comprehensive school) originates from the German term *Einheitsschule* (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959, *Lov om folkeskolen*, 46). Reform ideas originating in Germany, such as the German *Arbeitsschule* movement, were widely discussed in Norway. Scandinavian comprehensive school reforms also became a subject of debate in postwar Germany. In both

<sup>2</sup> A comparative analysis of Nazism in Germany and Norway is beyond the scope of this book. Rokkan (1999, 235ff) discusses potential reasons for why nationalist movements succeeded in overturning democracy in some European countries but not others, such as an imperialist past, an experience of geo-economic peripheralization over time, and attempts at recreating former glory through alliances between military and industry.

countries, reformers, having survived Nazi persecution and returning from exile, tried to build on their pre-war reform efforts. Infrastructure and state had to be rebuilt, including a functioning school system.

Still, conditions for postwar comprehensive school reformers were somewhat more favorable in Norway. In the 1950s, the Norwegian comprehensive primary school already lasted three years longer than the German comprehensive primary school. Lower-secondary education was also comparatively less segmented, because the *realskole* and the *gymnas* built on each other consecutively, while the German *Realschule* and *Gymnasium* were parallel schools (see Figures 1.2 and 1.4). In previous struggles, reformers in Norway had been more successful than their German counterparts. Earlier reforms had had feedback effects, by strengthening the position of primary school-teachers, by increasing the quality of rural schooling, or by disseminating arguments in favor of comprehensivization. In Prussia, the Weimar Republic, and Nazi Germany, the establishment and consolidation of parallel secondary school types had channeled the educational ambitions of various social groups away from the *Gymnasium*, and the privileges of *Gymnasium* teachers had been consolidated. Furthermore, the country's division and the intensification of the Cold War weakened the first postwar reform efforts.

Nevertheless, previous trends did not necessarily have to continue. In Norway, the *realskole* had a long history and was a respected school type in the 1950s, with influential supporters. German history also provides examples of comprehensivization and equalization, such as the decision in 1900 to put *Gymnasien* and *Oberrealschulen* on a par with each other and, more notably, the introduction of the four-year comprehensive primary school in 1920. In both cases, the institutional development of the school system involved conflict and compromise, the exact nature of which could not be known at the beginning of each reform period. Not least, the postwar reform period, which is analyzed in the following chapters, marks a turning point because educational expansion accelerated to a degree unknown in the past. It constitutes a critical juncture during which new compromises were negotiated. Different choices of political actors could have resulted in different kinds of compromises, which could have led to a more similar development in the two countries.

## Political Playing Fields

### *Actors' Power Resources and Social Base*

This chapter introduces the major collective actors involved in education politics during the postwar reform period, with a focus on their structural and social base and power resources, such as election results, government participation, membership numbers, and financial resources. This is motivated by the insight that cleavages have structural and organizational dimensions, which develop historically and, at any given time, limit actors' scope of action to some extent. In the present chapter, these structural and organizational dimensions are explored.

The analysis shows that party systems and teachers' organizational structures were shaped by additional cleavages besides the class cleavage. Rural and Christian interests were represented in different ways. In Germany, the state-church cleavage was expressed organizationally by splits among primary schoolteachers' organizations. In Norway, primary schoolteachers were comparatively more united, especially after 1966. Furthermore, the distribution of power resources between the left and the right in the two countries was somewhat different, though not so different as to preclude alternative outcomes in education politics. The failure of Norwegian conservatives and of German social democrats to shape education politics more decisively cannot be explained by a lack of financial resources or insufficient membership numbers. Moreover, analyzing the distribution and development of power resources alone cannot tell us *how* Norwegian social democrats and German Christian democrats managed to build strong and stable alliances. To understand outcomes in school policy it is therefore necessary to also examine the ideological expressions of cleavages and how actors navigated cleavage structures with respect to potential coalitions in education politics. This is done in [Chapters 4](#) and [5](#).

## THE NORWEGIAN PLAYING FIELD

## Political Parties

In Norway, the Labor Party was the strongest political force during the postwar decades. In terms of election results, the Conservative Party posed no serious competition until the late 1970s (Figure 3.1). Among the Labor Party's voters were many workers, large sections of the urban middle class, including public but also private employees, fishermen and farmers in rural areas – especially in northern Norway – and a proportion of the self-employed (Svåsand, 1985, 182ff; Valen, 1981, 104ff). The Labor Party was equally successful among women as among men but more successful among those with shorter educations than among those with longer educations (Svåsand, 1985, 181, 188; Valen, 1981, 28f, 119). In 1977, the Labor Party's voters had on average 8.8 years of education – less than the average education of the voters of all other parties (Valen, 1981, 119). The party did well in municipal elections, including in rural areas. For example, in 1963, 242 of 525 Norwegian mayors were members of




FIGURE 3.1 Parties' percentage of seats in the Norwegian parliament, 1945–81  
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB).

the Labor Party, compared to 31 conservative mayors, 58 liberal mayors, 87 mayors belonging to the Center Party and 20 mayors belonging to the Christian Democrats (Svåsand, 1992, 742). The Labor Party was affiliated with the Norwegian trade unions that represented many workers and later also white-collar employees (Sass, 2012, 2014). In 1954, around 43 percent of wage earners were members of trade unions belonging to the social-democratic Federation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen*). By 1980, the number had decreased to around 38 percent (Stokke, 2000, 17). Eight percent of wage earners were members of other trade unions in 1950 and this number grew continually in the following decades (Stokke, 2000, 17). Among these non-social democratic trade unions were the largest teachers' unions, discussed in more detail below.

The Norwegian Conservative Party (*Høyre*) had its roots in the conservative state bureaucracy and the economic, urban upper class (Kaartvedt, 1984, 392; Svåsand, 1994b, 169ff). After the Second World War, it represented primarily urban middle- and upper-class voters working in the private sector and self-employed people. The share of workers among its voters was 5–6 percent until 1973. This grew from the late 1970s onward, mostly among non-unionized workers with roots in middle-class families (Svåsand, 1994b, 215f). As illustrated by the low number of mayors referred to above, the Conservative Party was weak in rural areas. It did poorly in municipal elections compared to national elections, partly because its party organization was weak (Svåsand, 1994b, 145). Men were more likely to vote for the Conservative Party than women and those with long educations were more likely to vote for the Conservative Party than those with short ones (Svåsand, 1985, 188; Svåsand, 1994b, 215). On average, the Conservative Party's voters had 10.8 years of education in 1977. Its voters were the most educated of all parties, apart from the Socialist Left Party (Valen, 1981, 119). Around two-thirds of the parliamentary representatives had completed a university education during the period examined here (Svåsand, 1994b, 166). The Conservative Party was successful among those with high incomes. In 1977, 48 percent of those with a yearly income above 100 000 kroner voted Conservative (Valen, 1981, 114). From the 1970s, the Conservative Party managed at least temporarily to attract voters from the middle and lower classes by projecting “an image of expanding the role of the welfare state” (Svåsand, 1992, 733).

The political center, consisting of the Liberal Party (*Venstre*), the Christian Democrats (*Kristelig Folkeparti*), and the Center Party (*Senterpartiet*), played an important role, as the Labor minority governments needed the center's support. The center parties were also the only



potential coalition parties for the Conservative Party. Voters and members of the Christian Democrats and the Center Party were similar. Both parties were strong in the rural periphery (Svåsand, 1985, 80ff, 122ff). The average incomes and the average lengths of education of the two parties' voters were low (Valen, 1981, 114ff). The Christian Democrats received votes from all social classes, including a share of the working class and the farmers' votes. Women were more likely to vote for them than men. Voters who belonged to the language movement or the teetotal movement and regular churchgoers were likely to vote for the Christian Democrats (Svåsand, 1994b, 223f). The Center Party was supported by many farmers and fishermen and received small but stable percentages of the votes of other social classes (Svåsand, 1985, 182ff).

The early Liberal Party organized farmers and members of the urban and rural middle class but also had a radical current which cooperated with unions (Mjeldheim, 1978, 271ff; Mjeldheim, 1984, 358ff). During the postwar period, the party had lost much of its early importance and it was weakened further due to the struggle over membership of the European Community. It received votes from various social classes and had its roots in the periphery; on average, however, its voter base was more highly educated and had a higher income than that of the other center parties (Svåsand, 1985, 84ff; Valen, 1981, 114ff).

On the left of the Labor Party stood the Socialist People's Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*), founded in 1961 and later called Socialist Electoral Alliance (*Sosialistisk Valgallianse*) and Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*). This party was opposed to the Labor Party in foreign politics. In 1977, the voters of the Socialist Left Party had the highest average education (11.2 years) but also the lowest average income of all Norwegian parties. Both these findings are partly because a high percentage of the Socialist Left Party's voters were under thirty years old (Svåsand, 1985, 180, 187f; Valen, 1981, 119).

The Communist Party (*Norges Kommunistiske Parti*) did not play a significant role after the 1950s. Similarly, the Red Party (*Rød Valgallianse*, today *Rødt*), has been small most of the time, despite recent electoral successes. The Red Party's predecessor, the Workers' Communist Party (*Arbeidernes Kommunistparti*, AKP), was not represented in parliament but played a role in education politics through its members' activities in teachers unions. This party was founded in 1973 and resulted from a split between the Socialist People's Party and its youth organization in 1969. Finally, the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*, called Anders Lange's Party until 1977) was founded in 1973 and became

a voice of the far right. However, it had no influence on the school reforms begun in 1954 and does not feature in the rest of this book.

Regarding government participation, the Labor Party was the most dominant party. Until 1961, it had an absolute majority. Most ministers of education were members of the Labor Party (Table 3.1). The only relevant exceptions were the period from 1965 to 1971, when Kjell Bondevik from the Christian Democrats was minister of education in a coalition of the center parties and the Conservative Party, and the

TABLE 3.1 *Composition of Norwegian governments and ministers of education, 1951–83*

Years	Composition of government	Minister of education
1951–5	Labor Party	Lars Magnus Moen (1951–3), Birger M. Bergersen (1953–5), both Labor Party
1955–63	Labor Party	Birger M. Bergersen (1955–60), Helge Sivertsen (1960–3), both Labor Party
Aug. 28–Sept. 25, 1963	Conservative Party (held post of prime minister), Liberal Party, Center Party, Christian Democrats	Olav Kortner, Liberal Party
1963–5	Labor Party	Helge Sivertsen, Labor Party
1965–71	Center Party (held post of prime minister), Conservative Party, Christian Democrats, Liberal Party	Kjell Bondevik, Christian Democrats
1971–2	Labor Party	Bjartmar Alv Gjerde, Labor Party
1972–3	Christian Democrats (held post of prime minister), Liberal Party, Center Party	Anton Skulberg, Center Party
1973–6	Labor Party	Bjartmar Alv Gjerde, Labor Party
1976–81	Labor Party	Kjølvs Egeland (1976–9), Einar Førde (1979–81), both Labor Party
1981–3	Conservative Party	Tore Austad, Conservative Party

Source: Mediås, 2010, 67.

period 1972–3 during a short-lived government of center parties. Only in 1981 did the Conservative Party form a minority government for the first time. To understand the necessity of coalition-building in Norwegian politics, it should be added that most Norwegian governments after 1961 were minority governments, except for the government of the Conservative Party and center parties in 1965–71.

The Labor Party had most members at the beginning of the reform period, but membership of the Conservative Party and the Christian Democrats grew during the 1970s (Table 3.2). In 1961, 7.04 percent of the electorate were members of the Labor Party, 4.17 percent were members of the Conservative Party, 2.61 percent were members of the Center Party, 1.3 percent were members of the Christian Democrats, and 0.43 percent were members of the Liberal Party. By 1981, a slightly higher percentage of the electorate were members of the Conservative Party than of the Labor Party (Katz et al., 1992, 343).

The Conservative Party employed a higher number of paid staff (Table 3.3). This is related to the Conservative Party's finances. Before 1970, parties received no state subvention, so their main income consisted of membership fees, donations, and lotteries (Svåsand, 1994a, 324). As implied by the column labeled 'Other' in Table 3.4, the Conservative Party received higher donations than any other party. The Labor Party depended on state subventions to a higher degree (Svåsand, 1994a, 324). Despite the electoral successes of the Labor Party, the Conservative Party was an important political player with considerable power resources.

### Teachers' Organizations

There were three major teachers' organizations in Norway during the postwar reform period. The Norwegian Teachers' Association had been founded by primary schoolteachers as *Norges lærerforening* in 1892 and had been renamed *Norges lærerlag* in 1912. Female primary schoolteachers organized in the Female Teachers' Organization (*Norges Lærerinneforening*) from 1912 to 1966. They did not feel that they received enough support from their male colleagues in their struggle for equal wages and career opportunities (Hagemann, 1992, 135ff; Tønnessen, 2011, 37). Most of them had urban upper- or middle-class backgrounds, whereas the male primary schoolteachers more often stemmed from the rural lower- and middle-class population – a difference which persisted well into the postwar period

TABLE 3.2 *Party membership in Norway over time*

Year	Labor Party	Conservative Party	Liberal Party	Center Party	Christian Democrats	Socialist People's Party/ Socialist Left Party	Progress Party
1960	165 096	96 931		61 000 <sup>a</sup>	30 346 <sup>a</sup>		
1970	155 254	110 241	13 220 <sup>b</sup>	70 000	41 137 <sup>b</sup>		
1980	153 507	152 185	12 007	53 517	69 697	10 000 <sup>c</sup>	10 000 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Figure for 1961. <sup>b</sup> Figure for 1972. <sup>c</sup> Figure for 1979.

Source: Svåsand, 1992, 744ff.

TABLE 3.3 *Numbers of paid staff of Norwegian parties over time*

Years	Labor Party	Conservative Party	Liberal Party	Center Party	Christian Democrats	Socialist People's Party/Socialist Left Party	Progress Party
1961–5	53	74	12				
1969–73	55	113	10	26	38		
1977–81	92	131	9	36	55	20	1

Note: Numbers include paid staff in the central organization, the subnational organization, the parliamentary group, youth organizations and women's organizations of the parties.

Source: Svåsand, 1992, 750ff, own calculations.

TABLE 3.4 *Income of party head offices in Norway over time (in Norwegian kroner)*

Labor Party			Conservative Party <sup>a</sup>			
	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other
1961-4	416 164		1 518 798			2 700 328
1969-72	624 211	4 034 333	2 394 296		1 696 933	3 787 058
1977-80	852 147	8 425 274	3 697 211		4 786 782	7 693 671
Liberal Party			Center Party			
	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other
1961-4	29 839		298 680			
1969-72	136 605	727 725	427 228			
1977-80	90 220	635 180	544 863	1 354 925	1 885 856	3 578 016
Christian Democrats			Socialist People's Party/Socialist Left Party			
	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other	Income from members and branches	State subvention	Other
1961-4						
1969-72	125 275	754 993	399 898			
1977-80	283 850	2 559 530	1 070 861	291 458	1 099 067	868 035

<sup>a</sup> Conservative membership fees are divided between municipal and provincial branches, so the central organization does not receive any share of them.  
Source: Svåsand 1992, 774f.

(Hagemann, 1992, 145ff, 242). In 1966, female primary schoolteachers again joined the Norwegian Teachers' Association, which was renamed *Norsk Lærerlag*, thereby overcoming the gendered, geographical, and class-based division of primary schoolteachers (Mediås, 2010, 58f). From 1939, *framhaldsskole* teachers organized in *Framhaldsskolelærerlaget*, but this organization was much smaller, with 426 members in 1955 (Hagemann, 1992, 296). It joined the Norwegian Teachers' Association in 1961.

The Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers was founded in 1892 as *Filologenes og realistenes landsforening*. The secondary schoolteachers belonged to the upper class of civil servants, were highly educated, and were paid well (Grove/Michelsen, 2014, 312ff). In 1939, they renamed their organization *Norsk Lektorlag* (Mediås, 2010, 41). From 1947, this association opened up to all teachers teaching at secondary schools, independent of education – a pragmatic decision related to the competition with primary schoolteachers, who were taking over more of lower secondary education (Grove/Michelsen, 2014, 316ff; Seip, 1990; Slagstad, 2000, 56f).

In terms of membership numbers, the Norwegian Teachers' Organization was the most important teachers' organization (Table 3.5). In the course of the educational expansion, the organizations of both

TABLE 3.5 *Membership numbers of the main Norwegian teachers' organizations*

Year	Norwegian Teachers' Association (Norges Lærerlag; Norsk Lærerlag from 1966)	Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers (Norsk Lektorlag)	Female Teachers' Association (Norges Lærerinneforbund)
1955	9 511	2 580	2 099
1960	11 650	3 430	2 996
1964	14 188	3 798	2 687
1966	15 962	4 281	2 564
1967	19 313	4 443	
1970	23 519	5 264	
1974	31 711	6 764	
1979	43 803	10 934	

Sources: Annual reports of Norges Lærerlag/Norsk Lærerlag, 1954–79; Den Høgre Skolen, 1954–74, Skoleforum, 1980; annual reports of Norges Lærerinneforbund, 1956–66.

primary and secondary schoolteachers grew, but the primary schoolteachers consolidated their leading position.

The Norwegian Teachers' Association also had the largest financial resources (Table 3.6). Besides its income from membership fees, it had funds, such as the *Fondet til særlige tiltak* (the fund for special measures), which was used for legal assistance for members and lent much of its capital to the organization's credit bank. In 1965, the fund's capital stood at 2 422 490 NOK. The Norwegian Teachers' Association ran a press office that published journals and had income from these. The Female Teachers' Association's funds were small compared to the other organizations.

The Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers had a large fund (*Norsk Lektorlagets Fond*) whose capital account stood at 2 173 070 NOK in 1965 – almost as large as the fund of the Norwegian Teachers' Association. The organization's budget was smaller but in 1979 it was more than half of the Norwegian Teachers' Association's budget, even though there were around four times as many primary schoolteachers. The organization published the journal *Den Høgre Skolen* (The Secondary School), which changed its title to *Skoleforum* (School Forum) in 1976. The change was in recognition of the fact that some members of the organization were teaching in the youth school, now a part of primary school. Strictly speaking, it was no longer an organization solely of secondary schoolteachers. Competition with the Norwegian Teachers' Association was fierce at the youth school level.

All three teachers' organizations were important political players, but the experts interviewed for this study agreed that the Norwegian Teachers' Association was most influential, as it cooperated closely with the Labor Party. Kari Lie, former secretary, vice-chair, and chair of the Norwegian Teachers' Association, confirmed that it was important to have good contact with the Labor Party, as it controlled the Ministry of Education most of the time (Table 3.1). According to the conservative politician Lars Roar Langslet, the Conservative Party also had amicable relations with the Norwegian Teachers' Association, but the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers had been a closer ally:

There were of course varying political positions within the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers and the Norwegian Teachers' Association, but we had better contact with the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers on many issues in the Conservative Party. Kaltenborn, who was chair of the association for a time [from 1965 to 1971], was also active as conservative politician. But it wasn't as if we brought our heads together and collectively agreed about this or that; it wasn't that kind of cooperation. (expert interview)



TABLE 3.6 *Total size of budget of teachers' organizations and amount of membership fees over time, rounded figures (in Norwegian kroner)*

Year	Norwegian Teachers' Association ( <i>Norges Lærerlag</i> ; <i>Norsk Lærerlag</i> from 1966)		Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers ( <i>Norsk Lektorlag</i> )		Female Teachers' Association ( <i>Norges Lærerinneforbund</i> )	
	Total budget	Membership fees	Total budget	Membership fees	Total budget	Membership fees
1956	631 640	606 840	276 600	244 780	185 310	134 500
1961	1 022 280	940 300	610 610	539 950	175 760	161 850
1966	3 104 090	2 633 180	1 181 240	966 100	305 030	208 260
1967	3 702 000	3 103 530	1 284 990	1 002 150		
1969	5 238 030	4 384 190	1 625 480	1 251 880		
1974	7 022 290	5 838 760	3 441 370	2 675 650		
1979	17 007 680	17 346 550	9 114 150	7 217 170		

*Sources:* Annual reports of Norges Lærerinneforbund, 1956–66; annual reports of Norges/Norsk Lærerlag, 1956–80; Den Høgre Skolen, 1956–75; Skoleforum, 1980.

Other experts made similar statements. Many secondary schoolteachers had conservative inclinations and many primary schoolteachers leaned toward social democracy. However, the teachers' organizations attempted to remain independent of the parties, and many teachers were also active in other parties. The Liberal Party had long been known as the primary schoolteachers' party. Both within the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers and within the Norwegian Teachers' Association, there were also small but active minorities of socialist and communist teachers. During the 1970s, many of them were members of the AKP but also earlier there had been socialists among the secondary schoolteachers, such as the politician, Trygve Bull.

### Other Actors

Several other collective actors played a role in education politics, such as the Protestant church and its lay organizations, which were involved in debates about Christian education and private schooling. In the debates about comprehensive schooling, the Norwegian church did not play a significant role, as it did not declare itself strongly for or against comprehensive schooling. The same is true of initiatives by parents and associations involved in the language struggle. These actors' impact is discussed in more detail in [Chapter 5](#). The employers' organizations and the Federation of Trade Unions were mostly involved in debates about upper-secondary and vocational education and had little to say about the prolonging of comprehensive education to nine years.

Finally, various education-political councils played a role, especially the Experimental Council (*Forsøksrådet*). The Experimental Council was composed of reform-oriented social scientists and politicians but was formally independent of party politics. Another important body was the Primary School Committee (*Grunnskolerådet*), which advised the ministry on reforms regarding primary schools. School directors also played a role as facilitators of reforms ([Telhaug/Mediås, 2003](#), 190ff).

## THE GERMAN PLAYING FIELD

### Political Parties

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) were the two major parties in postwar West Germany. The CDU was the most successful party in elections on the national level, and in




FIGURE 3.2 Parties' percentage of seats in the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia, 1947–85

Source: [Düding, 2008](#), 775.

North Rhine–Westphalia (NRW) until the mid-1960s ([Figure 3.2](#)). The SPD had better election results in NRW than nationally, especially in later decades ([Figures 3.2](#) and [3.3](#)).

The CDU followed in the footsteps of the Catholic Center Party, which disappeared from the NRW parliament in 1958 and was mostly absorbed into the CDU. On the national level, the CDU cooperated with its strongly conservative Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). In the Rhineland, some of the founding members of the CDU were quite leftist but Konrad Adenauer, soon to be one of the leading figures, fought such tendencies effectively ([Düding, 2008](#), 41ff). The CDU had been founded with the aim to unite Christians across the denominations. Nevertheless, in 1971, 73 percent of CDU members were Catholic and 25 percent Protestant. The Catholic Church supported the CDU rather openly, while the Protestant Church did not take as clear a stand ([Schmitt, 1989](#), 78ff). Among churchgoing, conservative Protestants, the CDU was more successful than the SPD ([Haungs, 1983](#), 23; [Schmitt, 1989](#)).

In comparison with the Catholic Center Party, the CDU was more clearly a right-wing party, representing upper-class interests. The integration of upper-class Protestants in the party meant that the Catholic workers' wing was relegated to an internal leftist opposition ([Schmitt, 1989](#), 79,




FIGURE 3.3 Percentages of parties in West German national elections, 1949–83  
Source: Zicht, 1999.

219). CDU membership was dominated by white-collar employees and the self-employed, who also made up the majority of the CDU's representatives in the NRW parliament (Düding, 2008, 519). Workers made up around 11 percent of the CDU's membership in 1980 compared to around 28 percent of the SPD's membership in 1978 (von Beyme, 1985, 214f). Seventeen percent of CDU members were union members (Haungs, 1983, 36). Women were more likely to vote CDU than men and the CDU had a slightly higher percentage of female members than the SPD (Haungs, 1983, 22, 36).

The educational attainment of CDU members and members of parliament was a little higher than that of SPD members. In 1947, 47.8 percent of the CDU's representatives in the NRW parliament had only attended the *Volksschule*, and by 1966, this share had dropped to 25.6 percent (Düding, 2008, 516). In 1971, 19 percent of CDU members on the national level had completed the *Abitur* and, by 1977, the percentage was 28 percent (Haungs, 1983, 36). The educational attainment of CDU voters was considerably lower than among its members (Haungs, 1983, 37). The CDU was more successful than the SPD in rural areas, especially in Catholic-dominated

areas. In such areas, and also in small and middle-sized towns, workers, especially qualified workers, tended to vote CDU (Haungs, 1983, 22f).

Over time, the SPD turned from a party dominated by workers into a party of public employees, teachers, and social workers. In 1972, one-third of the members belonged to the age group of sixteen to twenty-four-year-olds (Walter, 2011, 178f). This development was reflected in the educational attainment of its representatives in the NRW parliament. In the first postwar parliament, 78 percent of the SPD representatives had only attended the *Volksschule*, against 7.8 percent who had completed the *Abitur* exam. By 1966, 46.4 percent were *Volksschule* graduates, while 41.4 percent had completed the *Abitur* (Düding, 2008, 516). Among the members of the SPD, the share of *Abitur* graduates was not as high. In 1977, it was 15 percent. In the same year, 53 percent of the SPD's members were Protestant and 28 percent Catholic (Haungs, 1983, 36). The SPD cooperated with the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB), founded in 1949. Despite the DGB's formal independence of party politics, the trade unions were dominated by social democrats. The DGB unions organized a little more than 30 percent of German wage earners during the 1960s and 1970s (Ebbinghaus, 2002, 9). In 1977, 50 percent of the SPD's members were union members (Haungs, 1983, 36).

The third party in the German national and federal parliaments was the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), which aimed at uniting national and social liberals. The early FDP had its strongholds in urban areas and in Protestant rural areas. It was more successful among Protestants than among Catholics (Vorländer, 2013, 275). In the late 1970s, the members of the FDP were mainly white-collar employees, and some civil servants and self-employed, while the share of workers was around 5 percent (von Beyme, 1985, 213). The FDP's parliamentary representatives in NRW were highly educated compared to the CDU's and especially the SPD's: in the first postwar parliament, only 16.7 percent had not continued their education after the *Volksschule* and this share dropped to zero by 1966. Most FDP representatives were self-employed in most of the election periods before 1980 (Düding, 2008, 516, 519f). In NRW, the early FDP comprised many former Nazi officials, some of whom had excellent links with industrial leaders. The social liberal current became more influential during the 1960s and 1970s (Düding, 2008, 50ff, 295ff, 626ff).

Finally, the German Communist Party (KPD) disappeared from NRW's parliament in 1954 and was banned in 1956 (Düding, 2008, 334ff). In 1968, a new Communist Party, the DKP, was founded, but it

never secured any seats in parliament. Its members played a role in some unions, including the Education and Science Workers' Union.

In contrast to Norway, majority governments were the rule. Until 1966, the CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU governed on the national level, from 1961 on only with the FDP (Table 3.7). The SPD joined the national government for the first time in 1966, in a coalition with the CDU/CSU. By 1969, the balance of power had changed to the extent that Willy Brandt became the first SPD chancellor, forming a government with the FDP. From 1974 until 1982, this coalition was continued under Helmut Schmidt (SPD).

In NRW, the SPD governed for the first time with the FDP from 1956 to 1958. In 1958, the CDU secured the absolute majority in the NRW elections and governed for another eight years. NRW became a "red" federal state in 1966, when the tide turned in the SPD's favor and NRW became a stronghold of the SPD for many decades to come.

In terms of membership, the SPD had long been strong but had been weakened by splits and Nazi dictatorship (Walter, 2011, 27f). In the postwar decades, the SPD still had more members than the CDU, but membership only approached a million again in 1975 (Table 3.8). In 1961, 0.66 percent of the national electorate were members of the CDU compared to 1.72 percent that were members of the SPD. By 1976, these numbers had increased to 1.55 percent for the CDU and 2.43 percent for the SPD (Katz et al., 1992, 341). The FDP's members made up 0.19 percent of the national electorate in 1976 (Katz et al., 1992, 341). Comparing the membership numbers of SPD and CDU in NRW and their national membership shows that the CDU had a comparably strong membership base in NRW. This is related to the strength of its predecessor, the Center Party and to the importance of political Catholicism in this region.

With respect to party finances, the figures in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 should not be overinterpreted, as the numbers vary from year to year and are not very reliable. Parties have "considerable discretion" regarding the interpretation of column headings in their financial reports (Poguntke/Boll, 1992, 319). On average, however, they show that the CDU, and in some years the FDP, received more donations than the SPD. The CDU's parliamentary groups also employed more people. Due to the SPD's strong membership base and stable election results, its financial resources were nonetheless not much smaller.

### Teachers' Organizations

Teachers in West Germany, and NRW, belonged to many different organizations. One of the most important was the Education and Science

TABLE 3.7 *West German and North Rhine–Westphalia governments and ministers of education over time*

Years	Composition of national government	Minister of education	Years	Composition of NRW government	Minister of education
1949–63	CDU (Chancellor Konrad Adenauer), with various small parties; from 1961 only with CSU and FDP	No such ministry	1950–4	CDU ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Karl Arnold), Center Party	Christine Teusch (CDU)
1963–6	CDU (Chancellor Ludwig Erhard), CSU, FDP	No such ministry	1954–6	CDU ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Karl Arnold), FDP, Center Party	Werner Schütz (CDU)
1966–9	CDU (Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger), CSU, SPD	No such ministry	1956–8	SPD ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Fritz Steinhoff), FDP, Center Party	Paul Luchtenberg (FDP)
1969–74	SPD (Chancellor Willy Brandt), FDP	Hans Leussink (no party affiliation) 1969–72, Klaus von Dohnanyi (SPD) 1972–4	1958–62	CDU ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Franz Meyers)	Werner Schütz (CDU)
1974–82	SPD (Chancellor Helmut Schmidt), FDP	Helmut Rohde (SPD) 1974–8, Jürgen Schmude (SPD) 1978–82	1962–6	CDU ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Franz Meyers), FDP	Paul Mikat (CDU)
			1966–78	SPD ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Heinz Kühn), FDP	Fritz Holthoff (SPD) 1966–70; Jürgen Girsensohn (SPD) 1970–83
			1978–98	SPD ( <i>Ministerpräsident</i> Johannes Rau), with FDP; from 1980 SPD majority	Jürgen Girsensohn (SPD) 1970–83; Hans Schwier (SPD) 1983–95

TABLE 3.8 Party membership in West Germany over time

Year	CDU	CDU NRW <sup>b</sup>	SPD	SPD NRW <sup>c</sup>	FDP	FDP NRW
1960	248 484 <sup>a</sup>	103 506	649 578	169 601		
1965						14 032
1970	329 239	121 899	820 202	224 279	56 531	18 515
1975	590 482		998 471	293 761	74 032	
1980	693 320	260 444	986 872	293 738	84 208	26 546

<sup>a</sup> Figure from 1962. <sup>b</sup> Figures are sums of the party chapters of CDU Rheinland and Westfalen-Lippe; figure for 1960 is from 1962; figure for 1980 is from November 1979. <sup>c</sup> Figures are sums of the party chapters of SPD Mittelrhein, Niederrhein, Westliches-Westfalen, Ostwestfalen-Lippe; figures always from the last calendar day of the previous year.  
*Sources:* Poguntke/Boll, 1992, 332; *Jahrbücher der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* 1958–9, 1968–9, 1975–7, 1979–81; *Archiv des Liberalismus, Bestand Druckschriften*; *Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik* (ACDP), *Pressedokumentation*; own calculations.

Workers’ Union (*Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft*, GEW), founded in 1948. Historically, it had its roots in the largest organization of primary schoolteachers during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the *Deutscher Lehrerverein* (DLV), founded in 1871. The union was open to anyone working in the education system. In 1970, 23 percent of the members were primary schoolteachers and 49 percent were *Hauptschule* teachers. The *Hauptschule* had been turned into a separate lower-secondary school based on the former upper stage of the *Volksschule*. Eleven percent were teachers at a *Realschule*, 6 percent were teachers at a special school, 4 percent were *Gymnasium* teachers, and 3 percent were university staff (Körffgen, 1986, 186). Like its predecessor, the DLV, the Education and Science Workers’ Union was non-denominational, but in 1970, three-quarters of the members were Protestants and 16 percent Catholics. Most members worked in large or small cities, with only 21 percent in rural areas (Kopitzsch, 1983, 295; Körffgen, 1986, 186). It was the only teachers’ organization that was affiliated with the DGB.

Primary schoolteachers had long been divided based on denomination and gender, as Catholic teachers and female teachers had founded separate, large organizations. Protestant teachers also sometimes founded separate organizations, but these were much smaller and less influential than the Catholic teachers’ associations, especially in Prussia (Pöggeler, 1977).



TABLE 3.9 *Numbers of paid staff of West German parties over time*

Year	CDU			SPD			FDP		
	Central	Subnational	Parliamentary	Central	Subnational	Parliamentary	Central	Subnational	Parliamentary
1962–3		224			288				
1970	150		344			282			37
1975	229		434		330	334			92
1980	218	256 <sup>a</sup>	651	67	348	567			105

<sup>a</sup> Figure from 1982.

*Note:* Figures include part-time and full-time positions in the central and subnational administrations and the parliamentary groups of the parties.

*Source:* Poguntke/Boll, 1992, 338ff.

TABLE 3.10 *Income of party head offices in West Germany over time (in deutsche marks)*

CDU				
Years	Income from members, MPs, and office holders <sup>b</sup>	State subvention <sup>a</sup>	Donations	Other
1960		2 180 000		
1970	2 324 785	2 657 574	2 644 748	12
1975	7 934 605	15 245 339	6 139 106	0
1980	10 358 376	18 202 951	11 365 298	0
SPD				
Years	Income from members, MPs, and office holders <sup>c</sup>	State subvention <sup>a</sup>	Donations	Other
1960	3 644 895	1 127 979	38 340	196 668
1970	4 672 499	4 148 133	1 719 069	0
1975	7 301 798	23 366 687	5 626 055	0
1980	10 843 156	27 232 888	943 856	0
FDP				
Years	Income from members, MPs, and office holders <sup>d</sup>	State subvention <sup>a</sup>	Donations	Other
1960		410 000		
1970	1 028	560 819	1 014 656	213 596
1975	2 445	4 258 316	4 736 834	23 430
1980	8 839	9 097 138	4 125 650	299 153

<sup>a</sup> 1960: direct state subsidies to parties; from 1967 to 1983 only elections subsidies. <sup>b</sup> Income of central party from membership fees and assignments from office holders of central party, federal ancillary organizations, lower-level organizations. <sup>c</sup> 1960: transfers from regional organizations, special transfers, assignments from office holders; 1970/75/80 income of central party from membership fees and assignments from office holders. <sup>d</sup> Only membership fees from FDP members living abroad. No assignments from office holders.  
Source: Poguntke/Boll, 1992, 378ff.

In 1889, the Catholic Teachers’ Association (*Katholischer Lehrerverband*) was founded in Bochum (Bölling, 1978, 33ff; Tymister, 1965). In 1890, female Catholic teachers founded the Association of German Catholic Female Teachers (*Verein katholischer deutscher*

*Lehrerinnen*, VkdL), which still exists today (Tymister, 1965, 141ff). The VkdL organized mainly *Volksschule* teachers but cooperated with smaller Catholic female teachers' organizations for secondary schoolteachers (Sack, 1998, 122). The *Allgemeiner Deutscher Lehrerinnenverein* was also founded in 1890, a nondenominational organization of female teachers of all school types dominated by Protestant liberal women that was not reestablished after the Second World War (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 92). Female primary schoolteachers more often stemmed from the upper class, while male primary schoolteachers were recruited mainly from the rural middle and lower classes (Bölling 1983, 78, 95ff).

After the Second World War, Catholic and Protestant *Volksschule* teachers refounded their organizations (the *Verband der Katholischen Lehrerschaft Deutschlands*, VKLD, and the *Bund Evangelischer Lehrer*). The *Bund Evangelischer Lehrer* was much smaller than the VKLD. From 1958, these organizations cooperated in the elections for the employee boards at the municipal and federal state level that had been introduced by the NRW government. In 1958, their lists received around 55 percent of the votes, with around 44 percent for the Education and Science Workers' Union (Groß-Albenhausen/Hitpaß, 1993, 85). In 1970, these organizations merged, forming the Association of Education and Upbringing (*Verband Bildung und Erziehung*, VBE). In the 1970s, the Association of Education and Upbringing continued to be the most successful teachers' association in most of the federal employee board elections (*Hauptpersonalratswahlen*) on the primary school and *Hauptschule* level, though the competition with the Education and Science Workers' Union was close (Verband Bildung und Erziehung, 1980, 111ff).

University-educated teachers at higher secondary schools (from 1955 all called *Gymnasien*) organized in the Association of Philologists, founded as *Vereinsverband akademisch gebildeter Lehrer Deutschland* in 1903, renamed *Deutscher Philologenverband* (DPHV) in 1921 and refounded in 1947. They were well-paid higher civil servants and belonged to the educated upper class (Bölling, 1983, 20ff). They were allied with the smaller and politically less significant Association of German Lower Secondary Schoolteachers (*Verband Deutscher Realschullehrer*).

Unfortunately, data on the financial resources of German teachers' organizations could not be obtained. Membership numbers were also difficult to come by. In NRW, the Education and Science Workers' Union was clearly the largest teachers' organization (Table 3.11). In 1960, the union had around 81 000 members nationally and it grew to around 120 000 members in 1970 and to 192 962 members in 1979

TABLE 3.11 Membership numbers of the main teachers' organizations in North Rhine–Westphalia, 1960–80

Year	Education and Science Workers' Union, NRW	Association of Philologists, NRW	Association of Education and Upbringing, NRW
1960	13 855		
1970	22 416		
1975	29 901		9 284
1976	33 206		
1980		4 334	12 764

Sources: [Verband Bildung und Erziehung, 1980](#), 123; information obtained from Bettina Beftink, GEW NRW, and Uta Brockmann, Philologen-Verband NRW.

([Kopitzsch, 1983](#), 295; [GEW NRW, 1980](#), 53). NRW members made up 19 percent of the national membership, which is lower than could be expected considering that NRW comprised around one-third of the West German population ([Kopitzsch, 1983](#), 295; [Körfgen, 1986](#), 186). It is possible that this is related to the low number of Catholic teachers in the union, who presumably preferred the Association of Education and Upbringing.

The Association of Education and Upbringing and its Catholic predecessor VKLD had significantly more members than the Association of Philologists. On the national level, [Pöggeler \(1977, 367\)](#) estimates that the male and female Catholic teachers' associations together had about 60 000 members in 1960, while the Association of Philologists had about 22 000. The exact membership numbers of the Association of Philologists were not published. [Rösner \(1981, 136\)](#) estimates that the NRW section had about 11 000 members in 1977. Several interviewed experts believed that the actual membership number was significantly lower and that the Association of Philologists kept this secret for political reasons. According to the current staff of the Association of Philologists in NRW, the NRW section had 4 334 members in 1980 ([Table 3.11](#)). This low number might confirm experts' suspicions.

All teachers' organizations were formally independent of party politics. The Education and Science Workers' Union was nonetheless closely connected to the SPD. A poll of members revealed in 1970 that 62 percent of the respondents considered the SPD to be the most "likable" party, compared to 16 percent that preferred the CDU/CSU and 7 percent that

preferred the FDP (Kopitzsch, 1983, 296; Körfigen, 1986, 187). There were also currents of communist and socialist groupings in the union, who opposed the SPD's politics but also each other's standpoints. These internal divisions characterized and weakened the union (see Chapter 5).

The Association of Philologists and the Association of Education and Upbringing were both affiliated with the Association of Public Employees (*Deutscher Beamtenbund*), a federation of non-social democratic public employees' organizations. The Association of Public Employees mostly refrained from taking part in the school debates because the differences of opinion between its teachers' organizations were so great. The Association of Philologists was politically closest to the CDU which should not be taken to mean that the association was always content with the CDU's politics. The interviewed experts all agreed that the Association of Philologists was a representative of "societal power" (Anke Brunn, SPD politician) that organized the "leading people" (Jürgen Hinrichs, former FDP politician).

Due to its Catholic roots, the Association of Education and Upbringing was originally also closely connected to the CDU but it harbored SPD politicians too, such as NRW's minister of education from 1966 to 1970, Fritz Holthoff. Over time, the Association of Education and Upbringing emancipated itself increasingly from the CDU. The former CDU politician Wilhelm Lenz, who was also managing director of the Association of Public Employees in NRW (*Deutscher Beamtenbund NRW*) from 1953 to 1984, made some interesting remarks with respect to the teachers' organizations' relations with the parties. In his view, the Association of Education and Upbringing played a similar role for the CDU as the Education and Science Workers' Union played for the SPD:

The Education and Science Workers' Union influenced the SPD but within the SPD it wasn't that well liked. "Those are nutjobs" and so forth. For us that was at times the Association of Education and Upbringing. However – how should I put this? – [they did] more objective work. And you could talk to them. (expert interview)

Most interviewed experts perceived the Education and Science Workers' Union and the Association of Philologists as ideological antipoles, while the Association of Education and Upbringing was considered more moderate.

### Other Actors

A few other actors should be mentioned. The Organization Comprehensive School (*Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft Gesamtschule*) was founded in 1969

in Dortmund, NRW, as a network of reform-oriented teachers, parents, social scientists, and politicians. In 1972, it merged with the NRW Working Group for Comprehensive Schooling (*Arbeitskreis Gesamtschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen*) and subsequently developed regional chapters in all federal states. By 1980, it had around 4 000 members (Lohmann, 2016, 2).

On the national level, reform-oriented social scientists, pedagogues, and politicians exchanged opinions through the German Educational Council (*Deutscher Bildungsrat*), founded in 1965. In 1970, an administrative Commission for Educational Planning comprising representatives of the national and federal governments was created to coordinate German education politics (*Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung*, 1973).

Parents' associations played a role, not least within the NRW movement against the cooperative school. In terms of financial resources, this movement was well endowed with funds it received from the CDU. Employers' organizations and the chambers of commerce were engaged in education politics, but more in vocational than in general education. For the upper-secondary level, employers opposed the integration of the upper grades of the *Gymnasium* with vocational schools. They were not among the most involved actors in the debates about comprehensive lower-secondary schooling. The Catholic and the Protestant Church influenced education politics in NRW to a higher degree than today but were most engaged in the debates about denominational schooling.

#### COMPARISON: PLAYING FIELDS IN POSTWAR EDUCATION POLITICS

Overall, the Norwegian and North Rhine–Westphalian political playing fields were clearly similar, yet there are also some important differences (Table 3.12). In Norway, the political center played a more important and complex role. The Liberal Party, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats were based primarily on the center-periphery, the rural-urban, and the state-church cleavage, respectively. However, all three center parties were anchored in the rural periphery and struggled for votes from rural, religious, working- and middle-class groups.

For both the Labor Party and the Conservative Party, alliances with the center were a precondition for successful policymaking. The Labor Party was based primarily on the class cleavage but became a cross-class party over time, including sections of the rural and urban working- and middle-class population. It represented the periphery in center-periphery

TABLE 3.12 Overview of most relevant actors in education politics, 1950s–1970s

	Norway	West Germany
Political left	Labor Party Socialist Left Party	SPD
Political center	Center Party Liberal Party Christian Democrats	FDP
Political right	Conservative Party	CDU
Primary schoolteachers	Norwegian Teachers' Association ( <i>Norsk Lærerlag</i> ); Female Teachers' Association ( <i>Norges Lærerinnelag</i> ) (until 1966)	Education and Science Workers' Union (GEW); Association of Education and Upbringing (VBE) (and its Catholic predecessor VKLD)
Secondary schoolteachers	Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers ( <i>Norsk Lektorlag</i> )	Association of Philologists

conflicts. Norway's Conservative Party, on the other hand, was an urban middle- and upper-class party, which organized few workers compared to the German CDU and to other Norwegian parties, and was weak in rural areas. It represented the interests of higher civil servants, especially in the political center Oslo. The conservatives were socially far removed from the members and voters of the center parties. Rather than within the Conservative Party, Christian workers and farmers more often organized themselves in the party of the Norwegian Christian Democrats. The membership of the Center Party and the Norwegian Liberal Party was also quite diverse in terms of class background.

In Germany, the FDP also played an important role as “kingmaker” for both the social and the Christian democrats. But the social profile of the FDP was more dominated by upper-class groups than that of the political center in Norway. The SPD gave organizational expression to the class cleavage and was strong among workers but not very successful in rural areas. The CDU represented the interests of parts of the upper class but was also a cross-class party. Many of the social groups organized by the center parties in Norway were found within the ranks of the CDU in Germany. This is true of farmers and the rural population, people with

a strong Christian identity, including women, and other sections of the middle classes. German social democrats and liberals also attempted to organize these groups, but they did it less successfully than the CDU. This is due to the high salience of the state-church cleavage. In state-church conflicts, the CDU represented the interests of the Catholic Church and the Catholic population, including Catholic workers, and of conservative Protestants, while the FDP and the SPD stood for the secularization of the state, including the education system.

In terms of power resources, both social democratic parties were strong, but the election results of the Norwegian Labor Party were more impressive. It governed for the most part through minority governments, which implies that coalition-making on single issues was important. In NRW and Germany as a whole, the balance of power between the social democrats and Christian democrats was not as clear, but overall the CDU was more influential. In NRW, this was especially true in the 1950s and early 1960s. From 1966, NRW turned into a “red” federal state, and from this point on social democrats had a greater chance of putting their political agenda into practice in a coalition with the FDP.

The parties of the political right received more donations than their social democratic opponents in both countries and had significant financial resources. However, financial resources and membership numbers were apparently not the most important determinants of political power. The Norwegian Conservative Party had many members and was well endowed with funds, but the electoral successes of the social democrats illustrate that ideological hegemony was more on their side. On the other hand, the German and North Rhine–Westphalian social democrats had significant incomes due to their high membership numbers. The fact that they did not manage to achieve a compromise more favorable to their program in education politics can therefore not be explained by a lack of financial resources.

Among the teachers’ organizations, the German Association of Philologists and the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers (*Norsk Lektorlag*) both represented teachers with comparatively high social backgrounds. They were smaller than the other teachers’ organizations, but well connected with the parties of the political right. The politically influential German Association of Philologists had surprisingly few members.

The major difference regarding teachers’ organizational structures can be found among the organizations of primary schoolteachers (the former *Volksschule/folkeskole* teachers). These teachers were organizationally



more united in Norway. In Germany, they were split into several organizations along the state-church cleavage. In Norway, the division of primary schoolteachers based on gender was an expression not only of the gender cleavage but also of urban-rural and class cleavages, since female teachers had more urban, upper-class backgrounds. However, this split was overcome in 1966. Groups of communist teachers could be found in the teachers' organizations of both countries. However, the communist-socialist cleavage was much more salient within the German Education and Science Workers' Union.

In conclusion, the distribution of power resources between all these political actors was clearly politically relevant. In Norway, the political left and primary schoolteachers were somewhat more powerful, which presumably facilitated comprehensive school reform attempts. However, the differences were not so overwhelming as to preclude any alternative political outcomes. More importantly, the distribution of power resources should be considered partly a result of successful political coalition-making, rather than a potential explanation for such coalitions. It cannot tell us anything about *how* Norwegian social democrats managed to become a cross-class party and to build cross-interest coalitions with the parties of the political center or *how* the CDU managed to uphold its intra-party cross-interest coalition in education politics. Or, to put it differently, power resources alone cannot explain why similar social groups turned into consenters to comprehensive schooling in the Norwegian case, but into antagonists in the German case. We must therefore explore the political processes, including the ideological expressions of cleavages and actors' attempts at coalition-making, in detail.

## The Class Cleavage

### *Struggles over Comprehensive Schooling*

This chapter explores the comprehensive school reforms of the 1950s to 1970s and examines how such reforms were legitimized or put into question ideologically. The analysis demonstrates how actors grouped into ideological camps along a political left-right axis in both cases, into protagonists, consenters, and antagonists of these reforms. The struggles around comprehensive school reforms should therefore be seen as an ideological expression of the class cleavage. However, political parties and teachers' organizations were not united, but most of the time divided internally into different wings that supported or opposed comprehensive schooling to different degrees. The most palpable difference between the cases is that the political right was ideologically comparatively more united in Germany, while the political left was more united in Norway. The ideological arguments that were used in debates about comprehensive schooling also differ markedly. Comparatively radical and leftist arguments became hegemonic in Norway, but not in Germany.

#### THE NORWEGIAN YOUTH SCHOOL REFORM

The introduction of a comprehensive lower-secondary school, the youth school, and the extension of obligatory schooling to nine years were first debated in Norway in the early 1950s. In 1954, a law on school experiments was passed unanimously. In 1959, parliament was split over the issue of whether the old school types, *realskole* and *framhaldsskole*, should be allowed to participate in experiments with nine-year obligatory schooling. The 1960s were characterized by debates about organizational differentiation. The two tracks of the youth school were replaced with

a system of ability grouping and elective subjects. In 1969, the law on primary schools regularized the youth school and finalized the abolition of the old school types but did not contain specific rules for differentiation. During the 1970s it was discussed whether grades in the youth school should be abolished. After a fierce public debate, the abolition of grading in the youth school was abandoned. With the curriculum of 1974, ability grouping was given up, and from 1979 the directives of the Ministry of Education stated that permanent ability grouping was unlawful until the ninth grade. Children were now taught in mixed-ability classes (*sammenholdte klasser*), based on the idea of pedagogical differentiation within the classroom. In the following, this development is examined chronologically in more detail.

### Experiments with the First Youth Schools and Nine-Year Obligatory Schooling

The introduction of the youth school (*ungdomsskole*) was first suggested in 1952 by a commission (*Samordningsnemnda*) that had been put in place in 1947 to discuss the internal coordination of the education system (Telhaug, 1969, 24ff). In the spring of 1954, the Ministry of Education, led by the social democrat Birger Bergersen, proposed the law on experiments in the school (*lov om forsøk i skolen*), which was passed after little debate in June 1954. The law did not contain any details on the future school structure. It simply opened up the possibility for experiments. It instituted the Experimental Council (*Forskningsrådet*), which was intended to coordinate school experiments in line with the law (Mediås, 2010, 43). It was stipulated that the council should inform parliament about the experiments regularly. The law gave the ministry decision-making power as far as all school experiments were concerned. Far-reaching competencies were transferred from parliament to the ministry (Slagstad, 2001, 379ff; Telhaug, 1969, 32).

Conservative Party representatives made some minor suggestions for changes, but when these failed the law was passed unanimously (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, June 17, 1954, 173f; *Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, June 22, 1954, 75ff). At the time, the Conservative Party had no clear education-political profile but was internally split. One of its leading education politicians, Erling Fredriksfryd, consented to the youth school reform. Fredriksfryd was a primary schoolteacher and a parliamentary representative of the Conservative Party from 1945 to 1965. From 1958 to 1965, he was chair of the parliamentary education committee. In 1957, he

was chair of a commission within the Conservative Party that drafted the party's education-political manifesto. The program he stood for was summarized in the Conservative Party's electoral manifesto of 1957:

The Conservative Party wants to realize eight years of obligatory schooling for everyone as soon as possible. The organization of the school must be reorganized so that we obtain a six-year primary school and a three-year lower-secondary school. Obligatory schooling will comprise the primary school and the two first years of the lower-secondary school. The third lower-secondary school year shall be voluntary for the time being and give access to upper-secondary education [*gymnas*] (3-years). [...] Within the new lower-secondary school, it must be possible to differentiate based on predispositions, abilities, and future choice of profession through careful tracking which does not weaken the general education an obligatory school first and foremost must preserve. [...] In this way, the Conservative Party wants to actively advocate the creation of equal conditions of education for all youths, without regard to one's place of residence and economic living conditions.

Later, Fredriksfryd published two brochures that explained the details (Fredriksfryd, 1960, 1965). Notably, the lower-secondary school envisaged by Fredriksfryd was meant to replace the parallel school types of the *realskole* and the *framhaldsskole*. There was no consensus within the Conservative Party about this.

In 1955, the first three experimental youth schools with two internal tracks (*linjedelt ungdomsskole*) were founded in the municipalities of Malm (in the county of Nord-Trøndelag), Sykkylven, and Ørsta (in the county of Møre og Romsdal). In 1957, experiments began in seven more counties, in 1958 in another six, and in 1959 in the last twelve (Telhaug, 1969, 36). The ninth school year was not obligatory, so many students in the experimental schools dropped out. The Experimental Council therefore suggested to parliament that experiments should be started with nine years of obligatory schooling (Myhre, 1971, 113).

In the Labor Party's manifesto for 1958–61, it was stated,

The Labor Party is of the opinion that the future expansion of schooling shall aim at an expansion of the primary school to a nine-year general comprehensive school which will become obligatory for everyone. The nine-year comprehensive school must be organized in such a way that the upper grades of the primary school become a youth school which will replace *framhaldsskole* and *realskole*. [...] The Labor Party wants to erase the class division which is rooted in unequal educational opportunities.

In line with this, the Ministry of Education proposed a new *folkeskole* law in 1958 (*Ot. prp. nr. 30* [1958], *Lov om folkeskolen*). In contrast to the experimental law of 1954, this proposal caused a lot of debate and split

the educational parliamentary committee and parliament itself. The law made it possible for municipalities to introduce nine years of obligatory schooling, after consultation with the local school board and the ministry. The most highly contested point was whether the old school types, *real-skole* and *framhaldsskole*, should be allowed to participate in the experiments with nine-year obligatory schooling (Telhaug, 1969, 55ff). The opposition parties, meaning the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats, the Center Party, and the Liberal Party, wanted to include the old school types, but the Labor Party did not. The Labor Party had seven representatives on the parliamentary education committee, while the opposition parties had six. In the committee's statement on the proposition (*Innstilling fra kirke- og undervisningskomiteen om lov om folkeskolen*, 1959), the division was expressed clearly. The Labor Party majority advocated nine-year comprehensive schooling without any reservations and wished for a final decision to be made.

The oppositional minority suggested that the municipalities themselves should choose whether to introduce nine-year obligatory schooling through the new youth school or the old school types. The debates on March 13, 1959, in the two chambers of the Norwegian parliament were lively (*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959; *Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959). Labor Party representatives pointed to the weaknesses of the *realskole*, which they considered to be overcrowded and lead to exclusion, and of the *framhaldsskole*, which they considered to be lacking quality. They saw parallel schooling as "costly, irrational, and unfortunate in many ways," especially in rural areas (Labor Party representative Anders Sæterøy, *Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 21). Trygve Bull, member of the parliamentary education committee for the Labor Party, expressed that, in the eyes of the Labor Party majority, the comprehensive principle itself was not to be subjected to experiments. Only the inner life of the school and its internal differentiation, pedagogy, and so forth should be developed further through experimental activity. Bull said,

What the majority wishes is to set a binding aim for the further development of the general children and youth school in our country. Without such a binding aim the development of the school system – and thereunder not least the building of schoolhouses all around in villages and cities – can come to pass under coincidental and shifting principles, and there will be a high degree of danger for significant false investments. The majority wants it to be asserted clearly and unambiguously that the social comprehensive school principle, which has been the basis of our seven-year *folkeskole* soon for 40 years, will in the future also be extended to the

two following years. (Trygve Bull, in *Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 3)

Clearly, the Labor Party cannot be accused of making a secret of its ambitions. The aim was to exclude any possibility of survival for the old school types. This was justified by the necessity to create equal educational opportunities, independent of economic, social, and geographical background. The ambition to overcome the parallel lower-secondary-school system was rooted in the conviction that it was necessary to achieve social levelling and break down educational middle- and upper-class and urban privileges. Such privileges had not been very exclusive in Norway to start with, but they were real (Aubert et al., 1960). The old school types were associated with different degrees of status and attended by students with different class backgrounds (Lindbekk, 1968, 1973, 88ff; *Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomiteén av 1963* [1965], 129). This inequality was unacceptable in the eyes of the Labor Party. In the words of the Labor Party politician Gudmund Hernes,

It was the underlying philosophy, that if you want tolerance and this type of mutual respect, [...] then they must learn to mix with one another. And you learn that at school. The school is the arena for this. So that was [...] an important part of the reason that one did not want to preserve the old class structure which came to expression through the school structure but change the school structure to create a different society. So you can say that it was an entirely different view of the school, [using] the school to preserve what is, with school types for different classes, now I'm saying it pointedly, to a situation where you are [...] using the school to create a more equal society. (expert interview)

Besides Fredriksfryd, there were two other conservative politicians on the parliamentary education committee at the time of the debates about the law of 1959: Per Lønning and Hartvig Caspar Christie. Christie was parliamentary representative of the Conservative Party from 1950 to 1959 and Lønning from 1958 to 1965. According to Lønning, Christie “represented the absolute oppositional extreme” compared to Fredriksfryd, and, as a result, “one noticed rather quickly that there developed a certain opposition within the conservative group of the committee” (expert interview). When the conservative parliamentary group prepared the parliamentary debate about the new *folkeskole* law, it was decided that Lønning should be the speaker for the party on this issue. Lønning described this in the following way:

Fredriksfryd was good at hiding his disappointment. But he did consider himself to be the Conservative Party's number one education politician. And I had no

experience as a primary schoolteacher. [...] There were many in the Conservative Party's group at the time who thought it was very nice that they had me who represented [...] the young people and the future but who at the same time was critical of the social democratic Swedish education politics. [...] They thought that it was very good to have me on that committee to keep the committee's chair somewhat in check. And [...] he was of average intellectual ability. And he wasn't the kind who ... even if he also spoke a few times in this *folkeskole* debate ... he was not very skeptical of the law proposal [...]. So he learned very quickly that he shouldn't get into a discussion with me because he had nothing to win on that and above all he didn't have the support of the majority of the Conservative Party's group to stir up such a war on his own. They trusted that [...] I would represent faith in the individual and critical moderation. (expert interview)

In the debates of 1959, Lønning and especially Christie showed skepticism of the comprehensive principle. Christie stated that the term "comprehensive school" (*enhetsskole*) had become "a propagandistic buzzword which is therefore little suited for a school program" (*Forhandling i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959, 46). In his opinion, the *realskole* had been a good school that could not be blamed for its overcrowding by people who did not belong there. Instead, the alternative schools – meaning the *framhaldsskole* – had not been good enough and needed to be improved, not abolished. Lønning suggested that there had to be room for future school structures that differed from the "dogmatic comprehensive school scheme" of the Labor Party and warned that the danger lay in "over-emphasizing unity and thereby elevating the holy general average to the main norm" (*Forhandling i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959, 14f). Differentiation in the youth school was essential in his eyes. Nonetheless, Lønning stated,

Personally I expect [...] that the so-called comprehensive school will potentially offer us a more richly differentiated school type with greater possibilities to preserve the individual student's abilities and dispositions than the school types we have today. I expect this but I don't see a reason to turn an assumption into a norm for future development. (*Forhandling i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959, 15)

In the expert interview, Lønning explained that he supported the tracked youth school because he believed that "tracking could point towards a type of differentiation where the intellectual, [...] theoretical track's advantage is underlined anew." Presumably for this reason, Lønning supported Fredriksfryd in adding a special remark to the parliamentary education committee's report regarding the law. Here, the two of them indicated that they expected the tracked comprehensive school to become "the school type on which it will [...] be advisable to build obligatory

primary education” in the future but that they thought that for the time being it should also be permissible to experiment based on the old school types (*lmnst. O. II.* (1959), 11). Christie did not support this remark. In contrast to Christie’s and Lønning’s antagonism, Fredriksfryd underlined the many agreements between all committee members in the parliamentary debate and pointed out that, in his view, disagreements were merely a matter of nuances (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5, 1959, 61).

The Center Party’s representatives, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats voted with the Conservative Party against the *folkeskole* law of 1959, but the reasons for their skepticism were different from the Conservative Party’s. For example, the Center Party representative Inge Einarsen Bartnes stated in the parliamentary debate that the main reason for his “mixed feelings” was his worry about whether there would be sufficient financial means for rural municipalities to execute the provisions of the law (*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 9). The Christian Democratic representative Erling Wikborg agreed that those municipalities with the worst financial conditions had to “come first in line” but also pointed out that one of the things about this reform that appealed to him most was that “we shall achieve greater equality at the outset.” In fact, he considered it “an unquestionable advantage that one, for so many years, will attend school with other youths who have completely different preconditions than oneself” (*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 18).

The Liberal Party representative Sivert Todal specified that comprehensive schooling in grades eight and nine should be introduced more “gradually” so that the municipalities that had not even managed to comply with the *folkeskole* law of 1936 would have sufficient time and flexibility during a “transitional period” (*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 16). His fellow party member Bert Røiseland warned against forcing municipalities to teach all tracks in the same building, as this could lead to “forced centralization” (*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, 26). According to the interviewed expert Hans Olav Tunesvik, there was a certain “nostalgia” within the center parties regarding the abolition of the *realskole*, since this school type had produced such good results in some places. However, many rural municipalities did not have *realskoler*. Even where they did exist, only a small percentage of rural age cohorts attended them. The main worry of the center parties was thus not the abolition of the *realskole*; rather, they worried whether rural municipalities would have sufficient means and flexibility to manage the transition to nine-year obligatory schooling.



The opposition was supported in its skepticism by the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers. In 1956, the association's yearly convention passed a statement against the abolition of the *realskole* and warned against any lowering of the *realskole*'s standard (Hagemann, 1992, 265; Marmøy, 1968, 49ff). In 1959, the association complained about not having been heard during the preparation of the *folkeskole* law and asked for the law proposal to be withdrawn (Marmøy, 1968, 56ff; Telhaug, 1969, 53). The secondary schoolteachers argued that the law proposal was not well prepared, that it anticipated the results of unfinished experiments, and that the powers it gave the ministry were too extensive (Marmøy, 1968, 59). There had been no commission to prepare the law, as had been usual earlier (Telhaug, 1969, 53f). Within the organization, the reforms were also critically discussed on the local level, where antagonistic voices could be heard in many places (Marmøy, 1968, 54ff).

The Female Teachers' Association was also skeptical of the law of 1959, however for somewhat different reasons. Female teachers supported prolonged obligatory schooling but opposed the abolition of the *framhaldsskole*. They were worried that education in homemaking would lose ground. Many of them did not have the necessary educational qualifications to teach in more academic lower-secondary schools, so the reform potentially threatened their jobs (Hagemann, 1992, 270ff). The small association of *framhaldsskole* teachers opposed a merger of the old school types for similar reasons. However, many *framhaldsskole* teachers and female teachers were instead organized in the largest teachers' association, the Norwegian Teachers' Association. Representatives of the Norwegian Teachers' Association had been more involved in the preparation of the law than the other teachers' organizations, as they had good personal contacts with the leaders of the Experimental Council and the ministry. They agreed with the Labor Party's ideological justifications of the reform but also profited from it structurally since the youth school was to become a part of the obligatory primary school. This opened up job opportunities for primary schoolteachers. For these reasons, they supported the reform wholeheartedly (Hagemann, 1992, 251ff).

Despite the opposition's caveats, the law was passed by the Labor Party's majority. From this point on, any municipality that wanted to introduce nine-year obligatory schooling had to do so by introducing the youth school as a new school type. Usually, the youth school would last three years, and the *folkeskole* would therefore be shortened to six years, but a seven-year *folkeskole* and a two-year youth school were also

possible. Municipalities that already had *realskoler* could introduce a nonobligatory tenth school year.

### Experiments with Reduced Organizational Differentiation

To begin with, the youth school was divided into vocational and academic tracks resembling the older school types. The tracks began in the second year of the youth school and were distinguished in the beginning mainly by whether learning a foreign language was obligatory. During the last year, the students following the practical track had fewer hours of mathematics, social sciences, and natural sciences and instead could choose from the subjects shop-floor work, homemaking, office work, agriculture, or fishing and seafaring (Telhaug, 1969, 68). The experimental curriculum from 1960 included ability grouping through *kursplaner* (course plans). There were three ability levels in Norwegian, mathematics, and English, while there were two in German and natural sciences. The curriculum designed by the Experimental Council suggested ability grouping from the first year of the youth school, the seventh grade – in other words, at an earlier point than had been usual in the old seven-year *folkeskole*. In a parliamentary debate on June 8, 1961, it became clear that the parliamentary majority did not want this. The Labor Party representatives, but also the representatives of the center parties, thought that there should be no ability grouping in the first year of the youth school and tracking should generally be more flexible.

Again, one of the arguments used by the center parties, for example by Center Party representative Einar Hovdhaugen, was that later differentiation in the new youth school would allow greater “elasticity” for rural municipalities (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, 3479). Hovdhaugen also warned that “it would be a disaster if one’s IQ should be a criterion for the choice of track” and suggested that experiments with ability grouping should be expanded to overcome the problems with current forms of differentiation. It was important to the Center Party that differentiation would not produce “losers” and lead to student apathy (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, 3480). The Christian Democrat Hans Karolus Ommedal expressed his concerns that ability grouping might lead to disorder in the school and pointed to the small rural schools as good examples of how the common teaching of all students in the classroom could be accomplished (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, 3487).

The Conservative Party alone had not taken a position for or against tracking and ability grouping in the seventh grade and wanted experiments with different models of tracking to continue, arguing that it was necessary to adapt schooling to individuals' abilities (*Forhandler i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961). For this, they were mocked by the Labor Party politician Håkon Johnsen, secretary of the parliamentary education committee. He complained that the Conservative Party's school manifesto of 1957 had not included tracking in the seventh school year. Johnsen pointed out that, in 1957, Fredriksfryd had been responsible for the development of the Conservative Party's education-political manifesto:

Since then, Mr. Fredriksfryd has been shoved aside and Mr. Lønning, who has a completely different view regarding these issues, acts now as the Conservative Party's speaker in these questions. I must therefore ask: is this just the result of an ambitious young man's sharp elbows, or is it so that the Conservative Party has changed its view on these issues since 1957? (*Forhandler i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, 3475)

Over fifty years later, Lønning mentioned this remark in the expert interview as an example of how the Labor Party attempted to split the opposition parties. Fredriksfryd was not happy about the situation, nor did he give up his stand on the nine-year comprehensive school. But antagonistic voices were slowly becoming louder within the Conservative Party.

Experiments with different curricula, tracking, the introduction of a tenth grade, and ability grouping continued (Seidenfaden, 1977, 18ff). From 1962, students were assessed in relation to their ability group. This meant that the same grades from different ability groups were not worth the same. In 1963, the *folkeskole* committee was set up to work on a law proposal that would end the experimental phase of the introduction of the youth school (Telhaug, 1969, 122). In June 1965, the committee presented a report in which it had drafted reasons for and against various forms of differentiation and evaluation (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965]; Telhaug, 1969, 122ff). One aspect was the question of which combinations of tracks, course plans, and subjects would be necessary to qualify for upper-secondary schooling at the *gymnas*. These schools had introduced the requirement that students had to have attended the highest ability groups in Norwegian, English, German, and mathematics (Telhaug, 1969, 87ff).

The Experimental Council published several revised versions of the experimental curriculum from 1960. These were known as the blue plan (1963), the red plan (1964), and the green plan (1965). In these plans, organizational differentiation was decreased. In the blue plan, tracking

was abolished. The number of obligatory, common subjects for all students rose. Differentiation was now more flexible and based on different choices of elective subjects. It was made possible for all students, no matter what their elective subjects, to choose the highest ability groups in mathematics, English, and Norwegian (Myhre, 1971, 119; Telhaug, 1969, 91ff). In the red plan and the green plan, the number of obligatory subjects was increased further (Myhre, 1971, 120f). In 1965, the Experimental Council started experimenting with mixed-ability classes (*sammenholdte klasser*, literally “kept-together classes”) in Norwegian and, from 1968, in mathematics. This was justified by studies showing that students in different ability groups did not always differ much in ability. The best students in the lowest ability groups were often better than the worst students in the highest group. The groups were not homogeneous (Dokka, 1986, 119ff; Telhaug, 1969, 118). The trend was one toward diminishing organizational differentiation and instead using pedagogical differentiation within the classroom.

The Labor Party, the Socialist People’s Party, and the center parties supported this development, as became clear in the parliamentary debates of 1963, 1965, and 1969 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969; Telhaug 1969, 101ff). In the eyes of the Labor Party and the Socialist People’s Party, the problem with ability grouping was that it reproduced the social inequalities that had characterized the old school types. Children from the upper and middle classes were overrepresented in the higher ability groups (Lindbekk, 1968, 1973; Telhaug, 1969, 143f). The fear was that ability grouping led to a stigmatization of the students in the lowest ability groups. For example, the Socialist People’s Party stated in its manifesto of 1965,

Children and youth schools should be organized so that they serve to equalize social class divisions. The school classes must be kept together most of the time, with the highest possible amount of differentiation within the class.

For the Labor Party, the abolition of organizational differentiation in the youth school was also connected to the aim of increasing the status of practical and vocational education. In its manifesto for 1966–9, the Labor Party stated for example that “practical and theoretical education must be deemed to be of equal value” and that “[t]he school system must not create social divisions as a result of differences in education.”

The center parties did not include any remarks on tracking or ability grouping in their manifestos. The details of differentiation

within the school were not a priority for these parties. Most small rural schools did not have enough students to implement ability grouping anyway (Telhaug, 1969, 143). However, in parliamentary debates the center parties voiced criticism. The Liberal Party representative Torkell Tende pointed out that tracking had meant “only the choice of *framhaldsskole-realskole* in a new version”; to him it seemed advisable to keep classes together, even after the seventh school year, with the help of an individual “differentiation in pace” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3350). The center parties’ representatives disliked the fact that grades in the different ability groups were not worth the same and that this created unfairness with respect to upper-secondary schooling. They also considered ability groups to have a stigmatizing effect. As Center Party representative Einar Hovdhaugen put it,

I’d like to underline that the nine-year school should be a comprehensive school. We are creating divisions here which in my opinion are unfortunate. Those who choose a lower ability group almost have a duty to be a little stupid. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3703)

However, the representatives of the center parties used most of their speaking time during the various parliamentary debates on education during the 1960s to address other issues closer to their hearts (see Chapter 5). They had accepted the fact that the new school type would replace the old parallel school types and rarely referred to earlier disagreements on this issue.

By 1963, the Conservative Party had given up its adherence to tracking, which was now considered to be out of date. Instead, the conservatives suggested expanding experiments with ability grouping. As Per Lønning stated in the parliamentary debate of May 1963, the abolition of tracking should not lead to the abolition of all differentiation (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3312ff; Telhaug, 1969, 101ff). In its manifestos, the Conservative Party made more detailed suggestions than the center parties regarding the development of schooling and differentiation. In 1965, the manifesto stated that the great pressure on schools “must not lead to a lowering of standards.” The manifesto also warned that some duties could only be fulfilled by the home and that one must avoid “creating ideas about society taking over the home’s responsibilities.” It stated that differentiation was necessary and that experiments with various forms of differentiation should be expanded to overcome problems with the current system. In

1969, similar formulations, including a reference to the *realskole*, were included:

The problem of differentiation must be solved through systematic and widespread experiments. Curricula must not be determined before the results of experiments have been thoroughly analyzed. [...] Those students who aim at upper-secondary theoretical education must receive schooling on the same level as in the former *realskole*.

### The Regularization of the Youth School

From 1965 to 1971, the four “nonsocialist parties” – the Conservative Party, the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats – governed, with Per Borten from the Center Party as prime minister. The youth school reform proposal, which the *folkeskole* committee had been preparing since 1963, was followed up. In the spring of 1967, the minister of education, Kjell Bondevik, a Christian democrat, presented the law proposal on the nine-year comprehensive school (*Ot. prp. nr. 59 [1966–7] Lov om grunnskolen*). The minister himself was of the opinion that “one would not have received a strongly differing proposal from another government” (quoted in Telhaug, 1969, 129). The law ended the experimental phase and regularized the new school type, the youth school. The term *folkeskole* (people’s school) was replaced by the more modern term *grunnskole* (primary school), which comprised both the *barneskole* (children’s school) and the *ungdomsskole* (youth school). The law obligated all municipalities to introduce the youth school by 1975 (Mediås, 2010, 45).

In April 1969, the law was passed. The only two representatives who voted against the law were from the Socialist People’s Party. Spokesperson Finn Gustavsen considered the Norwegian school to be too centralized, not democratic enough, and too strongly based on exams. In his view, schools supported a “competition and career mentality” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 288). He also did not support the strong focus on Christian education. The first paragraph of the law (*formålsparagrafen*) had been a source of massive conflict revolving around the relations between church, parents, and the school. In the end, a compromise was reached that was supported by all parties, except the socialists (Tønnessen, 2011, 72f; see Chapter 5).

This outcome was not what the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers had wished for. As indicated by a survey among 1153 *gymnas* teachers in 1969, the introduction of the youth school was hard to

accept for many of them. Over 40 percent of the interviewed teachers agreed fully or mostly with the statement that “the decision to introduce the nine-year school was taken because the many people who disagreed, mostly did not dare to publicly oppose the political buzzwords which were used” (Lauglo, 1972, 9). Almost 70 percent of the interviewed *gymnas* teachers agreed fully or mostly that nine years of obligatory schooling were too much, and 57 percent agreed fully or mostly that the old school forms of the *framhaldsskole* and *realskole* should have been expanded instead of introducing the youth school (Lauglo, 1972, 10). However, the secondary schoolteachers adapted to the conditions and did not organize opposition when the law of 1969 was passed.

The law did not offer any solution to the problems of differentiation, ability grouping, and evaluation. The question of differentiation was avoided. The ministry was hesitant (Telhaug, 1969, 129). Kjeld Langeland, representative of the Conservative Party, explained in the parliamentary debate that it was still too early to make a decision. Experiments had not come far enough (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 256).

There are a few indications that the center parties were more open to the abolition of ability grouping than the Conservative Party. For example, the Liberal Party representative Olav Kortner criticized the Conservative Party’s representative Kjeld Langeland for his choice of words. Langeland had spoken of “so-called social reasons” in relation to parents’ choice of ability group. Kortner did not like the tone of this. His opinion was that ability grouping was creating “considerable social problems” and that it was necessary to “intensify experiments [...] to find more socially beneficial forms [of differentiation], for example forms of mixed-ability classes” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 262).

In the interviews, the experts who had been active in the center parties at the time were asked why their parties did not attempt to reverse the comprehensive school reforms when in government but instead continued on the path that had been laid out by the Labor Party. To this, Hans Olav Tungesvik – then a member of the Liberal Party and later a member of the Christian Democrats – replied,

My impression is that the whole thinking about expanded obligatory schooling [...], this idea of equality, the idea to give equal choices to all, it wasn’t just social democrats and the Labor Party that supported this. It was an idea which had broad support, to contribute to greater equality and greater opportunities for all. So I think there was a consensus in Norwegian politics that we should give better choices to our young people and equal choices. But we were somewhat divided



with respect to the degree to which one should offer specialized choices. And the Conservative Party [...], how should I put this? They have always gone further than the others in individualization. [...] They have always been most concerned about giving choices which fit and not least giving choices to the most able. So there's somewhat more of an elitist line of thought there than in the other parties. On this issue I believe that all the center parties, the Christian Democrats, Center Party, and Liberal Party, have a line of thought which is more closely related to the line of thought of the Labor Party. (expert interview)

Other experts, such as the Christian Democrat Jakob Aano agreed that the conservative/center parties' government of 1965–71 was mostly a time of continuity in education politics. The Christian Democratic minister of education Kjell Bondevik supported the introduction of the youth school. Apart from the law on private schooling that was passed under his leadership (see [Chapter 5](#)), he had no interest in any far-reaching changes of the school structure.

A new committee was appointed, *Normalplanutvalget*, with the pedagogue Hans-Jørgen Dokka as chair. This committee had to discuss the question of differentiation again and found itself in a “painful dilemma” ([Telhaug/Mediås, 2003](#), 234). In its reports from 1970, the abolition of ability groups was suggested. It was said that the focus had to lie more on the individual student and that group homogenization would not solve the problem. However, mixed-ability classes depended on smaller class sizes, new teaching material, and the possibility of dividing students up in groups more flexibly ([Dokka, 1986](#), 119ff).

In 1971, the non-leftist government collapsed because of internal disagreement about membership of the European Community. While the Conservative Party supported membership, the Center Party was against, and the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats were split. The Labor Party again took over government. In April 1972, the Labor Party's Congress and the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions decided to support membership. However, 53.5 percent of the voters voted against membership in a referendum in September 1972. The Labor Party government left office. From 1972 to 1973, the center parties created a short-lived government, followed by new Labor Party governments from 1973 to 1981.

### The Grading Debate

During the 1970s, the opposition between the social democrats and conservatives became more pronounced. Lars Roar Langslet, chair of



the parliamentary education committee from 1973 to 1980 and parliamentary representative of the Conservative Party from 1969 to 1989, described the development over time:

I would say that within the Conservative Party there was a steadily growing feeling that our people who were working with school policy were too evasive and nice and just following along. And that it was important to set in place a corrective to this pedagogy of reform that was a victorious current across the board. [...] But [...] I believe that it was an area of consensus in many ways, the politics of schooling, in this phase. And this probably also had something to do with there not being any consciousness among education politicians on the top level within the Conservative Party that it was necessary to develop oppositional politics, it was just easier to follow along and “strew sand” over what was coming from the so-called experts. [...] It became much more intensified when Lønning came in and since ... when I came in, this gradually became an area of confrontation within politics during the 70s. And there were a few primary concerns over which the Conservative Party gained a strong profile, and which gave us the feeling that the Labor Party’s education politics were on the retreat. (expert interview)

One of the issues Langslet refers to here was the debate on grading. Grades in the first three years of the *folkeskole* had been abolished already in the curriculum of 1939, and from 1962, grades in the fourth grade were abolished (Tønnessen/Telhaug, 1996, 23; *St. meld. nr. 42* [1964–5], 15f). In the Labor Party’s manifestos, it was stated on several occasions from 1969 onward that the nine-year comprehensive school should be “free of exams.” In September 1972, the Ministry of Education appointed an Evaluation Committee (*Evalueringsutvalget for skoleverket*) to examine all questions related to the evaluation of students. A united parliamentary education committee agreed to the appointment of the Evaluation Committee, stating that “today’s regulation with final exams and grades based on the achieved results has inherent weaknesses” (*Innst. S. nr. 287* [1971–2], 548). It was said that grading provided little motivation for the weakest students and that it could lead to an overly strong focus on achieving good exam results. In the same year, grades were abolished throughout the six-year children’s school (Mediås, 2010, 46; Myhre, 1971, 140). This did not lead to much debate. Many supporters of the reforms, such as the members of the Primary School Committee, the Experimental Council, and education politicians within the Labor Party, anticipated that the next step would be to abolish grades in the youth school.

On February 26, 1974, the ministry, led by the Labor politician Bjartmar Gjerde, issued regulations that restricted grades in the youth school to Norwegian, English, and mathematics. This led to protests.

Many parents, students, and teachers were against the regulations. In April, the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats, the Center Party, and even the Socialist Electoral Alliance issued statements asserting that the regulations should be withdrawn and that no regulations should be issued before the reports of the Evaluation Committee had been published (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3126).

On May 8, 1974, the regulations were debated in parliament. In this debate, several of the Labor Party's representatives attacked the grading system (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3120ff). It was pointed out that grading destroyed students' motivation for learning and that it was unfair to judge students not based on their effort but based on their varying preconditions. Grades did not convey a nuanced picture of students' abilities and effort but led to an overly high focus on simple and inadequate measurements. The same performance could be graded differently depending on the composition of the class, since the students' performances were compared with each other, not with their earlier personal achievements. This meant to these Labor representatives that whether a student would be admitted to upper-secondary schooling was to a high degree the result of luck, with major repercussions for students' lives. Grading was harmful with respect to the aim that students should feel safe and respected at school. The Labor Party politician Einar Førde summarized his position the following way:

[A] grading system and competition socialize [people] into the status quo. To all the radical people who now defend the grading system, I'd like to say: haven't they considered that one of the most important conditions for the capitalist competition society to work is that one manages to convey this to the school in the form of grades? The grading system splits the students, and they can then be catalogued as good and bad. [...] It produces losers. The grading system is the currency of the capitalist education system. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3133)

The conservative speakers made it clear that their party was opposed to any reductions in grading. On this issue, they were more united than in the debate about the structural reforms. Lars Roar Langslet expressed the conservative position:

The Conservative Party disagrees in principle with the abolition of grades and exams in the primary school. The old system was far from perfect but there have also been made great exaggerations in referring to the hunt for grades and exam pressure. A mentality of unhealthy competition must of course be dealt with, but it is not unhealthy that the school stimulates students to achieve something, to reach towards a goal. [...] I think this answers a human need. The "loser" problem at

school has to be tackled in a positive way. [...] We won't solve this by taking away the measuring scales. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3126)

Like Lønning, who had argued against the abolition of grading in the *folkeskole* in the 1960s (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, 3474; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3697f), Langslet argued that written evaluations could lead to more arbitrariness than grades (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3126).

The center parties consented to the abolition of grading in the children's school but stood closer to the Conservative Party than to the Labor Party regarding the question of grading in the youth school. The Center Party representative Ola O. Røssum declared that "the school must not needlessly contribute to and strengthen career chasing and demands for achievement" and that it was therefore sensible to have abolished grades in the children's school (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3120ff). But he deemed it impossible to abolish grades in the youth school as long as upper-secondary schooling had not been expanded sufficiently to grant access to everyone. The Christian democrat Kjell Magne Bondevik agreed that while the intention might have been good, the regulations were "a pedagogical and political mistake." Like Røssum, he thought that the abolition of grades in the children's school had been sensible but that selection for upper-secondary schooling necessitated grading in the youth school. "Nuanced evaluations" could possibly be added to or replace grades at some future point, "when there is a basis for it." He reacted strongly to the accusations of the Labor Party that had been calling opposition to the reduction of grading an expression of "conservative currents in the population." He did not want to be identified with the label "conservative" and thought that the Labor Party was flattering itself by labeling the reduction of grading "a radical reform" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3128f). The Liberal Party representative Hans Hammond Rossbach, a secondary schoolteacher, agreed that abolishing grades in the youth school was a bad idea since the necessary conditions for such a step were not met. He pointed out that both the students' and the teachers' associations were opposed to the new regulations (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3134).

He thus pointed to a difficulty for the Labor Party. Not surprisingly, the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers was critical of the abolition of grades. However, as was lamented by several of the Labor Party's speakers, the Norwegian Teachers' Association could also not be depended on regarding this question.

In earlier statements, the organization had suggested that grading in the youth school should be reduced to the subjects of Norwegian, mathematics, and English and had supported the reduction of grades to a minimum. But in March 1974, the primary schoolteachers sent a letter to the ministry complaining that they had not been heard and stating that they opposed the reduction of grading (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, 3135). Internally, they were split on the issue. As Kari Lie, at this point secretary of the Norwegian Teachers' Association and formerly active in the Female Teachers' Association, stated, "There were several people on the national board who thought I was hopeless for wanting to keep grades in the system" (expert interview). According to Lie, one reason for this disagreement was that many primary schoolteachers were not as radical as the progressive pedagogues who supported the abolition of grading. Like herself, some found it difficult to produce written evaluations of students' achievements and thought that such evaluations could be more harmful than a bad grade.

Furthermore, even the Labor Party itself was internally split on the issue, as was confirmed by several of the interviewed experts. In his book, *Langslet* (1977, 47) quotes a Gallup poll, according to which 89 percent of Labor Party members supported grades in the youth school, against only 9 percent who wanted them abolished. In the expert interview, he added that during this phase he had met "central people in the Labor Party who were quite crestfallen about how these school reformers had harried [them]" (expert interview).

Despite all this, the majority of the Evaluation Committee concluded in its first report in 1974 that grades should be abolished in the youth school (NOU 1974: 42 (1974) *Karakterer, eksamen, kompetanse m.v. i skoleverket, Eva I*). The minority agreed with abolishing grades in the children's school but thought that youth school students should be given grades if they wanted them. Another minority even wanted to abolish grades in upper-secondary schools (NOU 1974: 42 [1974] *Karakterer, eksamen, kompetanse m.v. i skoleverket, Eva I*). In its second report from 1978, the committee suggested that entry to the *gymnas* should become independent of grades (NOU 1978: 2 [1978] *Vurdering, kompetanse og inntak i skoleverket, Eva II*). These reports created much debate. Over 2600 comments were sent in during the hearing. Two-thirds of those were negative about abolishing grades in the youth school (Tønnessen, 2011, 79ff; Tønnessen/Telhaug, 1996, 26). The Norwegian Teachers' Association disagreed with the committee's proposals, even though they

showed a willingness to discuss the grading system based on further research (Tønnessen/Telhaug, 1996, 28).

As a result of the massive opposition even within the Labor Party's own ranks, the Labor Party minister Bjartmar Gjerde decided to backpedal. After the debate of May 9, 1974, he had already repealed the regulations on the reduction of grading. The socialist school reformer and primary schoolteacher Kjell Horn described the change of course as follows:

There had been put in place this Evaluation Committee which concluded that grading should not be used in an obligatory primary school. And I was sent around the country as consultant of the Primary School Committee to argue for this system on behalf of the [...] ministry. I thought that I was doing a rather good job but apparently not good enough because this reform had no enthusiasm among the Norwegian people. Then one day, Gjerde comes to my office and stares at something. He is not looking at me but past me. And then he asks me what I am doing, and I tell him and he says "Yes, but grading, that is not a topic for the Labor Party any longer," he said. Oh dear! (expert interview)

### The Final Debate on Differentiation

The debates on differentiation in the youth school also became more polarized during the 1970s. The Conservative Party became more clearly antagonistic, but on this matter the Labor Party asserted itself. In 1972, the entire parliamentary committee had agreed with the suggestion of the *Normalplanutvalget*, of the Primary School Committee, and of the Labor Party-led ministry to abolish the current ability-group system, which was producing inequality of opportunity in the eyes of almost everyone (*Innst. S. nr. 287* [1971–2]). This decision came into effect in 1975 with the new curriculum (*Mønsterplanen for grunnskolen*, M74). The parliamentary committee's statement of 1972 also contained the following sentences:

The committee would, however, like to assert that the primary school will need various forms of organizational differentiation also in the years to come. In the long term, it should be a goal that the individual school can develop the form of differentiation which fits best to local conditions. (*Innst. S. nr. 287* [1971–2], 547)

In 1973, the manifesto of the Conservative Party asserted that the individual school should have responsibility for choosing the best form of differentiation. The conservative manifesto of 1977 opposed mixed-ability classes:

With today's scarce resources, a rigorous implementation of the principle of classes that are "kept together" means that one shoves a regard for students'

needs into the background. The Conservative Party thinks that it is necessary to develop satisfying forms of organizational differentiation, while keeping the class as a social unit.

Lars Roar Langslet's (1977) book serves to illustrate the growing conservative antagonism. In the book, Langslet did not question the nine-year comprehensive school as such and showed some sympathy for the aim of developing a spirit of community between all youths, independent of social background. But he also wrote,

I myself supported the "farewell" to the ability-group system [in 1972] and don't want to deny my responsibility for this. But I must admit that I have become doubtful whether this was right. I think the ability-group system was, pedagogically, a good solution for the question of differentiation and presumably better than the new regulation with mixed-ability classes [...] is likely to become. (Langslet, 1977, 56)

He did not support special schools for especially able children, which could "justly be branded as an attempt to create 'apartheid' in the school" (Langslet, 1977, 62). Nonetheless, he claimed that the ablest students had been neglected by social democratic school reforms and that social democrats had no respect for inequalities but instead aimed exclusively at erasing or hiding them (Langslet, 1977, 34ff, 61f). He also pointed out that, while much could be done to give disadvantaged children better chances, political measures "can under no circumstances go so far that all important inequalities disappear" (Langslet, 1977, 39). This "pessimistic insight" was hard for socialist education politicians to accept (Langslet, 1977, 39). He made the further accusation that to the socialists, "competition in itself [was] an evil which mirrors the basic inhumanity of the capitalist system" (Langslet, 1977, 40).

In the interview, Langslet dubbed social democratic education politics "a sentimental school ideology," aimed at turning the school into a counterpart of the "abominable capitalist society outside, where demands for performance at work are made and where there is competition and all kinds of ugliness" (expert interview). By way of comparison, the socialist politician Theo Koritzinsky pointed out that competition and hierarchies were important mechanisms for conservatives. Even though they would never have said that they supported differentiation with the aim of reproducing class differences, "they know full well that this is what can happen ... and for them it's not a problem; that's how it is; that's life; that's how we are made" (expert interview).

In May 1979, these oppositions became visible in the final parliamentary debate on permanent ability grouping. The exact rules regarding organizational differentiation had been unclear since 1972 (*Stortingstidende* [1976–7], 2100 f; *Stortingstidende* [1977–8], 2694ff). For this reason, the Ministry of Education issued new regulations stating more clearly that permanent ability grouping throughout the course of a whole year was not allowed. Grouping students was only allowed on a short-term basis (*St. meld. nr. 34* [1978–9], 11).

In the debate on these regulations, the Conservative Party's representatives criticized the Labor Party's "equality ideology" in harsh words. The conservative politician Håkon Randal, a member of the parliamentary education committee, thought that the abolition of ability grouping would lead to a "lowering of standards" and that it violated the school law (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3360). His fellow party member Tore Austad considered it a "great and very deplorable step backwards" to make ability grouping throughout a school year unlawful (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3367). Another conservative member of the parliamentary education committee, Karen Sogn, complained about the Labor Party's "hysterical reaction" to the Conservative Party's support for more far-reaching organizational differentiation. She quoted the Labor Party politician Reiulf Steen, who had accused the conservatives of supporting "apartheid in the school" and of working for an "elite school." This, to her, was proof that the Labor Party was elevating "ideological considerations" above what was best for the individual student (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3373f). The conservatives also demanded that the Experimental Council be abolished, that structural reforms end, and that the focus should now be on improving the quality of teaching by introducing stricter demands regarding the content of schooling (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 17, 1975; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 20, 1978; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979; *Langslet*, 1977).

The Christian Democrats and the Center Party sided with the Conservative Party against the new regulations (*Innst. S. nr. 215* [1978–9]). Even though the Center Party and Christian Democrats had agreed in the 1960s and early 1970s that the ability-group system was unfair, they now defended local schools' freedom with respect to organizational differentiation, including ability grouping. The Christian Democrat Olav Djupvik attacked the Labor Party for turning pedagogical questions into



“ideological questions” in accordance with its “misunderstood equality ideology”:

If forms of instruction can no longer, without ideological concerns, vary based on what schools and the home at any time consider best for the individual student, we cannot, in my opinion, claim for ourselves to be fighting for equality. We have then accepted that certain forms of instruction are discriminatory. And that is an expression of a discriminatory attitude. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3364)

To this, the Labor Party representative Kirsti Grøndahl replied,

Mr. Djupvik talked much about the Labor Party’s “misunderstood equality ideology.” The mistake is not that the Labor Party has a misunderstood equality ideology. The mistake is that Djupvik has misunderstood the Labor Party’s equality ideology. My speech also included a very negative remark about homogenous ability groups, Mr. Djupvik said, and that is indeed true. [...] We want to do something about this and it is of course nice that Mr. Djupvik has also understood that what we are against is something negative. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3382)

Clearly, there was little sympathy between the Christian Democrats and the Labor Party at this point. However, the debate was dominated primarily by the antagonism between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party, whereas most representatives of the center parties did not choose equally strong words. The Center Party representative Leiv Blakset pointed out that he would like to “strongly underline” that it was right to focus on creating the best conditions, especially “for the weakest students,” though this should not mean neglecting the most able (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3368). His fellow party member Johan Syrstad regretted that the debate had been dominated by “buzzwords” and that the participants had “gone into the trenches.” He also thought that the Labor Party’s position was not so far removed from his own, since they agreed on the most important point: to give “considerable local freedom to the individual school.” He thought that it was a better idea to “let those who deal with the problems of daily life” make the decisions, instead of introducing “new, centrally issued regulations” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3381). In other words, for the Center Party it was mostly a matter of principle to oppose central regulations.

The Liberal Party was weak at the time and not represented on the parliamentary education committee. The Liberal Party representative Odd Einar Dørum made it clear that his party sympathized more with



the point of view of the Labor Party, even though he thought it difficult to detect “great oppositions” in the parliamentary committee’s report:

Both groups agree, and the Liberal Party supports this view, that grouping shall be based on local conditions and that one should use common sense in this regard. Furthermore, the Labor Party says that one wants to avoid long-term grouping. This is a view I share. [...] We supported the abolition of the ability-group system, and we want to assert that this is a definite position. We are happy to state that we cannot see – if we base ourselves on the words which have been chosen here – that there is anyone who wants to return to the ability-group system. (*Forhandler i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3376)

Dørum thus pointed to a difficulty faced by the opponents of the new regulations. It was hard to argue for organizational differentiation against the accusations of the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party that one wanted to reintroduce the ability-group system through the back door. This system had become utterly unpopular. The directives were eventually passed by the parliamentary majority of the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party. Due to this decision, a long-term development from parallel school types to tracked lower-secondary schooling, to ability grouping, and finally to the abolition of all organizational differentiation came to an end.

When the conservatives regained power in 1981, they abolished the Experimental Council and changed curricula. However, they did not attempt any far-reaching reversal of the structural reforms. According to Langslet, the main reason for this was “that one was fed up with reforms” and that the school now deserved “a quieter period where one should instead make the best out of the existing system.” Furthermore, he pointed out that “we weren’t a majority government, so we had to take into consideration whether this could receive support in parliament and such a total reversal would presumably have been a utopian project” (expert interview).

It would be wrong to say that changes came to a complete halt at this point. The regulations of the 1980s focused on the content of schooling more than on the outer structure of the system. During the 1990s, the comprehensive reform ideas were taken up again by the Labor Party’s minister of education, Gudmund Hernes. Under Hernes’ leadership, the age of school enrolment was lowered from seven to six years, thereby extending the children’s school to seven years again and comprehensive education to ten years. Upper-secondary education was also reformed further. However, at this point, the historical narrative of this chapter comes to a close. The final words shall be given to the Labor Party

representative Einar Førde, minister of education from October 1979 to October 1981, who pointed out the following in the final parliamentary debate on organizational differentiation in May 1979:

This demand for “peace in the school” apparently has a totally debilitating effect on the ability for thinking of the conservatives. If it is so that they are unhappy with the situation of today, they must of course reform themselves out of it – unless they are so naive as to believe that there is a way back to what was, back to the *framhaldsskole* and the *realskole*. [...] But they can hardly be so naive. This way back is of course as closed as the way back to the Garden of Eden. The social unrest and the unrest in the school which would arise if one attempted to turn back to the systems we have left behind would be unrest of a wholly different character and of a wholly different seriousness than the unrest which is now used as an excuse for not doing anything about what one doesn’t like. (Einar Førde, in *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, 3378)

#### COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL REFORMS IN NORTH RHINE–WESTPHALIA

In 1959, the “framework plan for the remodeling and standardization of the general school system” sparked off new reform discussions. During the second half of the 1960s the integrated comprehensive school became a topic of debate. In 1966, the last Christian democratic government of NRW introduced the *Hauptschule* and nine years of obligatory schooling. In 1969, the first seven integrated comprehensive schools were founded and by 1975, another sixteen such schools followed. Within these schools, organizational differentiation by ability grouping was the rule. In the early 1970s, even the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was open to the introduction of so-called cooperative comprehensive schools. During the 1970s, the opposition to comprehensive schooling grew and reformers’ aim that the integrated comprehensive school should replace all parallel school types was gradually given up. In the second half of the 1970s, the NRW government attempted to introduce the cooperative school as an additional school type that was a combination of the *Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, and *Gymnasium*, with comprehensive schooling in grades five and six followed by three tracks. This led to the collection of 3.6 million signatures against the reform. The government withdrew the law. The integrated comprehensive school became an additional school type beside the older ones and lost its experimental status in 1981. In the following, these reforms are discussed chronologically.

### Early Debates on Comprehensive and Nine-Year Obligatory Schooling

In NRW, the initial postwar years were a time of restoration. In education politics, the main conflict was about denominational schooling (see [Chapter 5](#)). In 1959, the German Committee for the Education and School System (*Deutscher Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen*) published its “framework plan for the remodeling and standardization of the general school system” (*Rahmenplan zur Umgestaltung und Vereinheitlichung des allgemeinbildenden Schulwesens*). This document suggested the upgrading of the upper grades of the *Volksschule*, termed *Hauptschule* in the document, by introducing a ninth and later tenth school year, an obligatory foreign language, and ability grouping in important subjects. It also suggested the introduction of a two-year transition or orientation stage after the first four years of schooling in the lower *Volksschule*, termed *Grundschule*. Grades five and six should serve to prolong the period of decision-making for one of the secondary school types. The SPD, the FDP, and the different organizations of *Volksschule* teachers supported these suggestions, while the CDU was hesitant ([Herrlitz et al., 2009, 168](#)).

The Godesberg manifesto of the SPD from 1959 stated that “all privileges in access to educational institutions must be eliminated” and that “for any able person the way to secondary schools and educational institutions must be open.” It also demanded ten years of obligatory schooling. In its manifesto for the federal state elections in NRW in 1962, the SPD stated,

To pave all ways for all children so that they can let their strengths unfold and develop their dispositions without restrictions, for the good and for the use of humanity and for their happiness – is this not a task which would be worth the strongest commitment? [...] Neither the father’s wallet nor the social standing of the family, neither the large or small number of children nor the denomination or the belonging to a group of the people – nothing should stand debilitatingly in the way, when the aim is to let unfold and develop the gifts and abilities of the young person.

The manifesto informed voters that the NRW SPD had passed a motion in 1959 in response to the “framework plan.” They had suggested the introduction of an “orientation stage” for all children in grades five and six that would prepare them for the school type they would attend from grade seven. It was argued that this could prevent a “draining” of the *Volksschule* and an overcrowding of secondary schools “with students who are unfit for scientific work.” Extending comprehensive schooling by

two years was thus presented as a measure that would strengthen selection at a later point.

In 1960, the Education and Science Workers' Union published its "Bremen Plan" (*Bremer Plan*), in which it suggested an extension of comprehensive schooling by two years. From grades seven to ten, schooling should be organized in three tracks. This was justified as follows:

The school of a modern society as a society of free and equal people should be realized through a dynamic, unified ladder system of schooling. [...] The school of the modern society should be a school of social justice, in which there is equality for all at the start, in which all normal children, by staying together until the end of the sixth grade, gain real experiences of companionship, before differences in ability and diligence have a separating effect. (Bremen Plan of 1960, quoted in [Kopitzsch, 1983, 172](#))

The Bremen Plan led to fierce reactions from the CDU and the Catholic Church because it also envisaged a secularization of the school system. The plan was said to be indistinguishable from the communist school program of the German Democratic Republic ([Kopitzsch, 1983, 190](#)). It led to controversial debates within the union and soon disappeared from the agenda. In the following years, the union's national chair, Heinrich Rodenstein, preferred to speak of "educational centers" in which traditional school types should be combined to increase permeability ([Kopitzsch, 1983, 230](#)).

In the early 1960s, education debates accelerated, and Georg [Picht \(1964\)](#) coined the phrase "the German educational catastrophe," referring to the low number of secondary school graduates and the large urban-rural and class inequalities. From 1962 to 1966, Paul Mikat from the CDU became minister of education in the last CDU-FDP coalition in NRW. He was young, more inclined to reforms than his predecessor, Werner Schütz, and supported experiments with tracked comprehensive schools ([Mikat, 1966, 38](#); [Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965](#)). He did not always have the support of more conservative CDU representatives. The former CDU politician Wilhelm Lenz mentioned that Mikat "would have been willing to do more" if the minister of finance had not restrained him (expert interview). During the first half of the 1960s, the CDU-FDP government created new paths to the *Abitur* exam by extending evening schooling and upper-secondary schooling for *Realschule* graduates and by increasing the number of *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*, especially in

rural areas (Düding, 2008, 488ff; Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965; Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1967). This was not subject to much debate, as there was consensus that the number of *Abitur* graduates needed to be increased (Fälker, 1984, 101f).

In July 1964, the party executive committee of the SPD passed the “Educational-Political Guidelines” (*Bildungspolitische Leitsätze*), which more boldly than before suggested replacing parallel schooling with a ladder system of education and employed the term “comprehensive school” (*Gesamtschule*) for the first time. The social democrats now suggested a six-year primary level of schooling followed by a four-year lower-secondary level and a three-year upper-secondary level. For the lower-secondary level, they envisaged a common core of teaching in addition to differentiated teaching in courses and ability groups. They considered the introduction of a two-year orientation stage in grades five and six and increased permeability between the traditional school types to be steps in the right direction. In the long term, all school types should be integrated into one organizational unit (Vorstand der SPD, 1964, 12ff). The NRW chapter of the Education and Science Workers’ Union (GEW) also included the integrated comprehensive school (*integrierte Gesamtschule*) in its program in 1965.

The Association of Philologists, on the other hand, opposed comprehensive schooling in its Göttingen Resolutions published in 1964:

The differentiation of modern working life demands a richly structured school system. [...] A leveling comprehensive school [*nivellierende Einheitsschule*] cannot do justice to the state of society today or in the future. Just as those who are endowed below average need special support, those who are endowed above average are also eligible to be supported as early and as much as possible. Support which starts too late impedes the development of endowments and sentences those who are endowed above average to boredom and thus to the degeneration of their innate possibilities. At the same time, the human development and educational support of the more weakly endowed are impeded. [...] For this reason, a pillared general and vocational school system is indispensable. (*Göttinger Beschlüsse*, quoted in Fluck, 2003, 207)

In the same document, the Association of Philologists supported an educational expansion based on preparatory forms of the *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* [*Aufbauschulen /Aufbauklassen*]. It also emphasized parents’ rights to decide about the education of their children. Permeability between the school types was supported to a certain degree but not “at any time point” since this would lead to “a lowering of achievements.”

The philologists viewed the *Gymnasium* as the school of the future elites and therefore as particularly important. It was stated,

The *Gymnasium* needs to stick to the principle of achievement; because for every nation the endowments are its most valuable property. An efficient economy is not [...] imaginable without a great number of personalities who are scientifically qualified and qualified in character. (*Göttinger Beschlüsse*, quoted in [Fluck, 2003](#), 209f)

In October 1964, the Düsseldorf Agreement of 1955 between the federal states was renegotiated. The result was the Hamburg Agreement. This agreement stipulated nine years of obligatory schooling and allowed ten years of obligatory schooling. It suggested the introduction of the *Hauptschule* – meaning the upper stage of the *Volksschule* – as a secondary school type in addition to the *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*, and a two-year transition stage in grades five and six, which should be common for all schools. These were discretionary clauses. Upper-secondary courses, preparing *Realschule* and *Hauptschule* graduates for the *Abitur*, were regulated. A foreign language, usually English, was introduced to the curriculum of the *Volksschule*. Experiments with new school structures were allowed ([Friedeburg, 1992](#), 349). The *Ministerpräsidenten* of the federal states governed by the CDU also signed this document, which is an indication of the drive toward reform.

In November 1964, the CDU organized a political congress in Hamburg, at which new guidelines for “education in the modern world” were passed. Here, the CDU stated, “the German education system must be shaped so that everyone, who is [...] capable, is offered his chance.” It supported increased “permeability” of the school system through the introduction of preparatory forms of the *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* [*Aufbauschulen*], which should recruit able students from the *Volksschule*. “In our education system, there must be no ‘one-way streets,’” the guidelines said. Nevertheless, the guidelines emphasized that a shortening of the *Gymnasium* would endanger academic standards. A comprehensive school was considered unsuitable for the aim of supporting all talents in the population. The paper also opposed an obligatory orientation stage in grades five and six.

Educational planning was intensified. In 1965, the German Educational Council (*Deutscher Bildungsrat*) was founded as the successor of the above-mentioned German Committee. It was comprised of an educational commission consisting of scientists and an administrative commission, which included school administrators and

educational politicians. The council published reports, studies, and recommendations for experiments and reforms (see e.g. [Deutscher Bildungsrat, 2003 \[1969\]](#); [Deutscher Bildungsrat, 1973](#); [Deutscher Bildungsrat, 1975](#)).

In June 1966, the CDU-FDP government of NRW passed a law on obligatory schooling (*Schulpflichtgesetz*) that regulated the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling. The law introduced the institutional distinction between the four-year primary school (*Grundschule*) and the five-year upper stage of the *Volksschule*, now called *Hauptschule* ([Fälker, 1984, 75, 114](#)). However, the *Hauptschule* remained attached to the *Grundschule*. This was opposed by the SPD. Social democrats voted against the law because they did not find it far-reaching enough (*Landtag NRW*, May 11, 1966; *Landtag NRW*, May 25, 1966).

On June 14, 1966, the NRW section of the Association of Philologists organized a rally in Essen to protest the new trends in education politics. The chair of the NRW section, Clemens Christians, argued at the rally that it was wrong to assign the *Gymnasium* the achievement of equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity could only be achieved through additional support in preschool (quoted in [Fluck, 2003, 215](#)). [Fluck \(2003, 216\)](#) also quotes vice-chair Hanna-Renate Laurien, who later became minister of education in the Rhineland-Palatinate for the CDU. She said,

The modern society is democratically structured and structured by achievement. In it, everyone shall receive their optimal chance; in it, citizens' rights are in principle equal, but it is not for this reason a society of people with equal status. What holds true in general for society must also hold true in the pedagogical area: special achievements, special requirements must be valued; egalitarian, leveling conceptions are not democratic – as they are sometimes presented – but are ideologies.

### The Introduction of the Integrated Comprehensive School

In July 1966, the SPD won the NRW elections. The new *Ministerpräsident*, Heinz Kühn, preferred a coalition with the CDU, but the parliamentary group insisted on forming a government with the FDP ([Düding, 2008, 520ff](#)). In education politics, the most pressing issue was still denominational schooling. Through negotiations with the CDU, a compromise was reached in June 1967 and new school laws were passed in February 1968. The *Hauptschule* was decoupled from the primary school and became nondenominational (see [Chapter 5](#)).



In 1968, the national Education and Science Workers' Union passed a motion for the integrated comprehensive school. It was not the first union to do so – the Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IG Metall) and the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) had passed motions in support of the integrated comprehensive school earlier on (Kopitzsch, 1983, 221, 269). There had been internal debates in the Education and Science Workers' Union (Kopitzsch, 1983, 228). Ilse Brusis, active in the union from 1960 and chair of the NRW chapter from 1975 to 1981, described how the union's young teachers decided to struggle for comprehensive schools in the late 1960s:

The Federal Committee of Young Teachers of the Education and Science Workers' Union organized a national conference each year. [...] So we sat together once again to plan this conference. [...] Then someone said: the students must be taught together for longer than four years. [...] They don't have it in Great Britain, they don't have it in France, they don't have it in the Scandinavian countries, why do they have it here? [...] The development has become stuck! This inspired us all that we should now demand and discuss this. And we did. Of course, word got round in the union; they want to discuss the *Einheitsschule* [comprehensive school]. So we said deliberately, "We don't call it *Einheitsschule*, *Einheitsschule* sounds too much like the GDR, we call it *Gesamtschule*." There was restlessness among the old, what are the young doing here? We organized our national conference and the chair, Professor Rodenstein, came [...] to give us a piece of his mind. If we passed this, the entire Education and Science Workers' Union would fall apart. The philologists could not be kept in the union, [...] and the *Realschule* teachers probably would [leave] as well and then the vocational teachers and then the entire union would be ruined. (expert interview)

The expert Anne Ratzki, who has also been active in the union for decades, confirmed that, in some cases, even the union's *Hauptschule* teachers were against integrated comprehensive schools on the local level, if the introduction of such a school implied that their own school would be shut. Internal divisions between teachers at different school types persisted after the integrated comprehensive school had been included in the union's official program. In other words, the Education and Science Workers' Union was not entirely united.

In January 1969, the German Educational Council published a recommendation for school experiments with integrated comprehensive schools, which should integrate the parallel school system with the help of internal ability grouping (Deutscher Bildungsrat, 2003 [1969]). Around the same time, the Kühn government decreed the establishment of the first seven such experimental schools in NRW. These were located in



Dortmund, Fröndenberg, Gelsenkirchen, Kamen, Kierspe, Oberhausen, and Münster. In November 1969, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the federal states agreed on an experimental program with forty such schools throughout the Federal Republic (Düding, 1998, 113).

Not all leading social democrats supported the integrated comprehensive school experiments wholeheartedly. In NRW, neither the *Ministerpräsident*, Heinz Kühn, nor the minister of education from 1966 to 1970, Fritz Holthoff, were particularly enthusiastic. According to several interviewed experts, Kühn did not prioritize comprehensive schooling because he wanted to avoid conflict and thought that it would be sufficient to open the *Gymnasium* up to children from the working class. Holthoff was a *Volksschule* teacher and cared about working-class children's access to good-quality education. However, he belonged to the older generation and did not like the rhetoric of the party's younger, more anticapitalistic wing. Much of Holthoff's writing was dedicated to his conflict with the "New Left," whom he accused of turning the comprehensive school into a school "which institutionalizes class struggle and class hate" (Holthoff, 1975, 16). Holthoff (1975, 16) did support a "convergence of school types" into a "general school" with the aim of achieving "social integration" but thought that such a development should be conducted "patiently and with convincing words."

The social democratic school reformer and social scientist H.-G. Rolff, who belonged to the SPD's leftist wing, believes that lack of support from Holthoff was crucial, since Holthoff was minister of education in the largest federal state at an important time:

We wanted the integrated comprehensive school as the nationwide regular school, my senator [Carl-Heinz Evers, school senator of Berlin] and the minister. [...] That was Ernst Schütte, minister of education in Hessen before Friedeburg. We also had quite good influence within the SPD. [...] All of us wanted the comprehensive school with blanket coverage [*flächendeckend*, meaning without any parallel schools]. And this chap Holthoff, minister of education in NRW, was our biggest opponent. It wasn't the CDU, it wasn't the FDP, they also wanted experimental programs and all kinds of things but the *Volksschule* teacher, Holthoff, who became minister of education here and who in our opinion had an inferiority complex because he hadn't studied properly but only gone to a Pedagogical Academy and didn't have [an academic] title. He wanted to defend and preserve the three-tiered school system. (expert interview)

After the elections of 1970, conditions became more favorable for reform. The reform supporter Jürgen Girgensohn became minister of education in

NRW. In the coalition agreement of the SPD and the FDP, the intended intensification of comprehensive school experiments was stated. The elections had brought several reform-oriented, young people into the NRW parliament, replacing older SPD politicians (Düding, 2008, 631).

One of them was the interviewed expert Reinhard Grätz, who confirmed that the SPD was far from united on comprehensive schooling. He replaced an SPD politician from his hometown of Wuppertal, Walter Jahnke. Jahnke had been chair of the SPD parliamentary group's working group for cultural issues. He was a *Realschule* teacher and was not supportive of the integrated comprehensive school. Two other SPD education politicians, Hans-Joachim Bargmann and Hans-Günther Toetemeyer, opposed Jahnke in this group. They were reform-oriented representatives of the teachers' organization within the SPD (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Lehrer*). As Grätz described it in the interview,

When I shyly appeared for the first time there [in the SPD parliamentary group's working group for cultural issues], [...] I was received by these two, Bargmann, Toetemeyer, like a demi-God. This is that boy who made it against that Walter Jahnke [laughs]. That was such a relief to them that Walter wasn't there anymore as a delayer of education politics. (expert interview)

Another young, reform-oriented SPD politician, who was voted into parliament in 1970, was Anke Brunn. She summarized the justification for comprehensive schooling as follows:

The most important argument for the integrated comprehensive school was that the children were separated too early on to different educational paths and that permeability was necessary which simply wasn't sufficiently given in the earlier, pillared school system. And that one could thus support children more individually. That was the idea, while the classical pillared German education system [...] was a system of exclusion and allocation of social chances, or the rejection of social chances. [...] And this idea of ascent through education and qualification through education and a future through education, [...] had to correspond with an education system which supports and doesn't exclude. (expert interview)

This idea increasingly gained ground. In 1970, the German Educational Council published the Structural Plan for the Education System (Deutscher Bildungsrat, 1973; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 175ff), where it suggested a ladder system of education. The system should start with pre-school education and continue with a four-year primary school, followed by a lower- and upper-secondary stage. The fifth and sixth grades should

be an orientation stage. Differentiation based on interests and abilities should start at the lower-secondary stage with elective courses.

Within the FDP, there had also been changes around 1970, and the social-liberal wing of the party was strengthened. In the early manifestos of the FDP, such as the one of 1961, there were only general formulations stating that access to higher education should be opened to “talented people from the employed population” and should not be prevented by “economic reasons.” During the 1960s, the social-liberal wing began to advocate school reforms more explicitly (see e.g. Dahrendorf, 1965; Heinz, 1970). In 1969–70, the FDP introduced its concept of the “Open School” (*Offene Schule*). The Open School was the liberal version of the integrated comprehensive school and differed from the social democratic concept in its more pronounced focus on internal differentiation. The NRW FDP stated in its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1970,

A state is only democratic if it offers its citizens actual equality of opportunity. [...] Until a thorough educational reform in the form of the Open School has been realized, the life chances of our children will not be equal. Each child must have the opportunity to receive an education appropriate to their abilities, independent of social background.

In the same manifesto, the NRW FDP supported the expansion of experiments with comprehensive schools. The manifesto stated that all former school types should be combined in the Open School, which should be divided into a kindergarten level, a primary school level, a lower-secondary level, and an upper-secondary level. The manifesto advocated a “flexible course system” within the Open School and individual support for all students. In 1972, the FDP published its Stuttgart Guidelines for Liberal Education Politics (*Stuttgarter Leitlinien*), in which it confirmed its support for far-reaching comprehensive school reforms.

In 1970, the Kühn government published a manifesto for NRW, which listed the reforms it intended to implement from 1971 to 1975 (*Nordrhein-Westfalen-Programm 1975*). This document stated that “the general idea of the comprehensive school [...] is hardly contested today” and suggested the establishment of thirty integrated comprehensive schools. This aim was not reached, but by 1975 sixteen more such schools had been founded. For the long term, the document announced that comprehensive education would be introduced on a general level, if experiments were favorable. It mentioned the reduction of educational inequality between urban and rural areas as an argument for comprehensive schools. Children from different social strata should learn to

cooperate and students' achievements should be increased through an increased "joy in learning."

The manifesto also included suggestions to increase the number of *Gymnasium* schools and to expand the *Hauptschule* with a tenth school year. This was not considered as standing in the way of a more far-reaching structural reform in the future. The upgrading of the *Hauptschule* was important for social democrats. In 1969, the education policy committee of the SPD (*Bildungspolitischer Ausschuss*) warned that the *Hauptschule* was about to become a "rest school" with low social standing and argued that the *Hauptschulen* would have to be of good enough quality to ensure that they could be transformed into comprehensive schools later (*ENTWURF: Modell für ein demokratisches Bildungswesen*, 1969, 47; see also [Dowe, 1968](#); [Hippenstiel, 1968](#)).

### Reforms Suggested by the Christian Democratic Union

The reformers among the interviewed experts were, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, convinced that a general introduction of the comprehensive school was possible. It seemed as though, with thorough planning, most political goals would be achievable. When I interviewed the former leading CDU politician Wilhelm Lenz, I asked him whether this reform spirit had to a certain degree affected the CDU in NRW. He replied,

Yes. The reason for that was that the old generation of parliamentary representatives was gone. The successors were young people. [...] They were more open to such thoughts. And to some extent there was also the opinion; we must not eternally keep saying "no" in questions of schooling. (expert interview)

In other words, the CDU now showed cautious willingness for reform, for strategic reasons and because of the conviction of a few reform-oriented CDU politicians. In its Deidesheimer Guidelines of 1969 (*Deidesheimer Leitsätze*), the CDU again outlined its education policy. Education was termed a "basic right." "Equality of opportunity in the access to educational institutions" was considered "a condition for a democratic social order, in which achievement decides the social standing of the individual." The manifesto demanded a "tracked achievement school" (*gegliederte Leistungsschule*) with "differentiated, permeable" educational paths, namely, for the secondary level, the five-year *Hauptschule*, the six-year *Realschule*, and the eight- or nine-year *Gymnasium*. The tracked structure was justified by differing "abilities and inclinations of the individual" and by the "varied educational requirements of society." The manifesto

suggested that curricula in grades five and six should be similar in all school types so that it would be possible to correct the choice of educational path during this time. In other words, the CDU now supported a weakened version of the orientation stage. The manifesto supported the introduction of ten years of obligatory schooling “in the medium term.”

From 1970 until 1972, the CDU published a range of more reform-oriented documents. In 1970, the NRW CDU published its manifesto for the federal state elections. Here, the NRW CDU demanded a “sensible integration of all educational institutions” and that principles of “permeability and differentiation” should be equally ranked. It also demanded ten years of obligatory education and teacher training oriented toward levels of schooling rather than school types. However, as the manifesto stated, “intellectually gifted [students] need to be particularly supported.” The manifesto emphasized that “objectively equal educational chances” should become “subjectively” accessible through better educational counseling.

In 1971 the national CDU published a manifesto for schooling and university education (*Schul- und Hochschulreformprogramm der CDU*), and in 1972 CDU politicians, including several ministers of education, published a paper entitled “Education Politics on Clear Paths – a Program of CDU/CSU Priorities.” In the 1971 manifesto, the CDU demanded the introduction of organizational differentiation within all school types and a reform of curricula so all schools would teach “common core obligatory subjects” and permeability would be increased. It even stated that “the new secondary level overcomes the three-pillared structure through a clearly arranged, permeable combination of schools [*Schulverbund*].” The documents from 1971 and 1972 also supported a reform of teacher training oriented toward levels of schooling rather than school types and the introduction of an orientation stage in grades five and six.

In NRW, the CDU parliamentary group prepared a motion in 1971 that suggested experiments with “cooperative comprehensive schools”; this was meant as a more strictly tracked alternative to the integrated comprehensive school. It was emphasized that this school type should be “more than an additive combination of the *Hauptschule*, *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*,” that it should have a shared headship and enable students to switch between the tracks (*Landtag NRW*, November 15, 1971).

In 1973 the CDU representative Karl Nagel, a *Hauptschule* teacher, even suggested in the parliamentary education committee that the cooperative comprehensive school, as designed by the CDU, could be introduced with blanket coverage from August 1, 1974, without further

experiments. He stated that while the school experiments with integrated comprehensive schools only encompassed a small percentage of students, the CDU proposal of 1971 had been intended to “initiate a reform of the entire lower secondary level” (*Landtag NRW*, September 13, 1973, 9). This is remarkable, for if the SPD and the FDP had gone along with this suggestion, the *Gymnasium* would have been abolished as a separate school type. The SPD’s education politicians, however, favored the more far-reaching integrated comprehensive school. They considered the CDU proposal a continuation of the traditional school system with “the fig leaf of so-called cooperation,” since the CDU proposal envisaged a differentiated, not an integrated, orientation stage (Hans Schwier, SPD representative, *Landtag NRW*, September 13, 1973, 11).

Remarks by CDU politicians during the parliamentary education committee’s meeting in September 1973 indicate that their support for cooperative schooling was motivated by several worries. When the CDU motion for cooperative comprehensive schools was debated, the crisis of the *Hauptschule* was discussed. A speaker for the Ministry of Education remarked, “with respect to the question whether the cooperative school could reduce the increasing popularity of the *Gymnasium*,” one needed to consider that parents had the constitutional right to choose the school type for their children (*Landtag NRW*, September 13, 1973, 11). CDU representative Nagel responded that it was necessary to channel the “streams of students,” or else one would have to restrict parental rights of choice or introduce admission exams at the universities (*Landtag NRW*, September 13, 1973, 12). One motivation of the CDU in the early 1970s thus seems to have been to re-channel a greater number of students back to the *Hauptschule* school type (or – in this concept – track) and away from the prestigious *Abitur* exam and university entry. As Nagel later explained in parliament, the other motivation was to undermine the more far-reaching idea of integrated comprehensive schooling (Blumenthal, 1988, 105f):

When you [...] in practice wanted to introduce the integrated comprehensive school, we would rather have been willing to introduce our model “cooperative school.” (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1812)

During the early 1970s, the CDU was not perceived as a stable ally by the Association of Philologists but considered “very unsettled and split into different political directions in education politics,” as the philologists’ representative, Fluck (2003, 228), points out. The CDU could not be depended upon. The Association of Philologists had no such periods of

insecurity but opposed any reform that endangered the *Gymnasium* as a nine-year secondary school.

### Continued Struggles over the Integrated Comprehensive School

After several years of negotiations, the Commission for Educational Planning published the General Education Plan in 1973. The national government and the six SPD-led federal states wanted to introduce comprehensive education until the tenth grade. The five CDU-led federal states expressed dissenting opinions with respect to the introduction of integrated comprehensive schools and the orientation stage in grades five and six (Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung, 1973, 16; Friedeburg, 1992, 404ff; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 177f). Toward the NRW elections of 1975, comprehensive schooling increasingly turned into an “apple of discord” (Düding, 1998, 116). The atmosphere changed.

In May 1974, the NRW government proposed a motion according to which the integrated comprehensive school would become a regular school type (*Regelschule*). The motion suggested that the parallel structure should be abolished in favor of a horizontal ladder system. The two-year orientation stage in grades five and six should become the rule and be independent of school type, so that comprehensive schooling would be prolonged by two years (*Landtag NRW*, May 7, 1974). When the proposal was debated, minister of education Girgensohn specified that the proposal was not meant to abolish the old school types straightaway but should merely lay the ground for a long-term reform. In his view, it was probable that the introduction of fully comprehensive schooling would first be accomplished in the course of one generation (*Landtag NRW*, July 11, 1974, 4436). “I don’t want integration at any price!” he declared (*Landtag NRW*, July 11, 1974, 4466).

But even this modest proposal soon seemed too radical. The comprehensive school experiment was now perceived to be “in crisis,” as discussed in a publication of the Association of Education and Upbringing (*Verband Bildung und Erziehung*, VBE) (VBE, 1974). In this publication, the association stated that it neither supported nor opposed the experiments in principle, but it did not approve of radical reformers’ attempts to use comprehensive schooling as a tool for social change. The experiments should focus on pedagogical questions, with the aim to create a school more attuned to students’ needs than the current system, but should not be used for anticapitalistic propaganda. Even though the chair of the NRW chapter of the Association of Education and Upbringing at the time,



Albert Balduin, supported the comprehensive school, the association did not want to be associated with socialist ideas. It was already losing some of its Catholic members, while increasing numbers of moderate social democrats were joining (Bongard, 2012, 11f). Still, many of the CDU's municipal politicians and some CDU parliamentary representatives were members of the association. It had to balance its positions carefully. As Uwe Franke, a representative of the Association of Education and Upbringing NRW, explained,

I think that [...] the term comprehensive school was socio-politically overburdened in the early 1970s. There were too many very different opinions about what the comprehensive school was. At least in this class struggle which was declared by big intellectual groups in the 60s and 70s, it was used also as a term which made conservatives and moderates think: this is a school of reeducation. It turned away from its original idea of the comprehensive school [*Einheitsschule*] of the 1920s or the American High School and Secondary School [...]. And [...] it turned into a [...] socio-political counter-concept. (expert interview)

The increasing political polarization came to expression in the federal elections in Hessen in 1974.<sup>1</sup> In NRW, the SPD's coalition partner FDP now blocked the implementation of the orientation stage. As a result, a law was passed in February 1974 which merely continued the experimental status of the comprehensive schools. The reference to the long-term integration of all school types was removed. The orientation stage was not mentioned at all (*Landtag NRW*, February 19, 1975). In the final parliamentary debate regarding this law, the speaker for the FDP, Wolfgang Heinz, justified the latter decision by adducing time pressures, since the legislative period was almost over. He stated,

a legal regulation of the school-type-independent orientation stage – which we too consider absolutely essential – requires the closest examination and coordination with all those involved. This is not possible now. Therefore, we will propose this motion in the next legislative period. (*Landtag NRW*, February 27, 1975, 5266)

He declared that an attempt to pass the orientation stage in the course of only one or two months would have been met by the opposition with “prevarications and purposeful misrepresentations” in order to create an

<sup>1</sup> In Hessen one of the most important reform supporters within the SPD, Ludwig von Friedeburg, had been minister of education from 1969 to 1974 and had attempted to introduce comprehensive school reforms. These encountered enormous opposition. Even though the SPD and the FDP could continue their federal government after the elections of 1974, the CDU had become the strongest party. Friedeburg was forced to resign by the coalition partner, FDP (Friedeburg, 1992, 459).



“adrenalized atmosphere” (*Landtag NRW*, February 27, 1975, 5265). Furthermore, he underlined that a six-year primary school would be a better solution but that the FDP had not received support from the other parliamentary groups for this suggestion. The CDU opposition met Heinz with derision. CDU representatives interrupted him, calling him a “pushover,” and ridiculing the FDP’s change of mind as a “dancing procession” (*Landtag NRW*, February 27, 1975, 5265).

In the same debate, the minister of education, Girgensohn, was the only SPD speaker who – with characteristic honesty – admitted that he was unhappy with the changes made to the motion (*Landtag NRW*, February 27, 1975, 5271ff). *Ministerpräsident* Kühn stated that, for him, the comprehensive school was the most desirable school type of the future but that opponents of such reforms should not be overruled but persuaded. When the leader of the CDU opposition, Heinrich Köppler, attacked him for the first part of his statement, he stated that, in his view, the comprehensive school was still in a state of experimentation and that it was not the SPD’s aim to introduce this school type as a regular one immediately. He even spoke against an extension of the number of experimental schools (*Landtag NRW*, February 27, 1975, 5268, 5270).

The CDU’s willingness for reform had now evaporated. The CDU’s manifesto for the NRW elections in 1975 stated,

As long as [...] school experiments do not necessitate a different judgment, a school structured into school types and permeable across levels of schooling does best justice to inclinations and abilities; it corresponds with different structures of endowment. This school imparts fairness of opportunity and offers parents and students possibilities and decision-making support [...]. Thus, a CDU federal state government will develop the *Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, and *Gymnasium* as equally valuable schools [...], with [...] equally valuable leaving certificates, in an organizational form adapted to the regional and social structure [...], in manageable sizes.

The CDU had now replaced the term “equality of opportunity” (*Chancengleichheit*) with the term “fairness of opportunity” (*Chancengerechtigkeit*). This was an attempt to underline that inequality was not a problem, as long as everybody received a fair chance. The party had also given up its support for ten years of obligatory schooling and had gone back to the position that nine years of obligatory schooling were enough. Experiments with integrated comprehensive schools, it was stated, would only be supported if “they are necessary to develop new pedagogical and school-organizational insights, if they are continuously scientifically controlled, [...] and if alternatives are provided.”

A comprehensive orientation stage was rejected, and it was instead suggested that curricula in grades five and six should be coordinated across school types. The manifesto of 1975 declared that the “neglected *Hauptschule*” would be developed into an “attractive alternative to the *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*.”

The SPD’s manifesto for the NRW elections of 1975 remarked,

Reforms need time. Especially the big reforms which make up a great deal of leeway. There are no reforms without difficulties and problems. [...] [T]hese are the problems that arise because something is changing for the better. Therefore, we warn against those who want to use the unavoidable difficulties of today to stop the reforms or even reverse them to reintroduce the old privileges and injustices. What has been achieved, more and better education for all [...], must be safeguarded and expanded.

The “problems” referred to here were manifold. For example, the experimental schools were accused of underperforming academically. As Anne Ratzki, principal of one of the first integrated comprehensive schools in NRW, pointed out, the opponents were comparing “apples with pears,” since the social background of the children in the integrated comprehensive schools was different from the social background of the children in the *Gymnasium*. The experimental schools also struggled with a lack of suitable school material, curricula, and buildings, and teachers’ lack of experience of comprehensive teaching. In Ratzki’s words,

It was very hard. [...] There was nothing, no books, no nothing. There were the children, very different children. [...] And these first teachers came from all kinds of schools. [...] They had to develop teaching units which were responsive to these different children. That was a lot of work. [...] And it wasn’t appreciated by the ministry. [...] So [...] frustration began to set in. (expert interview)

The NRW elections of 1975, and the national elections of 1976, showed that the SPD was losing ground to the CDU. Unemployment was rising and a crisis was under way in the steel industry (Briesen, 1995, 244ff). In his first government policy statement after the election of 1975, Kühn pointed out that slowing economic growth meant that public revenue would diminish. He declared that the aim of the government would be to “secure the initiated reforms” and that educational reforms should be continued in a “sober-minded” way. The development of curricula and teacher training should take precedence over organizational reforms (*Landtag NRW*, June 4, 1975, 14ff). The coalition agreement did not contain far-reaching educational-political suggestions. Experiments with

comprehensive schools would be continued with the earlier planned number of thirty schools (Blumenthal, 1988, 16; Düding, 1998, 117).

The strategy of the CDU now became to justify the parallel school structure with an increased focus on the *Hauptschule*. Several CDU representatives, such as Karl Nagel and Peter Giesen, who were *Volksschule/Hauptschule* teachers, genuinely cared about this school type. When I interviewed him, the CDU politician Wilhelm Lenz explained that, in internal CDU debates, the supporters of the *Hauptschule* had convinced him to support their struggle for better financing of this school type and better salaries for its teachers. This inner-party class compromise satisfied representatives of the *Hauptschule* clientele while giving *Gymnasium* supporters a convenient justification for the pillared school structure. As long as all school types were valued and permeability between them was ensured, a united CDU saw no need for further reform. For example, the CDU representative and *Hauptschule* teacher Albert Pürsten remarked in a parliamentary debate that two of his daughters had attended the *Hauptschule* but had attained the school-leaving certificate of the *Realschule* [the *Mittlere Reife*]. To him, this was proof that comprehensive school reforms were simply not necessary because permeability of the school system had already been achieved (Landtag NRW, July 11, 1974, 4461).

Of course, what the CDU suggested to “support” the *Hauptschule* was a reduction in educational demands. In May 1976, the CDU parliamentary group proposed a motion entitled “Reform of the *Hauptschule*,” which stated that it was “unpedagogical and inhumane” to confront *Hauptschule* students with “excessive demands of abstraction.” They should receive a more practical – but “equally valuable” – education (Landtag NRW, May 5, 1976; Landtag NRW, April 2, 1979). The fact that “a certain social destiny inevitably leads to the *Hauptschule* and to a particular occupational [...] world,” as the FDP representative Silke Geringk-Groht put it, was ignored (Landtag NRW, May 3, 1979, 7056). Acknowledging this would have meant saying openly that the lower classes were incapable of “abstraction” and should receive only practical education.

Wilhelm Lenz, former leading CDU politician, summed up the position of the CDU as follows:

I thought this was all nonsense. This idea that one needs to keep the children together longer so that the children from the working strata, [...] who are strangers to education, will be carried along by the better ones. [...] I never

thought anything of that because we need young people in Germany [...] who are capable, who are first class. We don't need windbags, [...] we don't need average. [...] I think that one should support the high-achievers primarily. And then the mass of the children remains [...] who are in the *Hauptschule*. So we must support the *Hauptschule* primarily. [...] The SPD says, [...] we are all one family. [...] I don't want that. I don't want to stick the people together who will have leading positions later as grown-ups with students who don't enjoy school. You cannot make these [students] change. If the parental home doesn't encourage the children to go to school, to do their schoolwork, to aim at goals, it is useless. That was my innermost conviction. (expert interview)

### The Failed Introduction of the Cooperative School

After the elections of 1975, neither Kühn nor the leader of the FDP's parliamentary group, Horst-Ludwig Riemer, were keen on further reform attempts. When the government abstained from any new initiative in education politics, the parliamentary groups took the matter in hand (Düding, 1998, 117ff). Hans Schwier, educational political spokesman of the SPD's parliamentary group, and Friedrich Wilhelm Fernau, consultant of the SPD's parliamentary group, prepared a law proposal for the introduction of "cooperative schools," which they published in March 1976 in the journal of the Education and Science Workers' Union.

A cooperative school was defined as a school lasting from the fifth to the tenth grade and consisted of a comprehensive orientation stage in grades five and six, followed by parallel tracks based on the *Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, and *Gymnasium*. An upper-secondary stage leading to the *Abitur* exam could be added. The school should consist of at least four but usually of six to nine parallel classes for each age group (Blumenthal, 1988, 19f). After the national elections of 1976, which Helmut Schmidt's social liberal government won by a small margin, the law proposal was broached in the NRW parliament (*Landtag NRW*, November 9, 1976; *Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976). In this debate, the spokesperson for the SPD, Schwier, appealed to the CDU:

Is the CDU degrading itself to being the spokesman for archconservative groups, who reject the mere possibility of going to school with *Hauptschule* and *Realschule* students as unbearable? Is the clientele who you believe yourselves to be representing so rooted in thinking about status that it refuses to share the teachers' common-room with *Realschule* and *Hauptschule* teachers? [...] Don't make yourselves, against your previous insights, the standard bearer of school-political ignorance! The ideology which considers school education safeguarded

only through separation and selection, must be termed apartheid. But, ladies and gentlemen, you and we know that the times of apartheid are over. (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1808)

Other speakers for the SPD pointed out that demographic development would soon put schools in rural areas under pressure. This problem could be solved by cooperative schools. They criticized the CDU for not supporting the proposal even though it was similar to the law proposal for cooperative schools that the CDU had made in 1971. They quoted from the CDU's manifestos to show that cooperation between the existing school types was what the CDU normally claimed to support. They argued that the cooperative school would lead to more choices for parents, not fewer, and emphasized that the cooperative school would neither delay nor accelerate the introduction of integrated comprehensive schooling but that it was an entirely independent reform. The CDU's claim that the cooperative school was a step toward the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school was said to be false.

Minister of education Girgensohn was the exception: he expressed openly that, in his view, a cooperative school could only be a "transitional stage" on the way toward the general introduction of the integrated comprehensive school. This was directed at the comprehensive schooling "purists" in the Education and Science Workers' Union and the leftist wing of the SPD, who thought that the reform proposal was a bad idea. These groups believed that the cooperative school would not further but delay more far-reaching reforms (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1826ff). For example, Anne Ratzki, member of the SPD, the Education and Science Workers' Union, and the Organization Comprehensive School, described how shocked she was to find that a new school reform was planned while "their" school had not even left the experimental state:

It was a SPD damp squib. [...] We were appalled. We had the integrated comprehensive school as a concept. And now a new concept turned up. [...] We were absolutely against it. We really saw the integrated comprehensive school going down the drain if it were instituted. (expert interview)

Girgensohn was thus right that these groups would have to be convinced of the reform but was nevertheless heavily criticized for his statement in a later meeting of his parliamentary group (Düding, 1998, 119). His statement was considered to have been strategically unhelpful. And indeed, during the debate, the conservative speakers rejoiced in Girgensohn's "honesty" and accused the other speakers of the SPD to be

lying about their true political aims. The CDU speaker, Nagel, remarked that the *Hauptschule* needed to be reformed before it could be included in any kind of cooperative school. The CDU was not “in principle against a cooperative school,” but what was really needed was an increased focus on the pedagogical work in the *Hauptschule* (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1812ff).

The speaker for the FDP, Jürgen Hinrichs, supported the reform proposal with the argument that it would reduce costs and ensure the educational supply at a time of declining birth rates (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1819). In the expert interview, he explained that he was skeptical of the reform at first but was convinced by more leftist party fellows such as Wolfgang Heinz that it would be a useful reform for less populated areas, like his own municipality in eastern Westphalia. Heinz also spoke in the debate but used a considerable amount of his speaking time to criticize Girgensohn for having claimed that the cooperative school should be a step toward the comprehensive school. Such a “personal statement of faith” was not backed by the liberal parliamentary group and the coalition agreement, Heinz argued (*Landtag NRW*, November 25, 1976, 1831).

On December 10, 1976, the Association of Philologists NRW decided to start a campaign against the cooperative school. In January 1977, the campaign began. The leader of the CDU, Heinrich Köppler, decided that the CDU would “spearhead the movement in solidarity,” and support it financially (quoted in Rösner, 1981, 116). The campaign was supported by conservative teachers’ and parents’ organizations: the *Realschule* teachers’ organization (*Realschullehrerverband*), the parents’ associations of the *Gymnasium* (*Landeselternschaft der Gymnasien in Nordrhein-Westfalen*) and the *Realschule* (*Verband der Elternschaften Deutscher Realschulen*), the Association of German Catholic Female Teachers, a Catholic parents’ association, the Association for Freedom of Research (*Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft*), and the parents’ associations *Elternverein Nordrhein-Westfalen*, *Landesschulpflegschaft Nordrhein-Westfalen*, and *Arbeitsgemeinschaft von Schulpflegschaften im Regierungsbezirk Münster* (Blumenthal, 1988, 135).

The FDP was now highly split. On January 21, 1977, the NRW FDP’s chair and NRW minister for economic affairs, Horst-Ludwig Riemer, proposed a motion at a meeting of the FDP’s parliamentary group that was entitled “Reservations against the Cooperative School.” Riemer was an economic liberal. He expressed worries that were shared by leading

national FDP politicians, such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that NRW was about to “turn into a second Hessen” (Blumenthal, 1988, 70). Many critical and supportive letters to the FDP’s office in Düsseldorf during the first weeks of 1977 document the split within the party (Blumenthal, 1988, 70). In February, Riemer gave a press interview in which he criticized his own parliamentary group for isolating itself from the party. On February 10, 1977, the FDP parliamentary group met with the FDP federal state board to discuss the issue. Blumenthal (1988, 69ff) refers to a discussion paper written by the skeptics on the federal state board. Here, they criticized tactical mistakes, such as an underestimation of the opposition from parents and the CDU, unnecessary time pressures, and insufficient discussion of the law proposal within the FDP. They disagreed in principle with the reformers in the parliamentary group, for example regarding the orientation stage, which they only wanted to experiment with, instead of implementing it straightaway (Blumenthal, 1988, 72ff).

The campaign against the proposal gathered momentum and there were large demonstrations. In March 1977, the SPD and the FDP lost the federal state elections in Hessen, where the introduction of the comprehensive orientation stage had been debated fiercely. The reformers were on the defensive. To calm the opposition, the law proposal was changed so that the orientation stage would no longer have to be comprehensive but could be tracked. A cooperative school could now also consist of only two tracks so that rural areas with only two existing school types could implement it more easily. It was underlined that municipal school authorities were not obliged to introduce the cooperative school, but that it was merely a legal offer (*Angebotsschule*). The schools were now supposed to be smaller and had to include an upper-secondary stage leading to the *Abitur*. None of this helped win over the CDU. The CDU’s motions of the early 1970s were off the table.

Within the FDP, opposition remained significant. The chairs of the FDP chapters of Düsseldorf and Cologne publicly opposed the reform in press interviews (Blumenthal, 1988, 75). In June 1977, the FDP federal state committee finally decided to support the law proposal but against the opposition of a sizable number of critics (Blumenthal, 1988, 86ff). In the second parliamentary debate on the proposal, the liberal speakers continued to support the reform and ignored the split in their own party (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977; *Landtag NRW*, October 26, 1977). Gerigk-Groht, who with Heinz and Hinrichs was



responsible for education politics and, like them, represented the social liberal wing, attacked the CDU:

Those who want rest on the school front create regression and then it becomes difficult to realize the postulates of the federal state constitution which still assign us [the duty] to realize the best possible education for everyone. [...] I find it particularly regretful that the *Hauptschule* student is always used throughout this discussion; one couldn't expect him to learn with other students. [...] One simply suspects that what is playing a role here is instead the motive that the other students can't be expected to learn with *Hauptschule* students. [...] Here there are people, who are defending a certain position. [...] I'd like to know what is more important, the protection of some people, who have succeeded, or the realization of the federal state constitution and its principles! (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977, 2926f)

The leader of the CDU's parliamentary group, Heinrich Köppler, on the other hand, had now sensed that there was a possibility "to create a furor in the majority of the population" if one opposed all further organizational reforms (Wilhelm Lenz, former CDU politician, expert interview). In the debate, Köppler emphasized that "the people in the country finally want some rest." He criticized the coalition for wanting to have their way, no matter what, and for ignoring the "reactions in the population." The CDU, he claimed, cared more about "the content of schooling than [about] its organization." It would stand by the side of students, parents, and teachers against this "so-called cooperative school." He also pointed to the internal split of the SPD and the FDP and mocked *Ministerpräsident* Kühn and his FDP deputy, Riemer, for carrying out a reform they did not really support (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977, 2894ff).

Indeed, *Ministerpräsident* Kühn had not been convinced from the outset. In a newspaper interview in February 1977, he stated that one should not "force anything on the parents." He pointed out that while he supported the proposal "in principle," it been prepared by the parliamentary groups, "not by the government" (Blumenthal, 1988, 33). In June 1977, the aging Kühn was replaced as chair of the NRW SPD by the young Johannes Rau, a reform supporter. At the same party congress, several motions were passed that emphasized that the cooperative school would only be a step toward comprehensive schooling and repudiated tracking in grades five and six. The SPD had also begun to react to the opposition's campaign by publishing leaflets and suchlike. Nevertheless, the split within the party remained palpable.



The school reformer H.-G. Rolff, a member of the SPD and the Organization Comprehensive School, described how he came to understand that an abolition of the *Gymnasium* and a general introduction of comprehensive schools were no longer enforceable within the SPD and that Schwier had developed the law proposal for the cooperative school because he perceived it to be the “last chance” (Blumenthal, 1988, 18). Rolff had been invited by Schwier to internal meetings with SPD representatives, at which the law proposal was discussed:

- Rolff: The social democrats told us, why should we support the abolition of the *Gymnasium* now, when for the first time in history our children are attending the *Gymnasium*?
- Interviewer: That’s what they said?
- Rolff: Yes. Not publicly during the hearings, in the preliminary talks. That was the tipping point. [...] There was a crazy expansion during the 1960s and 1970s and, in fact, these parliamentary representatives now had their children in the *Gymnasium* and they had not attended the *Gymnasium* themselves. So they did indeed think like that. [...] That was the time when I thought, “now the window is closed.” [...] It was socially selfish, not social democratic. (expert interview)

On October 26, 1977, the law on cooperative schools was debated for the last time and passed by the SPD and the FDP against the opposition of the CDU. The chair of the FDP parliamentary group, Hans Koch, claimed that the FDP had never considered abandoning the law proposal (*Landtag NRW*, October 26, 1977, 3257). This statement might have been true of the parliamentary group but not of the party as a whole. Koch criticized the Catholic bishops of NRW for interfering in the debate with an episcopal letter (*Landtag NRW*, October 26, 1977, 3278). This letter warned against a “comprehensive school which could become an instrument of social change with ideological characteristics” and was read aloud in all churches and published as a leaflet (quoted in Seifert, 2013, 254). There were also reports of Catholic priests and nuns who mobilized against the cooperative school (Seifert, 2013, 259f). Koch regretted that “the money of the CDU and the ‘non-blessing’ [or ‘bane’] of the ministerial church [were coming together] against the educational-political initiatives of the SPD/FDP coalition” (*Landtag NRW*, October 26, 1977, 3278). He also declared,

The *Gymnasium* has received its greatest importance in the history of the federal state during the last two legislative periods and we want to preserve the

*Gymnasium*'s educational supply with this law proposal. Those who accuse us of wanting to smash the *Gymnasium* are disabused of this notion by these facts or disqualify themselves as intentional propagandists. (*Landtag NRW*, October 26, 1977, 3260)

In September 1977, the Association of Philologists and the other organizations belonging to the movement against the cooperative school formed the Citizens' Action for a Petition for a Referendum against the Cooperative School (*Bürgeraktion Volksbegehren gegen die kooperative Schule*) (Blumenthal, 1988, 135). The Citizens' Action movement argued against a "leveling of achievement" and accused the cooperative school of being the first step toward the general introduction of integrated comprehensive schools. The term "socialist comprehensive school" [*sozialistische Einheitsschule*] was widely used. It was argued that the cooperative school would destroy the *Gymnasium* (Rösner 1981, 168ff, 216f). Less prominently, the movement argued that the cooperative school endangered the Catholic *Hauptschulen* that remained after the reform of denominational schooling of 1968 (Seifert, 2013, 245ff; see Chapter 5). Support for the pillared structure was justified with the theory of "endowment," according to which "intelligence is up to 80% hereditary and only up to 20% related to the environment" (propaganda material by the Citizens' Action movement, quoted in Rösner, 1981, 170). Finally, the movement emphasized parental rights of choice. From February 16, 1978, to March 1, 1978, the movement collected 3 636 932 signatures for a referendum on the law, equivalent to 29.8 percent of the population of NRW eligible to vote. The 20 percent quorum was exceeded by almost 10 percent. Especially in rural areas, many people signed (Rösner, 1981, 172).

Only three relevant teachers' and parents' associations did not support the Citizens' Action movement (Blumenthal, 1988, 135): the parents' association of the integrated comprehensive schools (*Landeselternrat der Gesamtschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen*), the Education and Science Workers' Union, and the Association of Education and Upbringing. The latter aimed at the upgrading of the *Hauptschule* through an integration of the *Hauptschule* and *Realschule* and was neither a strong supporter nor opponent of integrated comprehensive schooling or cooperative schooling (VBE, 1978; 1991, 66). As its former chair Uwe Franke explained in the expert interview, several of its leading members opposed the Citizens' Action movement, but they could not bind their members to this position. Franke emphasized that the high number of signatures was an expression of general uneasiness resulting from far-reaching social changes: "There was a great social struggle where a great deal was lumped together which

very much constituted a test of the internal unity of our association” (expert interview). The Association of Education and Upbringing therefore attempted to stay out of the conflict.

The Education and Science Workers’ Union NRW campaigned against the referendum, but many of its members were not fully motivated. As former chair of the Education and Science Workers’ Union NRW Ilse Brusis put it, they thought that the cooperative school was “neither fish nor fowl” and difficult to defend (expert interview). They were worried that this half-baked reform would discredit the integrated comprehensive school. Nevertheless, some hoped that it could perhaps be a modest first step.

The SPD and the FDP also campaigned against the referendum, but, as the FDP politician Wolfgang Heinz put it, “the reform momentum which was characteristic of the second half of the sixties and the early seventies for the SPD and FDP alike was strongly diminished, if not evaporated” (expert interview). In a special issue of the NRW FDP’s newspaper, *Forum liberal*, of February 1978, it was emphasized that they were not attempting to abolish the *Gymnasium* and it was even stated that “the FDP and SPD support a pillared school system” (FDP Landesverband NRW/Wolfgang-Döring-Stiftung, 1978, 2). The former FDP politician Jürgen Hinrichs regretted in the expert interview that they had not managed to get that message across.

A day after the Citizens’ Action movement’s success was made public, the coalition committee, consisting of the leaders of the parliamentary groups, decided that the law would be repealed. There would be no referendum. The parliamentary groups had no choice but to agree. The cooperative school was taken off the agenda (Düding, 1998, 123f; Seifert, 2013, 317ff). As pointed out by Reinhard Grätz, Kühn repealed the law “not unwillingly, since the cabinet overall didn’t think much of it” (expert interview). The reformer Anne Ratzki summed up how supporters of comprehensive schooling analyzed the defeat:

But it [the counter-campaign] was no use. [...] And what really irritated us – and that was what we had foreseen – was that it damaged the integrated comprehensive school, because the SPD always said afterwards, “the comprehensive school isn’t enforceable.” (expert interview)

This event marks the end point of this study. It had become clear that the integrated comprehensive school would not be introduced on a general level, since not even the cooperative school had survived the political process. In March 1978 the new chair of the NRW SPD, Johannes Rau,

declared in a letter to all SPD officials that the new aim would be to turn the integrated comprehensive school into an additional regular school type (Düding, 1998, 125). In September 1978, Rau was elected *Ministerpräsident*. In the SPD and the FDP manifestos for the elections of 1980, both parties made it clear that they would not abolish the traditional school types. The SPD won the elections, partly because of tensions in international politics (Düding, 2008, 749). The SPD now had an absolute majority of seats, as the FDP did not make it over the barring clause. In July 1981, the social democrats turned the integrated comprehensive school into a regular school type. The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the federal states agreed in May 1982 to accept the school-leaving certificates of each other's comprehensive schools. Up to 1987, forty-nine more integrated comprehensive schools were founded in NRW (Blumenthal, 1988, 371ff). During the late 1970s and the 1980s, ten years of obligatory schooling were introduced (Düding, 1998, 38). The SPD's strategy was now – and to some extent still is – to introduce comprehensive schooling in a bottom-up way, through decisions by municipalities, with the support of parental groups. Leading SPD politicians never again articulated the aim of abolishing parallel schooling, including the *Gymnasium* (Düding, 1998, 175f).

#### COMPARISON: THE CLASS CLEAVAGE IN POSTWAR EDUCATION POLITICS

In summary, a left-right opposition can be distinguished in the debates about comprehensive school reforms in both cases. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 give an overview of the positions of the most important actors within these struggles. Importantly, internal disagreement was the rule rather than the exception within all these organizations, which is why their placement in the figures only approximately indicates their overall positioning.

In Norway as in Germany, the major protagonists for reform were social democrats. They aimed at creating more equality and at giving the children of the working class access to education. Many social democrats themselves stemmed from those parts of the population that had previously been excluded from upper-secondary and tertiary education and considered it their historical role to make sure that the people's thirst for education could be quenched.

Especially within the Norwegian left, hierarchies and competition in school were seen as negative and as a precondition for capitalist society.




FIGURE 4.1 Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists of comprehensive school reforms along the political left-right axis in Norway, 1950s to 1970s




FIGURE 4.2 Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists of comprehensive school reforms along the political left-right axis in North Rhine–Westphalia/Germany, 1950s to 1970s

The reform of the school system was associated with the goal of overcoming a class society. In Germany, the left's skepticism toward competition was not as outspoken and the ideological emphasis was more on equality

of opportunity than on social leveling. Some leading social democrats thought that the opening of the *Gymnasium* to children from the working class was sufficient and did not question the hierarchy of educational institutions as forcefully as Norwegian social democrats did. An equalization of students' school careers up to the tenth grade was harder to imagine in the more hierarchical, German class society, where school-leaving certificates had long been tightly interwoven with labor market opportunities. Ideas of biological endowment and achievement were dominant and influenced social democrats' thinking to a higher degree than in Norway.

More leftist German reformers, for example in the ranks of the Education and Science Workers' Union or the Organization Comprehensive School, were closer to the Norwegian left's ideology. They were not keen on the introduction of cooperative schooling but preferred the model of the integrated comprehensive school. Because the German left was split over such central aspects, social democrats could not act as one in struggles with reform antagonists. This weakened them considerably. In Norway, a similar split first came about in the grading debate of the 1970s, when the Norwegian Teachers' Association and parts of the Labor Party politically abandoned the more radical representatives of the reform movement, who wanted to abolish grading in the youth school. Before that, Norwegian social democrats were comparatively united behind their aims to introduce nine years of comprehensive education and to decrease organizational differentiation in primary and youth schools.

Social democrats in both countries emphasized the value of practical and vocational education and the necessity of upgrading the status of such knowledge. The German social democrats supported the reform of the *Hauptschule* and the introduction of the ninth and later tenth obligatory school year. Protagonists of comprehensive schooling went along with these reforms because they believed them to be a prerequisite for the introduction of comprehensive schools. They failed, however, to connect the *Hauptschule* reform and the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling directly with comprehensive school reforms. In Norway, social democrats connected the prolongation of obligatory schooling with the youth school reform, which made the reform attractive to the center parties. Finally, social democrats in both countries emphasized that school reforms should serve to increase pleasure in learning and that mixing students socially would foster understanding and respect among people of different backgrounds. When children felt respected and at ease, they would learn more. These arguments became hegemonic in Norway but not in Germany (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

TABLE 4.1 *Similarities between ideological arguments in comprehensive school debates*

Important ideological arguments in both cases were . . .	
Equality vs.	freedom of choice/parental rights
Social leveling vs.	the rearing of elites/support for high-achievers /schooling with different content but of equal value for unequal groups of students
Upgrading of practical/vocational education vs.	academic standards
Community of joyful learners vs.	competitive achievement

TABLE 4.2 *Differences between hegemonic ideological arguments in comprehensive school debates*

Hegemonic ideological arguments . . .	
. . . in Norway	. . . in Germany
Mixing students with different social backgrounds and abilities is valuable for the development of comradeship and community as well as learning.	Children should be taught in homogenous ability groups of practically, theoretically, or practically theoretically endowed children. Low achievers and high achievers must be separated to facilitate learning.
Excessive differentiation, such as parallel schooling, tracking, or ability grouping, will lead to a reproduction of class inequalities. Elite schooling and separation based on social background is unjust. In primary and youth schools, all children should therefore be kept together.	The <i>Gymnasium</i> should continue to be the most important path to the <i>Abitur</i> exam and the school type of high achievers and future elites. In principle, it should be open to all talented students but many students from “bad parental homes” will be better served by attending one of the lower secondary schools.
Too much competition will produce “losers” and have a demotivating effect. Pleasure in learning must be safeguarded.	Competition in hierarchies, based on achievement, serves to motivate students and is necessary for selection.

The antagonists of comprehensive school reforms were representatives of the upper and middle classes and organized mainly within the Norwegian Conservative Party, the German CDU, and the secondary

schoolteachers' organizations. In Germany, parental organizations and Catholic female teachers also played a role in the movement against the cooperative school. One of the antagonists' arguments was that a certain amount of differentiation was necessary to make sure that the ablest students received sufficient support. In addition, the conservative mantra in both countries was that academic standards must be upheld and that achievement should be the most important criterion. Hierarchies and competition were seen as positive, motivating, and necessary for selection to upper-secondary schooling. Organizational differentiation either into school types or ability groups was considered important to foster future elites, who had to be well educated. This argument was, however, much more influential in Germany (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Few, if any, conservative Norwegian politicians would have voiced this as clearly as German Christian democratic politicians and the Association of Philologists did. In both countries, the individual freedom of choice of parents was an element of antagonists' ideology, but, again, this argument played a more significant role in Germany. It was argued that the state should not decide over parents' heads which education was best for their children.

German Christian democrats often repeated their conviction that it was necessary to provide schooling of "equal value" but with "different content" for different groups of the population. An important element of this ideological strategy was to demand a better *Hauptschule* so that the widespread increase in demand for upper-secondary schooling would slow down. The development of the *Hauptschule* into a school for the lower classes could then be portrayed not as a result of parallel schooling during times of educational expansion but as negligence toward the *Hauptschule* by social democracy. For the CDU's representatives, who were educated as primary schoolteachers or came from rural areas within NRW, the expansion of the *Realschule* and *Gymnasium* in these areas and the upgrading of the *Hauptschule* were important. Like the Norwegian center parties, they wanted good educational provision in the countryside; however, they felt that this could be achieved without comprehensive schooling. The CDU's emphasis on the importance of the *Hauptschule* is thus also evidence of an internal cross-class compromise.

In Norway, this alternative solution was no longer a possibility after the Labor Party's decision in 1959 that the old school types could not participate in the experiments. Nevertheless, the conservative parliamentary representative Christie argued in the Norwegian debate of 1959 that the *framhaldsskole* should have been developed into a better alternative to



the *realskole*, instead of merging the school types. This indicates that Norwegian conservatives could have made use of similar arguments, if the parallel school system had persisted. However, the Norwegian Conservative Party was highly split over the introduction of the youth school. Its leading education politician, Fredriksfryd, consented to the Labor Party's education politics, while other important parliamentary representatives, such as Christie or Lønning, held more antagonistic views. As with the German social democrats, this lack of internal unity was a major problem and prevented Norwegian conservatives from developing a strong, antagonistic voice. This changed gradually during the 1970s when political polarization became more pronounced.

In both cases, conservatives mostly did not openly acknowledge the reproduction of class differences in the school system. Sometimes, they would point out that it was simply impossible to erase all inequality. Thus, they acknowledged implicitly that class differences persisted and that educational paths were not of "equal value" but were associated with unequal life chances. Especially in Germany, conservatives sometimes explicitly stated that children from lower-class backgrounds were better served attending a lower-secondary school type, because their chances of success in the *Gymnasium* were marginal. They did not consider this a great problem. As long as particularly talented or motivated individuals could make their way upwards in the system by way of exception, they did not think that the system was unfair. Class differences in educational attainment were concealed with theories of biological endowment in both countries, though more so in Germany. Such theories, according to which children are either theoretically or practically endowed, were referred to by the left and the right, but more often by the right. The idea that students should be taught in homogenous ability groups remained hegemonic in Germany.

In Germany, the hegemony of the antagonists also came to expression in the way the protagonists argued: In the debate about cooperative schooling, some social democrats did not even consider it wise to say in parliament that they saw the cooperative school as a step toward comprehensive schooling but pretended that it was an entirely "neutral" reform. Their ideological strategies were mostly defensive. In Norway, the conservatives, not the social democrats, had to adapt their arguments to a different hegemonic consensus. As a result, their arguments come across as a strongly extenuated version of the German antagonists' arguments. This was not exclusively a result of strategic decisions but also a result of their actual opinions, which were less radical compared to the opinions of

German Christian democrats. The hegemonic consensus thus influenced Norwegian conservatives' convictions. In the Norwegian context, suggesting a school system like the German one would have seemed absurd and unjust – and presumably politically suicidal – to everyone, including the conservatives.<sup>2</sup>

Experiments played an unequal role in the two cases. In Norway, the decision of 1959 to experiment exclusively within the framework of the youth school and exclude the old school types from experiments with nine-year obligatory schooling is exemplary. Experiments, planned in such a way, served to set the course while legitimizing reforms. Nobody could really argue against the experiments, which is why it was so fatal for the antagonists of the reforms that the old school types were excluded. Had they not been excluded, experiments might have served to slow down change. As it was, they served to speed up the reform process. This was related to the financial incentives that the Labor government gave to municipalities that implemented the reforms. These were considerable and made it unattractive, especially for poorer rural municipalities, not to participate in the introduction of the youth school.

In NRW, experiments were designed in a way which slowed the reform process because they prevented final decision-making. Antagonists of the reforms argued that experiments should be evaluated in more detail before any decisions could be made. As the former CDU politician Wilhelm Lenz declared, this was primarily a strategic argument: “It was in a way cheating: the CDU couldn’t come up with anything other than experiments” (expert interview). In addition, German postwar education politics were at first dominated by debates over denominational schooling (see [Chapter 5](#)). For this reason, experiments with comprehensive schools started later than in Norway, giving comprehensive school reformers a shorter time window.

In the second half of the 1970s, the political trend was reversed in both cases, in part because of the global economic development. The times of seemingly never-ending growth and optimism were coming to an end. This was marked by a shift from outer structural reforms to “the inner reform” of the schools. Reform antagonists in particular criticized the strong focus on structural reforms. In both cases, radical reformers were

<sup>2</sup> This is illustrated by remarks by Norwegian conservatives in the expert interviews. They showed polite interest in the structure of the German school system and indicated that Norway could perhaps have something to learn here. At the same time, they made it clear that even though they supported a higher degree of differentiation, dividing students at the ages of ten or eleven seemed rather extreme to them.

disappointed that the social democratic governments had given up the most far-reaching reform ideas. In Norway, this was manifested in the grading debate. Suddenly, public opinion was more on the side of the conservatives. In NRW, the reversal in the political trend became evident in the conflict over cooperative schooling. The short-term openness to reform of the CDU was over and a conservative alliance was formed against the reform politics of the social-liberal government.

Overall, the ideologies of the left and the right regarding comprehensive schooling were clearly opposed in both cases. Power resources theory's focus on the class cleavage as the main driver of political and institutional change thus seems warranted to a certain degree. However, the observation that the left and the right disagreed does not quite explain why the hegemonic consensus and the political coalitions for or against comprehensive school reforms that came about in the two cases differ.

For example, most Norwegian primary schoolteachers supported the structural comprehensive school reforms. Among the organizations of German primary schoolteachers, only the Education and Science Workers' Union did so, while the organizations with denominational roots at best consented to or, in the case of the Association of German Catholic Female Teachers, even opposed comprehensive schooling. The Norwegian center parties, while opposing some aspects of the reforms, ended up consenting to most of the structural changes, and were even responsible for regularizing the youth school in 1969. The Conservative Party and secondary schoolteachers did not manage to build up significant opposition through most of the period. In Germany, farmers, the rural and the religious population, secondary schoolteachers, some primary schoolteachers, and upper-class groups were united under the umbrella of the CDU and became antagonistic to reform attempts. This broad cross-class alliance within the CDU represented a serious obstacle to social democratic school reforms. If we are to truly understand the nature of this intra-CDU alliance, as well as the nature of the cooperation between social democrats and center parties in Norway, it is necessary to examine these coalitions in more detail and to expand the focus beyond comprehensive school debates. What were these coalitions about? What made them durable? Which cleavages were they founded on? The [next chapter](#) sheds more light on these questions by examining several crosscutting conflicts that had an impact on political coalitions and outcomes.

## The Crosscutting Cleavages

### *Struggles over Religion, Centralization, Language, Anti-communism, and Gender*

As discussed in the [previous chapter](#), Norwegian social democrats and conservative German Christian democrats both managed to decisively shape the outcomes of comprehensive school reform attempts. Their respective ideologies regarding comprehensive and parallel schooling became hegemonic, implying that most people accepted the arguments presented by them. This chapter explores in more detail how they convinced such large parts of the population to consent to their school-political agendas and how they successfully forged reform packages that appealed to different groups. To this end, the chapter analyzes five dimensions of education politics that highly engaged at least some parts of the population: struggles over religion, centralization, language, anti-communism, and gender. It becomes clear that especially the center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages continued to be manifested in Norwegian education politics during the postwar reform period. For the most part, this facilitated coalitions between the rural periphery and the Labor Party. In NRW, the state-church cleavage and the communist-socialist cleavage stood in the way of similar coalitions and instead stabilized the internal cross-interest coalition of the CDU.

#### STRUGGLES OVER RELIGION

Both in Norway and in Germany, religion was one of the most contested issues in education politics. In Germany, these conflicts overshadowed everything else until a compromise was reached in 1967–8. The Catholic Church played a decisive role. In Norway, Christian education was the

most important educational-political topic for some Protestant laymen, who left their mark on school debates and reforms.

### **The Norwegian Debate about Christian Education and Christian Private Schools**

Of all the Norwegian parties, the Christian Democrats were the strongest antagonists of the de-Christianization of the school. Since the party's foundation in 1933, they had defended the influence of the Norwegian Church on schooling. In their postwar manifestos, the Christian Democrats emphasized the importance of Christian education. This was a crucial issue related to their main political aim: to protect Christian moral values. The party received support from pietistic Christians in the west of Norway, the Home Mission milieu, and similar. It was anchored in the Christian lay population and the rural population to a higher degree than the Conservative Party, which also represented parts of the Norwegian Church but more the upper ranks of the clergy who were concentrated in the cities and integrated into the state (Svåsand, 1994b, 177ff). From a Rokkanian perspective, the Christian Democrats gave expression to the state-church cleavage, but also the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages.

Despite the Christian Democrats' efforts, secularization of the school progressed over time, promoted by social democrats and, in some periods, by currents within the Liberal Party. The Labor Party did not include secularization as an aim in its manifestos between 1958 and 1978. In most manifestos there were no references at all to the role of Christianity in the school. The only exception was the manifesto of 1969, to which a special supplement was added at the end:

The Norwegian Labor Party wishes for a society with freedom of belief and tolerance – with the same respect for those who have and for those who do not have a religious faith. [...] The Labor Party sees a clear connection between the Christian message and societal politics built on solidarity. [...] The Labor Party sees Christianity as an essential part of the cultural heritage [...] and the generation which is growing up must receive knowledge about this through the school's education. The Labor Party will continue to unite everybody around its basic view, across differences in beliefs and worldviews.

This is a good example of how the Labor Party maneuvered on this issue. Some social democrats wanted a fully secular school, but many wanted to keep a modernized form of Christian education because of its ethical value (Tønnessen, 2011, 73). Even in the Socialist Left Party some high-ranking

representatives were Christians, notably the education politician Otto Hauglin. Nonetheless, social democrats and socialists agreed that schooling was primarily the responsibility of the state and that children should be taught about other religions as well (Korseberg, 2016, 155ff). This consensus dominated their politics.

The Center Party supported the Christian Democrats in the struggle against secularization and included the importance of Christian education in most of its manifestos from 1957 to 1977. But the issue was not as pivotal for Center Party politicians. The same was true of the Conservative Party. This party also included remarks about Christian education in its manifestos but without insisting that the entire content of schooling had to be in line with and based on the Christian faith. The Liberal Party of the postwar period can be placed in between. In its manifestos, it emphasized the importance of Christian education. From the late 1960s, the manifestos also emphasized that students should be taught about other worldviews as well.

Several other organizations were involved in the conflicts. Christian organizations and institutions supported and sometimes pressured the Christian Democrats, such as the Church Educational Center (*Institutt for Kristen Oppseding*, IKO), the Association for a Christian School (*Landslaget for kristen skole*), and the Synod of the Church of Norway (*bispemøtet*). The missionary societies also played a role. The Association for a Christian School was founded in 1963 and was based on the former Norwegian Christian Teachers' Association (*Norges Kristelige Lærerforbund*), which had been founded in 1909. According to the organization, the 1970s and 1980s were its "heyday," with around 4000 members and fifty-six local chapters (KPF, 2021). The Church Educational Center was founded in 1945 and is owned by the diocesan councils, the Synod of the Church of Norway, and several other Christian organizations (IKO, 2021). The Norwegian Humanist Association (*Human-Etisk Forbund*) is situated on the other side of the conflict. It was founded in 1956 and supported secularization and the separation of church and state; it had around 30 000 members in 1986 (HEF, 2016).

The issue of religion caused conflicts over the *folkeskole* law of 1959, the number of hours taught of Christian education during the 1960s, the primary school law of 1969, and Christian private schooling, which are now discussed in turn. The *folkeskole* law of 1959 was not only contested because it limited experiments to the youth school. It also created opposition because it curtailed the rights of the Church of Norway. In the parliamentary debates, the Christian Democrats underlined their worries.

They were supported by the representatives of the Conservative Party, the Center Party, and the Liberal Party (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959; *Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959). The preamble of the law (*formålsparagraf*) had been changed. The paragraph still contained a reference to “Christian and moral education,” but this had been moved to the second sentence. In the sixth paragraph of the law, the subject of Christian education was listed in third place, after Norwegian and Mathematics, even though it had been listed in first place in the earlier law. All non-Labor Party representatives in the parliamentary education committee objected to this and suggested listing Christian education first. They also wished to add a sentence stating that each school day should start and end with a hymn or prayer.

Their proposition was rejected by the Labor Party majority in parliament (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 111). As the Labor Party representative Rakel Seweriin pointed out, no gym teacher or physics teacher should be forced to begin the day with a hymn or prayer. Such Christian elements of education should not be the result of a “decree.” Seweriin accused the opposition of conducting a “superficial [...] struggle about the placement of a single word in a list” and of overreacting (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 106f). The Labor Party representatives downplayed all changes as barely relevant. It would not have served the Labor Party well to say outright that secularization was the aim. Instead, they pointed to the fact that the school laws of the nineteenth century had also listed the subject of reading before the subject of religion, since being able to read was necessary for all further learning (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 102).

Another contested issue was whether the bishops of the Church of Norway should have the right to comment on the curriculum for Christian education. The minority in the parliamentary education committee, consisting of the three Conservative Party representatives, Erling Fredriksfryd, Per Lønning, and Hartvig Caspar Christie, and of the three center party representatives, Olav Hordvik (Liberal Party), Einar Hovdhaugen (Center Party), and Hans Ommedal (Christian Democrats), suggested including this right of the bishops in the law. To this, the Labor Party representatives replied that it was unnecessary to include in the law text something so “self-evident” (*lnnst. O. II.* [1959], 9; *Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 113). However, the minority succeeded in convincing all but one of the Labor Party representatives on the committee to include a sentence about the content of Christian education (*lnnst. O. II.* [1959], 9). The minister of education,



Birger Bergersen, felt that he was being “strongly attacked on this point, [...] completely without reason.” He found it unnecessary to include specifications about the content of Christian education in a law but considered that this concession would not do any harm (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 113f). As a result, Hordvik could claim that “the biggest and most dangerous simplification suggested by the ministry” had been avoided and that “Christianity will have its central place as before in the Norwegian *folkeskole*” (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 18). Ommedal was not as enthusiastic and concluded,

The church has to a high degree been sidelined and this has created unrest [...]. The letter from the bishops and the many hundred letters to the parliamentary committee are evidence of this unrest. The bishops are excluded from supervision and have a diminished position on the school boards and there is little left of the right of supervision the church possessed through bishops and local priests in accordance with the old law. (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 37)

He referred to the fact that the local priests, who had been appointed to the school boards by the bishops, had lost their voting rights and were now only allowed to comment on issues that had to do with Christian education. The nonsocialist representatives on the parliamentary education committee had accepted the loss of voting rights but had suggested that the priests should retain the right to comment on all issues broached at school board meetings (*Innst. O. II.* [1959], 15). The Christian democrat Kjell Bondevik put to the vote a proposal according to which the priests would also retain full voting rights. In his opinion, the priests had played such an important role in the school historically that it would be democratic to continue to preserve this role for them (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 142). The conservative Per Lønning was not pleased. He believed that it would make life easier for the priests not to have to vote on political decisions and considered it strategically unwise to split the four nonsocialist parties. Hordvik agreed that decision-making power should be given exclusively to elected representatives. Bondevik reacted irritably, saying that he apparently had “a stronger belief in theologians than Mr. Lønning,” which was ironic since Lønning was a theologian himself. Lønning replied that Bondevik had a more “romantic” view of the working conditions of the priests on school boards (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, 144ff). These were not the words of close allies. Bondevik’s proposal received fourteen votes – five votes more than the nine votes presumably coming from his



own party. It is probable that the five additional votes came from the Center Party. Lønning's proposal, which suggested that priests should be allowed to comment on all issues, received most of the non-Labor Party votes but the Labor Party majority asserted itself.

In the following years, the number of hours devoted to Christian education became the subject of massive debate. The number of hours taught in the old *folkeskole* had varied considerably from municipality to municipality. The urban municipalities could afford to dedicate more hours to Christian education because the total number of hours taught was higher there. In some of the rural municipalities in western Norway, Christian education had also received high numbers of hours in the *folkeskole*, up to three hours weekly. In poor rural municipalities this often implied that other subjects received less time (comment by minister Helge Sivertsen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3724). In 1959, new minimum standards were devised for municipalities that wanted to participate in the experiments with nine-year obligatory schooling. On the children's level, meaning the first six years, the minimum number of weekly hours taught was set at 135 hours.<sup>1</sup> The minimum standard for Christian education was set at 1.5 hours per week for the first three school years and at 2 hours in the next four years. Grades eight and nine should have one hour weekly (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1960, 9f). In 1963, the minimum number of weekly hours taught was lowered to 123 on the children's level.<sup>2</sup> The minimum for Christian education was increased to 1.5 hours weekly in the first three years and 2 hours weekly for grades four to nine (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1964, 18f).

For some of the poorer rural communities, especially in western Norway, that could not afford to increase the number of hours taught above 123 on the children's level, this implied that they were forced to reduce the number of hours taught in Christian education if they wanted to join the youth school experiments. This created opposition. In 1964, the ministry decided to allow municipalities that followed the minimum standard to redistribute up to three hours between the subjects to strengthen Christian education. Municipalities that had had a higher

<sup>1</sup> During the first three years, the minimum standard was 15 hours taught per week and during the next three years 30 hours per week. This adds up to 135 hours (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1960, 9).

<sup>2</sup> During the first three years, the minimum standard was still 15 hours taught per week, whereas for grades four and five the minimum standard was lowered to 24 hours per week. Grade six were to still receive 30 hours of schooling per week (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1964, 18).

number of hours taught in Christian education could apply to the ministry to reestablish their previous level (*Rundskriv nr. 13* [1964], published in *Innst. S. nr. 233* [1964–5], 539f).

This concession did not have the intended effect of calming the Christian groups and rural municipalities. On the contrary, the debate became more heated, and the issue became highly politicized in the months preceding the elections of 1965. In January 1965, a group of mayors and local politicians of various parties from the western county of Hordaland sent a letter to parliament, asking whether it agreed that around 70 percent of the Hordaland school boards had to apply to the ministry to keep their previous number of hours taught in Christian education (*Innst. S. nr. 234* [1946–65]). The Norwegian Association of Farmers' Women (*Norges Bondekvinne*) and the Norwegian Association of Housewives (*Norges Hømsforbund*) complained about the reduction in hours taught in Christian education. In March 1965, around 8000 teachers signed a letter of protest. The grand finale was the collection of 725 614 signatures between March and June 1965, delivered to parliament on June 8, 1965. The People's Action for Christian Education (*folkeaksjon for kristendomsfaget*) had been initiated by a group of leading men in the organizations of Christian laypeople, such as the principal of the Christian *gymnas* in Oslo, Hans Bovim; the conservative theology professor Carl Fredrik Wisløff; the chair of the executive board of the Inner Mission Society, Fredrik Wisløff; and the general secretary of the Norwegian Lutheran Mission Society, Tormod Vågen. A committee was created, which organized the campaign. It was led by Bjarne Stoveland, who had a leading position in the Inner Mission Society.<sup>3</sup> All of Norway was divided up into thirty districts, where local committees were founded to organize the collection of signatures (*Kvalbein, 1965, 171*). Among the first signatories were all the Norwegian bishops. The number of signatures approached approximately 26 percent of the population over sixteen years (*SSB, 2014, 52*, own calculation). The text to be signed read as follows:

Our society is undergoing a process of change which seems to confront us with a new era in the history of mankind. [...] It is our responsibility to make sure that the generation growing up in this new era can find an anchoring in Christian belief and morals. [...] The preamble of the school law underlines that the school shall

<sup>3</sup> This background information was obtained through personal contact with Jon Kvalbein, one of the youngest members of the committee, who was active in Oslo's Christian Students' Association at the time (*Kvalbein, 1965*).

give children a Christian and moral education. Christian education is therefore a key subject at school and needs a number of hours taught which corresponds to the subject's importance. Christian education must not only be rebuilt but expanded and strengthened. We view with concern and worry that the transition to experiments with nine-year schooling will lead to a strong reduction in the number of hours taught weekly in Christian education in many municipalities. [...] As the matter is once again being debated in parliament, we kindly ask the honored parliament to support the following:

1. No municipality must be forced to reduce the weekly number of hours taught in Christian education.
2. All school boards must have the possibility to receive approval for three hours of Christian education per week during the first seven school years, even if they do not increase the normal teaching time at school. In the eighth and ninth grades, there should be two hours of Christian education per week.
3. The minimum number of hours taught of Christian education should be twenty-one hours in the course of nine school years.  
(quoted in Kvalbein, 1965, 171f)

On the day the signatures were delivered to parliament, a school-political debate was taking place there and the conflict led to fierce exchanges. The Labor Party representatives believed that the regulation of 1964 had taken all justified criticism into account and that the campaign was expressing its criticism one year too late. The real intention, it was said, was to influence the elections of 1965. Several Labor Party representatives accused the organizers of the campaign of misinforming people and pressuring them into signing. It was said that rumors had been spread according to which the Labor Party wanted to force municipalities to weaken or abolish Christian education. It was asked how exactly the supporters of the campaign wanted to increase the number of hours taught in Christian education without increasing the total number of hours taught. The implication was that other subjects would suffer due to Christian overzealousness. Overall, the campaign was deemed by social democrats to be a political campaign against the Labor Party (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965). The two Socialist People's Party representatives supported the Labor Party. The socialist Finn Gustavsen pointed out that the Church of Norway sanctioned the state's right to "kill and go to war" and concluded, "When these are the official morals of the Norwegian Church, it won't help to double the number of hours taught in religious education" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3748).

The conservative representative Per Lønning showed some understanding for the social democrats' discontent regarding the timing of the campaign. He did not think that the Labor Party aimed at weakening Christian education. However, there were other strong forces at work, he maintained, presumably referring to the radical left and the Norwegian Humanist Association. He showed some sympathy for the petition, without subscribing fully to its demands (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3701). The Center Party representative Hovdhaugen also chose his words carefully, saying that it would "probably be a gain if the minimum hours taught in the subject were increased somewhat," but also pointing out that much had been corrected by the regulations of 1964. He claimed that the issue was problematic due to its relationship with the aim of comprehensive schooling:

[O]ne is faced with the fact that we shall achieve a nine-year comprehensive school for the whole country, with the same competency and the same exam demands. [...] [T]oo great a freedom of choice for the school boards within the framework of the minimum curriculum can come into conflict with this principle of comprehensive education. With good will, I nonetheless believe that the question can be solved satisfactorily. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3705)

The Christian Democrats' representatives defended themselves against the social democrats' criticism by underlining that it was not their party's campaign or even a political campaign; it was a campaign based on justified concerns. Financially weak municipalities would not have the means to increase the number of hours taught above the minimum level and would not be able to retain their earlier levels of three hours weekly, even under the regulations of 1964. The Christian democrat Ommedal considered it a democratic loss not to allow local school boards to decide about curricula (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, 3710).

It is probable that the petition contributed to the result of the elections of 1965 and to the forming of the non-Labor government. The Christian Democrats' support of the campaign presumably also contributed to the strong reactions to the Christian democrat Kjell Bondevik becoming minister of church and education. Jakob Aano, who became parliamentary representative of the Christian Democrats in 1965, describes in his memoirs how shocked he was at the extreme antipathy Bondevik and his party engendered in the media. Internally, the party was divided into a radical Christian current and a moderate current consisting of people, like Aano, who wanted to turn the Christian Democrats into a reliable

party of government capable of democratic tolerance and cooperation (Aano, 1991, 81ff).

In Aano's opinion, Bondevik proved to his critics in the following years that he was not a marionette of the Christian organizations but was capable of showing "independent political expertise" (Aano, 1991, 123). The minimum number of hours taught in Christian education was raised to only two per week for all grades, even though the Christian organizations had demanded a higher number. This was in line with the suggestion of the *folkeskole* committee of 1963, which had been put in place by the Labor Party and delivered its report shortly after the parliamentary debate of June 1965 (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomiteén av 1963* [1965], 165). The local school boards could choose the maximum number, three hours weekly, though only during the first six years. The total number of hours taught had been rising across the country, and the new minimum standard was set to 126 hours (*Ot. prp. nr. 59* [1966–7], 24f).

With the primary school law proposal of 1968–9, new conflicts arose. In the text accompanying the proposal, Bondevik's ministry stated that Christian education served the aim of educating members of the church in their faith (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 30). The Labor Party representatives on the committee turned this into a big issue. Some representatives of the center parties were also unhappy. After negotiations between the Christian democrat Jakob Aano, the liberal Olav Kortner, the social democrat Rolf Fjeldvær, and the conservative Kjell Langeland, the committee agreed to point out that it was primarily the church's opinion that Christian education was part of its baptismal education (Aano, 1991, 125; Korseberg, 2016, 163). The committee's report stated that "the church itself has the responsibility to give baptismal education in the ecclesiastical sense" (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 32). In Aano's memoirs, it is not clear whether he was aware of the great change he had thus agreed to: the church's representatives had lost the right to consider Christian education part of "their" baptismal education. The bishops and the Christian organizations were not pleased.

Nonetheless, the law of 1969 reversed several of the critical points discussed in 1959. In paragraph 7 of the law, on curricula, Christian education was mentioned in first place again. Local priests regained the right to express their opinion on all topics in school board meetings. They did not regain voting rights (*Besl. O. nr. 33* [1968–9]). Once again there was a massive debate about the preamble. The non-Labor government made sure that "Christian and moral education" was again mentioned in the first sentence. The formulation suggested by the ministry, according to

which the primary school should provide Christian education “with the home,” was interpreted by the Labor Party as Bondevik wanting to impose on parents the obligation to raise children in the Christian faith. According to Aano, this had not been the intention (Aano, 1991, 121ff). The Labor Party, on the other hand, considered it a great victory that the sentence was changed; it now stated that the primary school should “in understanding and cooperation with the home, assist in giving students Christian and moral education.” The school should also “further freedom of thought and tolerance” (*Besl. O. nr. 33* [1968–9], 63). Despite these changes, supporters of the separation of state and church criticized the law. The Socialist People’s Party voted against it and considered the preamble an “unbearable” compromise (*Forhandler i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 284).

Another conflict was related to private schooling. In 1965, all four governing parties had included in their manifestos remarks about the financing of private schooling. The Labor Party had intended the school system to be public and had not financed private schools on a general basis, but only by application and from year to year. The few private schools that existed in Norway had precarious financial conditions.<sup>4</sup> When Bondevik became minister of education, he appointed a private school commission, *Privatskoleutvalget*, which was meant to conduct a survey of private schools in Norway and prepare a regular financing scheme for these schools.

In the first report of the private school commission, disagreements between the opponents and the supporters of private schooling became apparent (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967]). For the Labor Party, a school system based on democracy and tolerance was one where all children were taught together. Religious private schools were seen as a means for “an intolerant parental generation [...] to educate their children to become as intolerant as themselves” (*Forhandler*

<sup>4</sup> In 1966–7, there were thirty-four private *folkeskoler* in Norway, with 1889 students. Of these, five were run by Adventists, eleven by the free Evangelical-Lutheran Church Society, six by various other free churches, and five by the Catholic Church; two were Rudolf Steiner schools, one was for deaf children, one only had one grade, and one was the result of a local struggle to keep the school in the village (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968]).

There were four private *gymnas* with a total of 1386 students; of these, only two had the right to hold exams, namely the Christian *gymnas* in Oslo run by four Norwegian mission societies and *Tyrfjord høyere skole* run by the Adventists. There were eleven private *realskoler*, but since this school type was being abolished it was clear that they would disappear (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967]).

*i Odelstinget* Nr. 7, February 17, 1970, 56). For the non-Labor camp, respect for the rights of all parents – including minorities – to educate their children in their belief was an expression of democratic tolerance. They argued that private schools should receive state support so that they would not have to charge tuition fees and thus become “exclusive schools for the financially well-off” (*Innstilling I fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1967], 17ff, 69).

The four governing parties were not in agreement regarding how generous the private school law should be. The Conservative Party emphasized in its manifesto of 1965 that it was “the parents’ right and responsibility to choose education for their children” and that “full access” to private schools was necessary. The position of the Center Party and of the Christian Democrats was not as categorical. The Liberal Party was most specific in its demands made of private schools, saying in its manifesto of 1965 that private schools “which work in accordance with curricula and school laws which comply with the demands for teacher training and facilities in the school and which cover a need, [will be] given state support in line with permanent regulations.”

The preparation of the law took a long time because the ministry was waiting for the reports of the private school committee and because there was disagreement about the conditions under which schools would qualify for state funding (Aano, 1991, 143ff). In April 1969, Bondevik’s ministry presented a law proposal (*Ot. prp. nr. 61* [1968–9]). The Labor Party representatives on the parliamentary education committee opposed the law and, in June 1969, prevented the government passing the law before the elections (*Innst. O. nr. 107* [1968–9]; Aano, 1991, 147). The non-Labor government won the elections by a small margin and the coalition continued. The center parties and the Conservative Party now needed to come to an agreement. This was difficult because of the reservations of the liberal member on the parliamentary education committee, Olav Kortner, who was in charge of preparing the committee’s report in response to Bondevik’s law proposal. Kortner was skeptical and pressured by a current within his party that opposed private schooling (Aano, 1991, 145). He pushed through several changes.

First, he insisted that the law had to include specifications as to which kinds of private schools could apply for funding. A sentence was added to the first paragraph, according to which private schools had to either be based on alternative pedagogical ideas, or be based on religious or ethical grounds, or fill a quantitative need for schooling. Private schools would not be allowed to pay their teachers more or less, or have smaller class



sizes, than public schools. They would also be obliged to send in lists of students to the ministry, to ensure that no selection took place based on social, religious, or economic grounds (*Innst. O. VII.* [1969–70]).

In the parliamentary debate on the law proposal, the liberal Kortner made it clear that he was not a supporter of private schools. He underlined that no international agreement obliged Norway to give economic support to private schools. This argument had been made by the ministry, but Kortner rejected it. The only obligation was to allow private schools in principle. Thus, one had to make a “political choice” regarding whether one should let the few private schools “starve to death” or help them with public resources (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 49). He gave his consent to the law, but conditionally:

We have made it clear that we cannot support private schools of any kind. We don't want new class divisions in the people. The law must not include private schools which are created openly or under camouflage to select students, for example on social grounds or with the purpose of being an intellectual elite school. (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 50)

He pointed out that while he respected the rights of parents, these rights were weak compared to the right of the child to learn and make a free choice. He also expressed the hope that, in the future, “all religious and ethical societies [...] will understand the value of the public school and will discontinue private group schools” (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 51). He ended by saying that, while Norway had the resources to allow a small number of private schools to exist, the most important aim was to focus on the expansion of the public school system, to make sure that this system would receive the necessary resources and would not be undermined (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 53).

The Labor Party representatives regretted Kortner's choice to support the law and warned that private schools would indeed undermine the public, comprehensive system. Resources were needed in the public system rather than in the old-fashioned, religious private schools (*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 54). The Christian milieu was not completely satisfied with the law either and considered it too strict (Aano, 1991, 149; *Forhandlinger i Odelstinget nr. 7*, February 17, 1970, 55).

Overall, the debates about Christian education do not give the impression of an ideologically united non-Labor block. The state-church cleavage became evident to some extent but was crosscut and partly eclipsed by



other cleavages. For the Christian Democrats, the religious character of schooling was most important, while the conservatives stood closer to the interests of the state elites and the upper class and were more liberal culturally and economically. For example, the former Christian democratic representatives Jakob Aano and Hans Olav Tunesvik both underlined in expert interviews that they did not support the Conservative Party's intention to allow private schooling without conditions and thus unleash commercial interests. The Center Party cared about the quality of schooling in rural areas and in some cases valued this goal more highly than, for example, the number of hours of Christian education taught. The Liberal Party especially represented an element of uncertainty for non-Labor majorities, as it was historically closely connected to the development of the nation-state and its school system and was critical of Christian private schooling. Thus, the Labor Party had opportunities to cooperate with one of the center parties, mostly the Liberal Party; to make small concessions, as in the debate on Christian education; or to ridicule and attempt to split and weaken the non-Labor camp. The Labor Party did not prevent Christian groups from asserting their interests in all regards. But the social democrats succeeded in defending the comprehensive principle against any serious threat from this fold. Curricula became more similar across the country and the final version of the private school law was restrictive enough to prevent a steep increase in private schools during the period in question.

### **The Debate on Denominational Schooling and Private Schools in North Rhine–Westphalia**

In NRW, Christian education was also among the most contested topics. This is especially true of the 1950s and 1960s, when the conflict over denominational schooling still dominated education politics. This conflict dated back to denominational conflicts during the Weimar Republic, to the cultural struggle under Bismarck, and even further to the Thirty Years' War and the Reformation. It can only be understood in light of historical background (Erlinghagen, 1972, 69ff; Schmitt, 1989, 27ff). In contrast to the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church had long stood in opposition to the Prussian state. During the cultural struggle, Catholics had developed a tight fabric of mass organizations in response to the state's attacks. The most important political expression of Catholicism during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was the Catholic Center Party, which was by far the most

successful party in Catholic areas. For the Center Party and the Catholic Church, denominational schooling was an important issue. In 1926–7, 23 313 of the 33 523 Prussian *Volksschulen* were Protestant schools, with 8823 Catholic schools and only 1392 common schools for both denominations. In the Rhine province and in the province of Westphalia, a majority of *Volksschulen* were Catholic, since Catholics were the majority here (*Statistisches Reichsamt*, 1930, 449).

In Rokkanian terms, the postwar conflict over denominational schooling was a continued expression of the state-church cleavage that had two faces: first, the Catholic Church and milieu wanted to ensure that its members would be educated into the Catholic identity so that their loyalty to the Church and to Catholic organizations would be ensured. Second, both Catholics and religious Protestants wanted to combat the secularization of society. The first motive was more important for the postwar debates about denominational schooling. In the area of NRW, this conflict was especially sharp owing to the religious mix of its population and the comparatively high proportion of Catholics. Until 1958, when it lost its last seats in the NRW parliament, the Center Party remained a fervent supporter of denominational schools. More importantly, the CDU, which was still predominantly Catholic in NRW, supported denominational schooling. The CDU was not quite as tightly connected to the Catholic Church as the Center Party had been. But it was the only party which explicitly represented Catholic interests and was associated with political Catholicism, not least by the Catholic population (*Schmitt*, 1989). The Protestant Church relinquished its adherence to denominational schooling and instead supported Christian common schools. It thus played a less prominent role in these conflicts.

In other federal states where the CDU organized a higher share of Protestants or where the tradition for denominational schooling was not as strong, the conflict was of less importance. For this reason, the CDU's national manifestos did not contain many comments on the issue. The party's Berlin manifesto of 1968 only stated that "besides Christian common schools, denominational schools and non-confessional [*bekenntnisfreie*] schools can be made legally and materially possible where parents in sufficient numbers wish it for their children." The federal state chapters of the party developed independent policies on the issue. The CDU in NRW did not produce written manifestos before 1970, at which point the conflict had largely been settled. The high importance of this issue for the party in NRW during the 1950s and 1960s was demonstrated in the battles fought over the school articles of the NRW Constitution, and over later school reforms and laws. However, the

CDU in NRW was not entirely united on this issue. Over time, the supporters of denominational schooling became fewer.

Social democrats and liberals had long argued against the denominational separation of students in the *Volksschule*. After the Second World War, the approach of the SPD to denominational schooling gradually became more pragmatic. In its Godesberg program of 1959, the SPD stated more clearly than ever before that Christianity and socialism did not stand in opposition to each other (Schmitt, 1989, 80). Even though some social democrats and liberals still supported a wholly secularized school, most of them now accepted the Christian character of the public school but insisted that children of both denominations should be taught together in “Christian common schools” (*Christliche Gemeinschaftsschule*). The Education and Science Workers’ Union (GEW) and the teachers’ organization within the SPD also opposed denominational schooling.

There were 3651 Catholic *Volksschulen* in NRW in 1959 but only 1802 Protestant *Volksschulen* and 884 common schools for both denominations (Table 5.1). In the latter, only 13.8 percent of the students were Catholic, the rest were Protestant (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1960, 49). This illustrates that denominational schooling was more important for

TABLE 5.1 *Number of Catholic, Protestant, and common Volksschulen in North Rhine–Westphalia, 1953–69*

Year	Catholic Volksschulen	Protestant Volksschulen	Common Volksschulen
1953	3 519 (5 private)	1 694 (4 private)	823 (none private)
1959	3 651	1 802	884
1963	3 705	1 846	925
1965	3 732	1 835	943
1967	3 439 (4 private)	1 492 (3 private)	1 136 (5 private)
1969 <sup>a</sup>	256 (3 private)	38 (none private)	47 (1 private)
	Catholic primary schools	Protestant primary schools	Common primary schools
1969	1 593 (none private)	362 (1 private)	1 688 (4 private)
	Catholic Hauptschulen	Protestant Hauptschulen	Common Hauptschulen
1969	75 (none private)	1 (1 private)	1 387 (1 private)

<sup>a</sup> These were *Volksschulen* that had not yet been divided into primary schools and *Hauptschulen* in accordance with the *Hauptschule* reform of 1967–8.

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1954, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970.

the Catholic parts of the population. The teachers of the *Volksschule* were educated in denominationally separate teacher-training colleges. After 1967–8, the upper stages of the former *Volksschule*, now termed the *Hauptschule*, became mostly nondenominational, while denominational schooling was continued in many primary schools. Today, there is still a sizable proportion of denominational primary schools in NRW.

The main conflict pertained to the denominational character of the *Volksschulen*, which were mostly public. In addition, the financing of the mostly Christian private schools was discussed. The debates about private schooling were secondary but related to the conflict over denominational schooling. The *Realschule* and the *Gymnasium* had never been denominational, except for the private schools. Social democrats and liberals agreed that too generous financing of such schools would endanger the public system. The CDU emphasized in most of its education-political documents that parents should have the option to choose a private school and that private schools should receive the same amount of financing as public schools. Its manifesto of 1964, “Education in a Modern World,” stated that in private schools, “any selection of students based on the property or income of the parents is to be precluded.”

Private *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* were mostly Catholic and mostly for girls. In 1959, 76.7 percent of the private *Realschule* students and 81.4 percent of the private *Gymnasium* students were Catholics, with 23 percent and 17.4 percent, respectively, Protestants. In the public *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*, there was a slight majority of Protestants. Around 9 percent of *Realschule* students and 18 percent of *Gymnasium* students attended private schools. The majority of these were girls (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1960, 49f, own calculations). In 1967, 50 of NRW’s 452 *Realschulen* and 114 of NRW’s 570 *Gymnasien* were private. The proportion of girls in the private *Realschulen* was about 75 percent and in the private *Gymnasien* about 69 percent (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1968, 57, own calculations). In 1980–1, there were 43 private *Realschulen*, of which 34 were Catholic and 7 were Protestant, and 103 private *Gymnasien*, of which 85 were Catholic and 14 were Protestant. There were also a few Rudolf Steiner schools but the main operator of private schools was the Catholic Church (*Lemper/Westphalen*, 1982, 207ff).

The postwar conflict over denominational schooling began almost immediately after the war with the reopening and the reorganization of the *Volksschulen*. Denominational schooling had been abolished by the Nazis. In response to pressure by the Catholic Church, the British military

government decided in 1946 to hold a referendum among parents about the reestablishment of denominational schools. The Catholic population especially voted for such a reintroduction. This was in part a result of a campaign by the Catholic Church, which deployed all its power to ensure a favorable outcome. In some cases, children of parents who voted against denominational schooling were even threatened with being excluded from the local school (Eich, 1987, 81). In the following years, denominational schooling was largely reintroduced. This led in some cases to the founding of small *Volksschulen* with only one class for all age groups (Düding, 2008, 268).

Private schools had also been closed during the Nazi dictatorship. Catholic Church officials and CDU politicians began to lobby for the reestablishment, financing, and legal protection of Catholic private schools after the war (Heumann, 1989, 74ff). They based their demands on the situation of private schools in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Constitution had permitted private schools but their approval by the state had been conditional on the qualifications of their teachers and on the demand that selecting students based on parents' income was not encouraged. Private denominational schools had only been permitted where public denominational schools were not available or they had to have been based on a special pedagogical interest (Article 147 of the Weimar Constitution, quoted in Heumann, 1989, 75). Many private schools had received subsidies from the federal states of Rhineland and Westphalia or from cities and municipalities. This was not legally regulated. The supporters of private schooling now demanded binding regulations for the financing of private schools. They argued that private schools eased the financial burden on state coffers. In their view, financial support was necessary to make sure that private-school teachers would be as qualified as public-school teachers and as protected socially. From 1945 to 1946, private schools received funding based on agreements between church officials and the school administration that were not legally formalized (Heumann, 1989, 100ff).

In 1950, the conflict culminated in connection with the passing of the NRW Constitution. Against the votes of the SPD and FDP, the CDU stipulated the denominational character of the *Volksschule* in the school articles of the Constitution. Denominational schools (*Bekenntnisschulen*), common schools for children of different denominations (*Gemeinschaftsschulen*), and schools based on other worldviews (*Weltanschauungsschulen*) were equally recognized. In practice, the number of denominational schools was much higher than the number of common schools, and worldview schools did not

materialize at all (Table 5.1). Article 12 of the new Constitution stated that small, one-class *Volksschulen* complied with the requirements of a “well-regulated school operation” (*geordneter Schulbetrieb*). The SPD had opposed this, as social democrats did not think that these “dwarf schools” were capable of offering quality schooling. They had demanded that only eight-class *Volksschulen* – with separate classes for all eight age groups – should be considered “well-regulated school operations” and had offered, as a compromise, that six-class *Volksschulen* could be defined as such. The FDP also opposed denominational “dwarf schools.” But the CDU and Center Party insisted on including a sentence in the Constitution that legitimized the existence of the more than 750 mostly denominational one-class *Volksschulen* and made it possible to establish additional such schools in denominationally mixed areas (Düding, 2008, 271).

The NRW SPD had moderated its position compared to the Weimar years. Some leading social democrats, such as Heinz Kühn, argued that common Christian ethics and tolerance between the denominations should be manifested in Christian common schools. Among leftist SPD members, who preferred a complete secularization of the *Volksschule*, this attempt to build a bridge with the CDU was unpopular. It was also unsuccessful, as the CDU was not willing to compromise and refused to add the label “Christian” to the term “common school” in the Constitution. For the NRW CDU of the immediate postwar years, the most important aim was to secure denominational Catholic schools, in which Catholic children would be socialized into the Catholic community (Düding, 2008, 267ff; Eich, 1987, 171ff). However, the CDU supported Christian common schools in other federal states and several Protestant CDU representatives in NRW also did so.

Article 8 of the NRW Constitution, which regulated private schools, also created debate. It referred to Article 7, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the German national Constitution (Basic Law). These paragraphs stipulated that private schools that functioned as a replacement for public schools needed public approval. This would be granted if the schools’ learning aims and teachers’ scientific qualifications were equal to those of the public schools and as long as a separation of students based on income was not encouraged. The economic and legal situation of teachers needed to be secured. Private *Volksschulen* could only be permitted if they had a special pedagogical approach or based on parental request. If parents requested a private common school, a private denominational school, or a private worldview school, a precondition was that such a *Volksschule*

was not available in the municipality (Article 7, Basic Law). All parties, except the Communist Party, which opposed private schools in principle, supported the inclusion of these regulations in the NRW Constitution.

But the CDU and the Center Party wanted a more private-school friendly regulation. Against the votes of the other parties, Article 8 of the NRW Constitution also stipulated that private schools had the same “authorities” (*Berechtigungen*) as public schools and were entitled to public funding. The SPD and the FDP had suggested that a separate law should regulate the role and financing of private schools (Eich, 1987, 181ff; Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 88ff). The conflict over the school articles was so serious that the SPD, the FDP, and the Communist Party voted against the Constitution and advised the population to do the same. Nevertheless, the following referendum resulted in a clear majority for the Constitution, due not least to the efforts of the churches to mobilize their members to vote yes (Eich, 1987, 194ff).

The debate continued with the *Schulordnungsgesetz* (Law on the Regulation of Schools) of 1952 (Düding, 2008, 331ff; Eich, 1987, 214ff; Falker, 1984, 113). This law interpreted the schooling articles of the Constitution in such a way that denominational schooling was strengthened further. The teacher workforce at denominational schools now had to belong almost entirely to the respective denomination. The financing and founding of private schools was regulated in a private-school friendly way. Regulations following the law clarified the details. Private schools needed to finance 15 percent of their costs. But this contribution could be reduced to 7.5 percent, or even waived completely, if the operator of the school had little income, provided school buildings, or employed teachers who did not receive full wages – for example, members of Catholic orders (Eich, 1987, 259ff; Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 101ff). The SPD attempted unsuccessfully to make it harder to transform nondenominational schools into denominational ones. Both the SPD and the FDP suggested to no avail that schools with denominational minorities of a certain size should be transformed into common schools automatically. They saw the law as an additional step toward the “confessionalization” (*Konfessionalisierung*) and fragmentation of the school system. The Education and Science Workers’ Union opposed the law as an attempt to “abolish the state school” (Eich, 1987, 226). Catholic Church officials had direct influence on the law text and regulations, to the extent that even the Protestant minority in the CDU parliamentary group was somewhat dismayed. Even though not all of the Catholic Church’s wishes were taken into account, Catholic Church officials were satisfied (Eich, 1987, 221, 258). The main



argument of the supporters of the law related to parents' rights to choose a denominational education for their children.

The SPD-FDP government of 1956–8 did not attempt to pass a new *Schulordnungsgesetz* in order to reverse the regulations on denominational schooling and “dwarf schools” because the social democrats and liberals had included a Center Party minister in their coalition. The support of the Center Party had been conditional on the acceptance of the status quo (Düding, 2008, 392, 395). The coalition passed a law on school financing (*Schulfinanzgesetz*) but the SPD decided, with the support of the FDP and against the votes of the CDU and the Center Party, that this law should apply exclusively to public schools. Presumably, this was a tactical move to avoid a new struggle before the elections. In the discussions regarding school financing, the SPD and the FDP favored higher contributions by private school operators, while the CDU and the Center Party defended the existing regulations (Eich, 1987, 266f).

During the CDU's next period of government, from 1958 to 1966, no further changes to the regulations on denominational schooling were made. In 1961, the CDU government passed a law on the financing of private schools (*Ersatzschulfinanzgesetz*). This law was much discussed in parliament and by the public (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960; *Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1961). It stipulated that private school operators would still have to finance about 15 percent of their costs, but this percentage was reduced across the board by 7 percentage points for the provision of school buildings and by an additional 2 percentage points for the provision of other school facilities. Previously, such reductions had been subject to individual examinations. All private schools now enjoyed these lump-sum reductions. As a result, they only had to finance 6 percent of their costs. This could be reduced further to 2 percent if the school operator faced a difficult financial situation. It was no longer permitted to completely waive the school operator's contribution. CDU minister of education Werner Schütz defended these rules. He argued that the old rules were basically being kept intact but just simplified. A lump-sum reduction in the contribution of all private schools was necessary because many schools could not afford to finance 15 percent of their costs. The minister defended private schools in principle, arguing that they were an expression of “the spirit of freedom” and a “truly democratic institution” (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1696). Banning private schools would in his view be an expression of “totalitarian state thinking, such as we have experienced it in the so-called Third Reich and today in the Soviet zone and in the countries of the Eastern Bloc” (*Landtag NRW*,



October 18, 1960, 1696f). He emphasized that the school administration would make sure that parents' income would not play a role in the composition of private schools' student bodies (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1696).

The law was opposed by the SPD and the FDP. Both parties feared that the public school system would be endangered and that the denominational division of the school system would be increased further, especially among the *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*. In the first parliamentary debate on the law, the SPD's speaker, Johannes Rau, criticized that school operators now only had to contribute their ideology, while the state would contribute the financing. He warned that the law would open up opportunities for nonreligious, economically oriented private school operators, especially in vocational education (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1700). The Liberal Party representative Liselotte Funcke pointed to the dominance of the Catholic Church in secondary private schooling. She warned that increased confessionalization and increased privatization of the school system would make it harder for children belonging to local denominational minorities to attend a school of their choice and would potentially force them to attend Catholic institutions. This applied especially to girls, for whom public secondary schools were not always available (*Landtag NRW*, October 18, 1960, 1702f). These protests were fruitless, and the law was passed and remained unchanged for decades.<sup>5</sup>

In its manifesto for the elections of 1962, the NRW SPD commented,

Regarding the question of public support for private replacement schools [*private Ersatzschulen*] [...], the CDU majority in the federal state parliament has enforced [...] a final regulation which is without precedent in the Federal Republic and in Western Europe: the law on the financing of private schools passed in July 1961 secures private schools a public subsidy of up to 98% of their total costs. [...] the SPD parliamentary group fears further fragmentation and confessionalization of our school system – and now, after the fragmentation of the *Volksschulen* as a result of the first school law [of 1952], also in secondary schooling. The low contribution of, in some cases, only 2% is [...] too great an incentive for private school operators to found new private schools [...]. Especially in smaller municipalities which do not find it easy to keep a higher school, there is the danger of a “clearance sale” of the public school system. [...] In all the discussions, the speakers of the SPD parliamentary group have made it clear that they support

<sup>5</sup> In 1981, the SPD attempted to increase the contributions of private school operators from 6 to 10 percent (Lemper/Westphalen, 1982, 238ff). This revision of the law on the financing of private schools was deemed unconstitutional by the NRW constitutional court, which the CDU had appealed to. The respective paragraph of the law thus remained unchanged until 2005, when the law was incorporated into a broader general school law.

private schools as a supplement to the public school system but reject any one-sided, preferential treatment of private schools through full public financing.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, the NRW FDP made the following demands in its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1962: “The public financing of private schools [should be limited], to preserve their character and avoid any erosion of the public school system; [there must be] an end to the increasing confessionalization of the school system.”<sup>7</sup>

The SPD and the FDP also continued to advocate the Christian common school, but only carefully, and connected this demand to a criticism of denominational schools that were too small to guarantee good-quality teaching. For example, in 1964, the national education policy guidelines of the SPD stated,

[T]he Social Democratic Party advocates the common school because it conveys the experience of the rich diversity of social forces and best ensures an upbringing which furthers constitutional, free and social democracy. The Social Democratic Party respects the decision of parents who give priority to an education defined [...] by their belief or worldview. [...] Common, denominational and worldview schools must comply with the [...] requirements of a well-regulated school operation [*geordneter Schulbetrieb*].

Similarly, the FDP stated in its manifesto for the NRW federal state elections of 1962,

Youth shall be educated in a sense of community and in respect for the convictions of others. For this reason, the Free Democrats advocate the Christian common school. For the sake of freedom of conscience, the FDP respects the wish of parents for the denominational school. This must, however, not lead to [...] the development of [small] dwarf schools.

In 1966, the last CDU government had introduced nine years of obligatory schooling and defined the upper grades of the *Volksschule* as a new secondary school, the *Hauptschule*. However, the primary school and

<sup>6</sup> The far-reaching erosion of the public school system that the SPD and the FDP feared did not take place. The number of private *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* even decreased a little. Even though NRW had private school friendly regulations, the conditions formulated in the Constitution apparently had a debilitating effect with regard to nonreligious private school operators.

<sup>7</sup> Later, the FDP changed its position regarding private schools and became a more active supporter of them. In its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1980, it stated that a “free society needs free schools in private operation” that should serve to develop new forms of learning, which should be publicly financed and supported. It still emphasized that the common school should be the rule and that private schools should be open to anyone independent of denomination and should not discriminate.

the *Hauptschule* were still one administrative unit and still denominational. By the time the SPD and FDP regained power in December 1966, conditions were more favorable for a reform of denominational schooling. According to a poll in January 1967, 65 percent of practicing Catholics and 85 percent of practicing Protestants in NRW now supported common schools for both denominations (Düding, 2008, 559). This was a result of several trends. For one, the influx of refugees after the Second World War and urbanization processes had broken up the geographical separation of the denominations and the population had begun to mix more. For example, marriages between Catholics and Protestants were becoming more common. Processes of secularization within the population were also beginning to make themselves felt and church attendance was becoming less frequent. Moreover, Catholics were no longer a minority in the Federal Republic, owing to the division with the GDR. Even though Catholics were still, on average, somewhat socially disadvantaged compared to Protestants, social inequalities between the dominations had gradually been reduced (Schmitt, 1989, 54ff). For all these reasons, political Catholicism had been weakened. For many Catholics, educating their children as Catholics within a denominational school no longer seemed such a pivotal issue.

The reform of the *Volksschule* became one of the greatest reform projects of the social democratic–liberal government. It entailed a change of the school articles in the Constitution and therefore depended on the CDU's approval. The compromise came about against the opposition of the Catholic Church and its bishops, who thought that the Concordat of the Vatican with the German Reich from 1933 forbade a weakening of denominational schooling and who even threatened to found a new Catholic party. The main argument of the bishops was still that parents should have the right to choose denominational schooling. The Protestant Church accepted the reform (Düding, 2008, 557, 560ff). The *Volksschule* was now split up into a four-year primary school (*Grundschule*) and a five-year secondary school (*Hauptschule*). The primary school would still be denominationally based but the newly founded *Hauptschule* was to become independent of denomination. Denominational *Hauptschulen* could still be founded either as private schools with funding from the federal state or as public schools, if a majority of parents asked for this – as long as a nondenominational *Hauptschule* was geographically reachable and as long as the school was big enough to ensure separate grades for all age groups (Düding, 2008, 555ff).

This compromise was a result of lengthy negotiations between the SPD and the CDU (Düding, 2008, 555ff). For the CDU, Wilhelm Lenz, who was interviewed for this study, was one of the main negotiators. He summed up the conflict as follows:

In the discussion, the SPD emphasized greatly that we were always supporters of a common school, we have never liked the denominational school and we want a new regulation and so on. The CDU was undecided. The CDU was largely a supporter of the denominational school, though this was a Catholic issue. The Protestants said, basically we don't want to fight over this. Basically we [...] support a Christian common school. We don't want any more conflicts with Catholics against Protestants. (expert interview)

Lenz was a Catholic but said in the interview that the Catholic Church had been a much more difficult partner for him in this process than the Protestant Church. He described how the five bishops of NRW had pressured him, especially the bishop of the Catholic diocese of Aachen. The bishops insisted it was their prerogative to “define the position of the CDU” on this matter. However, a generational shift was taking place in the CDU. Lenz was one of the younger CDU politicians, who had joined the party after the war and who thought that the opposition between Catholics and Protestants should be a thing of the past. In this spirit, the CDU had been founded as a union of both denominations. In Lenz's words, he did not want another “cultural struggle.” Some of the older CDU politicians, who had defended denominational schooling during the Weimar period when they had been Center Party representatives, did not agree. As Lenz explained,

I was aware that the position of the old – I would say – within the CDU, for denominational schools, meaning Catholic religious education, [...] educating children into Catholics ... that was somehow after the Second World War [...] over. And people [...] didn't really care [anymore] about all of this. (expert interview)

For this reason, Lenz and the CDU committee that supported him during the negotiations (which also included former minister of education Paul Mikat, another young and comparatively reform-oriented CDU politician) resisted pressure by the Catholic Church. In the negotiations, they developed the compromise described above, which left some loopholes for a small number of Catholic *Hauptschulen* and which retained denominational schooling at the primary school level. Most of the CDU representatives eventually accepted this. With this compromise, the conflict over denominational schooling was put to rest, though it never vanished

entirely since the public school system of NRW was never fully secularized.

In 1969, teacher training at the Pedagogical Colleges was also decoupled from denomination. The CDU accepted a change in laws and the Constitution in return for several concessions. The Catholic Church was given influence in the appointment of professors of and lecturers in theology. Each Pedagogical College needed to appoint at least two Catholic theological professors. The Catholic Church was also granted the right to establish institutions for further teacher training, which teachers could attend voluntarily (Düding, 2008, 58off).

Overall, state-church conflicts demanded much time and energy from all education-political actors in NRW during the 1950s and 1960s. Before the compromise of 1967–8, there was hardly any room for debates about comprehensive schooling. Even though the Catholic Church was not satisfied with the compromise, the CDU remained the only party that saw itself as a representative of the Catholic Church's interests in education politics. The CDU ensured that NRW regulations were designed in a private-school friendly way, which was important for Catholic private schools. Catholic Church officials could count on a steady stream of information and stable cooperation from the CDU. In return, the Catholic Church did much to mobilize its members to support the CDU. This is one of the explanations for how the CDU managed to integrate people of different class backgrounds among its members and voters.

The conflict also created an alliance between the SPD and the FDP in NRW education politics. The SPD and the FDP both had sizable numbers of comparatively less religious Protestants among their voters, many of whom opposed Catholic denominational schooling (Schmitt, 1989). Despite the influence of economic liberals in the FDP, the FDP opposed not only denominational but also private schooling during the first post-war decades. The main explanation for this is that private schools in NRW were mostly Catholic and the FDP opposed the far-reaching influence of the Catholic Church. The FDP first adopted a more private-school friendly position when the conflict over denominational schooling had been put to rest. In other words, both the SPD and the FDP stood more on the side of the state in the state-church conflicts.

#### STRUGGLES OVER CENTRALIZATION

Norway and NRW differ greatly with regard to population density and geographical conditions. In 1960, the average population density in

Norway was 11.6 people per km<sup>2</sup>. About 57 percent of the Norwegian population lived in “densely populated areas,” meaning a population cluster with at least 200 residents and with fewer than 50 meters’ distance between the houses (Table 2.2). In 1955, the average population density in NRW was 420 people per km<sup>2</sup> and over 91 percent lived in urban municipalities with more than 2000 inhabitants (Table 2.5). These enormous differences meant that Norwegian school reformers had to deal with a different kind of challenge regarding the quality of rural schooling and school centralization. Centralization, in the sense the term is employed here, implied that school districts and schools were merged into larger units and small schools were closed or relocated. Nonetheless, centralization was an issue in North Rhine–Westphalian politics as well, since there were a few rural municipalities in NRW in which the small, village *Volksschule* had been the norm.

### The Centralization Debate in Norway

All three center parties had their strongholds in the countryside. This applies especially to the Center Party, which since its foundation in 1920 represented farmers primarily. It was called the Farmers’ Party until 1959, when the name was changed in an effort to represent other groups of the (rural) population too. Decentralization and the economic and cultural strengthening of Norway’s rural areas were the party’s main political goals. For the Center Party, decentralization implied that decision-making, provision of services, and relevant public institutions should all be maintained locally. Schooling played an important role, since schools in small rural communities functioned as cultural centers. Local schools were also considered important for the local economy. In its manifestos of 1957–77, the Center Party emphasized the importance of a “decentralized school system.” It opposed the development toward larger schools and insisted that no rural municipality should be forced to close its primary school against the population’s will. At the same time, it supported the improvement of schooling in the countryside and insisted that rural municipalities had to receive as much financial support as possible so that schooling conditions would be equalized. The Center Party’s manifestos were most detailed and extensive with regard to these issues, but the two other center parties also supported school decentralization, largely for the same reasons.

This should not be taken to mean that the other parties openly dismissed such arguments. The manifestos of the Labor Party, the Socialist

People's Party/Socialist Left Party, and the Conservative Party also mentioned the necessity of improving schooling, especially in the poorest rural municipalities. The Socialist People's Party was especially clear in its rejection of too much centralization, stating for example in its working manifesto of 1965 that "the first years of the children's school [*småskolen*] should be located so close to the home that transport by car is avoided." Neither the Labor Party nor the Conservative Party included equally categorical formulations in their manifestos, but they too showed an understanding of the needs of the rural population. For the Labor Party, the most important aims were better schooling for working-class and rural youths and increased investment in rural municipalities, especially at the level of the children's and youth schools. In its manifestos of 1961 and 1965, the Conservative Party focused on the importance of expanding upper-secondary schooling in the countryside. They demanded that no municipality should be forced to close its *gymnas* due to centralization. From the 1970s, the Conservative Party and the Labor Party suggested increased decentralization – but by this time, the major changes had already taken place. In the following, the conflicts related to centralization are analyzed chronologically.

Much centralization of the school system had already occurred before the introduction of the youth school, based on the laws of the 1930s. Social democrats had long aimed at equalizing schooling conditions across the whole of the country. In the 1950s, the conditions were still very different. There were separate laws for rural and urban schools. The rural *folkeskoler* were often so small that they could not divide children into different age groups or had to group them in fewer than seven groups. The minimum amount of schooling was much lower, and curricula were different. The law of 1959 became the first school law that applied to rural and urban schools alike. All parties supported this. Everyone agreed that it was necessary to improve the rural schools and lessen the differences in standards by integrating the previously separate laws.

However, disagreements within the parliamentary education committee indicate that the center parties stood in opposition to the Labor Party and the Conservative Party regarding some of the details. The three center party representatives on the committee, Hordvik (Liberal Party), Hovdhaugen (Center Party), and Ommedal (Christian Democrats), suggested a change to the law proposal according to which the state would finance up to 50 percent of the costs of new school buildings. They argued that economically weak rural municipalities would need more state support or else they would be left behind. The Labor Party and the



Conservative Party representatives agreed that state support for weak municipalities had to be increased but thought that 50 percent state financing for school buildings would be too high, considering that the law already contained a paragraph according to which the counties had to pay 50 percent. In effect, it would thus be possible for a municipality to receive up to 100 percent financing from county and state together. The Labor Party and the Conservative Party thought that this would stand in opposition “to the old principle that municipalities should organize their schools themselves” (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 14). The center party representatives also argued that financing of school buildings by the county should be increased from 50 to 65 percent, which the majority of the committee, including the conservatives, rejected (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 14).

Paragraph 2 of the law included regulations for the reorganization of school districts. The merging of school districts often led to the closing of village schools. The school directors, who were appointed by the ministry, played an important role as organizers of comprehensive school reforms and of centralization. According to [Telhaug and Mediås \(2003, 190ff\)](#), the school directors were usually welcomed by municipalities as advisors but sometimes centralization led to conflicts between school directors and other bodies on the local level. In case of such disagreements, both the county school boards and the school directors had the right to appeal to the ministry. The center party representatives and the conservative representative, Christie, suggested a change to the law text. They did not like the fact that the school director, a single individual, could appeal to the ministry by himself, whereas a majority of the county school board had to consist of at least three people. Instead, they suggested that each member of the county school board and the school director should be allowed to appeal to the ministry as long as one more member of the board supported them in the appeal. The two other conservative representatives, and all the Labor Party representatives, thought that there was no reason to change current regulations (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 7). This illustrates that the center parties were critical of attempts by the central government to control reforms in rural areas with the aid of the school directors.

An important reason for the center parties' representatives voting against the law of 1959 was that they were worried that it would lead to excessive centralization, implying long distances to school or an increase in boarding schools. They opposed boarding schools and school centralization, especially in the first six years of the primary school, and argued that reforms had to be based on the existing school infrastructure so that



“elastic” transitions to nine-year obligatory comprehensive schooling would be possible (*Innst. O. II* [1959], 10f).

During the 1960s, school centralization and the discussions about it continued. By 1963, around 72 percent of all students in the *folkeskoler* across the country went to schools divided into yearly age groups. In the cities, this was 96 percent. In the rural districts, the percentage had increased from 41 percent in 1953 to 63 percent in 1963. Still, around 22 percent of students in the countryside attended schools that were divided into only four or five age groups and around 15 percent attended schools that were even smaller, and in 1 percent of the cases without any differentiation by age (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151). Furthermore, 5076 primary school students lived in boarding schools or boarding homes close to their school (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 282). The *folkeskole* committee projected in its report of 1965 that better roads, improved transport conditions, and the decreasing rural population would lead to even more centralization. The declared aim was to get rid of the smallest village schools, since these were considered pedagogically inferior and too expensive. There was also a lack of qualified teachers, especially in the rural schools (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151f).<sup>8</sup>

For the youth school, the pressures of centralization were even greater than for the *folkeskole*. The reason was that the *folkeskole* did not have organizational differentiation. The early curricula of the youth school, which were based on tracks, ability groups, and elective subjects, implied that a certain number of students were required. The *folkeskole* committee suggested that a youth school should have at least three parallel classes in each grade (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 155). In some urban areas, the enthusiasm for differentiation led to extremely large youth schools. In Bergen, there was one youth school with fourteen parallel classes (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 279).

To the Center Party, the centralization of the *folkeskole* was the bigger problem. As the Center Party representative Undheim put it in the school debate of 1963,

<sup>8</sup> However, the total number of teachers relative to the number of students was quite high: In 1963–4, there were 16 815 *folkeskole* teachers for 419 441 *folkeskole* students (approximately 25 students per teacher) (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculation). In the *realskole* and *gymnas*, the average number of students per teacher was approximately 21. In the *framhaldsskole*, it was around 17 (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculations).

It has often been said that the nine-year school is of great benefit for the villages in that it places them on a par with the cities in terms of schooling. And there is much truth in this. The youth school exam or the kind of *realskole* exam that all rural young people will now receive in their home village, instead of having to travel further away, is of the greatest value for the villages [...]. But the advantage for the villages lies at the youth school level, not as far as the children's school is concerned. The villages already had an equally good or better children's school than the cities and there is no reason to take it from them. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3343)

Undheim further argued that the rural *folkeskoler* had managed to teach children just as much even though there had been tuition on just three days of the week. The reasons for this were that the children spent more time studying at home than was usual in the cities, that they were taken better care of at home, and that they were not as "overly schooled" as city children. He was also worried that rural children would lose touch with the local economy and would be raised to become "city youths," uninterested in and incapable of doing "the hard toil on farms tough to cultivate" (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, 3343). Here, the Center Party's opposition to centralization was coupled with an opposition to the city's curricula and cultural standards, which were seen as detrimental to the rural way of life. In this regard, the Center Party was more conservative than the Labor Party, whose politicians enthusiastically supported not only the structural but also the curricular changes that resulted from the equalization of regulations for rural and city schools. Presumably, not many Labor Party representatives would have agreed that the rural schools were actually "better" than the city schools. This was an unusual point of view, for despite some reservations voiced by the center parties there was a broad consensus that a certain degree of centralization was necessary to improve rural schools.

In some cases, the pressures of centralization led to fierce conflicts, for example between the individual schools' boards, the municipality's school boards, the county's school boards, the school directors, the ministry, and the local population. In one instance, namely in the small mountain village of Vats in central Norway, parents and teachers decided to found a private school to replace the fourth to sixth grades of the public *folkeskole*. These upper grades had been closed down and centralized even though the municipal school board had voted against it with a slight majority. The school director had reluctantly accepted the municipality's decision, but the county school board had objected and appealed to the ministry. The Labor Party minister Sivertsen had ruled

in 1961 that the upper grades of the *folkeskole* should be centralized in the village of Leveld, 12.8 km away. This was unacceptable to the parents of Vats, who wanted their children to be able to walk to school and who were afraid that once the upper stage of the *folkeskole* vanished, the lower stage would vanish too (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 24). The report of the private school committee of 1968 included the claim that this conflict is “in many ways typical of the centralization debates across the country” (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 32). It was, however, the only case in which the village population took the matter into their own hands, built a new school building collectively, and hired their own teacher. To the administration, the school was a “difficult case, because it would be impossible to implement the large nationwide plan for the *folkeskole* if all district regulations were annulled” (*Innstilling IV fra Privatskoleutvalget* [1968], 32).

Over time, the enthusiasm for larger schools began to wane. It was now said that very large schools led to pedagogical and administrative problems and made it difficult to develop “a good school atmosphere” (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 10). The pedagogical trend of the late 1960s and 1970s was to differentiate less in the youth school. Large schools were therefore no longer as necessary. In its report on the primary school law of 1969, the parliamentary education committee unanimously supported the suggestion of the Christian democratic minister Bondevik that youth schools should have a maximum of six parallel classes. Youth schools with only two parallel classes were allowed but should usually be connected to children’s schools. In the case of very isolated areas such as islands, even smaller, one-class youth schools were allowed based on exemptions (*Ot. prp. nr. 59* [1966–7], 38 f; *Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 10). According to Jakob Aano (1991, 124), this was another example of Bondevik’s capacity to withstand pressure, in this case from rural education politicians who were disappointed that a minimum of two parallel classes remained the norm and who had expected the non-Labor government to go further in its correction of the “centralized school expansion the Labor Party had initiated.” This interpretation is supported by a remark by the Center Party representative Hovdhaugen in the parliamentary debate on the primary school law of 1969:

Correctly or incorrectly, it has often been claimed that the municipalities at times have been pressured by the government to go further on the path of centralization than they often wished. This has often created antipathy and conflict around the

new school regulation. The new school law should put municipalities in a freer position. But I would like to ask the ministry to assume a liberal stance with respect to exemptions from the demands regarding the size of the youth school, in cases where the geographical and transport conditions indicate this. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 275f)

Representatives of the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats also uttered their concern regarding exemptions for youth schools that had only one class. The minister assured them that exemptions would be granted liberally and pointed out that the number of small youth schools with one or two classes had risen from 62 in 1966–7 to 107 in the forthcoming school year of 1970–1 (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 369). The Labor Party representative Per Karstensen remarked in response to this,

I listened with interest to the information from the minister about the tendency we can see today for smaller youth school units. This is probably a tendency which one can find not least on the pedagogical level. It is becoming easier to manage and easier to make possible smaller youth schools. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 369)

Presumably, he was referring to changes in the forms of differentiation in the youth school. At this point, the Labor Party had begun to support pedagogical differentiation within the classroom and thus no longer saw the need to insist on larger school units at any cost.

The Center Party also suggested a change to the law proposal according to which one- and two-class youth schools would be allowed to remain independent of children's schools. Their representatives argued that such a connection between the children's and the youth school would lead to overly large schools and would weaken the small youth schools pedagogically, leading to a lack of qualified teachers trained for the youth school level. The proposal received no remarks from the other parties. It received thirteen votes, all presumably from the Center Party, and was rejected (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 368ff).

Finally, with regard to the merging of school districts and the relocation of schools, the law of 1969 contained a small change. In paragraph 3, it was specified that the population of the school district should only be allowed to vote on such changes if the municipal board or the municipal school board requested this. In the previous laws, special rules had applied to rural municipalities, which had been allowed to vote on such issues in all cases. The votes were nonbinding. The aim was now to create equal rules for rural and urban municipalities, which was the reason why all parties apart from

the Center Party agreed to the change. The parliamentary education committee underlined that it should remain usual to let the population of rural municipalities have a say (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 11f). The Center Party was not satisfied with this and suggested that all school districts should be allowed to vote on such issues in all cases. The proposal received seventeen votes, which indicates that a few other representatives besides the Center Party's voted for it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, 371). However, the Center Party was clearly most concerned about these issues.

In the 1970s, “decentralization” became a buzzword used by all parties. In the name of democratization and decentralization, it was demanded that the individual school, teachers, students, and parents should be given more influence. For the different parties, the term “decentralization” did not have the same meaning. The conservative Lars Roar Langslet (1977, 101) summed up his view of decentralization thus:

We need a school that has better interaction with the society around it. No more mammoth schools! But school units as small as we can manage and with good distribution [across the country]. [...] We must give the local society more decision-making power over the local schools and end unnecessary central management through an unstoppable flood of regulations, instructions and provisions from the ministry and expert councils. If other countries west of the Iron Curtain dare to treat people outside of such organs as adult, responsible creatures, we must also be able to dare to do so.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the conservatives used the decentralization argument to argue for the abolition of the Experimental Council and against the central regulations of 1979 that forbade permanent ability grouping (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979). The regulations of 1979 were, however, not of much consequence for rural schools, which is probably the reason why the Center Party and the Christian Democrats did not oppose them with the same ideological fervor as the conservatives. The Labor Party and the Liberal Party, on the other hand, emphasized that local schools should receive pedagogical influence but not with regard to whether there should be ability grouping.

For the most part, the Center Party and the other center parties accepted the youth school reform, not least because the introduction of the youth school in many cases meant that rural students received two years of additional schooling. This was especially true for the northern counties. In the words of the leftist school reformer Kjell Horn:

In Finnmark, in the counties furthest north, the school supply was miserably bad. And when the state decided they wanted to start with what they called

experiments, [...] start with nine-year schooling, these counties received full funding to build these fantastic [...] school palaces [which were] out of this world. With boarding schools and everything. And I worked in one of these. [...] And there was such an enthusiasm for the nine-year school in Finnmark because ... [from a situation] where there had been almost no school supply, all young people now received a proper nine-year school supply. And that was a fantastic cultural boost out of this world in northern Norway. (expert interview)

It should be added that the Labor Party was strong in the northern counties. In many rural areas, it had local politicians who supported the introduction of the youth school and forged alliances with center party politicians. The youth school was welcomed in the countryside because it was connected to the introduction of nine-year obligatory schooling. Even though the conservatives sometimes succeeded in building alliances with the center parties based on the argument of centralization, the issue overall did not contribute much to the cohesion of the non-Labor camp. The conservatives were still perceived by the center parties as an urban party that did not really prioritize rural interests. The Labor Party's efforts to increase the quality of education in rural areas were more believable from the center parties' point of view. Therefore, the urban-rural conflict over centralization was no obstacle to the prolongation of comprehensive schooling. On the contrary, the trend for decreasing organizational differentiation made it even easier to introduce the youth school throughout the country.

### Debates about Rural Schooling and Centralization in North Rhine–Westphalia

In NRW, many farmers and Christian laypeople were organized in the CDU. The CDU was strong in rural areas, where small *Volksschulen* were common, and emphasized the value of smaller schools. During the 1960s, the party's position changed and modernized somewhat, but it continued to support decentralization in its manifestos for the NRW elections of 1975 and 1980. In the CDU manifesto for the national elections of 1980, the party stated,

Schools need to be preserved in adequate local proximity. Children and youths in rural areas are also entitled to a local, varied supply of educational institutions. We will prevent the decrease in the number of students leading to a wave of school closures and more and more students having to be driven to a distant central school.

The SPD continuously opposed small “dwarf schools,” as social democrats termed them. Even though the SPD had its strongholds in the cities, it

justified this with the wish to improve living conditions in the countryside. Social democrats did not believe that the quality of small *Volksschulen* could ever be on a par with larger schools. For this reason, the SPD's manifestos suggested using school buses and centralizing schools. During the 1960s, the SPD's irritation was focused on the undivided or little divided denominational *Volksschulen*.

The FDP also favored the centralization of schools and the equalization of opportunities for city and rural youth. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, liberals fought against denominational and private schooling, partly because these schools were too small. During the CDU-FDP coalition of 1962–6, FDP speakers supported some of the SPD's motions for the establishment of central schools. In the following, the debates about the undivided – and in many cases, denominational – *Volksschulen*, the introduction of the *Hauptschule* during the 1960s, and the cooperative school during the 1970s are reviewed once more, this time with a focus on centralization.

There were surprisingly many undivided *Volksschulen* in NRW during the 1960s, compared with both the much less populated Norway and the other federal states. In 1960, there were 895 one-class schools, 1050 two-class schools, 779 three-class schools and 509 four-class schools out of a total 6365 *Volksschulen* (Düding, 2008, 492). In 1959, the average number of students per class was 39.2 and the average *Volksschule* had 5.7 classes, even though it comprised eight age groups or grades (Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1960, 44, own calculations). In 1963, there were still around 2000 one-class or two-class *Volksschulen*, as the SPD politician, and later minister of education, Fritz Holthoff, lamented in several parliamentary debates (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3009; *Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 535). The CDU minister of education, Paul Mikat, pointed out that undivided one-class schools were attended by only 1.8 percent of all students, while 40.4 percent of *Volksschule* students attended schools with at least eight classes; 82.7 percent of the students attended schools with five or more classes (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 545).

In April 1962, the NRW parliament debated the shortage of teachers in the *Volksschule*, in response to an interpellation made by the FDP (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962). Even though the small schools were not the main topic of this debate, they were mentioned several times. The SPD politician Fritz Holthoff and the FDP politician Ernst Günther Herzberg argued that the lack of teachers was partly a result of the large number of “dwarf schools” (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3009, 3019).



These schools bound up too many teacher resources and made the teaching profession unattractive to young people. They suggested that *Volksschulen* should be centralized to overcome the “medieval” structure of the system (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3020). The CDU representative Albert Pürsten defended the small schools and emphasized their value to the village. He thought that it would be an undesirable “mechanization of our pedagogical life” if six-year-old children from fifteen different villages were driven to a central school (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3012). Herzberg replied that the school was no longer the “intellectual center of a village” because more and more teachers commuted from cities and refused to live in the village (*Landtag NRW*, April 10, 1962, 3019).

In its manifesto for the elections of 1962, the SPD NRW included the following sentences:

The rural child must have the same number of educational opportunities as the city child. Central schools which unite children from several villages in a centrally located school must be established and equipped so modernly that their performance will be wholly equal to the performance of the city schools.

The CDU won the NRW elections of 1962 and formed a government with the FDP. In the following years, the SPD parliamentary group continued to advocate central schools. In February 1963, the issue came up in a budgetary debate (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963). Holthoff (SPD) suggested that the small *Volksschulen* should be replaced by central schools (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 251). To this, Pürsten (CDU) replied:

The central school was contrasted with the schools with not much division and one-class schools by Mr. Holthoff. [...] I think that we should never see this question as a matter of principle [...]; these questions can only be judged and decided on from the local perspective and based only on the individual case. [...] let us not underestimate the value of the school to the village [...]. We should really discuss this without rage or jealousy or based on extremes and we should not aim at general regulations, but we should try to achieve an improvement of our school system in the countryside by way of enlightenment and support. But I warn against [...] seeking salvation exclusively in the central school. If we equip the small school in the countryside as well as the larger school, if we make an effort so that good teachers come to the small rural schools, then [...] we will see that it can be a fine and rewarding task to be involved in the life of a village as a teacher. (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 269)

In response, Herzberg (FDP) remarked again that the school might have been the intellectual center of the village in earlier times, “when one still



traveled by means of the post cart or horse,” but no longer (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 278). The young SPD representative Johannes Rau argued that the current school system was adapted to the “first half of the nineteenth century.” He lamented that young teachers risked being placed in tiny schools “in the dark countryside” without any colleagues and without public transport facilities to maintain contact with family and friends. CDU representatives reacted with yells to his words, suggesting that he should tell the voters during election campaigns that they were living in “the dark countryside” and arguing that the result of centralization would be that all students would have to commute, instead of just one teacher (*Landtag NRW*, February 12, 1963, 287f).

Shortly after this debate, the SPD proposed a motion for the introduction of central schools (*Mittelpunktschulen*) (*Landtag NRW*, April 2, 1963). These schools should comprise grades five to eight of the *Volksschule*. For this level of schooling, the motion suggested, a well-regulated school operation (*geordneter Schulbetrieb*) could only be guaranteed if all age groups or grades were taught in separate classes. The term “well-regulated school operation” referred to the Constitution, in which the CDU had made sure in 1950 that one-class schools were defined as such. All *Volksschulen* that could not comply with this should be shortened to four years so students could attend a central school from grade five. The federal state should pay for the use of school busses. The motion ended with the following remarks:

During the implementation of the reorganization of the rural school system [...] any coercion or schematization of the school operators is to be rejected. Instead, the open-mindedness and initiative of the municipalities and other participants in school life are to be brought about through the speedy planning and realization of exemplary individual central schools. (*Landtag NRW*, April 2, 1963)

In the parliamentary debate on the motion, speakers of the CDU mentioned this paragraph several times, emphasizing that centralization could indeed not be brought about by coercion and voicing doubts about whether the SPD really understood this. The minister of education, Mikat (CDU), replied carefully. He did not want to “glorify” the rural schools, but was aware of their “great value” (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 546). He supported the merging of small schools “where it seems reasonable” (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 548). On the other hand, to him it was an “open question” whether dividing schools into classes for all age groups always meant better performance (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 547). Transporting students by bus was undesirable and “shrunk

schools” comprising only grades one to four were not sufficient to uphold the “originality of the rural schools” (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 549). He suggested that only grades eight and nine – once the ninth school year had been introduced – should be centralized. Mikat refused “any leveling, not only between city and countryside but also between differently structured rural areas,” while claiming that the problem had to be solved in different ways in different places. In his view, “differentness but equal rights and equal value” characterized “the relation of city and countryside today” (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 546). The emphasis on “differentness but equal rights” sums up one of the main arguments of the CDU, not only in this but also in other education-political debates.

Two other CDU representatives, Peter Giesen and Anton Volmert, spoke more passionately about the small village schools than Mikat. Giesen warned against taking the older students from the school and thereby “executing” it and emphasized the pedagogical advantage of teachers living close to the students’ parents (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 570). Volmert, who represented the rural municipality of Warburg, explained that the introduction of central schools for grades five to eight would mean an increase in one-class schools in his municipality. The reason was that a two-class school, which would lose its oldest students, would then be reduced to a one-class school for grades one to four. He was appalled by the motion:

One thing I know – I come from a small village – if such a village loses its school, it loses a center of cultural education. The opposition of very many people out there hangs [...] on the following consideration: our village is no longer attractive for anything, not even as an industrial location, if we no longer even have a school. (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 574)

The SPD speakers justified the motion by pointing to the unequal educational results in cities and villages and underlined that their aim was to promote the talents of the rural population. Holthoff (SPD) pointed to the USA, Sweden, and Norway, where centralization of the school system was taking place. One-class schools were an “anachronism” in the twentieth century (*Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 532f). The FDP representatives Herzberg and Luchtenberg showed sympathy for the SPD motion and rejected the CDU speakers’ plea for the small village schools, even though they were in a coalition with the CDU at the time.

In January 1965, the SPD once again attempted to initiate a reform of the *Volksschule*. This time, the social democrats suggested that all *Volksschulen* – not only those in the countryside – should be divided

into a four-year primary school and a five-year *Hauptschule*, which would become an independent secondary school. The primary school could in exceptional cases be undivided but the *Hauptschule* should always consist of at least five separate classes. The SPD proposed a change in the school laws and in the Constitution so that only separate classes for all age groups in the *Hauptschule* would be considered a “well-regulated school operation” (*Landtag NRW*, January 12, 1965a; *Landtag NRW*, January 12, 1965b).

Shortly afterward, Mikat proposed a new obligatory schooling law that prolonged obligatory schooling to nine years and introduced a distinction between primary school and *Hauptschule* but with no real administrative separation (*Landtag NRW*, January 28, 1965). The amendment of the law and the SPD motions were discussed in three parliamentary debates (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965; *Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966; *Landtag NRW*, May 25, 1966). Mikat now supported centralization more clearly than in 1963. He stated that the students in grades five and six could under no circumstance be taught in the same class as the students of the primary school and declared that those who did not share this view could not claim to be aiming for a higher number of *Abitur* graduates in the countryside (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1831). On February 23, 1966 – exactly a year after the first debate on the SPD motions – Mikat issued a decree for the introduction of central schools (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1966). He stipulated that grades seven to nine had to be centralized so that two classes for each grade would become the norm. In rural districts, one class for each grade would be acceptable. Grades five and six should be taught in at least one class for each grade. In exceptional cases, grades five and six could be taught in one class but under no circumstance with grade one to four. The first four grades of primary school should be taught in separate classes, but it was permissible to combine a maximum of two grades in one class. Furthermore, central schools could either comprise all nine grades, so small schools would be disbanded completely, or central schools could comprise grades seven to nine or grades five to nine. These decisions should be made case by case. Mikat’s new rules were significantly stricter than previous regulations and meant that great changes had to be made in NRW’s rural districts.

However, it was an open secret that Mikat stood in opposition to many of his party colleagues regarding these – and other – education-political issues. In the parliamentary debates this fact was commented

on by the SPD speakers, but Mikat dismissed such comments lightly. He had not given up his personal opinions when becoming minister, he declared:

The difficulties which I [...] have with my parliamentary group are not pleasant for me but they are a sign of a lively debate to me which is possible and taking place in my party; and even if Mr. Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs sometimes slams a door so that it can be heard in your parliamentary group, then you'll know "It's lively over there! They must be on the trail of a new improvement!" That's how you should look at it! (*cheerfulness and applause by the governing parties*) (*Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966, 2770)

Presumably, Mikat's difficulties with his parliamentary group were the reason why he refused to change the Constitution and to split the *Volksschule* into a separate primary school and a *Hauptschule*. He argued that a change to the Constitution should be an "*ultima ratio*" and that the necessary centralization could be achieved without it (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1827). In addition, he argued that the *Hauptschule* would remain the obligatory school for any child who was not attending the *Realschule* or the *Gymnasium* and that it would not help the *Hauptschule* to be considered a new secondary school (*Landtag NRW*, May 10, 1966, 2776f). Some of his fellow party members became more emotional, stating that the SPD aimed at "breaking up" the *Volksschule* (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1838).

In response, the SPD speakers pointed out that, constitutionally, allowing one-class *Volksschulen* was a real obstacle. Some municipalities continued to build one- or two-class schools because the Constitution sanctioned this practice. A change in the Constitution was necessary. The separation of the *Volksschule* into a primary school and a *Hauptschule* was also more than a matter of wording for the social democrats. Turning the *Hauptschule* into a secondary school was a sign of respect and an upgrading of this school type. This time, the FDP speakers did not side as clearly with the SPD but supported Mikat's argument that a change in the Constitution was unnecessary and that the primary school and the *Hauptschule* should remain one unit (*Landtag NRW*, February 23, 1965, 1840). Presumably, both Mikat and the FDP politicians knew that a change in the Constitution's school articles would not have received a majority from the CDU parliamentary group (Düding, 2008, 494).

Mikat also supported the expansion of *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien* in rural areas. His aim was to "increase the number of higher schools and

*Realschulen* especially in those urban and rural districts where the relative school attendance for these school types is below the federal state's average" (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 7). Social democrats and liberals, as well as the representatives of rural areas within the CDU, supported this, so the expansion of secondary schooling did not create the same amount of debate.

After the NRW elections of 1966, the SPD formed a government with the FDP. Generational changes within the CDU parliamentary group made a new attempt at a change in the Constitution more likely to succeed. The compromise of 1967–8 between the SPD, the FDP, and the CDU entailed not only that denominational schooling was given up on the *Hauptschule* level but also that the *Hauptschule* should consist of two classes for all grades and be considered an institutionally separate secondary school type. The primary school should consist of at least four classes. In exceptional cases, two-class primary schools and five-class *Hauptschulen* were permitted (*Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1967b; *Landtag NRW*, February 21, 1968b). The Constitution was changed and no longer contained the sentence that sanctioned one-class *Volksschulen* as "well-regulated school operations" (*Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1967a; *Landtag NRW*, February 21, 1968a). This change received 172 of 200 votes, implying that 28 CDU representatives voted against it or abstained (*Landtag NRW*, February 29, 1968, 1106).

Centralization of the school system was now conducted rather swiftly. In the years before the reform, the number of *Volksschulen* had decreased only slightly, from 6530 in 1964 to 6255 in 1967 (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1968, 52). By 1969, the total number of primary schools was 3643 and the total number of *Hauptschulen* was 1463. The average primary school now had 7.1 classes and the average *Hauptschule* had 12.3. There were 341 *Volksschulen* that had not yet been divided up into primary schools and *Hauptschulen*. These had on average 5.8 classes per school (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1970, 48, own calculations). In other words, separation into age groups had finally become the norm. This development created some unrest. The CDU was criticized by its political grass roots. It initiated a parliamentary debate about the implementation of the new school laws, during which several CDU representatives complained about the speedy centralization process (*Landtag NRW*, June 12, 1968a; *Landtag NRW*, June 12, 1968b; *Landtag NRW*, June 26, 1968). The CDU representative Peter Giesen made no secret of his dislike of excessive centralization and claimed that the government had not kept its promise to implement the laws in

a cautious way (*Landtag NRW*, June 26, 1968, 1388). The SPD speakers denied the criticism. They pointed out that the unrest created by the new laws had been foreseeable and could have been avoided if the CDU had accepted earlier reforms. These debates were, however, a rather irrelevant footnote in the wake of the decisive battles and negotiations; despite the internal unrest the CDU had to deal with, the compromise held. By 1979, only six *Volksschulen* remained that had not yet been included in the reform and all of these consisted of separate classes for all grades (*Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1980, 126).

During the conflict over cooperative schools in the 1970s, centralization again became a topic. For example, the FDP's manifestos appealed to the rural population, arguing that cooperative schooling would make it easier to preserve a good supply of education in rural areas. At this point, the number of students had begun to decline, which implied that rural schools would have to be shut if no other solutions were found. The SPD also advocated cooperative schooling as a compromise designed for rural areas.

Opponents of the cooperative school did not have a united response to this. Some of them denied that the demographic development was a problem, while others argued that cooperative schools would not solve it (*Rösner*, 1981, 168). A few local CDU politicians in rural municipalities who were worried that their *Realschule* or *Gymnasium* would have to close because of the declining birth rates supported the cooperative school (*Rösner*, 1981, 139). These were a small minority whose utterances played little role. The petition against the cooperative school received most signatures in typical CDU municipalities, meaning in rural, Catholic-dominated areas (*Rösner*, 1981, 226). One of the most important arguments used by the cooperative school protagonists was thus mostly ineffectual.

It can be concluded that the CDU for the most part successfully managed to integrate rural interests by giving voice to demands for decentralized school provision to some extent. The FDP and the SPD did not manage to build bridges with the rural population in these debates, even though they tried. However, the centralization conflict was not as dominant as the conflicts over denominational and comprehensive schooling. Rural politicians did not manage to determine the policy of the CDU entirely. CDU minister of education Mikat eventually ushered in the centralization of primary schools. During the cooperative school debate, declining birth rates in rural areas were not considered a valid argument

by the conservative opposition. In other words, the rural-urban cleavage was not as salient as other cleavages and was overshadowed by the state-church and class cleavages to a large degree.

#### THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE STRUGGLE IN EDUCATION POLITICS

The Norwegian language struggle has its roots in the country's long domination by Denmark and later by Sweden and has no comparable equivalent in Germany. It arose in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the farmer's son and linguistic researcher Ivar Aasen and others developed the New Norwegian language standard (*nynorsk*) based on Norwegian dialects and Old Norwegian. The language struggle was, and remains, mainly a center-periphery conflict between conservative urban elites who speak the traditional language standard *bokmål* (literally "book language"), which is more like Danish, and the peripheral rural and urban population governed by these elites, speaking various dialects.

The two language standards are mutually understandable, but they differ in vocabulary and grammar. Over time, both standards have changed. In both camps of the struggle, there were internal disagreements about whether traditional, historical forms should be used or forms based on the spoken language. There was also disagreement about whether the two standards should be developed toward each other and possibly merged into a common standard (*sammorsk*), or whether their distinctiveness should be preserved. In education politics, the language struggle came to be expressed through conflicts over the choice of language standard taught at school, the language of schoolbooks, and whether students should learn both language standards. The percentage of *nynorsk* users in primary schools has been going down since 1944, when it reached its maximum of 34.1 percent (Vikør, 2002, 157).

Of the political parties, the liberals have traditionally been the most important supporters of *nynorsk*. The *nynorsk* language movement was one of several social movements that came together in the founding of the Liberal Party in 1884. The idea of a purely Norwegian language was a unifying factor for the liberal movement and related to the development of the Norwegian nation. Ever since, the party has been an advocate of *nynorsk*, though it has included currents emphasizing either the "pure" *nynorsk* of the villages or a convergence with urban spoken Norwegian (Almenningen, 2002a, 104). In its manifestos of the postwar decades, the party demanded that all schoolbooks should be published in both



language standards at the same time and for the same price. Until 1969, the Liberal Party's political manifestos included a sentence stating that the long-term aim should be a merging of the two standards into *samnorsk*. In the manifesto of 1973, this position had been relinquished.

The Center Party has also been a supporter of *nynorsk* and, until 1965, its manifestos suggested that the two standards should be merged in the long term. The Christian Democrats' manifestos did not include equally detailed demands, but the party agreed with the two other center parties that schoolbooks had to be published in both standards and that *nynorsk* had to be strengthened in the public sphere. In 1977, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party demanded in their manifestos that it should continue to be obligatory for students in youth and secondary schools to learn both standards. The Socialist People's Party and its successors the Socialist Electoral Alliance/Socialist Left Party also supported *nynorsk*. In their manifesto of 1973, the socialists insisted that the two standards needed to be put on a par in all public documents.

The Conservative Party stood on the other side of the conflict. Of all parties, it had the largest number of supporters of *bokmål*. Most of these came from the urban upper class and considered *bokmål* to be the most sophisticated, refined form of Norwegian. In its manifestos of the postwar period, the Conservative Party did not openly attack *nynorsk*; on the contrary, it was argued that both *nynorsk* and *bokmål* should be allowed to "develop freely and naturally side by side." In some of the manifestos, the importance of *nynorsk* schoolbooks and of supporting the development of *nynorsk* were also mentioned. The most important language-political goals of the conservatives were to avoid the merging of the standards into *samnorsk* and to defend the most conservative variant of *bokmål*, Traditional Standard Norwegian (*riksmål*).

The Labor Party did not have a clear stance on language politics in its early decades of existence; even in the postwar period, its manifestos did not contain much about this issue. Language was not one of the priorities of the party. The workers living in urban areas, who spoke urban dialects, were placed in between the rural population and the cities' upper classes in language politics (Almenningen, 2002a, 100). However, from the 1930s, the official line of the Labor Party changed. The Labor Party now gradually took over the Liberal Party's role as a nation-building party, though giving it a social-democratic flavor. This was also reflected in the party's language-political ideology. The new strategy of the Labor Party was to support the development of *samnorsk*, which should be based on the actual language spoken by the common people, both in the cities and in



the countryside. The Labor politician Halvdan Koht played an important role in the development of this policy. He argued that farmers and workers shared an interest in language politics and should force the upper class to respect their language. In Koht's eyes, both *nynorsk* and *bokmål* would have to be adapted (Ramsdal, 1979, 17ff). The Labor Party's manifesto of 1953 still included the development of *samnorsk* as a political aim, but in 1957 the social democrats removed this demand from its manifesto – much earlier than the Liberal Party and the Center Party.

Besides the parties, the most important collective actors in this conflict were the organizations of the language movement, such as the Norwegian Language Society (*Norges Mållag*), founded in 1906, and the Riksmåal Society (Society for the Preservation of Traditional Standard Norwegian, *Riksmålsforbundet*), founded in 1907. The Riksmåal Society had long been a small organization, but it grew, especially from the 1950s, and had about 45 000 members in 1963 (Almenningen, 2002b, 132). Even though most supporters of *riksmål/bokmål* had upper-class or middle-class urban backgrounds, not all of them were conservatives. The Norwegian Language Society was also characterized by variety in the political standpoints of its members. It was rather weak after the war, with around 10 000 members, and grew slightly to around 12 000–13 000 members in the 1980s (Almenningen, 2002b, 138; Vikør, 2002, 168). While the Riksmåal Society continuously opposed *samnorsk*, the Norwegian Language Society was characterized by internal splits regarding this issue. From 1968, the organization relinquished the idea of *samnorsk*, worrying that a merger of the standards would be based primarily on *bokmål* (Vikør, 2002, 167). The Association for Language Integration (*Landslaget for språklig samling*) was founded in 1959 and still supports a form of *samnorsk*.

The opposition to *samnorsk* increased over time. In 1951, The Riksmåal Society organized a committee called *Foreldreaksjonen mot samnorsk* (Parental Action against the Common Standard). This committee collected 400 000 signatures against *samnorsk* but for schoolbooks with “moderate” instead of “radical” forms of *bokmål*. In 1953 and 1954, the campaign asked parents to correct the language in the schoolbooks. This campaign was supported by conservatives and business leaders, who hoped to weaken the Labor Party. In 1954, the Ministry of Education allowed parallel editions of schoolbooks with radical and moderate forms. As a result, books with radical forms became less used (Almenningen, 2002b, 132ff).

In 1959, a new language standard for schoolbooks was passed in parliament against the votes of the Conservative Party and the opposition

of the Riksmåls Society. Some *nynorsk* supporters were equally unhappy because they thought that *nynorsk* had been changed too much, while *bokmål* had been changed too little. However, users of *nynorsk* accepted the standard in practice, while many users of *bokmål*, such as the conservative press, big publishing houses, or businesspeople, ignored the rules applied in the new schoolbooks and kept writing a more traditional form of *bokmål* (Almenningen, 2002b, 139ff).

The 1959 *folkeskole* law specified that the school board had the power to decide which of the language standards should be used primarily in the school. A vote had to take place if more than 25 percent of the eligible voters in the school district, or a majority of the school board, requested it. The eligible voters were all voters registered for the municipal elections and parents of children of school age. If a majority of more than 40 percent of the voters wanted a certain language standard to be used, this would be binding. In 1964, the Vogt Committee was tasked with discussing the language situation in the country. In 1966, it suggested that parents should simply let the school know which language they preferred for their children when they started school and that ballots should no longer be held. A minority of the committee suggested that there should still be votes on the question but only parents of schoolchildren under fourteen should have voting rights. This minority position was supported by all parties except for the Conservative Party and included in the 1969 *grunn-skole* law. It was decided that schoolbooks had to be published in both languages for the same price and that all students should be taught both language standards during the last two years of primary school. The conflict was becalmed by new rules for parallel teaching: if the parents of more than ten students wanted their children to be taught a different language standard, teaching in parallel classes was allowed (Myhre, 1971, 141ff.).

For the purposes of this book, the most important insight is that, of the parties, the Conservative Party stood alone in the debates about language throughout the period under investigation. Both in 1959 and in 1969, when the center parties were in a coalition with the Conservative Party, the paragraphs of the school laws that regulated questions of language were passed with the support of the center parties and the Labor Party, against alternative suggestions from the conservatives (*Innst. O. II*. [1959], 17f; *Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 50ff). It is hard to grasp from the reports of the parliamentary education committee what these conflicts were about, since the disagreements do not seem very significant. In 1959, the conservatives were the only party that

suggested that only parents of under fourteen-year-olds should have voting rights in local elections about the school language. By 1969, this position had been adopted by the other parties as well, except for a minority of Labor Party and Liberal Party representatives, who still insisted that all eligible voters for municipal and national elections should be allowed to vote on school language, since this was such an “important cultural question” (*Innst. O. XIV* [1968–9], 38). The conservatives now wanted to make all local ballots on school language binding. The background for this was that most local elections were in favor of *bokmål* (Almenningen, 2002b, 130ff). The center parties and the Labor Party made sure that a majority of at least 40 percent of the eligible voters continued to be required to bind the school board to the voters’ decision.

To understand these conflicts, one must look at them in more detail. Language was an emotional, hotly contested issue in Norway. For example, the socialist politician Torild Skard roused anger by speaking a mixture of the two standards – something she did because she had spent her early years in exile in the USA as the daughter of a couple who mixed the standards and the granddaughter of the “*sammorsk* prophet,” Halvdan Koht:

Whenever I said “*nase*” [nose] or “*gras*” [grass] or something like that, they booed at me at school. Still, I didn’t want to back down because I didn’t understand why “*gras*” was less acceptable than “*gress*.” So I was in this war throughout my youth. And even in the student society, if I used a radical form, the right side of the audience sat there booing. And [the newspaper] *Aftenposten* corrected all radical forms in articles, for example. So this was a tough, really tough time. (expert interview)

When asked whether this issue upset people more than the question of differentiation at school, Skard replied,

Yes, yes, yes, [...] The question of differentiation, of using different courses of study or different groupings to differentiate between the students, this was in a way a pedagogical-technical issue, right? [...] Whereas the language issue applied to everyone, everyone spoke a language after all. And language is strongly related to identity. So that was the basis for all those emotions. (expert interview)

This assessment was supported by other experts I interviewed. Many of them gave examples that illustrate how controversial the issue was. Kari Lie mentioned that the Norwegian Teachers’ Association generally tried to keep a neutral stance in language politics and therefore made sure that

the editorials of its journal were written alternately in *nynorsk* and *bokmål*. She remembered one national congress of the association that started out with a protest by *nynorsk* supporters about the fact that the remittance slip for the membership fee had been sent out to members only in *bokmål*. For this reason, some members refused to pay their fee. Another example was given by the leftist Kjell Horn, who remembered a situation he had experienced when teaching in the western parts of Oslo. There, he was once confronted with complaints by one of his students' fathers, a lawyer, about his spoken language. It was said that he spoke too "radically," meaning that he was not sticking to conservative forms of *bokmål/riksmål*. He had to invite all parents to a meeting at which he made an effort to speak as conservatively as possible in order to undermine this criticism.

Two important former activists of the language movement were also interviewed. One was the conservative politician Lars Roar Langslet, who has written a history of the *riksmål* movement (Langslet, 1999). The other was the former Liberal Party and later Christian democratic politician Hans Olav Tunesvik, who has been active in the *nynorsk* movement all his life and was chair of the Norwegian Language Society from 1965 to 1970. Both opposed the idea of *sammorsk* and regarded each other as allies in this regard, though opponents in others. Two quotes from these interviews illustrate what motivated them and how they viewed their opponents. Tunesvik explained his activism for *nynorsk* as follows:

Tunesvik: [...] my natural dialect base is close to *nynorsk*. [...] The other [reason] was that my father had also been active for the language cause and encouraged me to participate in this important work.<sup>9</sup> And I have [...] always considered it a very important cultural value that as many people as possible [...] can use, also in writing, a language that is most natural for them orally. So consistency between written and spoken language is an important consideration. And not least the very rich cultural treasure that we have in *nynorsk* with all the *nynorsk* authors and, in general, the *nynorsk* contribution to Norwegian cultural life is very important [...].

Interviewer: [...] So what do you think motivated the people from the Riksmåls Society to struggle against this?

<sup>9</sup> Tunesvik's father was mayor of the small village of Skånevik for thirty years, in the county of Hordaland. In 1914, he went there as a teacher. He was a member of the Liberal Party and of the language movement, as many teachers were during this period.

- Tungesvik: Well, it was in a way something similar, you might say the finer classes, as we called them ... in Oslo ... the Oslo area and eastern area especially and in a way also in Bergen ... they wanted [...] to have a written language as close as possible to their natural “*talesprog*” [spoken language], as they liked to say, with a “g” at the end instead of “*språk*.” [...] And then there were the most conservative *riksmål* people. There is a difference between *bokmål* and *riksmål*. *Riksmål* is ultraconservative. Almost half-Danish. So they wanted to continue the very traditional, oldest variant of *bokmål/riksmål*. And the goal of the Riksmåls Society was to prevent modernization and what they experienced as a destruction of their formerly strongly conservative form of speaking. [...]
- Interviewer: So it was in a way the “finer classes” as you put it who placed an emphasis on this, who considered it to be more cultivated or ... ?
- Tungesvik: Absolutely. That’s exactly the way it was, yes. (expert interview)

Langslet, on the other hand, viewed things in this way:

- Interviewer: But what motivated you to fight for *riksmål*?
- Langslet: Yes, rather simply [the fact] that it’s the main language here in the country. Around 90 percent use it in writing and large parts of our literary heritage are connected to this tradition, which is irreplaceable for me. So it’s my language. But I have great regard for the part of Norwegian heritage which is connected to [...] *nynorsk*. I write regularly in *nynorsk* myself in the newspaper *Dag og Tid*, so I try to use both, but I see also how difficult it is, because when I write *nynorsk* I need to sit and rack my brain for a long time over each sentence.
- Interviewer: So what do you think motivates the *nynorsk* supporters of the Norwegian Language Society? Why are they so concerned about this?
- Langslet: The good thing which motivates them is probably that they stand for an important tradition in Norwegian culture [...]. And as long as there is a rather large group who feel that their identity is connected to *nynorsk* that should be respected. But I do think the Norwegian Language Society is a bit too sly with their tactical maneuvers which they did in the old days, when they had the Liberal Party as their ally. They use their power as far as they can. To prevent reforms. My position today is that the Language Society belongs to the most highly conservative powers in Norway. Nothing at all is supposed to be changed within the language-political regime which was introduced one hundred years ago. Ultraconservative. (expert interview)

Fascinatingly, both experts, one a Christian democrat and the other a conservative, accused the other side of the conflict of being

“ultraconservative.” Clearly, the issue split the political landscape cross-ways and not primarily to the left and the right. Langslet explicitly stated that there had mainly been opposition between the center parties and the Conservative Party and that the Labor Party had been less consistent in its language-political stance. In his view, the activism of the Riksmåls Society of the 1950s contributed to the change of mind within the Labor Party. The fact that parents affiliated with the Labor Party also took part in the “correction” of schoolbooks according to *riksmål* standards frightened some leading social democrats, he thought. He pointed out that the Labor Party’s decision to put in place the language-political Vogt Committee in 1964 had been an expression of their understanding that they needed to “slow down and reposition, for otherwise one could risk losing elections” (expert interview). The committee, it was hoped, would calm people’s passions. As a parliamentary representative, Langslet later gladly contributed to the “winding-up” of the *sammorsk* policies and thought that in this process they had achieved “good cooperation with the Labor Party, who also understood that such politics now had to be turned around” (expert interview). It had become clear that the opposition to *sammorsk*, especially in the middle and upper classes of Oslo and the second largest city, Bergen, was too strong to be overcome. The Labor Party had to avoid burning any bridges with the *nynorsk* supporters and social democrats continued to support *nynorsk*-friendly policies. This was presumably not too difficult since the center parties also eventually relinquished the idea of *sammorsk*.

Somewhat in contrast to Langslet, Tunesvik thought that the Labor Party had been in a rather stable alliance with the center parties and the Socialist People’s Party in language politics, while the Conservative Party and later the right-wing Progress Party stood on the other side. To understand this view, one should remember that this was partly a class issue, as indicated for example by Tunesvik’s characterization of his opponents as “the finer classes.” The center-periphery, rural-urban, and class cleavages partly overlapped in Norway since the Norwegian power elite, consisting of the upper ranks within the state and the economy, was centered in the cities, and especially in Oslo. The rural periphery was governed by an urban elite. For this reason, the socialist Kjell Horn was of the opinion that the language struggle was primarily an expression of “the bourgeoisie defending its privileges” (expert interview). In his words,

Fiendishly much power lies in language, right? Since the olden days, the language of the Danish civil service kept its hand over the proletariat and the farmers in a colossally strong way. The sheriff and the priest and all the bailiffs

and the entire establishment spoke Danish. And after a while they spoke *bokmål*, call it *riksmål*. And in this enormous power lies. [...] So I think that the language struggle, it's taking from the bourgeoisie their language, which is a means of power; you're taking a means of power from them. And that's not ... that wasn't popular, no. (expert interview)

The coalition of the center parties and the Labor Party in language politics did not mean that the conservatives were weak on this issue. The conservative Per Lønning even claimed that his party “won the language struggle,” in the sense that the idea of *sammorsk* was buried (expert interview). This was a great comfort to many conservatives, since they had perceived *sammorsk* as the greatest danger. As illustrated also by the quote from Lars Roar Langslet above, they could tolerate, and even to a certain degree value, *nynorsk* as long as it remained a minority language used mainly for literary purposes that did not threaten *riksmål*. Nonetheless, *nynorsk* supporters also enjoyed some victories. They certainly contributed to the fact that Norwegian dialects today enjoy higher social standing than German dialects. The idea that children should be allowed to speak dialect at school without having to feel inferior and that their written language should be as close as possible to their dialect is still part of Norwegian “common sense” in education politics. In Germany, this is not the case; the school system and the media, the economy, and the state are dominated by standard German.

Overall, the language struggle should be considered primarily an expression of the center-periphery cleavage that separated the Conservative Party from the center parties and thereby destabilized potential non-Labor alliances. The Labor Party's support for *sammorsk* and later *nynorsk* policies was not only tactical but based on an understanding that the rural population and the urban lower classes both belonged to the cultural periphery and had common interests in the struggle against conservative cultural hegemony.

#### GERMAN ANTI-COMMUNISM IN EDUCATION POLITICS

While the language struggle had no equivalent in the German case, the great significance of anti-communism in German education politics had no equivalent in Norway. German anti-communism split the labor movement and to a lesser degree the liberals, undermined school reformers' legitimacy, contributed to polarization and emotionalism in German political discourse, and thereby had a detrimental effect for potential school reform coalitions. Of course, anti-communism is not only



a German phenomenon. It has certainly also played a role in Norwegian politics, but the important difference is that it was not manifested in education politics the way it was in Germany. Anti-communist arguments against the comprehensive school and generally against the education politics of the SPD, the unions, and in part the FDP characterized German debates and must be considered an important explanatory factor for why comprehensive school reforms failed. Before this is demonstrated empirically in the following, some historical and theoretical remarks are necessary.

Anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage have a long history in Germany, beginning with the suppression of social democracy in the nineteenth century and continuing with the split of the German labor movement during the First World War and the Weimar Republic. After the Second World War, the conflict was intensified by the fact that Germany was divided into a communist East and a capitalist West, which turned Germany into one of the primary arenas of the Cold War. The Communist Party (KPD) was refounded after the war but forbidden in 1956. In 1950, the Adenauer CDU government had issued a resolution, according to which members of the KPD or any of its subsidiary organizations could not be employees of the state (*Beschluss der Bundesregierung vom 19. September 1950*, quoted in Koschnick, 1979, 83). As a result of the party's ban, it has been estimated that around half a million people suffered persecution – many of whom had already suffered persecution under the Nazis (Graf, 1976, 112). In 1968, a new German Communist Party, the DKP, was founded. The DKP and its subsidiary youth organizations, such as the Socialist German Workers' Youth (SDAJ) and the Marxist Student Union Spartakus (MSB), sympathized with the orthodox interpretation of communism of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and received financing from there. Various other communist groups and parties with Maoist, Leninist, or Trotskyist orientations were founded in the aftermath of 1968, known as the "K-groups." These groups were smaller and stood in opposition to the orthodox communists of the DKP. The communist groups were severely split among themselves. In elections, the DKP was unsuccessful. Communist groups achieved influence only within student politics, on a few works councils, and in local union chapters.

Even though communists in postwar West Germany had little political influence, many saw communism, and especially the Soviet Union, as "the danger of our time," as the CDU stated in its Düsseldorf Declaration of 1965. The SPD's Godesberg manifesto and the ideology of the leading



SPD personnel were also clearly anti-communist. However, it was a more divisive and complicated issue for the SPD because the CDU's anti-communism was also directed against the SPD and because there was no agreement within social democracy about how to respond to that. The SPD was split into a moderate or right-wing faction, to which many leading SPD politicians in NRW belonged, and a group of radical, left-wing, and often younger reformers. The conflict was to a high degree a generational conflict, especially after 1968. When the SPD-FDP government under Willy Brandt initiated *Ostpolitik* in 1969, a new external policy that aimed at easing the tensions with the East, the internal split became more problematic. For the leading personnel of the SPD, *Ostpolitik* entailed the problem of having to dissociate themselves (even) more clearly from communists to rebut conservative criticism that the SPD was cozying up to communists. The young reformers disliked such moves to the right. Even though they were not revolutionaries, they did indeed want to use reforms to change society. Acts of terror by groups such as the Red Army Faction, and the reports of former communists who had left the GDR and become "apostates," contributed to anti-communist hegemony. Around 2.4 million people had migrated from the GDR to the Federal Republic between 1950 and 1961 (Koch, 1986). Many West Germans had relatives in the East and were aware of the GDR's weak economic development and the repression of internal critics. People's negative experiences with the communist regime influenced the climate in West Germany decisively.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the character and extent of anti-communism in Germany in general and about the special role it has played there (for an overview of different contributions, see Schwan, 1999, 19ff, 35ff; see also Graf, 1976; Hofmann, 1967). It should, however, be remarked that authors from different political camps have at least agreed that anti-communism has played an important role in German postwar society as an "integrative" ideology (Schwan, 1999, 17, 40f, 66f). Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (2007 [1967]) argue that German postwar society was characterized by a denial of the defeat by the Soviet Union and by a denial of Germany's identification with the Nazi crimes against, among others, the Slavic people. As a result of this denial, parts of Nazi anti-Bolshevist ideology, according to which the Slavic people were inferior in culture and "race," prevailed without reflection and were merged with the anti-communist ideology of the capitalist West into "the official civic attitude" of "emotional anti-communism" (Mitscherlich/Mitscherlich, 2007 [1967], 42). To what extent this

diagnosis is correct cannot be discussed further here. It is certainly true that anti-communism remained an extremely emotional issue; this made rational evaluations of anything communist, which would have permitted rational criticism, difficult (Hofmann, 1967). Anti-communism often served as a tool for discrediting egalitarian policies suggested by leftist opponents as “undemocratic,” or even treacherous, and for stoking fears against irrational images of the enemy (Graf, 1976; Schwan, 1999, 35ff). From the very beginning of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, anti-communism has thus represented a challenge to the internal unity of the German left, including the SPD, and diminished the left’s prospects of achieving far-reaching reforms. As Graf (1976, 104) points out,

The – desired and intended – result of the application of such [anti-communist] methods was a great pressure toward social conformity. Accusations of anti-communism needed only to be levelled, not supported; the onus of proof then automatically went over to the accused who, even if he could prove his innocence, was “tainted” by the charge. Political proposals or policies were not judged according to their intrinsic value but by the degree to which they were associated with communist objectives or by the number of “eastern contacts” which their proposers were said to have had. Such defamation almost invariably meant the neutralization of independent-minded persons, particularly those on the Left. Professors, Nobel Prize winners, former anti-Nazis, distinguished public personalities, whole parties and organizations – all saw their influence diminished through the application of the techniques of anticommunism.

The relationship between anti-communism and education politics can be traced in the manifestos of the CDU, especially during the second half of the 1970s, when the debate about the comprehensive school was in full swing. In its manifesto for the national elections of 1976, the CDU and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), assured voters that they would

stand up firmly [...] against a socialistically shaped Germany in a Europe threatened by popular fronts; [...] against a society steered by functionaries and bureaucrats; against the trivialization of enemies of the Constitution, of political radicalism, terror, and violence; for school and education policies which secure future chances for the young generation; against dangerous experiments and socialist education at the expense of our children, their parents and the future of us all.

Furthermore, the manifesto stated, “The school and education policies of the SPD/FDP have failed. The coalition has misused schools and colleges

as an ideological field for experimentation.” The cultural-political manifesto of the CDU from the same year concluded,

Since 1969, the education politics of the SPD and FDP in the federal government and the federal state governments have been designed to assist in a change of society. [...] Contents of education [...] must not be instruments of social change. [...] The institutions of the education system must be defended against ideological misuse.

The CDU/CSU manifesto for the elections of 1980 warned that due to the *Ostpolitik* of the social-liberal government, the “menacing shadow of the Soviet Union over Europe [was] becoming longer and darker” and the “terrible alternative of capitulation or war” was becoming more and more likely. The manifesto also emphasized that “enemies of the state have no place in state service.” With respect to school reforms, the CDU manifesto of 1980 stated,

The SPD and FDP have experimented heedlessly with their school policies and have thus unreasonably burdened parents and students. Socialist system changers are attempting to practice class struggle in the classrooms. Schools should no longer be places of education and upbringing but [reformers seek] opportunities to charge students “conflict-theoretically,” to alienate them from their parental home, to push on them a one-sided political worldview based on a distorted and falsified view of history.

The reference to “practicing class struggle” in the classrooms contained a grain of truth in that some of the more radical school reformers indeed wanted to enlighten students about the power structures of society and motivate them to take action. For example, Anne Ratzki, former principal of a comprehensive school, remembered that a left-wing teacher at another school had developed a lesson on the subject of work that ended with a demonstration against the local employer, organized by the students. This lesson had been forbidden by the social democratic ministry. The CDU used the fact that some of the proponents of comprehensive schooling were positioned quite far to the left to present even the most modest educational reforms of the social-liberal coalition as dangerous, anticapitalistic politics.

In the expert interviews, the importance of anti-communist arguments became clear. All the German experts interviewed who supported comprehensive schooling agreed that they could under no circumstances use the term *Einheitsschule* – similar to the Norwegian term *enhetsskole* – as a description of the comprehensive school, even though it was the usual term in the 1920s. The reason was that *Einheitsschule* was now associated with the GDR and the term “socialist *Einheitsschule*” was employed exclusively as an “agent of warfare,” as the former CDU politician

Wilhelm Lenz explained in our interview. For example, the leader of the CDU opposition in the NRW parliament, Heinrich Köppler, argued against the cooperative school reform in a parliamentary debate with the following words:

I know that you don't like hearing about the socialist *Einheitsschule*. But [...] the aim of introducing integrated comprehensive schools as regular schools for everyone is a socialist aim after all (*shouts from the SPD*). You decided it at your party convention. (*Schlottmann [CDU]: "Also the minister of education in this house!"*) And a school that wants to take away from other school types their right to exist is an *Einheitsschule*. (*"Very true!" Applause from the CDU*) And both taken together, my ladies and gentlemen, is this socialist *Einheitsschule*, toward which you want to make a decisive step with this cooperative school. (*Landtag NRW, June 29, 1977, 2893*)

Uwe Franke, representative of the Association of Education and Upbringing and left-wing CDU member, thought that this "threat of the socialist *Einheitsschule*" and of "an alternative concept of society" had been the most influential argument against the integrated comprehensive school. It scared people and stood in the way of cooperation between moderate and radical school reformers. Ratzki, who was a member of the SPD and of the Education and Science Workers' Union, agreed that this was one of the most influential arguments:

- Ratzki: One side was the debate about achievement; the second side was the socialist *Einheitsschule*. Your children are brought up to be class warriors. Right and left extremists teach your children, do you want that? They're the kinds of tones we were elated with in 1975. [...]
- Interviewer: Since you referred to the GDR and the socialist *Einheitsschule*, [...] would you say that the comparison with the GDR played an important role in this discussion?
- Ratzki: Yes, yes, yes. In the beginning. How did they put it? In the pamphlets [...] it was said again and again that one wanted to introduce the socialist *Einheitsschule*. The teachers were communists. It played a great role; this fearmongering against the GDR was transferred to the comprehensive school. Most people actually had no idea about what was going on in the GDR and they only noticed what was said in the papers or by politicians. Where they knew comprehensive schools locally, it didn't work, but in places where comprehensive schools were introduced for the first time, without the possibility of getting an idea of them, it did some damage, of course. (expert interview)

Figure 5.1 is a copy of a CDU pamphlet from 1974 against social-liberal school reforms that Ratzki had among her personal papers and kindly supplied to the author. It is possible that the pamphlet originates from the

1. 10. erste Termin CDU  
über GS pro Contra

# Schule '74 CDU-aktuell Schule '74

Eine falsche Schulpolitik der SPD/FDP-Landesregierung hat an unseren Schulen dazu geführt, daß ein erheblicher Organisationswirrwarr herrscht und daß extreme Gruppen immer mehr ihren Einfluß auf unsere Kinder ausüben können.

## Eltern wehrt Euch

### ■ gegen den Mißbrauch unserer Schule ■

**Laßt  
nicht  
zu  
Unter-  
stützen  
Sie ...**

... daß unsere Kinder zu Versuchskaninchen reformbesessener Bildungsphantasten werden!

... daß unsere Kinder zu antidemokratischen Klassenkämpfern erzogen werden!

... daß rechte und linke Extremisten die Lehrer unserer Kinder sein dürfen!

unsere  
**„Sechs Thesen zur Schulpolitik“**

unsere Aktion  
**„Gegen den den Mißbrauch unserer Schule“**

Anwerberischer Sahe für Lieschen Müller | Geld f. 30 wird heute f. 16 95 ausgegeben

23.7. Rahmen-  
mitbringen, ▶

## CDU-aktuell Schule '74 CDU-aktuell

FIGURE 5.1 Christian Democratic Union pamphlet against social-liberal education politics from 1974

Source: Anne Ratzki, personal archive. The handwritten notes are by Anne Ratzki.

federal state of Hessen, not NRW, but in any case, it illustrates the anti-communist character of antagonists' arguments. The pamphlet reads as follows:

The wrong school policies of the SPD-FDP federal government have led to considerable organizational chaos at our schools and to extreme groups increasing their influence on our children. Parents, defend yourselves against the misuse of our school! Don't let our children be turned into the guinea pigs of reform-obsessed educational fantasists! Don't let our children be brought up to be antidemocratic class warriors! Don't let right and left extremists be teachers for our children!

The tone of the pamphlet is characteristic of the emotionalism and polarization of education-political debates in Germany. As the former FDP politician Jürgen Hinrichs stated in our interview, there were "too many emotions involved, less reasoning." Hinrichs described several situations where he was confronted with audiences who were comprised of up to about 90 percent reform opponents and where he felt that he was being "mopped up": "It was really . . . you have no chance, you cannot gain any ground, if you are being booed at after every sentence. So it was terrible. Yes. But that is how it is, when masses are mobilized" (expert interview).

Ilse Brusis, former chair of the Education and Science Workers' Union in NRW from 1975 to 1981, also gave accounts of anti-communist attacks:

Interviewer: The socialist *Einheitsschule* was something of an agent of warfare of the opponents as well? [ . . . ] [W]as the argument about the GDR used much?

Brusis: Yes. Very much. No matter where I appeared in public and argued for a longer common length of schooling, or for the introduction of pre-school education, or for more democracy in schools [ . . . ], the conservatives always countered: "Go to the GDR, there you have it all!" [What one was saying] was always demonized with GDR conditions, it was terrible. One couldn't argue without inhibition. And they were not willing to let something like this get through to them at all. That's GDR, we don't want that. (expert interview)

That Brusis of all people had to face this charge illustrates that conservative opponents drew no significant distinction between whom they attacked with anti-communist arguments. Brusis fought her own battles with the DKP members in the Education and Science Workers' Union, who "were such a pain in the neck with their dogmatism," as she put it. But the fact that she was involved in conflicts with communists to the extent that people thought "at times that I ate a DKP man for breakfast



each morning” did not make her immune to anti-communist attacks (expert interview). Because she led one of the most left-wing unions in NRW, she was perceived as “Red Ilse” by her CDU opponents, which delegitimized any political suggestions she made.

Wilhelm Lenz pointed out in our interview that none of the parties wanted a communist *Einheitsschule*, including the SPD. CDU politicians were aware that the SPD was not promoting communist school policies. Nevertheless, CDU politicians were swift to warn against communist “infiltration” within social democracy, as the CDU politician Heinrich Köppler put it in a parliamentary debate on the employment of “radicals” in the public services (*Landtag NRW*, August 22, 1973, 2930).

To all these charges, the SPD, the Education and Science Workers’ Union, and the FDP had no forceful or united response. For the SPD, it was especially difficult to handle the charge that they were conducting “socialist” education politics. The SPD had socialist roots, but it had abandoned a clearly socialist, anticapitalistic program with its Godesberg manifesto of 1959 and had moved considerably to the right (Graf, 1976). In 1960, the SPD had cut its ties to its student organization, the Socialist Democratic Student Union (SDS), but this had not brought an end to internal opposition to the party’s adaptation to CDU hegemony (Graf, 1976, 225ff). The successor to the SDS, the Socialist College Union (SHB), and later large parts of the Young Socialists, continued to play the role of a left-wing internal opposition. Left-wing opposition outside of the SPD was also growing in the groups of the New Left after 1968. Among the radical school reformers and teachers, many saw school reform as a step toward a socialist society. Many of the leading SPD politicians, including *Ministerpräsident* Kühn and minister of education Holthoff, had little sympathy for this New Left and its ideas about the purpose of education. In this situation, it was difficult for SPD politicians to agree that their education politics were socialist, but nor could they entirely refute it. For example, in the second parliamentary debate about the cooperative school, the SPD politician Heinz Schwier argued,

If more cooperation between schools and an improvement in educational opportunities is socialism (Köppler, CDU: “As if this is an improvement!”) and if the forced selection of young children to separate schools is freedom, then I am in support of socialism (*applause from the SPD*). (*Landtag NRW*, June 29, 1977, 2885)

Instead of taking ownership of the term “socialism,” Schwier only referred to the opposition between socialism and freedom drawn up by the CDU. This was a weak line of defense.

The split in the labor movement and partly in the Liberal Party became even more apparent in the debate about occupational bans. These bans stemmed from a decision by the *Ministerpräsidenten* of the federal states and Chancellor Willy Brandt on February 28, 1972, according to which members of “anti-constitutional organizations” (mainly DKP communists but, in a few cases, also members of the K-groups, social democrats, or Nazis) could not be public employees (see the decision quoted in Koschnick, 1979, 84). This affected around 11 000 activists, among them many teachers, and led to massive public debate (de Lorent, 1977; Düding, 2008, 693; Koschnick, 1979). Within the SPD, and also in NRW, opposition to the bans was significant from the start. Most of the Young Socialists and the Young Democrats, the youth organization of the FDP, opposed them. Large sections of the SPD grassroots in NRW considered the occupational bans illegal (Düding, 2008, 678). In 1973, one of the first occupational bans in NRW, against a young lawyer and DKP member, Volker Götz, led to a parliamentary debate (*Landtag NRW*, August 22, 1973). This gave the CDU a welcome opportunity to criticize the social-liberal government and split the coalition of the FDP and the SPD. Whereas the SPD minister of justice at first insisted that Götz was well-qualified for the job and not dangerous, several FDP ministers disagreed, insisting that Götz could not be hired. *Ministerpräsident* Kühn, with the support of Chancellor Brandt, decided that Götz was not worth risking the coalition with the FDP for, both in NRW and nationally, and Götz was rejected and never became a judge. This decision by Kühn led to indignant reactions from the SPD’s left wing (see Düding, 2008, 676ff, for a detailed discussion of this case).

In the following years it became apparent, also to the initial supporters of the bans within the SPD and the FDP, that they had made a mistake, as Chancellor Brandt later admitted (Koschnick, 1979). In CDU-governed federal states but also in NRW – as the case of Götz illustrates – membership of the DKP was often enough for a person to be banned from public employment. Sometimes the bans were repealed later but, in any case, they led to a general feeling of insecurity for young, left-wing activists. Applicants’ records with the secret service were checked as a matter of principle and the regulation virtually invited the federal states’ administrations to snoop and make denunciations. Both the SPD and the FDP underlined in their manifestos of 1976 and 1980 that they still opposed the employment of “enemies of the Constitution” by the state but that administrative practices were out of proportion. They insisted that the involvement of the secret service in each appointment was unnecessary.



The SPD underlined that mere membership of the DKP should not be a sufficient criterion but that applicants would have to be involved in actual “anti-constitutional activities” to be rejected. This was also a reaction to criticism from abroad.<sup>10</sup> The new – still rather unclear – policy regarding the occupational bans did not overcome the internal split. The anti-communist line of the leadership was still in opposition to a sizable minority of the SPD’s and a smaller minority of the FDP’s grass-roots supporters.

This also became apparent in the SPD’s internal conflicts over cooperation with communists. On November 14, 1970, the SPD party executive decided that any type of “popular front” with communists was unacceptable and that any social democrat who issued publications, organized meetings, signed appeals, or in any other way cooperated with communists would have to be “informed about the damaging character of his behavior for the party” (quoted in [Hasenritter, 1981, 156f](#)). If necessary, internal disciplinary proceedings were to be initiated. [Hasenritter \(1981\)](#) has studied the frequency of party disciplinary proceedings within the SPD, the CDU, and the FDP and has shown that the SPD had by far the highest number of such proceedings. Most of the proceedings carried out by the Federal Arbitration Commission of the SPD were related to cooperation with communists ([Hasenritter, 1981, 157](#)). Members who cooperated with communists in the struggle against the occupational bans or in the peace movement risked exclusion. Many of such members were not excluded but, instead, particularly prominent internal critics were made an example of. On the local or federal state level, such conflicts were sometimes resolved with the imposition of sanctions – for example, loss of voting rights for a few years. Whenever such disciplinary proceedings reached the Federal Arbitration Commission, members who had cooperated with communists were always excluded ([Hasenritter, 1981, 162](#)). Party disciplinary proceedings in the FDP and the CDU were rare. The FDP tolerated the Young Democrats’ partial cooperation with communists to some extent. No similar problems existed within the CDU ([Hasenritter, 1981, 192ff](#)).

<sup>10</sup> The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 1995 that the German practice of occupational bans was a violation of Article 10 (freedom of opinion) and Article 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950. Only then was the practice given up ([Düding, 2008, 693](#)).

The unions, especially the Education and Science Workers' Union, were also beset with internal power struggles and splits. There was fierce infighting between K-group and DKP members and between moderate and left-wing social democrats. On October 1, 1973, the Federal Executive Committee of the German trade union federation, DGB, passed a resolution according to which membership of one of the K-groups, such as the KPD, the KPD/ML, or any of their subsidiary groups, was irreconcilable with membership of the DGB. DKP members were not mentioned (Sachse, 1985, 67). The reason was that DKP members did not attempt to organize communist factions but aimed at a broad "popular front" and were thus considered loyal union members. Members of the K-groups were often involved in the organization of internal opposition, for example through the founding of "revolutionary" or "red union" opposition groups. The Education and Science Workers' Union adopted what was dubbed the *Unvereinbarkeitsbeschluss*, a resolution on irreconcilability, on March 8, 1975, but not all federal state chapters accepted this immediately. The Berlin chapter did not manage to produce the necessary majority for a change to its statutes and was therefore excluded in January 1977 (Sachse, 1985, 69). As a result of this resolution, 854 individuals were excluded from DGB unions until 1982, of whom a total of 272 were excluded from the Education and Science Workers' Union (Sachse, 1985, 84, 86). The Education and Science Workers' Union was in other words the DGB union with the highest number of exclusions. Because the Education and Science Workers' Union also organized students and university professors, it became one of the most left-wing unions and thus had to deal with much internal opposition.

Overall, in the Cold War atmosphere of the postwar decades, it was a challenging, if not unsolvable, task to remain ideologically independent of either bloc. This was a problem for the internal unity of the social democrats and the unions. The CDU had chosen to place itself clearly on the side of the capitalist west and employed anti-communist arguments whenever it seemed useful, including in education politics. Within the labor movement, a sizable minority refused to take such a clear stand. People were drawn in both directions and the labor movement was split. Instead of positively and confidently defining the contents of "socialist" education politics, the leading personnel of the SPD continued their strategy of moderating the SPD's goals, seconding anti-communist fears, and stifling internal criticism. This strategy consolidated anti-communist hegemony instead of weakening it. From a Rokkanian point of view, postwar anti-communism thus deepened the internal split of the labor

movement in Germany. This affected the capacity for cooperation between moderate or right-wing social democrats, who were anti-communist, and left-wing social democrats, who considered anti-communism to be a tool against their egalitarian political goals, including the comprehensive school. For potential cooperation partners, such as the Association of Education and Upbringing, anti-communist arguments, the internal conflicts of the reformers' camp, and the leftist orientation of the Education and Science Workers' Union had a deterrent effect. The relationship between the FDP and the SPD suffered as well. Even though the FDP was comparatively tolerant of its left-wing Young Democrats, its leading personnel remained strictly anti-communist and rejected the idea that education politics should be a means to change the social system. For the opponents of reform, this situation opened up various possibilities for ideological attack.

#### STRUGGLES OVER GENDER

Finally, education for girls and women was also a controversial issue. Women's organizations and organizations of female teachers strove for equal treatment, better education, and better working conditions. In Norway, girls' access to schooling on a par with boys was introduced significantly earlier, in the 1880s. Of all the German states, Prussia was among the last to open the education system to girls. Secondary girls' schools were first put on a par with boys' schools in 1923 (Herrlitz et al., 2009, 100). In the initial decades after the Second World War, girls' educational achievement was still much lower. Both in Germany and in Norway, girls caught up with boys during the 1970s (Danielsen et al., 2013, 281ff; Herrlitz et al., 2009, 191). Coeducation was introduced step-by-step but earlier and more consistently in Norway.

#### Norwegian Debates on Gender Roles, Girls' Education, and Homemaking Education

The most important actors in the debates on gender and education in Norway were the women's organizations and not least the female teachers. Norwegian male and female primary schoolteachers were organized separately between 1912 and 1966. The story of the Female Teachers' Association is a fascinating piece of organizational history, which cannot be explored in detail here (but see Hagemann, 1992, 135ff). Female teachers were a central element in Norway's first women's movement,

even before they had their own organization. For the female teachers, one of the most important political aims was to achieve recognition for women's work – both their own work but also the work of the many Norwegian women who were housewives. They struggled for an ideological recognition of the contribution women were making in society but also for material recognition, in the sense of equal wages for female teachers, equal representation in the teachers' organizations, and rights to holidays for housewives. To increase the social status and competencies of housewives, Norwegian women founded "housewife schools" (*husmorskoler*) from the 1860s, where girls were trained to become housewives and teachers of homemaking (Fuglerud, 1980). In the first half of the twentieth century, these schools were greatly expanded. Female teachers cared about the living conditions of the population, which they thought needed to be improved with the help of health education, mothering education, sex education, and lessons in cooking and homemaking (*husstellundervisning*) in primary and secondary schools. Many female teachers saw great value in the comparatively new school type the *framhaldsskole* (continuation school), which they considered to be suitable as further education for girls. Many of these schools were for girls only or included homemaking tracks and were important workplaces for female teachers.

The Norwegian women's movement was politically independent, but well connected to political parties. During the first wave, many women activists belonged to the liberal movement. For example, the pioneer in homemaking education Helga Helgesen was a member of the Liberal Party and its only representative on the city council of Kristiania (Oslo) from 1923 to 1925. Another example is the first leader of the Female Teachers' Association, Anna Rogstad, who was also the first woman in the Norwegian parliament. She represented a small liberal party (*Frisinnede Venstre*), which cooperated with the Conservative Party. In 1917, she joined the Labor Party. Most female teachers did not stand this far to the left, presumably due to their higher-class backgrounds.

The class cleavage also resulted in an early split in the Norwegian women's movement. In 1904, the Norwegian Women's National Council (*Norske Kvinners Nasjonalråd*) was founded by various women's organizations. In 1914–15 the newly founded associations of Norwegian housewives and Norwegian homemaking teachers joined. But the Women's Union of the Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiets Kvindeforbund*), which had been founded in 1901, preferred to remain independent. The conflict behind this was that the labor movement's women supported the struggle of housemaids for better working conditions, while the

Association of Norwegian Housewives opposed it. Nonetheless, from 1914, the Labor Party's women's organization supported the idea of education in homemaking (Fuglerud, 1980, 84f). Until the 1950s, "housewife ideology" remained strong, also within the labor movement (Danielsen et al., 2013, 270; Pedersen, 2001, 22).

The Female Teachers' Association was not as enthusiastic as the male primary schoolteachers about the comprehensive school reforms begun in 1959, even though they supported the idea of extended obligatory schooling. They were worried that the advantages of the *framhaldsskole* would disappear and that education in homemaking would lose ground. Many of them did not have the necessary qualifications to teach in academic secondary schools, so the reforms potentially threatened their jobs (Hagemann, 1992, 270ff). The development of the youth school from 1959 did weaken the Female Teachers' Association because they lost the influence they had had through the *framhaldsskole* (Hagemann, 1992, 274ff). As the expert Kari Lie remarked in our interview, from the 1960s it became less understandable to young female teachers why they should have a separate organization. The reunification of the primary schoolteachers' organizations in 1966 was a logical consequence.

At the same time, a new women's movement was taking shape during the second wave of women's political mobilization, culminating during the 1960s and 1970s. "Housewife ideology" lost ground and the early movement's acceptance of separate gender roles was questioned. New women's organizations were founded that were more radical and leftist. Even though the Association of Norwegian Housewives still had 50 000 members in 1974, with only 5000 members organized in the new women's organizations, they were more active politically and had many sympathizers (Danielsen et al., 2013, 293). Some of the new organizations, such as the Women's Front, had ties to the small Workers' Communist Party. The older women's organizations of the political parties also still played a role. Not least, the labor movement's women gained influence though the Labor Party's rise to power. However, the women's movement continued to exhibit a spirit of independence. For example, in the municipal elections of 1971, women of all parties came together in several Norwegian cities in a "women's coup" with the aim of increasing the number of female politicians on the municipal councils. Female voters were taught how to strike out male candidates on the ballot papers and replace them with female ones. The campaign, which was prepared in secret, succeeded to such a degree that women became a majority on the

municipal councils of Oslo, Trondheim, and Asker. Male politicians were not pleased, but the action contributed to an increase in women on the parties' lists (Danielsen et al., 2013, 313f).

In the party manifestos published between 1957 and 1977, immense ideological changes can be traced. The Labor Party's manifestos went from a long paragraph on the rights and living conditions of housewives in 1958 to suggesting that "married women must receive realistic possibilities to take work outside of the home" in 1969 and asking for "actual equality" and the overcoming of "traditional differences between men's and women's jobs" in 1974. In 1969, the Labor Party suggested that school curricula should be revised so that men and women were no longer represented as assigned with specific roles in society. From the 1970s, the party's manifestos stated that measures had to be taken to induce both genders to choose nontypical types of education.

The manifestos of the Conservative Party also changed markedly. In 1958, the manifesto stated that it was worrying that economic and demographic development would presumably lead to an increase in married women in the labor market since "the housewife is the midpoint of the home and her wholehearted dedication there is of the very greatest importance both for every single family and for society as a whole." It was also suggested that schools should include "elementary consumer economics in homemaking lessons so young girls can learn how to handle money and examine quality and prices." In the 1960s, the manifestos continued to demand that education in homemaking had to be prioritized but, from 1961, the Conservative Party also demanded "full equality with equal wages for equal work and equal advancement conditions for women and men." In the 1970s, the term "housewife" (*husmor*) vanished entirely from the manifesto, which now only spoke of homemakers (*hjemmeværende*). It was stated that the Conservative Party wanted to "work for a change of mentalities and for practical reforms that make it possible to divide responsibilities and rights in society equally between women and men." From 1973, the manifesto demanded that curricula should not include "antiquated gender role thinking" and that the schools should take into account "that girls and boys shall share equal rights to vocational and other further education."

Among the smaller parties, both the Socialist People's Party and the Liberal Party included radical demands for gender equality in their manifestos. In its first manifesto, from 1961, the Socialist People's Party demanded that equal wages for women had to be introduced immediately, "not in the course of the next seven years as intended by the agreement

between *Landsorganisasjonen* and NAF,” meaning the unions and the employers’ organization. But even here it was stated that “the question of better access to holidays and free time for housewives must be broached,” though “access to part-time work for housewives” was also demanded. From 1965, the Socialist People’s Party demanded that curricula should become “equal for girls and boys,” and from 1969 that teaching material should be “considered carefully so that differential treatment and gender role thinking are changed in accordance with the principles of equality and equal rights.”

The Liberal Party was the first party to include the following demand in its manifesto in 1957: “Boys and girls must have the same amount of teaching both in practical and theoretical subjects.” This referred especially to lessons in homemaking, which at this point were still mostly reserved for girls. In 1977, the party made the radical demand that gender quotas should be applied in all educational institutions after primary school “in order to create a better balance in the distribution of women and men in our educational institutions.” From 1973, it suggested that all discriminatory representations should be removed from schoolbooks and that a change in attitudes was required to overcome “traditional gender role thinking.”

A change of rhetoric can also be discerned in the manifestos of the Christian Democrats and the Center Party, even though they more clearly emphasized the housewife ideal and stuck to it longer. The Center Party’s manifestos demanded from 1957 to 1965 that “all girls should receive good and adequate housewife education.” Otherwise, the manifestos did not include any demands regarding the situation of women. Only in 1977 did the Center Party include a paragraph about gender equality in its manifesto, suggesting that the school system should contribute to a change of attitudes so “both genders shall have the same possibilities and responsibilities with respect to the home, work, public life, and so forth.” The manifestos of the Christian Democrats advocated separate gender roles until 1973, when they made an effort for the first time to formulate their demands in a more gender-neutral way. They now demanded that “housewife schools [...] must receive increased capacity and necessary equipment in order to provide a modern education, also for male students.” They also stated that economic reasons should not force both parents – mentioning no longer only mothers – of small children to work outside of the home and that part-time jobs should be made available for men and women alike. They did, however, continue to emphasize the value of marriage and homemaking, and their support for housewife



schools at a time when the other parties had abandoned the term “housewife.”

The development of the school subject of homemaking is a good indicator of how gender issues affected education politics in this period. From 1936, homemaking had been an obligatory subject for girls in the cities’ primary schools. From 1946, it had been obligatory for girls in continuation schools (*framhaldsskoler*), if at least four girls attended such a school. In 1949, the commission that had been tasked with evaluating the school system (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket*) published a report about homemaking. Here, it was stated that homemaking should become obligatory as soon as possible for girls all over the country. This demand had a financial dimension, since cooking classes required school kitchens, which were expensive. Arguments were made as to why strict gender separation might not be the best solution:

In the continuation school, boys should receive sufficient teaching in homemaking in the school kitchen so that they can be self-dependent and help others with the most usual activities in the house. The girls [...] could perhaps receive some teaching in manual training so that women will no longer be so clumsy when banging a nail into the wall, using a knife, axe, saw, or other usual tools. (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket* [1949], 4)

This was supported by the Norwegian Teachers’ Association, which had commented in a letter to the commission that while girls often received some instruction in cooking at home, boys most often did not. They pointed to studies about the diets of lumberjacks and fishermen that showed that these men ate poorly. They suggested that the municipal school boards should have the possibility of offering homemaking lessons to boys, even if it would be impossible to make the subject obligatory for all boys (*Samordningsnemda for skoleverket* [1949], 9).

In 1952, a commission was put in place to discuss homemaking. In its report of 1954, it suggested that the subject should become obligatory for all girls (*Innstilling fra Utvalget til å utrede skolekjøkken- og husstelløpplæringa*, 1955). When the youth school reform was prepared in the late 1950s, the Labor Party ministry issued a document that built on the commission’s conclusions but suggested that homemaking should become obligatory for both girls and boys in primary schools and in the youth school (*St. meld. nr. 61* [1957] *Om heimkunnskap og husstell*). This was justified by the fact that the content of the subject needed to be expanded



to include not only cooking, handling clothes, and other domestic chores but also knowledge about bookkeeping, housing, furniture, nutrition, and health:

The ministry cannot agree with the commission [of 1952] that these points of view shall apply only to girls. It might be correct that the woman more than the man has to take responsibility for everything to do with the home and family life. But when the subject is supposed to include so much more than just practical cooking, it is difficult to understand why the boys should not take part in the teaching. Neither does it seem appropriate in today's times that boys shall receive no knowledge about practical cooking. In schools where cooking classes for boys have been tried, the experiences are good. The boys like the subject, the results are equally good as in girls' classes, and the parents appreciate boys receiving such an education. If the majority of boys do not use what they learn in the subject, it is still of great educational value that all children should take such a course in the same way as all children are included in the other practical subjects in school. The housewife must probably take the biggest responsibility when it comes to the home but both the housewife and the housefather [*husfar*] are together in their decisions about and responsibility for the order of and tasks in the house. If the housefather is to [...] develop the right respect for the housewife's occupation, it is desirable for him to have the same education and insight into the problems as the housewife (*St. meld. nr. 61* [1957] *Om heimkunnskap og husstell*, 9)

The opposition in the parliamentary committee responsible, meaning the representatives of the center parties and the Conservative Party, thought that it would be too costly for the time being to make homemaking obligatory for boys, even if it would be desirable. As long as homemaking could not be offered to all students for financial reasons, they thought that girls should be prioritized (*Innst. S. nr. 294* [1958], *Tilråding frå den forsterkede landbrukskomité om heimkunnskap og husstell*, 472).

This was debated in parliament in January 1959. It became clear that not all representatives really did consider it desirable that boys should receive homemaking lessons. The Center Party representative Hans Borgen stated that he personally thought that “there is reason to consider in more detail whether it is a reasonable usage of our educational possibilities and of students' school time to press boys through the exact same educational program in homemaking as girls should have and hopefully also will have gradually in the general schools” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 61). The Labor Party representative Olav Meisdalshagen, who had been the leader of the committee of 1952, expressed doubts about the feasibility of introducing homemaking for all boys and all girls, for whom it was “despite of everything so much more important

that they [girls] receive this education” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 75). This was not in line with the view of the female Labor Party representative Guri Johannessen, who considered the decision to include boys in homemaking lessons to be extremely important and who praised the ministry under Birger Bergersen for having underlined this. Her main argument was that increased respect for the housewife’s occupation required boys to have more knowledge about it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 79). She was supported by her party colleagues Peter Kjeldseth Moe and Rakel Seweriin. Kjeldseth Moe pointed out that if resources were insufficient to introduce homemaking for all students, it should be introduced for one age group at a time, instead of one gender. In his view, it was about time to “break down barriers built on prejudices that do not belong in our time” (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 91). Rakel Seweriin, leader of the Women’s Union of the Labor Party from 1953 to 1963, and one of the few influential female politicians at the time, chose the following words:

It is a new thought that never before has been presented to parliament that both sexes are to learn to work together and have responsibility together for the home and one should expect this to be greeted with happiness and satisfaction, at least by the majority of women in this country. But the bourgeois [*borgerlige*] parties emphasize in their remarks the old difference. They say that when it comes to practical education, meaning cooking lessons, the boys must be held back, even if experiences show that the boys have at least as much interest in and benefit from this education. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 95)

The conservative Mons Arntsen Løvset and the liberal Olav Hordvik both felt prompted to reply. They rejected the charge that they were in principle against including boys in homemaking and repeated that they merely thought that girls should be prioritized due to a lack of resources (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell*, 98ff).

Since the Labor Party had the absolute majority and the majority of the Labor Party supported the ministry, the caveat was ignored. The *folkeskole* law of 1959 included homemaking (now called *heimkunnskap*) as an obligatory subject for students of both sexes. In the experimental curricula of 1960 and 1964, homemaking was included as an obligatory subject from the fourth until the eighth grade and then became a separate track in the third youth school year (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1960,

369ff; *Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1964, 288ff). In the upper grades, the curricula included topics such as “a democratic family life,” family finances, housing and furniture, nutritional knowledge, and childcare and care for the elderly. The subject of homemaking had to be organized in cooperation with the subjects of manual training (*forming*) and civics (*samfunnskunnskap*), which were supposed to cover additional topics such as handicrafts, family law, and housing politics (*Forsøksrådet for skoleverket*, 1964, 309).

A related debate in the 1960s was the question of how the upper-secondary housewife schools should be regulated, what they should teach, and to whom. In 1961, the Ministry of Education set up a working group that was to discuss which place these schools should have in the future school system. Based on this group’s report of December 1962 and a report by the Council for Homemaking (*Rådet for heimkunnskap og husstell*) of 1964, the Labor Party minister of education, Helge Sivertsen, presented a white paper in May 1965 (*St. meld. nr. 101* [1964–5] *Om yrkesskoler i husstell*). The parliamentary education committee commented on this paper in February 1966, and it was debated in parliament in March 1966 (*Innst. S. nr. 94* [1965–6] *Innstilling frå kirke- og undervisningskomiteén om yrkesskoler i husstell* [*St. meld. nr. 101*]; *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966). There was now agreement that housewife schools served several aims. They no longer exclusively prepared women to be housewives but also for several occupations on the labor market. The name of the schools was therefore changed to “occupational schools for homemaking” (*fagskolene i husstell*).

The development of the housewife schools, which mostly ended up as one of many tracks in the reformed upper-secondary school in the 1970s, cannot be analyzed in detail here (but see *Fuglerud*, 1980). But it is interesting to note that the parliamentary debate of 1966 again revealed that the Labor Party representatives, especially the female ones, expressed most clearly their belief that homemaking was no longer only for girls and that these schools should therefore be open to boys as well. They also emphasized that homemaking schools served as a form of vocational education. The Labor Party representative Gunvor Eker remarked,

The homemaking schools should be a part of an ensemble, in a way that they are attended by both boys and girls. [...] It is talked here of the housewife and the girls all the time. I think we should get away from that. Everywhere, we have shared classes. Boys and girls go to school together from primary school on. We can see how young husbands to an ever-higher degree take their share of the housework

and they probably have as great a need to acquire a good base. The married couple together build up a home and raise their children. I cannot see that this is something which lies only on the mother or the housewife. Something has happened also on this front recently and I hope that it can be continued so that there will be equality in this area too. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2314)

The speakers of the Conservative Party did not make such far-reaching remarks, but they were clear in their support for homemaking as a vocational form of education. For example, the conservative Jo Benkow pointed out,

The term “occupational schools in homemaking” is used with an all too narrow meaning. I think what we need is an education which in competition with other occupational schools and also in competition with the academic upper secondary school [*gymnas*] can stand independently and [...] lead to actual vocational competencies both in and outside of the home in the entire large sector connected to the home and the family, to services, consumption, and social work. Education in this sector must never be given the character of being a subsidiary solution because one has no access to other, more attractive choices in the general school supply. Today it is obvious that a great number of young women – and also men for that matter – choose for example the upper-secondary school [*gymnas*] because there are no equal or better suited possibilities in the general school supply. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2305)

For this conservative representative, the important matter was to regulate the educational expansion that was also taking place among women in a way that would not threaten academic education in the upper-secondary school. The Center Party politician Karstein Seland insisted that the most important role of the homemaking schools should still be to educate housewives – “the most important of all occupations,” as he put it (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2303). He thought that it was strange that the Labor Party ministry had argued in its white paper in 1965 that it was hard to estimate the exact need for spaces in these schools, since one did not know exactly the number of “employees” in the occupation of housewife. In his view, the fact that around 24 000 marriages were registered in Norway each year was a sufficient estimate. Each one of these 24 000 newly wed housewives should have access to a housewife’s education, not only a meager 15 percent, as was the case at present (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2303). The reference to the number of marriages was repeated by various nonsocialist representatives, such as the Christian Democrat Jakob Aano. The Liberal Party representative Borghild Bondevik Haga also agreed that it was a shame that so many young housewives could not be offered a housewife’s

education. At the same time, she seemed unsure whether only women needed this:

The goal for the expansion of our housewife schools will not be reached until one can give every single girl – and why not just as well say every single boy – education as to how to take care of and make a home, education which gives knowledge about cooking, about managing the family economy, knowledge about the psychological element in a family's life and in our society in general, some knowledge in sociology. All this is required to be able to build a home and take care of the values which one would like a home to have. (*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, 2311)

The additions made by both Bondevik Haga and Benkow with respect to men and boys show that mindsets were changing fast and that politicians felt compelled to adapt their wording. There was a trend in the 1960s toward equal curricula and coeducation on all levels. The *folkeskole* committee of 1963 expressed in its report in 1965 that since the division of labor in the home was now “less marked” than it had been, it was right that curricula should no longer distinguish between boys and girls. All differentiation should be based on interests, not gender (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomiteén av 1963* [1965], 116).

In the expert interviews, this trend was confirmed. The introduction of coeducation that took place in many urban municipalities during the 1950s and 1960s had not been heavily debated but had simply been an expression of the spirit of the times. In rural areas, the coeducation of boys and girls had been the norm anyway, since there were not enough children to divide them by sex. Of all the experts interviewed, only Torild Skard could remember that the introduction of coeducation had been opposed by anyone, namely by the school reformer Anna Sethne, who had been the chair of the Female Teachers' Association from 1919 to 1938 and who continued to take part in reform debates until her death in 1961. According to Skard, Sethne argued that girls could easily be dominated by boys in mixed classes and that separate teaching for girls and boys was therefore required in some cases. In the early female teachers' movement, there was no agreement about this question (Hagemann, 1992, 178f). During the 1960s, separation by sex within the school system became a thing of the past. With the curriculum of 1974, it was made officially binding that girls and boys should always attend mixed classes and should not be separated in any subject (Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, 1974, 23f). As the expert Theo Koritzinsky pointed out in our interview, the curriculum of 1974 was one of the most radical curricula in Norwegian history with respect to the equality of the sexes.

Overall, it should be underlined that the strong Norwegian women's movement stood for an independent political struggle that sometimes criss-crossed other lines of conflict. During the waves of increased political mobilization by women, the gender cleavage became comparatively more salient. During the second wave, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Labor Party and the Socialist People's Party supported the claims of the radical women's movement. Girls' postwar educational expansion based on a conception of equal gender roles was integrated into the labor movement's school reform project. The Center Party and the Christian Democrats were the most reluctant to give up their insistence on separate gender roles. Presumably this is related to their more rural and Christian voter base. The postwar Liberal Party and the Conservative Party often supported the claims of the less radical, older women's organizations, such as the Female Teachers' Association. Both parties organized some well-educated upper- and middle-class women who belonged to the women's movement. The nonsocialist parties thus had different positions with respect to the gender cleavage. This was an additional factor that weakened non-leftist alliances.

### Debates on Gender Roles, Girls' Education, and Coeducation in North Rhine–Westphalia

For the German women's movement, girls' education was also one of the most important aims (Hervé, 1990). From the beginning, the movement was divided into social democratic, liberal, and conservative wings (Hervé, 1990, 12ff). The liberal/conservative wing was united under the umbrella of the *Bund deutscher Frauenvereine* (BdF, Union of German Women's Associations) founded in 1894, but splits existed within it between social liberals, national liberals, and conservatives (Wurms, 1990). In addition, the women's movement was split along lines of denomination. The conservative *Deutsch-Evangelischer Frauenbund* (German-Evangelical Women's Union) became a member of the BdF but the *Katholischer deutscher Frauenbund* (KDFB, German Catholic Women's Union), which still exists today, did not. Membership of the liberal BdF would have been irreconcilable with the rootedness of the Catholic women's activists in the Catholic milieu that had developed during the cultural struggle (Sack, 1998, 38). When a new national umbrella organization, the *Informationsdienst für Frauenfragen* (Information Service for Women's Questions; since 1969, *Deutscher Frauenrat*, German Women's Council), was founded in 1951 the Catholic women's movement was, however, included (Illemann, 2016,

112ff). Besides the KDfB, the Catholic women's movement comprised organizations such as the *Verein katholischer deutscher Lehrerinnen* (VkdL, Association of German Catholic Female Teachers), founded in 1885, which also still exists today. This association had its strongholds in the Rhineland and Westphalia, where there were higher numbers of female teachers than in the Protestant areas of Prussia. The reason was that the coeducation of boys and girls was rarer in Catholic areas. Separate girls' schools meant greater possibilities for the employment of female teachers (Sack, 1998, 115ff). The Catholic women's movement cooperated with the Center Party and later with the CDU.

There was no agreement between the currents of the women's movement regarding the content and structure of girls' education. The liberal and the conservative divisions of the early women's movement supported traditional gender roles and argued that most girls should receive an education that befitted their destiny as mothers and housewives and that would improve the status of these roles. Even though the liberal women also struggled for the admittance of upper- and middle-class women to secondary schools and universities, it was understood that the destiny of most women was to marry, which excluded active participation in the labor market. Only the social democratic women's movement represented the interests of working women from the start. Nevertheless, ideas of the special "character" of women were adhered to here too (Tornieporth, 1977, 221ff). In the decades after the Second World War, the situation gradually changed. Working women became more usual and one spoke increasingly of the "double role" of women as housewives and employees. In the liberal and social democratic parts of the women's movement, more and more women supported coeducation – the further to the left they stood, the more they argued for coeducation in principle, not merely as a workaround (Pfister, 1988, 35). These trends were intensified after 1968, when the second wave of women's mobilization reached its peak and radical women's organizations mushroomed (Doormann, 1990, 255ff).

The Catholic women's movement continued to oppose coeducation in principle and clung to the idea that the freedom of women consisted in the choice between marriage and motherhood or maidenhood and career (Illemann, 2016, 179ff; Pöggeler, 1977, 372ff; Schultheis, 1994, 200ff, 254ff). Until at least the 1950s, the VkdL expected its members to remain single to concentrate completely on their vocation.<sup>11</sup> It opposed married

<sup>11</sup> Christine Teusch, CDU minister of education in NRW from 1947 to 1954, is a prime example. Born in 1888, she became a *Volksschule* teacher and joined the VkdL, several



teachers, even though the celibacy requirement for female teachers had been abolished during the Weimar Republic (Illemann, 2016, 180; Sack, 1998, 128ff). This can only be understood against the background of Catholic theology and practice, which offered limited possibilities of emancipation to women who chose celibacy. Especially in the Rhineland and Westphalia, Catholic female orders had stood for the development of girls' education (Sack, 1998, 30). The VkdL's support of separate education for girls had its roots both in pedagogical convictions based on traditional gender roles and in vested interests. With good reason, Catholic female teachers were worried that they would not receive equally good conditions of professional advancement in coeducational schools (Sack, 1998, 133). The Catholic female teachers also supported denominational schooling, in contrast to the rest of the women's movement. In the expert interviews for this study, frequent derisory remarks about this organization illustrated that many politically active people in NRW did not take the Catholic female teachers very seriously but considered them a relic of the past. Their importance should therefore not be overemphasized. Nevertheless, the VkdL had influence, especially within the many Catholic girls' schools, and it was included in all parliamentary hearings about education politics. It joined the campaign against cooperative schools in 1976 and was thus a part of the conservative anti-reform alliance.

In the party manifestos of the SPD, the CDU, and the FDP from the 1950s to the 1970s, all parties included more and more detailed comments regarding the situation of women. However, significant ideological changes in gender roles can first be traced in the second half of the 1970s. The early party manifestos of the CDU contained almost no references to women. The Hamburg manifesto of 1953 only stated that even though the CDU supported "equal rights of men and women" – which had been proclaimed in the new Constitution after long struggles – the "natural order of family and marriage" was the CDU's principle with regard to a possible revision of the family law. In other words, husbands' legal predominance should not be abolished completely. Indeed, equal rights in family and marriage law first became a reality in 1976, under the

other Catholic women's organizations, and the Center Party, which she represented in the first democratic parliament from 1919. She was active in the Christian unions. Against massive male opposition, she struggled for influence within the postwar CDU and became one of the leading politicians of NRW, responsible for the reestablishment of denominational schooling, among other things. In accordance with the VkdL's principles, she never married (Eich, 1987, 84ff).



social-liberal national government. The CDU managed to modernize its manifestos while continuing to represent traditional ideals of motherhood and homemaking. For example, the manifesto of 1972 stated,

We want to strengthen the position of women in our society. Women must be able to choose freely whether they want to address themselves exclusively to the tasks of family and household or in addition be employed fully or part-time. Women's rights to fair chances in education, apprenticeship, further education, professional practice, and to equal chances of ascent must be realized. We are – also with respect to women – for equal pay in cases of equal performance. The independent woman's right to sufficient social security is to be ensured for the future. We advocate a strengthening of the regard for the social merit of women in the family and household.

The CDU continued to take it for granted that the “tasks of family and household” were primarily women's but widened its view of women so that the interests of employed women would also be represented. Like the Catholic women's movement, the CDU emphasized in its manifesto of 1976 that “the position of the housewife and mother is of the same value as that of the employed women” and that “the occupation of the woman in the family is to be put on a level with professional occupations outside of the family.” “Small children especially need the security of the parental home,” the 1976 manifesto also stated. In its manifesto of 1980, the CDU stated that there had been “a lack of progress in the equal rights of man and woman, which must not be limited to the social betterment of the childless employed woman.” The CDU also passed a comparatively more radical declaration entitled “Woman and Society” at its party congress of June 1975, in which it was stated that “already in the upbringing of children in the parental home, gender typical role clichés must be avoided” and that boys and girls should receive education in pedagogy and homemaking to be prepared for “their task in the family based on partnership.” The declaration suggested that more girls should be motivated to choose nontypical occupations, that housewives should receive possibilities for further training, and that upper-secondary homemaking lessons should be developed further so that they would qualify for various occupations.

In comparison with the CDU, the SPD included more detailed suggestions for women's politics in its early manifestos, but here too the housewife ideal stood strong. In its manifesto for the elections of 1957, the SPD suggested that all girls in general and vocational schools should receive homemaking lessons. Being a housewife and mother was described as “the natural task of the woman.” Women were said to be “of equal value” but

not of “equal character” to men, which meant that women had a right to “special protection.” In contrast to the CDU, the SPD demanded in 1957 that the woman’s status in marriage and family law should be equal to that of the man. As the Godesberg manifesto of 1959 stated,

Woman’s equal rights must be realized legally, socially, and economically. The woman must be offered the same possibilities of education, apprenticeship, choice of occupation, professional practice, and pay as the man. Equal rights shall not call into question the psychological and biological character of the woman. Housewives’ work must be acknowledged as occupational work. Housewives and mothers are in need of special help. Mothers of pre-school and school-aged children must not be forced to hold down a job for economic reasons.

In its youth-political guidelines of 1965, the SPD had not come much further. Here, it was stated that “full employment of mothers is difficult to reconcile with the upbringing of infants and school children” and that “part-time work offers the possibility to realize the child’s right to motherly care and education and the right of the woman to an occupational development of her own.” That the child could also have a right to fatherly care was not considered. In NRW, the SPD prided itself in its manifesto of 1962 on having defended the monthly paid “housework day” for employed women, which had been introduced in NRW after an initiative by the Communist Party in the early postwar years (*Hervé/Nödinger, 1990, 202*). It was in its manifesto for the NRW elections of 1980 that the NRW SPD first pointed out that part-time work should be available to men and women alike. It was still assumed that combining family and work was mostly a problem for women:

Reducing prejudices and disadvantages is only possible if the consciousness of society regarding the role of man and woman is changed. The state has the task to create the necessary conditions so that women can reconcile their family and an occupation.

That schoolbooks or curricula should be changed to change gender roles was not a major topic of debate during the 1970s (but see *Zinnecker, 1972, 83ff*). This was first debated in the NRW parliament in the early 1980s, and in 1985 the SPD-led Ministry of Education in NRW published a regulation on the topic (quoted in *Pfister, 1988, 261f*).

Like the CDU, the FDP did not include demands for women in its early manifestos. In 1961, the national manifesto merely included the sentence that “social, pedagogical and domestic women’s occupations are to be valued more highly socially and economically.” From 1969, the FDP demanded independent pensions for housewives. The national manifesto

for the elections of 1976 underlined in more detail that the FDP had contributed to the reform of marriage and family law that finally allowed women to choose freely whether they wanted to work, without needing their husband's consent. Nevertheless, the manifesto conceded that "many disadvantages" persisted and that women needed to receive equal chances in the education system and employment. Here too, it was stated that "the occupation in the household must receive the same value and appreciation as any other occupation." In the manifesto for the federal state elections of 1976, the NRW FDP mentioned that "housewives' work" should be recognized but that "practical life support," such as "company kindergartens" or "day nannies," was also necessary. In its manifesto for the national elections of 1980, the FDP demanded an anti-discrimination law and suggested that "the traditional view of the family hierarchy, for example in schoolbooks," should be dismantled.

In education politics, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by ideological and structural continuity with respect to gender. Girls' education in the region had long been dominated by the Catholic Church, which had filled the vacuum left by the Prussian state in secondary schooling. In the postwar decades, a large percentage of private secondary schools were still Catholic girls' schools. In 1953, 20 of the federal states' private *Realschulen* were for girls, 8 were for boys and 9 for both sexes. Among the public *Realschulen*, 34 were for girls only, 41 for boys only, and 108 for both sexes. Among the private *Gymnasien*, 50 were for girls only, 19 for boys only, and 10 for both sexes. Among the public *Gymnasien*, 96 were for girls only, 155 for boys only, and 112 for both sexes (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1954, 8off). In 1979, 2433 of the 3141 students (77 percent) who passed the *Realschule* exam at a private school were still girls. A total of 25 202 girls passed the *Realschule* exam at a public school, so private school *Realschule* graduates made up about 9 percent of all female *Realschule* graduates. Among the *Abitur* graduates of private schools in 1979, 3469 of 5365 students (65 percent) were girls. A total of 15 896 girls passed the *Abitur* at a public school, so about 20 percent of female *Abitur* graduates had attended private schools (*Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1980, 134). Even though some private schools were Protestant or non-religious, most of them were Catholic. In other words, the influence of the Catholic Church on girls' education remained significant.

The NRW *Schulordnungsgesetz* (law on the regulation of schools) of 1952 stated that the different "character of the sexes" should be taken into account in the structure of the school system. Compared to other

West German federal states, NRW was in a leading position regarding the separate education of girls and boys. In 1967, a total of 70.8 percent of all *Gymnasien* were either boys' or girls' schools. Only the Saarland had a higher percentage (Zinnecker, 1972, 67). This was a result of the Catholic Church's influence on education in the federal state but also of the many densely populated areas, which made coeducation for practical reasons less necessary (Zinnecker, 1972, 68).

The postwar years saw the reestablishment of the *Frauenoberschule*, a secondary school exclusively for girls with roots going back to 1908, when girls' education had been regulated for the first time by the Prussian state. During the Weimar Republic and under the National Socialist regime, this school type had been developed further. It was revived only in NRW, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony (Zinnecker, 1972, 72). The reestablished *Frauenoberschule*, from 1966 dubbed the *Gymnasium für Frauenbildung*, did not award a general qualification for university entrance but qualified students only for entrance to a pedagogical academy in order to become a primary schoolteacher, for university education as a secondary schoolteacher in specific subjects, and for some administrative state careers, for example in public libraries. Talented students could take an additional exam in Latin or French and mathematics to acquire a full *Abitur*. Under the National Socialist regime the *Frauenoberschule* had awarded a general qualification for university entrance – dubbed “*Pudding Abitur*” by contemporaries (Eich, 1987, 166; Neghabian, 1993). The first female minister of education of NRW, the Catholic teacher Christine Teusch (see footnote 11), was responsible for the demotion of this school type's leaving certificate and enforced this policy against considerable protest. Eich (1987, 170) suggests that Teusch preferred a more scientific girls' education and opposed the *Frauenoberschule*. If that is correct, Teusch was unsuccessful in reducing the importance of this school type. The *Frauenoberschule* remained a relevant, downgraded version of the *Gymnasium*. In 1965, 133 such schools had 23 879 students, which made up almost 22 percent of all female *Gymnasium* students (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, tables 6 and 7, own calculation). Its curricula did not include Latin and “the scientific subjects ma[d]e way from the ninth grade on for the subjects of women's work,” meaning homemaking and pedagogy (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 13). As the Ministry of Education under Mikat (CDU) declared,

There is no comparable [school] type for boys. This can be explained by the dual task of all girls' education, which is defined by the goals of the specific school type

and the tasks of the future housewife and mother. In the area of secondary schooling, this led to the creation of a school type which accentuates the second task. (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1965, 12)

In 1967, SPD minister of education Holthoff proudly declared that educational expansion had affected girls to the extent that they now made up 50 percent of all *Realschule* students and 44.4 percent of all *Gymnasium* students (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1967, 28). The last number, however, included 29 215 students at the *Frauenoberschule*, now termed the *Gymnasium für Frauenbildung*, so a significant number of female *Gymnasium* students still did not take a full-value *Abitur* exam. Furthermore, 22.5 percent of girls left the *Gymnasium* after the tenth grade, compared to 11.2 percent of boys (Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs of NRW, 1967, 33). Only in 1972 was the *Frauenoberschule* abolished in the course of the *Gymnasium* reform. Until then, many different *Gymnasium* types had existed. Girls had mostly attended modern languages *Gymnasien* or *Frauenoberschulen*, while boys more often attended classical or mathematical-natural scientific *Gymnasien* (Zinnecker, 1972, 70). All these types were now merged and reduced to elective subjects in the upper-secondary level. Homemaking and pedagogy became elective subjects open to boys and girls alike. They were still chosen mostly by girls, so they became a type of “women’s school within the comprehensive *Gymnasium*” (Neghabian, 1993, 216).

The curricula of the *Volksschule* and the *Realschule* were also dominated by traditional gender-role thinking throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The curricula of the NRW *Volksschulen* of 1955 included eight hours of “life-practical education” for girls during the eighth grade. During the same time, the boys had three hours of manual training, one hour of mathematics, three hours of physics and chemistry, and one hour of German (Hagenmaier, 1988 [1969], 250). When the ninth *Volksschule* year and the *Hauptschule* were introduced in 1966, coeducation became the rule in this school type; centralization also made this necessary. Nevertheless, the curricula differentiated between the sexes. For grades seven, eight, and nine, girls were allotted five to six hours of “life-practical education” (including homemaking, biology/physics/chemistry, needlework, and art) and two to three hours of physical education. During the same time, boys were taught three hours of biology/physics and chemistry, two hours of manual training, and three hours of physical education (*Landtag NRW*, June 13, 1966; *Landtag NRW*, November 29, 1966, quoted in Dowe/Frommberger, 1968,

303ff, 309f). In the NRW *Realschule* curricula of 1965, two hours of needlework and three hours of homemaking were reserved for girls in the ninth grade. During the same time, the boys had two hours of mathematics, one to two hours of physics and chemistry and one hour of biology (Hagenmaier, 1988 [1969], 250).

The NRW curricula for the *Hauptschule* and the *Realschule* of 1968 and 1973 gradually included boys in homemaking lessons, though at the beginning this was elective. In 1968, Holthoff stated in a parliamentary debate that even though he thought it could be useful for boys to learn how to cook, he thought that their participation should not be obligatory (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595). Homemaking was given up as an individual subject and instead included in a broader subject named work studies (*Arbeitslehre*) (Tornieporth, 1977, 340ff). Only in the *Hauptschule* and in the integrated comprehensive school did elements of homemaking remain obligatory parts of the curricula for both sexes. Subjects that included homemaking elements remained girls' subjects in all other educational institutions because they were chosen mostly by girls (Bartsch/Methfessel, 2012, 203; Methfessel/Kettschau, 1994, 90). Methfessel and Kettschau (1994, 90) conclude with respect to homemaking lessons that "coeducation, even where it is realized formally, is undermined in real terms, or only takes place in adaptation to male biographies."

In the *Realschulen* and the *Gymnasien*, coeducation was realized from the late 1960s onward. This was not so much a result of purposeful political decision-making but mostly a result of changed preferences in the population. In October 1968, the topic was discussed in the NRW parliament because the SPD representative Bargmann had directed a question to the minister of education, Holthoff. The question was, "Does the federal state government welcome the tendency of many school operators to introduce coeducation also at *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*, analogous to the development of the secondary *Hauptschule* school?" (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1593). Holthoff replied that he supported coeducation because boys and girls grew up "into the same cultural, social, and political reality" and should be made capable of realizing "the political-legal equality of the sexes" (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1594). To this end, they needed to practice cooperation in school. At the same time, Holthoff emphasized that coeducation was only desirable if it was ensured that "potential gender-specific interests" could come to expression (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1594). For this reason,

one had to make sure that the number of female teachers was sufficient and that the principal and the vice-principal of the school were, if possible, a man and woman. Holthoff stated,

It must be ensured that the education in physical education and needlework is secured for the girls and that separate education within the bounds of possibility is given in single subjects which are especially characteristic – of girls' education for example. Under these conditions, the federal state government will support coeducation at the *Gymnasien* and *Realschulen*. (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595)

In the following exchange, SPD representative Bahr asked whether this meant that the ministry would now decree that coeducation had to be introduced at the public *Gymnasien*. To this, the minister replied that he would not do so because he thought it was better to let things grow:

My perception is that especially the school operators, parents, and teachers are going in for coeducation to an increasing degree. I have received numerous applications which I will examine. So far I have not found a reason to refuse any application. The development is definitely heading in this direction. But to do so with a decree [...] would mean underestimating the different situations in the teachers' bodies [...] and so on. I openly declare my sympathy for such a development but without imposing any obligations by decree. (*Landtag NRW*, October 22, 1968, 1595)

Anne Ratzki, former principal of a *Gymnasium* in Cologne that was founded in 1967 and turned into one of the first comprehensive schools in NRW in 1975, described the development at her own school and at other similarly newly founded schools in our expert interview:

Well, the conditions were rather modest [...] but – and that was the really great thing – it were the first coeducational *Gymnasien* in Cologne. [...] Until then there were only boys' and girls' [*Gymnasien*]. So [...] in 1967 these were founded [...]. And it was greeted by the parents – I can only speak for Cologne, I have no overview of the federal state but assume that it was similar in other places – so enthusiastically that we had 450 applications the following year for three classes ... and in shacks with really bad conditions. And the old boys' and girls' *Gymnasien* had just 25 to 50 applications. So the city of Cologne of course urged other *Gymnasien* to convert too. And then from year to year it became ... [...] well, there were still some boys' *Gymnasien*, some girls' *Gymnasien* but they grew fewer year on year. (expert interview)

Other experts agreed that by the late 1960s, opposition to coeducation had been greatly reduced and the only antagonistic force at this point was the VkdL. As the former chair of the Education and Science Workers' Union Ilse Brusi put it, any remaining opponents gave up their opposition



because “they were just making fools of themselves” (expert interview). By 1980, there were 600 coeducational *Gymnasien* in NRW (65 of which were private schools), with 14 boys’ *Gymnasien* (11 of which were private schools) and 31 girls’ *Gymnasien* (28 of which were private schools) (*Philologen-Verband NRW*, 1981, 620). A small number of boys’ and a slightly higher number of – often Catholic – girls’ schools remain now.

Overall, women’s demands were not prioritized by any of the parties from the 1950s to 1970s (Doormann, 1990, 272ff). While the social democratic women’s organization suggested many policy changes, few of these made it into the agendas of the social-liberal governments (Doormann, 1990, 274). It therefore seems that the influence of the German women’s movement on party politics was relatively limited. Changes in the situation of girls in the education system took place from the late 1960s onward, but the ideal of the housewife remained strong throughout the period. Conservative opponents of school reform found willing partners within the women’s movement, such as the VkdL. Even though the VkdL represented mostly *Volksschule* teachers, social democrats and liberals could not forge an alliance with this group because of its connection to political Catholicism. The Catholic women’s movement belonged to the Catholic milieu, which, historically, had sympathized with economic policies serving the working class. But culturally, the Catholic female teachers were too far removed from social democracy. Social democrats and liberals only forged a weak alliance with more radical parts of the women’s movement. In other words, the dominant state-church cleavage undermined the unity of the women’s movement and the gender cleavage remained comparatively latent. The women’s movement did not represent a threat to the conservative alliance against school reforms; on the contrary, the Catholic women’s movement was integrated into this alliance.

#### COMPARISON: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSSCUTTING CLEAVAGES

One can conclude that crosscutting cleavages resulted in both cases in crosscutting struggles in education politics that, for some actors, were more relevant than conflicts over comprehensive schooling. In Norway, these crosscutting struggles stabilized the cooperation between the center parties and the Labor Party, or at least did not sabotage it. In Germany, they stabilized the internal unity of and cross-interest alliance within the CDU. The fact that social democrats in Norway managed to build a stable



reform alliance while German social democrats did not can therefore be explained as due to the unequal cleavage structures of the two countries (Table 5.2). In this section, these findings are discussed in more detail.

In Norway, the most important cleavages, which crosscut the class cleavage, were the center-periphery and rural-urban ones. In terms of class politics, the Norwegian Liberal Party, the Center Party, and the

TABLE 5.2 *Education policy expressions of cleavages in Norway and North Rhine–Westphalia during the postwar reform period*

Cleavage	Expressions in Norway	Expressions in NRW/ Germany
Worker-owner	Conflicts over the introduction of the youth school and the abolition of the <i>realskole</i> , tracking, ability grouping, and the abolition of grading in the youth school	Conflicts over the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school and the cooperative comprehensive school
Center-periphery and rural-urban	Conflicts over the centralization of rural schools, school language, and the number of hours of Christian education taught in west Norwegian schools	Conflicts over the centralization of rural “dwarf schools”
State-church	Conflicts over the number of hours taught in Christian education, the content and role of Christian education, the Christian preamble of the school law, and Christian private schooling	Conflicts over denominational schooling, denominational “dwarf schools,” the influence of the Catholic Church, and Christian (especially Catholic girls’) private schooling
Communist-socialist		Conflicts over the political standing of teachers, occupational bans, supposedly socialist curricula, and the conservative claim that comprehensive schools were “socialist”
Men-women	Conflicts between male and female teachers’ organizations, over equal curricula for boys and girls, and over coeducation	Conflicts over equal curricula for boys and girls and coeducation

Christian Democrats represented the political center. But in terms of the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages, they represented the rural periphery. The Conservative Party was mostly an urban party, while the Labor Party stood in the middle, as it was strong in the cities and countryside alike. The Labor Party also represented urban outsiders linked to the peripheral cultural movements. Nevertheless, these cleavages were potentially threatening for the Labor Party because it could not have held on to power in the political center, Oslo, if the periphery, potentially including non-central cities such as Bergen, had decided collectively to rise up against it. This was illustrated by the struggle over EC membership.

In education politics, these cleavages came to expression in the conflicts over the centralization of small rural schools and in the conflicts over the language used in schools and schoolbooks. The rural periphery opposed far-reaching centralization and disliked the urban elites' traditional views of language. Conflicts over Christian education were also to a certain degree a manifestation of the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages, as illustrated by protests by west Norwegian mayors against the central governments' regulations limiting the number of hours taught in this subject. The Labor Party usually managed to prevent these conflicts seriously obstructing its school reforms. Only in 1959 were rural worries the reason why the center parties did not vote with the Labor Party for the abolition of the old school types. After this, the Labor Party government financed the introduction of the youth school in rural municipalities so generously that it became viewed as a formidable educational boost in these areas, because it was connected with the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling. The trend toward less organizational differentiation within the youth school accommodated the center parties' dislike of centralization because schools without tracking or ability grouping could be smaller. In language politics, the Labor Party also maneuvered smartly in not repelling the peripheral movement even after it had relinquished the aim of *sammorsk*. Even regarding Christian education, the Labor Party government made concessions. The Conservative Party opposed the center parties in the language struggle. With regard to centralization and Christian education, it attempted to build bridges, but this did not lead to any stable alliance. The center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages thus strengthened the coalition of the center parties and the Labor Party.

In NRW, the rural-urban cleavage manifested to a certain extent in the conflicts over the centralization of small rural schools, termed "dwarf schools" by the SPD. Centralization in NRW progressed more slowly than in the much less populated Norway. In Norway, only 1 percent of students

were taught in one-class schools in 1963, compared to 1.8 percent in NRW in the same year (*Innstilling frå Folkeskolekomitéen av 1963* [1965], 151; *Landtag NRW*, May 14, 1963, 545). This difference is remarkable, considering that NRW was one of the most highly populated federal states.<sup>12</sup>

The NRW social democrats had little sympathy for small rural schools. They were supported in their struggle for centralization by the liberal FDP. Both parties considered centralization to be in the interests of the rural population because only schools of a certain size could guarantee the quality of education. The rural population did not necessarily share these concerns. On the contrary, the CDU was strong in many of NRW's rural areas. Within the CDU, some parliamentary representatives were especially known for their support for small rural schools. In debates, these representatives emphasized the small schools' advantages and their cultural and economic value for rural communities. At the same time, other CDU representatives, such as Mikat, supported centralization. But they also knew that they had to avoid provoking unrest and thus did so very carefully. In other words, even though a certain amount of ideological division existed within the CDU, the rural population's dislike of centralization was integrated into the CDU's program and its internal cross-interest coalition was maintained.

The struggle over "dwarf schools" was also related to the more important struggle over denominational schooling, which can be considered a manifestation of the state-church cleavage. This cleavage had long been dominant in the region of NRW, where the Catholic Church continued to enjoy significant power in the postwar decades. The SPD and the FDP not only disliked denominational schooling as such but also disliked the fact that it made it harder to get rid of the many small schools. The high number of Catholic private schools was another point of discord. The Protestant Church was to a certain degree involved in these debates, but it ran a much lower number of private schools and gave up its support

<sup>12</sup> One explanation for the many one-class schools in NRW was the lack of teachers. Even though there was a lack of teachers in Norway as well, there were on average 2.5 students per teacher in Norway in 1963–4 (SSB, 1966, 269, own calculation). In NRW, there were 42.8 students per *Volksschule* teacher in 1963 (*Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1964, 52). During the 1970s, centralization in NRW progressed. The shortage of teachers was finally overcome, and the average number of students decreased to 22 students per teacher in the primary school and 19.4 students per teacher in the *Hauptschule* in 1979 (*Landesamt für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1980, 126). In Norway, there were 18.9 students per teacher in children and youth schools in 1978–9 (SSB, 1980, 347, own calculation).

for denominational schooling. The CDU was the party closest to the Catholic Church. Even though it eventually had to accept a compromise over denominational schooling, the CDU managed to push through exceptions that safeguarded some Catholic influence. The state-church cleavage and the rural-urban cleavage thus overlapped. Both these cross-cutting cleavages, but especially the highly salient state-church cleavage, strengthened the internal alliance of the CDU, rather than offering the SPD and the FDP any means to weaken it.

Ideologically, the struggles over denominational schooling and Catholic private schooling were in many ways paradigmatic for later struggles over comprehensive schooling. The argument that parents should be able to choose freely which education they wanted for their children was one of the most important conservative arguments in these debates, as was the argument that everybody should receive “equally valuable but different” education. The CDU saw the education politics of the SPD and the FDP as an attack on parental rights driven by an excessive belief in the state. In these debates, representatives of the Catholic Church especially warned in drastic terms against supposedly totalitarian tendencies in social democratic and liberal education politics.

In Norway, the state-church cleavage manifested in the conflicts over the number of hours taught in Christian education, the financing of Christian private schools, and the Christian preamble of the school law. It overlapped with the rural-urban cleavage. The Norwegian Christian Democrats especially struggled for a Christian influence on schooling. The Christian Democrats sometimes received support from the Center Party and the Conservative Party, while the Liberal Party was placed more in the middle. The Labor Party and the Socialist People's Party represented the other side of the conflict. These conflicts contributed to the electoral victory of the four nonsocialist parties in 1965, which illustrates that they were politically dangerous to the Labor Party. Regarding comprehensive schooling they were, however, not a great obstacle for social democratic policies. In some cases, the Labor Party managed to split the nonsocialist parties by cooperating with the Liberal Party. The Christian Democrats' demands for Christian education were sometimes so far-reaching that even the Center Party and Conservative Party could not agree. On other issues, the Conservative Party stood alone in the coalition of 1965, for example regarding deregulation of private schooling. The center parties wanted Christian schools to have stable financing, but they did not support private elite schooling. The nonsocialist bloc was thus not entirely united, and the Labor Party made the most of these divisions. Neither the regulations on

Christian education nor those on Christian private schooling could seriously threaten comprehensive school reforms, at least during the period in question. Compared with the German case, there were also no equally obvious ideological similarities between the struggles over Christian education and the debates about comprehensive schooling.

In the Norwegian case, anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage did not become apparent in education politics. This cleavage might have played a role in local conflicts here and there, but on the national level anti-communist arguments cannot be found in school debates. There were communists in all teachers' unions, but this did not split them to a degree that would have diminished their influence. The Norwegian teachers' organizations had no problem studying the GDR school system with an open mind. Even though anti-communism and communist-socialist divisions played a role in other areas of Norwegian politics, this line of investigation can therefore be disregarded with respect to school reforms. This cannot be said about the German case.

In NRW, the communist-socialist cleavage was a serious obstacle for reform protagonists. Conflicts over teachers' convictions, occupational bans on teachers, and conflicts over cooperation between social democrats and communists split them internally. The fact that Germany was a divided country and that the GDR had instituted a more comprehensive school system played a role. The Education and Science Workers' Union especially was split into factions of social democrats, more radical socialists, and various groups of communists. The SPD was also ridden with internal disagreements. Within the SPD, the split was not between communists and socialists but between a moderate or right-wing current comprising many leading SPD politicians in NRW and a current of younger, leftist reformers. The reformers' camp considered the comprehensive school to be an anticapitalistic tool aimed at teaching students to be critical of the capitalist system, develop solidarity and so on. Less radical social democrats wanted the comprehensive school to be less concerned with class struggle and to have more of a harmonious character, aiming at social and national integration. For the reform antagonists, this opened up possibilities for ideological attack. The integrated comprehensive school was dubbed the "socialist comprehensive school" (*sozialistische Einheitsschule*) and warned against in drastic words. This scared off potential reform allies, such as the primary and lower-secondary schoolteachers organized in the Association of Education and Upbringing and probably many parents and voters. Anti-communist

arguments also played a role in the movement against the cooperative school. They created a lot of fear and emotion.

The manifestos of the German parties were generally characterized by a higher degree of polarization compared to the Norwegian manifestos. They were formulated less matter-of-factly and were often extremely critical of the other parties. The Norwegian manifestos were focused on detailed suggestions for reforms and only included slight criticisms of the other parties here and there. It is especially striking how much space German party manifestos of the time devoted to foreign politics and the Cold War and how emotionally charged the manifestos were with respect to this. This illustrates that Germany's separation and the Federal Republic's position on the border of the Western alliance shaped German (education) politics decisively.

Finally, the gender cleavage came to expression in both cases but again with unequal results for coalition- and decision-making. The comparable strength of the Norwegian women's movement is illustrated by the fact that coeducation and the equalization of curricula were achieved much earlier and with fewer exceptions than in NRW. Norwegian female primary schoolteachers had their own organization until 1966, which also reflects their strength. The gender roles expressed in curricula became a topic of debate in Norway at an earlier point than in Germany and the "housewife ideal" came under greater criticism. The radical women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s was connected to the political left and supported by the Labor Party. The gender cleavage did not overlap exactly with the class cleavage as the Christian Democrats and the Center Party were the clearest antagonists of the radical women's movements' demands, while the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party more often supported reforms that were in the interests of the women's movement. The Labor Party profited from this cleavage because it split the four nonsocialist parties.

In the German case, too, social democrats stood most clearly on the side of the postwar women's movement, but the German SPD was not as modern in this respect as the Norwegian left was. The German manifestos contained less extensive demands than the Norwegian manifestos with regard to gender roles in education. In 1957, the SPD suggested that all girls should receive homemaking lessons – this coincided with a time when the Norwegian Labor Party was introducing homemaking as an obligatory subject for both sexes, despite the skepticism of the other parties. In NRW, a special *Gymnasium* for girls existed until 1972 and did not award a full-value *Abitur* so a significant percentage of girls

continued to be channeled away from high-status university education and toward typical female occupations. There was no comparably strong female teachers' organization as in Norway. Female Catholic teachers had and still have their own organization, which was originally dominated by primary schoolteachers. This organization is an expression of the state-church cleavage as well as the gender cleavage and results from the special and somewhat contradictory role the Catholic Church has played in girls' education. The state-church cleavage split the German women's movement not only along party lines but also along denominational lines, which weakened the movement. The CDU had ties to the Catholic parts of the women's movement and managed to build an alliance with them. As a result, Catholic female teachers became a part of the antagonists' camp in the comprehensive and cooperative school debates. As with the other crosscutting cleavages, the gender cleavage did not undermine the internal unity of the CDU and did not considerably strengthen the reformers of the SPD.

## Conclusion

The previous chapters have shed light on the politics of comprehensive schooling in two ways. On the one hand, the comparative-historical case studies develop historically specific arguments for why Norwegian and German education politics evolved the way they did. On the other hand, they demonstrate that the Rokkanian approach is a fruitful starting point for comparative research on education politics. In the following, the results of the case studies are summed up one more time, followed by a discussion of the general conclusions that can be drawn from them for comparative welfare and education regime research. The [next section](#) discusses some open questions that would merit further research. Finally, the current education-political situation in Norway and North Rhine–Westphalia/Germany is analyzed briefly with a focus on how cleavages are manifested today and what this means for political coalition-making.

### CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES AND EDUCATION POLITICS IN NORWAY AND GERMANY

The comparative-historical case studies in this book are divided into four parts, corresponding to [Chapters 2–5](#). [Chapter 2](#) provides a historical sociological analysis of the development of schooling in the two countries up to the 1950s, demonstrating how cleavages were manifested over time and shaped the school as an institution. It concludes that conditions were somewhat more favorable for comprehensive school reformers in the postwar period in Norway because of feedback effects of previous reform cycles. The Norwegian school system was already somewhat more



comprehensive than the school system of NRW. On the other hand, in the 1950s both school systems consisted of comprehensive primary schools, followed by segmented secondary schooling, and, despite different cleavage structures, there were also significant similarities in their historical development. Even though previous events and processes shaped the conditions for postwar reformers, different types of compromises between historical actors remained possible and could have brought the two cases closer to each other. The reform period of the 1950s to the 1970s was a critical juncture with an open ending.

A detailed analysis of this period is provided in [Chapters 3, 4, and 5](#). [Chapter 3](#) introduces the most important collective actors involved in the politics of schooling during these postwar decades and compares their power resources and social base. The analysis shows that cleavage structures shaped the political playing fields in both cases, leading to differences in party systems and among teachers' organizations. Social democrats and primary schoolteachers were somewhat more powerful in Norway than in NRW. However, the differences in power resources were not so great as to preclude alternative political outcomes. They should also at least partly be considered a result of successful coalition- and policymaking.

[Chapters 4 and 5](#) analyze these processes of coalition-making in detail. [Chapter 4](#) focuses on the struggles over comprehensive school reforms. It demonstrates that the left and the right were ideologically opposed to each other and that the struggles over comprehensive education were an expression of the class cleavage in both cases. However, the hegemonic consensus differed. In Norway, the idea that it was unjust and detrimental for learning outcomes to divide students into school types, tracks, or ability groups became hegemonic over time. Norwegian social democrats and their allies, such as primary schoolteachers, were mostly united in their support for the comprehensive school. The center parties did not push for comprehensive education but for the most part consented to the structural development of the school system. The politicians of the Conservative Party were divided over the question, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, so the party did not manage to develop a clear profile. Many secondary schoolteachers were skeptical toward the reforms, but hardly dared raise their voices. Only during the 1970s did Norwegian conservatives become a clearly antagonistic and more united voice in school debates.

In Germany, the situation was the reverse. The idea that children should be divided into (seemingly) homogeneous ability groups remained

hegemonic. Many viewed the *Gymnasium* as an “untouchable” school type that should be the school of future elites and high achievers. German social democrats were highly divided. Many moderate or right-wing social democrats in leading positions did not consider comprehensive schooling very important and did not care for the anticapitalistic rhetoric of the leftist current of the party. The liberal FDP was also divided over the issue. Christian democrats, and their allies such as the *Gymnasium* teachers, were for the most part ideologically united in their skepticism toward comprehensive education. Around 1970, some Christian democrats consented to experiments with cooperative schooling, but during the second half of the 1970s, conservative hegemony was reestablished.

Chapter 4 draws out how different coalitions and lines of division emerged in the struggles over comprehensive school reforms between and within political parties and teachers’ organizations. However, class interests and ideologies alone cannot explain why some rural, religious, lower-class, and middle-class groups actively supported or at least consented to social democratic comprehensive education politics in Norway, while similar groups in NRW opposed the reforms. To really understand the nature of the different cross-interest coalitions that materialized in the two cases, we need to extend our focus beyond the class cleavage and comprehensive school reforms.

Chapter 5 therefore takes a closer look at these cross-interest coalitions and focuses on other major school-political debates of the time that were expressions of crosscutting cleavages. In Norway, these crosscutting cleavages mostly had the effect of weakening potential coalitions between the political center and the conservatives. This holds especially for the rural-urban and center-periphery cleavages. The Conservative Party did not manage to build stable alliances with the political center in the struggles over language, centralization, gender, or religion. The Labor Party succeeded in handling crosscutting cleavages in a way that did not sabotage and sometimes even strengthened its school reforms, thus building a powerful hegemonic coalition. The Labor Party was in such a strong position that it could in some cases push through important decisions on its own. In other cases, it cooperated with the parties of the political center. It also had an alliance with primary schoolteachers and with the women’s movement. Norway’s cleavage structure gave Norwegian social democrats opportunities that they used skillfully.

In NRW, the state-church cleavage and the communist-socialist cleavage had the greatest influence on the political outcome. Both cleavages were a major obstacle for social democratic and social liberal

comprehensive-school reformers. They led to intra-party splits and made it difficult to build extra-party coalitions, especially with the Catholic population. For the CDU, these cleavages had a unifying effect by integrating the Catholic rural population and many Catholic primary school-teachers. Social democratic and liberal reformers managed to destabilize the hegemony of conservative ideas about schooling during the 1960s and 1970s, but their lack of internal unity stood in the way of more far-reaching success. Finally, because of the dominance of the struggle over denominational schooling until 1967–8, the time window for reforms was shorter than in Norway.

If reframed from the point of view of the lower- and middle-class groups who opposed comprehensive schools in NRW but consented to them in Norway, the argument of this book can also be summed up in the following way. In NRW, the decision of rural Catholics, religious Protestants, Christian primary schoolteachers, and Catholic female teachers to cooperate with conservative representatives of the upper class in their opposition to comprehensive schooling was not simply a result of “false consciousness” in terms of their material class interests. It was the result of their evaluation of who would be most likely to support their demands for denominational and Christian private schooling, anti-communist education, decentralization of schools, and the preservation of Catholic girls’ education. Equality of educational opportunities was important to some of them; however, they concluded that the modest structural reforms supported by the CDU would suffice to ameliorate the educational chances of their offspring. They did not want to cooperate with supporters of comprehensive schooling, who were for the most part opposed to their concerns listed above. The CDU managed to maintain this cross-interest and cross-class alliance by supporting educational expansion within the parallel school system through the expansion of the *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*, and through its support for the introduction of the *Hauptschule* and nine years of obligatory schooling.

In the Norwegian case, the consent of the rural and religious population to comprehensive school reforms was a result of these reforms being connected to a social democratic reform package, which included educational expansion in rural areas, an upgrading of the social status of the rural populations’ language and culture, and compromises regarding centralization. Not least, the center parties embraced the youth school because it was connected to the introduction of nine years of obligatory schooling. There was some disagreement with the social democrats regarding Christian education and gender roles, but these issues were

not as decisive as decentralization or language politics. And, importantly, the Norwegian urban upper-class conservatives did not appear as a more attractive coalition partner because they did not care much about the issues that mattered most to the representatives of the rural periphery and, for a long time, they were themselves internally split on education politics.

Finally, it should be underlined that the historical outcomes represent a compromise in both cases. Even though the Norwegian compromise was more in favor of reform protagonists and the North Rhine–Westphalian compromise was more in favor of reform antagonists, neither of them got exactly what they wanted. In Norway, reform protagonists had to relinquish the abolition of grading in the youth school. In NRW, reform antagonists had to accept that the integrated comprehensive school would become a regular school type besides the other parallel school types, that additional such schools were founded in the 1980s, and that they have remained a growing part of the North Rhine–Westphalian school system up to the present day.

This implies that the strategies chosen by the actors in the period of investigation were meaningful and had consequences for the kinds of compromises that came about. This may seem like a trivial statement. However, in Germany, the belief that comprehensive schooling was and continues to be “impossible” to introduce in a German context is quite influential today. In Norway, it might be difficult to imagine a development of the Norwegian school system that would not have included comprehensivization to the same extent. The present analysis certainly supports the view that the structural, organizational, and cultural conditions actors faced contributed to developments along different paths. However, this should not be taken to mean that there was no room for action. For example, it should be noted that it is uncertain whether Norwegian social democrats would have managed to introduce the youth school as smoothly if they had not decided in 1959 that the old school types should be excluded from experiments, thereby overriding all opposition. With regard to ability grouping within the youth school, different kinds of compromises could also have come about. In theory, social democrats in NRW could have insisted on introducing the comprehensive school as a regular school type with blanket coverage but without experiments, or on focusing experiments exclusively on organizational differentiation within the comprehensive school, as Norwegian reformers did. Maybe more realistically, they could have accepted the CDU’s offer to introduce cooperative schools on a general level in 1971–3. True enough, this would have roused

opposition in the population. However, it is probable that this opposition would not have been equally strong in the late 1960s or early 1970s as it was during the late 1970s. Moreover, if the CDU had been involved in the reform, it would have had to defend it. Of course, these are hypothetical remarks. Nobody knows what would have happened if actors had made different choices. It is nevertheless important to emphasize that there were opportunities for making different choices.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATE AND EDUCATION REGIME RESEARCH

Within the field of comparative welfare state and education regime research, Rokkanian cleavage theory is not often discussed as a separate theoretical approach worthy of consideration. A few scholars have argued for a “Rokkanian amendment” (Manow, 2009, 2015; Manow/van Kersbergen, 2009) and have applied and developed Rokkanian theory, for example in studies of European political development and party systems (Bartolini, 2000, 2005; Berntzen/Selle, 1992; Caramani, 2004; Ferrera, 2005; Hooghe/Marks, 2018; Kriesi, 2010; Magone, 2010; Mair, 1997). In the historical-institutionalist literature, the interest in macro-historical analyses of critical junctures and political processes survived, and Rokkan is acknowledged as a classic contributor to the field (Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 1999). Still, overall, his work has not received the attention it deserves.

The most important general contribution of the present book is thus to demonstrate the continued empirical fruitfulness of the Rokkanian approach for the study of education politics – and presumably, many other policy fields. It should not be considered a structuralist approach but rather an invitation to dig deeper into one’s cases and to respect the historical complexity of political agency and coalition-making in varying political and institutional environments and contexts (Mjøset, 2000). The approach stands not in opposition to the other major perspective employed here, power resources theory, but rather represents an extension of focus. In the field of education politics, it is not difficult to see that additional lines of conflict besides the class cleavage, which have roots back into the nineteenth century, have played an important role. By examining how religious, center-periphery, rural-urban, communist-socialist, and gender conflicts have been expressed in education politics and how they have influenced coalition-making, the book sheds light on a question that remains underexplored, namely *how* different kinds of

cross-interest coalitions come about in specific policy fields. It is the first contribution to spell out from a Rokkanian perspective how Norwegian social democrats and German Christian democrats accomplished building their hegemonic alliances in the field of primary and lower-secondary schooling.

The book supports Manow's (2009) suggestion that agrarian parties should be included in comparative welfare state analysis. As has been emphasized by Esping-Andersen (1990) and later by Manow and van Kersbergen (2009), the center-periphery and rural-urban cleavages have been particularly influential for the development of Scandinavian welfare states, while the state-church cleavage has been the second most salient cleavage after the class cleavage in some of the continental welfare states, such as Germany (see also Baldwin, 1990; Huber et al., 1993; van Kersbergen, 1995). However, Manow's (2009, 110) conclusion that the Christian Democrats in Scandinavia "did not exert any substantial influence on post-war welfare state development" is incorrect for the Norwegian case. Especially during the conservative-center party government of 1965–71, the Christian Democrats did have an influence, not least on the development of the school system. During Labor Party governments, social democrats were also forced to consider Christian interests to a certain degree.

This might become more understandable when one considers that the agrarian Center Party is not the only party of agrarian defense in Norway, contrary to Manow's (2009) discussion. The Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party also represented sections of the rural periphery and consented to social democratic reforms many times. In other words, it should be recognized that parties can be founded on more than one cleavage and that several parties can give voice to the same cleavages. All three Norwegian center parties share a similar, mostly rural voter base, for whom decentralization, language politics, and, to a certain extent, religious convictions have been important cornerstones of political orientation. The parties have long emphasized different elements of this program. The early Liberal Party was founded around a range of issues but gave voice to center-periphery conflicts most of all. The Christian Democrats were founded based mostly on the state-church cleavage, while the Center Party emphasized economic rural interests and thus the rural-urban cleavage. In terms of the left-right dimension of politics, the three parties together constitute the Norwegian political center and should be taken into account in an analysis of coalition-making. In Germany, the Catholic Center Party and its successor, the CDU, gave expression to the state-church cleavage. However, they

also integrated economic and cultural rural interests such as support for decentralization and, in the early phase, opposition to the Prussian center. In other words, rural-urban and center-periphery divisions coincided with state-church divisions, which strengthened the internal unity of the Catholic Center Party and later the CDU. While the Catholic Center Party was also to some extent a workers' party, the CDU became more of a representative of sections of the upper class. Rokkan's (1999, 309) insistence that one should always consider the interrelationships of different cleavages is therefore important.

In this book, the gender cleavage is incorporated into the Rokkanian framework (see also Sass/Kuhnle, 2022). The provision of welfare and education has been a prime issue for women in politics, even long before they had the right to vote. Compared to other actors and movements, women's organizations have not been sufficiently considered in comparative welfare and education regime research. There is a rich comparative literature on welfare and gender regimes (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 2009, 2016; Korpi, 2000; Laperrière and Orloff, 2019; Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 1996; Orloff, 1993, 2009; Sainsbury, 1994, 1999; Sümer, 2009), but for the most part this literature has focused more on how regime types produce different consequences in terms of gender equality than on how women as political activists have contributed historically to the development of these regimes (but see Berven/Selle, 2001; Bock/Thane, 1991; Hobson/Lindholm, 1997; Koven/Michel, 1993; Sainsbury, 2001; Skocpol, 1992, for important exceptions). There is also an interesting literature on gender, voting, and party politics, which has demonstrated among other things that issues like childcare, health care, or education are more salient for women than for men, independent of socioeconomic factors or position on a left/right axis, and that women, including conservative women, support higher social spending than men (Campbell 2017; Campbell/Childs 2015; Finseraas et al., 2012). Clearly, gender conflicts should not be reduced entirely to other cleavages, and women's political mobilization should receive increased attention (see Sass/Kuhnle, 2022, for an extended discussion of this argument). There remains much to be explored here.

Regarding the cases in this book, the analysis shows that organizations of the first-wave women's movement, such as organizations of female teachers, were important players in education politics (see also Sass, 2021). Furthermore, in the Norwegian case, the radical second-wave women's movement was in an alliance with the Labor Party, which supported coeducation of boys and girls in line with its general support



for comprehensive education. In the German case, the Catholic women's movement was in an alliance with the CDU, and the women's movement as a whole was weaker and more split than in Norway. Catholic women's organizations supported separate schooling for girls as an alternative route to emancipation and opposed comprehensive schooling. Even though other cleavages were more salient, the gender cleavage is thus a relevant piece of the puzzle.

Another cleavage that has not received much attention is the communist-socialist cleavage (but see [Bartolini, 2000](#), 97ff; [Manow, 2015](#)).<sup>1</sup> That might in part be because Rokkan was not consistent in his treatment of this cleavage, which was not included in all of his models and papers ([Rokkan, 1999](#)). As shown in [Chapter 5](#), this cleavage was highly significant for the education-political development in Germany. Pervasive anti-communism put social democrats and reformers in a difficult position. The "socialist comprehensive school" was presented as a serious threat, which frightened the rural, religious, and middle-class population. The fact that the GDR had instituted a secular and more comprehensive school system influenced debates, as did negative experiences of the population with the communist regime. In Norwegian education politics, anti-communist arguments were nonexistent. Even though the Norwegian left has long been split into different currents and parties, this did not impede cooperation in education politics. In other words, it should be an empirical question to what extent legacies of (anti)communism and communist-socialist divisions affect coalition-making in different cases and policy fields.

A related insight is that crosscutting cleavages can be expressed through splits within parties, movements, or organizations. In Germany, social democracy, the unions, teachers' organizations, and the women's movement were all split internally into different wings. The SPD and the unions, including the social democratic teachers' union – the Education and Science Workers' Union (GEW), were split into radical and moderate currents that disagreed, among other things, on the issue of cooperation with communists and the right response to anti-communist attacks. This implied conflicts about the right strategy for comprehensive school

<sup>1</sup> [Watson \(2015\)](#) has demonstrated the importance of splits between and within parties of the left, with an emphasis on the effects of such splits rather than their roots. Possibly for this reason, she does not refer to [Rokkan's \(1999\)](#) historical analysis of the communist-socialist cleavage. If she had done so, she might have realized that splits on the left are not something historically new in her shadow cases Norway and Germany but have old roots ([Watson, 2015](#), 258ff). In Norway, this has not stood in the way of coalition-making to the same extent as in Germany.



reforms. Moderate social democrats preferred a careful, harmonious, and defensive strategy, while younger radicals demanded a bolder, more anticapitalistic approach. The communist-socialist cleavage was thus an obstacle not only for social democrats' cooperation with rural, middle-class voters but also for their internal unity. This made it difficult for social democrats to build up a cross-interest coalition for their school reform ideas.

Teachers' organizations and the women's movement were split along class divisions, but more importantly along religious divisions. The dominant state-church cleavage led to the development of separate organizations for Catholic and Protestant teachers and Catholic female teachers. Because primary schoolteachers were not united, philologists could dominate through their alliance with the CDU. Christian primary and lower-secondary schoolteachers were also to a certain extent integrated into this alliance but were less successful in influencing the CDU's politics. Up to the present day, primary and lower-secondary schoolteachers in Germany are separated into organizations with social democratic and religious roots, which is a major reason why they have not been more influential.

In Norway, the Conservative Party originated on the side of the center in the center-periphery conflict of the nineteenth century, not on the side of the periphery like the German Catholic Center Party and later the CDU. In the countryside, it was a weak party. As a result, the Norwegian Conservative Party had difficulties with responding to the reform demands of the rural population. This led to disagreements within the party about the right strategy. A more reform-oriented current and a conservative current opposed each other, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The reform-oriented current included, for example, the primary schoolteacher Erling Fredrikfryd. His opponents in the party were representatives of the urban elites. This split was debilitating for the conservatives. In other words, the Norwegian cleavage structure weakened the unity of the political right and strengthened the unity of the political left, while the opposite was the case in Germany.

On the methodological level, this book underlines the importance of the historical, comparative, and case-oriented approach. "Large processes" and "big structures," such as the education reforms and systems studied here, have multiple and configurational causes (Tilly, 1984). For research questions pertaining to *how* such reforms come about, historical comparison is the most adequate approach because it is the only way to study how different factors *combine* with each other *over time* in creating a historical outcome (Ragin, 1987). Historical case studies shed light on

the dynamics of politics and allow historical situations to be analyzed as wholes and in context.

In addition, historical comparison encourages researchers to think outside of the box of national explanations and are the best way to take temporal dynamics in politics into account (Haupt/Kocka, 2009; Streeck, 2015). Education politics today are still partly shaped by social conflicts that originated centuries ago. An ahistorical analysis would be incapable of uncovering the relevance of such factors. Examining the historical roots of education systems increases our understanding of the role of institutionalized schooling in the development of modern welfare and nation states and sharpens our perspective on how cleavage structures continue to shape education politics today. This is not merely a historical exercise but is necessary to understand the potential for future changes. For all these reasons, we are going to need comparative-historical case studies of education politics also in the future.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the method of historical comparison involves going back and forth between theory and data, as well as between cases, with an open mind and an explorative attitude (Ragin, 1987; Ragin/Amoroso, 2011). This method is not inferior to hypothesis testing. It means taking one's cases seriously and making the most of the benefits of comparison, while balancing generalization and contextual relevance (Mjølset, 2000, 393). In the case of this book, this process led to the realization that a class perspective on education politics is not sufficient to understand the development of the school system. The comparison produced the insight that school reforms are shaped by cross-cutting cleavages that have not been sufficiently considered in previous work. The theoretical approach that resonated most with this finding was the Rokkanian approach.

#### OPEN QUESTIONS

The politics of education continue to be under-researched, especially from a comparative perspective. There are numerous possibilities for further research that would be valuable for the development of the field. For example, it would be interesting to apply the Rokkanian perspective to other cases. The most obvious potential theoretical generalization of this study relates to the other Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland). As Rokkan (1999, 306ff) has shown, cleavage structures and party systems in these cases were similar to the Norwegian case. In Sweden and Denmark, rural-urban, center-periphery, and communist-socialist

cleavages were not quite as salient as in Norway but were still much more salient than the state-church cleavage. As we know from the work of [Wiborg \(2009\)](#), comprehensive education politics in Scandinavia had much in common, and the presence of comparatively strong liberal and agrarian parties was important in all these cases. In addition, there was no Catholic political movement in any of these cases. In other words, the political coalitions that emerged in the other Nordic countries were most likely a result of similar processes as in the Norwegian case, but it would still be valuable to analyze the relevance of specific crosscutting conflicts in more detail.

One could also compare the cases in this study with reforms of secondary schooling in the countries of the United Kingdom, and other countries historically connected to the British Empire. This would be of interest, because postwar comprehensive school reforms in the United Kingdom went further than in many continental countries. On the other hand, private schooling and school choice have played a much more prominent role in England and Wales than in Norway and Germany – while Scotland is an interesting case of its own and apparently more similar to the Nordic countries. How crosscutting cleavages emerge in conflicts over private schooling or school choice in English-speaking, continental, or Mediterranean countries could generally be examined in more detail.

It would also be interesting to consider the relevance of the communist-socialist and gender cleavages for other cases. Not least, the role of women's organizations in welfare state and education regime development should be studied further. For example, a comparative-historical study of the role played by female teachers' organizations would be an interesting research project on its own. To what extent splits on the left have impeded comprehensive school reforms in other places is also an issue worthy of further consideration. Most likely, the Rokkanian framework would prove fruitful in approaching other cases and generate new insights.

Some scholars have attempted to develop Rokkanian theory further to make sense of current political conflicts about globalization, European integration, ethnicity, migration, and nationality. They have, for example, conceptualized a “transnational cleavage” ([Hooghe/Marks, 2018](#)), a “libertarian/authoritarian cleavage” ([Kriesi, 2010](#)) and a “universalism-particularism cleavage” ([Bornschieer et al., 2021](#)) to describe these conflicts of today, which are apparent in the rise of far-right parties in many places (see also [Bornschieer, 2010](#); [Ferrera, 2019](#); [Kriesi, 2010](#); [Kriesi et al., 2012](#); [Seiler, 2015](#)). It would be interesting to examine to what extent such

a cleavage can be detected in debates about the treatment of migrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities in national education systems. There is certainly a structural foundation for conflicts, considering that ethnicity is today one of the most significant determinants for educational outcomes (OECD, 2010b, 2016, 2018).

Another issue that would merit more analysis is the relationship between comprehensive school reforms at the lower-secondary and at the upper-secondary level. In Norway and Germany, protagonists of comprehensive school reforms envisaged comprehensive schooling also on the upper-secondary level, while antagonists opposed it. In Norway, upper-secondary schooling did not become fully comprehensive, but reforms diminished the differences between academic and vocational upper-secondary schooling (Olsen, 2012). In Germany, academic and vocational upper-secondary forms of education remain more distinct. While the history of vocational education has been analyzed, for example by Thelen (2004), commonalities and interlinkages between debates about lower- and upper-secondary education could be examined in more detail. Whether crosscutting cleavages influenced the outcomes of upper-secondary reform attempts in similar ways as in the field of lower-secondary education could also be analyzed. Busemeyer's study (2014) illustrates that there are potentially similar dynamics.

Another potential extension of the present study relates to post-secondary education in colleges and universities. In Norway and Germany, the 1960s and 1970s saw the establishment of new types of colleges, not least in rural areas. This involved debates about the status of these new institutions in relation to the universities. In NRW, the term "comprehensive college" (*Gesamthochschule*) became a political buzzword employed by social democrats and liberals and at times even by the CDU. In both cases, the development of the postsecondary educational sector was an important part of the educational expansion. This part of educational history could be examined more closely and related to the debates about comprehensive schooling at the lower levels of the education system.

There have also been recurrent debates and reforms of special schooling. In Germany, the slowly increasing inclusion of disabled children in the general school system has led to renewed discussions of parallel schooling (Hartong/Nikolai, 2016). In Norway, special schools were largely abolished in the 1970s and 1980s (Dalen, 2006). Much of the data collected for this book indicates that the ideological arguments for the abolition of special schools were similar to the arguments for comprehensive schooling. However, this field of politics involves important

additional actors besides the ones studied here, such as special-school teachers and parents of disabled children, who would have to be included in future research on this issue.

Another open question is why a political trend reversal occurred in both cases in the mid-1970s. All the experts interviewed agreed that such a trend reversal took place. Some of the reform protagonists who were interviewed had realized with the benefit of hindsight that the window of opportunity had been closed from the mid-1970s onward. Other experts noticed at the time that the tide had turned and that eagerness for reform was waning. Most likely, economic development played a role in this trend reversal, but it is unclear how exactly it may have done so. Future research should analyze the relationship between economic development and cycles of educational expansion and reform in more detail, from a long-term, comparative perspective (see e.g. Dartenne, 2016; Nath, 2001; Titze, 2004, for a starting point). This could be connected to an analysis of the long-term relationship between demographic development and educational expansion. The increasing student numbers of the 1960s and 1970s and the economic need for more qualified labor certainly put pressure on political actors to reform the school system. Economic development was often referred to by reform protagonists. Demography also played a role in the debates. Reform protagonists pointed out that comprehensive schooling would secure schools in rural areas, once student numbers started to decline again. However, this argument was not very effective during the 1970s because demographic pressure on rural schools first made itself felt in the 1980s. A more detailed analysis of these questions would be valuable but should not be based on functionalist assumptions linking the economy, demography, and the education system in a clear-cut way. As Green (2013, 35ff) and Ringer (1979, 1ff) convincingly argue, there is no simple functionalist relationship between economic development and the institutional development of the school system. Among other things, the variation between national education systems is too big to warrant a purely functionalist explanation.

#### THE POLITICS OF SCHOOLING TODAY: IS THE ROKKANIAN PERSPECTIVE STILL RELEVANT?

Finally, the timeframe of this study could and should be expanded with the aim of analyzing how cleavage structures have continued to influence the development of schooling since the 1980s. In this final section, a short analytical sketch serves to demonstrate that coalition-making is still

constrained by the cleavage structure in the two cases of this study. Numerous collective actors, such as parties, teachers' and parents' organizations, and unions, continue to be involved in the struggle over the school system. Changes have taken place with regard to the political playing fields and the salience of political issues. However, the hegemonic alliances that developed during the postwar reform period for the most part bore up.

In NRW, prolonging comprehensive schooling has not been attempted since the 1970s. It is common for politicians and activists to point to the conflicts of the 1970s as an explanation for why governments have not dared suggesting comprehensive school reforms ever again. This does not imply that there was a complete standstill. Today, integrated comprehensive schools (*Gesamtschulen*) continue to play an important role in the North Rhine–Westphalian school system. The proportion of integrated comprehensive schools has grown significantly in the past years. In 2008–9, this school type had 232 814 students, with 593 080 students attending *Gymnasien*. In the school year 2020–1, 335 805 students in NRW attended an integrated comprehensive school, with 501 395 students attending *Gymnasien*, 203 010 attending *Realschulen* and only 52 410 attending *Hauptschulen*. The *Hauptschule* is in the process of disappearing, as student numbers at this school type are declining quickly. A new school type was introduced in 2011 that combines at least two school types from grades five to ten. This school type is called *Sekundarschule* (secondary school) and had 58 620 students in 2020–1 (IT.NRW, 2018, 2021). In the same school year, around 38 percent of *Hauptschule* students, 14 percent of comprehensive schools' students, and 6 percent of *Gymnasium* students were not of German nationality, indicating that the background of students at different school types differs massively (IT.NRW, 2021, own calculation).

The slow death of the *Hauptschule* might eventually force politicians in NRW to reform the system more decisively, for example by reducing the high number of parallel school types – as has been done many times before in the region's school history. In other federal states, the *Hauptschule* has already been abolished and a two-tier school system seems to be taking shape (for an overview see Helbig/Nikolai, 2015, 99ff). This is not so much a result of strategic decision-making than of parents' choices. Some leftist school reformers of today see the development toward a two-tier system as a potential step toward comprehensive education.

The class cleavage remains relevant, and activists and social scientists continue to emphasize that class inequality is reproduced in the German

school system. The educational certificates of the lowest secondary schools (the *Hauptschule* as well as the special schools) have become largely worthless on the labor market. As a result, these school types have become schools for the most deprived children of society; those of poor, often immigrant, workers or unemployed people, who lack the educational and financial resources necessary to ensure the educational success of their children (Solga, 2004; Solga/Wagner, 2007). Even though the postwar educational expansion affected all social classes, working-class children's relative disadvantage was not significantly reduced with regard to the *Gymnasium* (Geißler, 2011, 282ff; Schimpl-Neimanns, 2000). The integrated comprehensive schools function as a possible path to the *Abitur* exam for children from more disadvantaged backgrounds, as these schools are less socially selective than the *Gymnasium* (Köller, 2008, 459f). The introduction of bachelor's and master's degrees in teacher training, which took place in NRW in 2009, has entailed new debates about the unequal pay of teachers from different school types. Now that all teachers have the same length of education, this might lead to a reduction in their status and pay differences, which would increase the chances of comprehensive school reforms.

Comprehensive school reforms might also be subject to more favorable conditions today because conflicts over gender, denominational schooling, and anti-communism have lost importance, thus taking up less political space. The consensus in the social scientific literature is that educational inequalities based on gender and denomination have decreased significantly or even disappeared. Gender is still a relevant political issue, and the Catholic Church especially continues to administrate a number of private girls' schools in NRW. The Association of German Catholic Female Teachers still exists. However, coeducation of boys and girls is not seriously questioned. Denominational primary schooling also still exists and continues to be debated in NRW, but these debates are much less emotional than in earlier times. The state-church cleavage thus seems to be less salient. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church is still a relevant actor, if not as powerful as before. One must assume that it continues to shape the political orientation of the Catholic population, in rural areas especially. To what extent this is reflected in opinions about comprehensive schooling would merit more research.

With the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the iron curtain having become history, anti-communism and the communist-socialist cleavage also seem less salient today. After reunification, a hierarchical, multi-tier school system including the *Gymnasium* was reintroduced in East



Germany, so that reformers today can no longer be thwarted with the suggestion to “go over there.” Nevertheless, one must assume that this cleavage continues to exert an influence on German (education) politics. It suffices to look at the relations between the parties to come to this conclusion. The German Left Party (*Die Linke*), founded in 2007, is subject to surveillance by the German secret service. Its relations with the social democrats are characterized by mutual mistrust, making coalitions difficult.

The opposition to comprehensive school reforms voiced by the CDU, the Association of Philologists, and others is still considerable. Many social democrats in NRW – and in Germany as a whole – consider truly comprehensive school reforms “impossible” and have basically accepted parallel schooling. This is illustrated by a compromise made by the minority government of the SPD and the Green Party with the CDU in 2011 to change the school articles of the NRW Constitution so that the *Hauptschule* no longer has to be an obligatory school type in the federal state. A sentence was included in Paragraph 10 of the Constitution according to which the federal state “guarantees a sufficient, varied public school system, which allows for a multi-tiered school system, integrated school types as well as other school types.” The inclusion of the multi-tiered school system in the Constitution will complicate future reform attempts. There seem to be even fewer clear-cut reform supporters in the SPD today than in the postwar reform period. Truly comprehensive schooling – which would include the abolition of the *Gymnasium* – has not been an issue for the party for a long time. The Green Party has been similarly quiet on the issue. Only the Left Party has included a ten-year comprehensive school as an aim in its manifestos but does not advocate this particularly boldly.

Another obstacle for any future reform is that teachers’ organizations in Germany remain highly fragmented. A minimum requirement for primary and lower-secondary schoolteachers to increase their influence would be an alliance between the teachers in the Education and Science Workers’ Union (GEW) and in the Association of Education and Upbringing (VBE). Both organizations support comprehensive school reforms. However, even though the two organizations cooperate in some ways, a more formal alliance or a complete integration seem unrealistic for the time being. Apparently, the state-church cleavage continues to complicate cooperation between these groups of teachers.

In Norway, the comprehensive school structure is taken for granted by most people. Hardly anybody – including conservatives – wishes to



reintroduce parallel schooling on the youth school level.<sup>2</sup> Even though the Norwegian school system is more open socially than the German one, the reproduction of educational inequality continues to be seen as a problem by the Norwegian left. The distributional effects of school reforms of the 1950s to 1970s have long been and continue to be a subject of debate (Hernes, 1973; Hjellbrekke/Korsnes, 2006, 119f; Lindbekk, 2008). In absolute terms, children from lower-class backgrounds significantly increased their participation in upper-secondary schooling. The percentage of Norwegian youths who finished upper-secondary education rose from 35 to 53 percent for the age cohorts born in 1954–5 and 1964–5. For youths with working-class backgrounds, the percentage rose from 26 to 39.7 percent. Lindbekk (2008, 97) concludes that class background continued to have a rather stable relative effect but that the effect of parents' education on their children's educational attainment was reduced by one-fifth as a result of the youth school reform (see, however, Hjellbrekke/Korsnes, 2006, 119f). The effect of class background was reduced slightly by the abolition of ability grouping in the youth school. In the most rural municipalities, the youth school reform increased the average level of education significantly. Women's earlier disadvantages at the upper-secondary level of schooling disappeared (Lindbekk, 2008, 91ff).

Comprehensive schooling was prolonged by another year by the social democratic school reforms of the 1990s, when the school enrolment age was lowered from seven to six. In addition, all youths received the right to three years of upper-secondary education. The ideological justifications of these reforms were similar to those of previous social democratic reforms in the sense that equality remained a major goal (Volckmar, 2008, 2016, 87ff). The center parties have also continued to emphasize the value of comprehensive education for equality.

Since the 2000s, Norwegian educational rhetoric and politics have changed more in the direction of the ideas and practices of New Public Management. There is an ongoing debate whether reforms of curricula oriented toward competencies more than the content of schooling and the related introduction of national tests have weakened the socially integrative function of the comprehensive school (Volckmar, 2016, 111ff). The growth in special schooling arrangements within the comprehensive

<sup>2</sup> The only exception I have come across is the suggestion of the leftist Kjell Horn (2015, 432ff) to divide the youth school up into two school types, one theoretical and the other practical. Horn (2015, 434) emphasizes that such a change is in his opinion conditional on a higher status of blue-collar work in the economic sphere.

schools can also be seen as a threat to comprehensive education. The term *enhetsskole*, which until the 1990s was the usual Norwegian term for the comprehensive school, has been replaced by the term *felleskole* – according to Volckmar (2016, 114), this is an indication that the previous conception of the Norwegian comprehensive school is seen by many as not leaving enough room for students' individuality. Schools in Oslo have been experimenting with permanent ability grouping, which has been supported by the Conservative Party (Wilden/Juven, 2013).<sup>3</sup> The political right has thus made some progress in Norwegian education politics. On the other hand, on the question of grading, the former conservative government, which was in place until 2021, decided after some debate not to reintroduce grades in the last years of the children's school because they concluded that this would be too demotivating for students. Abolishing grades in the youth school has not been attempted since the 1970s. With respect to grading, it seems that the hegemonic balance that came about in the postwar reform period has borne up.

Among the Norwegian teachers' organizations, the merger process continued over time so that all groups of teachers are now united in the Union of Education (*Utdanningsforbundet*), Norway's second largest union with over 180 000 members. Dissatisfied university-educated secondary schoolteachers founded a new organization in 1997, which is somewhat boldly called *Norsk Lektorlag*. It is not to be confused with the earlier Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers, which was named *Norsk Lektorlag* until 1983 and which became a part of today's Union of Education through mergers. With around 8200 members, the new *Norsk Lektorlag* is relatively small in comparison with the Union of Education, but it is growing. Originally, it could be considered a conservative and antagonistic actor to comprehensive schooling; for example, it demanded the option to make use of organizational differentiation and grades also in the children's and youth school (*Norsk Lektorlag*, 2015). The most recent manifesto from the organization is not as clear in this respect but still emphasizes the importance of grading, testing, and exams. The new *Norsk Lektorlag* also demands to only allow students with average grades above a certain level to choose academically oriented upper-secondary education (*Norsk Lektorlag*, 2019).

<sup>3</sup> The author has collected anecdotal evidence from students indicating that more or less informal ability grouping is practiced in some subjects in Norwegian youth schools outside of Oslo as well. This is not in line with national regulations and would merit further research (see also OECD, 2010a, 212, which, however, gives no information about how permanent Norwegian ability grouping is).

Other moot points are whether the growth in private schooling and grade-based upper-secondary school choice undermine comprehensive schooling in the public school. The law on private schools has been reformed several times in the past fifteen years (Volckmar, 2016, 114ff). A reform took place in 2015, with the support of the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats. The law remained for the most part as restrictive as previous compromises but made it easier to found new “profile schools” with alternative curricula and a focus on specific subject areas (Volckmar, 2016, 123). In April 2022, the new Labor Party and Center Party government presented a new private school law proposal with the aim of undoing the reform of 2015. The law proposal is currently under debate. The current minister of education from the Labor Party, Tonje Brenna, has stated that “we want to stop privatization and build a stronger public comprehensive school” (Norwegian Ministry of Education, 2022).

With regard to school choice, there is an ongoing debate about whether intake of students to lower- and especially to upper-secondary schools should be based on geographical catchment areas or competition based on grades (NRK, 2018). Upper-secondary schooling is regulated by the Norwegian regions, *fylker*, approximately half of which have introduced school choice based on grade competition. The Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the Progress Party support grade-based school choice. The former conservative government attempted to force all regions to introduce grade-based school choice from autumn 2022, but this was reversed in November 2021 by the government of the Labor Party and the Center Party. The left parties and the Christian Democrats are also skeptical of grade-based school choice, as they fear increasing social, ethnic, and geographical inequality.

Overall, the class cleavage continues to become apparent in conflicts over the regulation of the Norwegian school system. To date, it seems that the Labor Party will continue to apply the strategy of cooperating with allies on the left as well as in the center to take steps against the growth in private schooling and liberalization of school choice. On the left, the Red Party (*Rødt*) has established itself as an additional competitor for the Socialist Left Party. While the Red Party is less likely to join coalitions with social democracy, both left parties continue to support comprehensive schooling and anti-privatization measures. Because Norwegian left parties enjoy more legitimacy than the German Left Party, their relations to social democracy continue to be less complicated.

Crosscutting cleavages continue to become apparent and to shape coalition-making in Norwegian politics. In education politics, this is still reflected in debates about decentralization, language issues, Christian education, and, recently, boys' fate in the school system. In these debates, it seems that the left and the center still have more in common with regard to decentralization and language than with regard to Christian education and gender.

In terms of coalition-making, the three Norwegian center parties have chosen different routes. The Center Party is today a firm coalition partner of social democracy. The Christian Democrats decided in 2019 to join the governing coalition of the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, and the Liberal Party. Both the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party suffer from massive internal conflicts about their coalition strategies, especially regarding cooperation with the Progress Party. It remains to be seen what will become of Norway's political center. My guess is that it will remain a force to be reckoned with. In the German case, the integrative power of the CDU as a cross-interest party based on several cleavages will also have to be taken seriously in the future.

Overall, education politics in both cases continue to be shaped by the entire cleavage structure. The class cleavage continues to be the most salient, leading to debates about educational class inequality. However, cooperation between social groups and political parties is still often hampered by disagreements over other issues. Whoever wants to understand cross-interest coalitions and political outcomes in education politics should thus study how cleavage structures come to be expressed in political coalition-making.

## Annex

### DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT AND ITS COMMITTEES

#### Parliamentary Debates

- Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, June 17, 1954, *Lov om forsøk i skolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, June 22, 1954, *Lov om forsøk i skolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, October 12, 1954, *Styrking av skoleverket.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, January 20, 1959, *Heimkunnskap og husstell.*  
*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 5 and 6, 1959, *Lov om folkeskolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Lagtinget*, March 13, 1959, *Lov om folkeskolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, March 13, 1959, *Lov om folkeskolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1961, *Forsøksvirksomheten i skoleverket.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 21, 1963, *Forsøksvirksomheten i skoleverket 1959–60.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, June 8, 1965, (1) *Interpellasjon fra repr. Borten om karaktersystemet i 9-årige skole; (2) a) Forsøksvirks. i skoleverket, b) Læreraksj. for kristendomsfaget; (3) Aksj. vedr. fag- og timebytepl. i 9-årig skole.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, March 10, 1966, *Yrkesskoler i husstell.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 21, 1969, *Lov om grunnskolen.*  
*Forhandlinger i Odelstinget*, February 17, 1970, *Lov om tilskudd til private skoler.*  
*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 8, 1974, *Interpellasjon frå representant Røssum om departementets rundskriv om å gi karakterar i berre 3 fag i grunnskolen.*

*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 17, 1975, *Forsøksverksemda i skoleverket 1973 og 1974*.

*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, April 20, 1978, *Forsøksverksemda i skoleverket 1975–76*.

*Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, May 11, 1979, *Forsøksverksemda i skoleverket i skoleåret 1976–7*.

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*St. meld. nr. 9* (1954) *Om tiltak til styrking av skoleverket*.

*Innstilling fra Utvalget til å utrede skolekjøkken- og husstelloplæringa*, Oppnevnt 29. august 1952, Avgitt 21. desember 1954 (1955). Oslo: J. Chr. Gundersen.

*St. meld. nr. 61* (1957) *Om heimkunnskap og husstell*.

*Innst. S. nr. 294* (1958) *Tilråding frå den forsterkede landbrukskomité om heimkunnskap og husstell* (*St. meld. nr. 11* for 1958, jfr. *St. meld. nr. 61* for 1957).

*Ot. prp. nr. 30* (1958) *Lov om folkeskolen*.

*Innst. O. II.* (1959) *Innstilling fra kirke- og undervisningskomiteen om lov om folkeskolen* (*Ot. prp. nr. 30* – 1958).

*Innst. S. nr. 233* (1964–5) *Innstilling frå kyrkje- og undervisningskomitéen om 1) forsøksvirksomheten i skoleverket 1960–1, 1962 og 1963, og 2) skriv frå Læreraksjonen til vern om kristendomsfaget* (*St. meld. nr. 42*).

*Innst. S. nr. 234* (1964–5) *Innstilling frå kyrkje- og undervisningskomitéen om aksjon til vern om skulestyra sin rett i høve fag- og timebyteplan for den 9-årige folkeskulen*.

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*St. meld. nr. 42* (1964–5) *Om forsøksvirksomheten i skoleverket 1960–61, 1962 og 1963*.

*St. meld. nr. 101* (1964–5) *Om yrkesskoler i husstell*.

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- Innst. O. XIV (1968–9) *Innstilling fra kirke- og undervisningskomiteén om lov om grunnskolen*.
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- Innst. O. VII. (1969–70) *Innstilling fra kirke- og undervisningskomiteén om lov om tilskudd til private skoler*.
- Innst. S. nr. 287 (1971–2) *Innstilling fra kirke- og undervisningskomiteén om mønsterplan for grunnskolen* (St. meld. nr. 46).
- NOU 1974: 42 (1974) *Karakterer, eksamen, kompetanse m.v. I skoleverket, Eva I.*
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- Landtag NRW, June 20, 1961, *Plenarprotokoll 04/63, 4. Wahlperiode, 63. Sitzung am 20. Juni 1961, 2291–2313.*



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- Landtag NRW, February 12, 1963, Plenarprotokoll 05/10, 5. Wahlperiode, 10. Sitzung am 12. Februar 1963, 231–293.*
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- Landtag NRW*, June 20, 1967b, *Betr.: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Ersten Gesetzes zur Ordnung des Schulwesens im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen, des Schulverwaltungsgesetzes und des Schulfinanzgesetzes*, 6. Wahlperiode, Drucksache Nr. 321.
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- Landtag NRW, November 15, 1971, Antrag der Fraktion der CDU, Schulversuch "kooperative Gesamtschule," Drucksache 7/1215.
- Landtag NRW, August 22, 1973, Plenarprotokoll 07/77, 7. Wahlperiode, 77. Sitzung am 22. August 1973, Beschäftigung Radikaler im öffentlichen Dienst auf Grund der neuesten Entwicklung, 2923–2988.
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- Landtag NRW, February 19, 1975, Bericht des Kulturausschusses zur 2. Lesung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Schulverwaltungsgesetzes und des Schulpflichtgesetzes (Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung) und zu den Anträgen der Fraktion der CDU Schulversuch "kooperative Gesamtschule" sowie Vorlegung eines Gesetzentwurfs über die Schulentwicklungsplanung im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen, Drucksache 7/4744.
- Landtag NRW, February 27, 1975, Plenarprotokoll 7/124, 7. Wahlperiode, 124. Sitzung am 27. Februar 1975, 5211–5282.
- Landtag NRW, June 4, 1975, Plenarprotokoll 8/2, 8. Wahlperiode, 2. Sitzung am 4. Juni 1975, 11–17.
- Landtag NRW, May 5, 1976, Antrag der Fraktion der CDU, Reform der Hauptschule, Drucksache 8/965.
- Landtag NRW, November 9, 1976, Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der SPD und F.D.P., Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulverwaltungsgesetzes. Drucksache 8/14.
- Landtag NRW, November 25, 1976, Plenarprotokoll 8/34, 8. Wahlperiode, 34. Sitzung am 25. November 1976, 1755–1838.
- Landtag NRW, June 29, 1977, Plenarprotokoll 08/51, 8. Wahlperiode, 51. Sitzung am 29. Juni 1977, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulverwaltungsgesetzes, 2878–2927.
- Landtag NRW, October 26, 1977, Plenarprotokoll 8/57, 8. Wahlperiode, 57. Sitzung am 26.10.1977, 3240–3284.
- Landtag NRW, April 2, 1979, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Schule und Kultur zu dem Antrag der Fraktion der CDU, Reform der Hauptschule, Drucksache 8/4355.

*Landtag NRW, May 3, 1979, Plenarprotokoll 8/104, 8. Wahlperiode, 57. Sitzung am 03.05.1979, 7053–7070.*

#### MANIFESTOS OF NORWEGIAN PARTIES

Note: All Norwegian party manifestos are accessible at the Archive of Party-Political Documents of the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD), see <https://polsys.sikt.no/parti/>

The following manifestos were analyzed for the present work.

#### Center Party

Bondepartiets program 1957

Senterpartiets program 1961

Senterpartiets stortingsvalgprogram 1965–9

Senterpartiets prinsipp-program 1965, Vilje til ansvar

Senterpartiets valgprogram 1969–73

Senterpartiets prinsipp-program 1973

Senterpartiets valgprogram 1973–7

Senterpartiets valgprogram 1977, Vekst er ikke å forbruke mer, men å forvalte bedre!

#### Christian Democrats

KrFs program ved stortingsvalget 1957

4 år med Kristelig Folkeparti, Program ved stortingsvalget 11. sept. 1961.

KrFs arbeidsprogram 1965–9

KrFs prinsipielle program 1965, Vegen og Målet

Valgprogram KrF 1969–73

KrFs program for 1973–7

KrFs program for 1977–81, Samling om verdier

#### Conservative Party

Hovedprogram for Høyre og Høyres arbeidsprogram 1958–61

Høyres hovedprogram 1961

Høyres hovedprogram 1965

Høyres hovedprogram 1965

Høyres hovedprogram og arbeidsprogram 1969–73

Høyres program stortingsvalg 1973

Høyres program 1977–81

### **Labor Party**

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1953–7

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1958–61

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1962–5

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1966–9

DNAs prinsippprogram 1969, Prinsipper og perspektiver

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1970–3, Politikk for en ny tid, Vekst – Trygghet – Trivsel

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1974–7, Vekst og vern – demokrati og likestilling, Trygghet for folket

DNAs arbeidsprogram 1978–81, Du skal vita kva det gjeld, solidaritet – arbeid – miljø

### **Liberal Party**

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1958–61, Stem for vi vil programmet, stem Venstre – Folkepartiet, Mennesket i sentrum

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1961–5, Framgang i frihet

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1965–9, Samspill mellom medmennesker – en framtid med Venstre

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1969–73

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1973–7

Venstres arbeidsprogram 1977–81

### **Progress Party**

Anders Langes partis valgprogram 1973, Vi er lei av å bli utbyttet av statskapitalismen

Fremskrittspartiets handlingsprogram for stortingsvalget 1977

Fremskrittspartiets prinsipp-program 1977

### **Socialist People's Party**

SFs arbeidsprogram 1961–4

SFs arbeidsprogram 1965–9

Prinsipperklæring SF 1969

SFs arbeidsprogram 1969–73

SFs valgprogram 1973–7

SVs prinsippprogram 1977

SVs valgprogram 1977–81

## MANIFESTOS OF GERMAN PARTIES

Note: The SPD's national manifestos were downloaded from the archive of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The SPD NRW's manifestos of 1962, 1975, and 1980 were obtained via the Bergen University library. The CDU's national manifestos were downloaded from the archive of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the NRW manifestos were kindly supplied by email by the archive. The FDP's national and NRW manifestos were obtained from the Archive of Liberalism by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Publications that summarize and document the most important education-policy positions of the parties over time were included, such as publications by the SPD executive board (SPD, 1975, 1979) and a publication by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation focusing on the CDU's education politics from 1945 to 2011 (Gauger, 2011). The following manifestos were analyzed for the present work.

## CDU

Hamburger Programm CDU, Das Programm der Christlich Demokratischen Union für den zweiten deutschen Bundestag, 1953  
Kölner Manifest, CDU, 1961

Bildung in der modernen Welt. Hamburger Empfehlungen der CDU/CSU zur Kulturpolitik. 3. Kulturpolitischer Kongress, 9.–10.11.1964.

Düsseldorfer Erklärung der CDU, 31. März 1965, beschlossen auf dem 13. Bundesparteitag der CDU in Düsseldorf.

Deidesheimer Leitsätze. Entwurf eines schul- und hochschulpolitischen Programms. 4. Kulturpolitischer Kongress, 28.2.–1.3. 1969.

CDU 1969–73, Wahlprogramm der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands

Schul- und Hochschulreformprogramm der CDU, 1971. Argumente, Dokumente, Materialien Nr. 5258, herausgegeben von der CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle.

Bildungspolitik auf klaren Wegen. Ein Schwerpunktprogramm der CDU/CSU. Ein Papier der Kultusminister Walter Braun, Wilhelm Hahn, Hans Maier, Werner Scherer, Bernhard Vogel und des vorm. MdB Berthold Martin, 1972.

Mannheimer Erklärung "Frau und Gesellschaft" 1975, 23. Parteitag, 23.–25. Juni 1975.

Kulturpolitisches Programm 1976. Vorgelegt von den Kultusministern der von CDU und CSU regierten Bundesländer.

Das Wahlprogramm der CDU und CSU 1976  
 Freiheit, Solidarität, Gerechtigkeit. Grundsatzprogramm 1978.  
 Für Frieden und Freiheit. Das Wahlprogramm der CDU/CSU für die  
 Bundestagswahl 1980.

### CDU NRW

Aktions-Programm für Nordrhein-Westfalen, CDU NRW 18.4.1970.  
 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP), Presse  
 dokumentation.  
 CDU: Ziele und Wege '80. Programm für Nordrhein-Westfalen zur  
 Landtagswahl 1975. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik  
 (ACDP), Bestand CDU-Landtagsfraktion Nordrhein-Westfalen,  
 05-009-349.  
 Aussagen der CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen zur Landtagswahl 1980.  
 Langfassung. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP),  
 Bestand CDU-Landtagsfraktion Nordrhein-Westfalen, 05-009-865.

### FDP

Aktionsprogramm zur Bundestagswahl der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei, 1957  
 Aufruf zur Bundestagswahl 1961 der Freien Demokratischen Partei  
 Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 1969 der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei "Praktische Politik für Deutschland – Das Konzept der F.D.P."  
 Wahlauf Ruf zur Bundestagswahl 1972 der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei "Vorfahrt für Vernunft"  
 Stuttgarter Leitlinien einer liberalen Bildungspolitik der Freien  
 Demokratischen Partei, 1972  
 Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 1976 der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei "Freiheit Fortschritt Leistung"  
 Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 1980 der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei "Unser Land soll auch morgen liberal sein"

### FDP NRW

Wahlauf Ruf zur Landtagswahl 1962 der Freien Demokratischen Partei  
 Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen "Besser regieren – weniger  
 Staat"  
 Wahlplattform zur Landtagswahl 1970 der Freien Demokratischen  
 Partei Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen "Aktion Liberal"

Wahlplattform zur Landtagswahl 1975 der Freien Demokratischen Partei Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen "Liberale Politik für Nordrhein-Westfalen"

Wahlprogramm zur Landtagswahl 1980 der Freien Demokratischen Partei Landesverband Nordrhein Westfalen "Mut zur Freiheit – Mut zur Verantwortung"

## SPD

Bundestagswahlprogramm 1957 (printed in Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1956–7, Hannover – Bonn: Neuer Vorwärts Verlag).

Godesberger Programm (Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands), 1959

Regierungsprogramm der SPD, 1961

Bildungspolitische Leitsätze der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1964

Tatsachen und Argumente, Erklärungen der SPD Regierungsmannschaft, 1965

ENTWURF: Modell für ein demokratisches Bildungswesen (1969 vom Bildungspolitischen Ausschuss beschlossen und im Einvernehmen mit dem Parteivorstand als Diskussionsentwurf veröffentlicht.), 42–72 in Dokumentation. Programme und Entschlüsse zur Bildungspolitik 1964–75. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands.

Regierungsprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1969, Erfolg, Stabilität, Reform

Wahlprogramm der SPD, Mit Willy Brandt für Frieden, Sicherheit und eine bessere Qualität des Lebens, 1972

Regierungsprogramm 1976–80, SPD – Weiter arbeiten am Modell Deutschland

Wege zur menschlichen Schule – die Reform muss weitergehen. Programm zur Fortführung der Bildungsreform (Beschlissen auf der AfB-Bundeskonferenz 23.–25. März 1979 in Osnabrück)

Wahlprogramm 1980, Sicherheit für Deutschland

## SPD NRW

SPD vorn. Nordrhein-Westfalen muss Vorbild werden. Material zur Landtagswahl am 8. Juli 1962

Nordrhein-Westfalen-Programm 1975 (published in 1970 by the social-liberal federal state government)

Programm zur Landtagswahl 1975 – Entwurf

Unser Programm für die 80er Jahre “Politik für unser Land,” 1980

## EXPERT INTERVIEWS: BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTIONS

### Norwegian Experts

**Jakob Aano**, interviewed on July 10, 2014; leading member of the Stavanger section of the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers 1955–8, principal of a Christian private school 1959–63, principal of a Christian school in Tanzania 1959–63, member of parliament for the Christian Democrats 1965–85, member of the Church and Education Committee 1965–77, vice-chair of the Association for a Christian School (today Christian Pedagogical Forum) 1967–72.

**Ivar Bjørndal**, interviewed on June 26, 2015; secondary schoolteacher and school inspector for middle schools and upper-secondary schools, county school inspector in Østfold County 1971–7, director of Østfold University College 1977–81 and 1990–2, director of the Council for Secondary Education 1981–90, education director in Østfold County 1992–8, member of the Labor Party and the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers.

**Gudmund Hernes**, interviewed on January 21, 2014; leader of the Labor Party’s student union in Oslo 1963, PhD in sociology from the USA 1970, professor in Bergen and Oslo 1971–90, minister of education, research and church affairs for the Labor Party 1990–5, minister of health and social affairs 1995–7, director of UNESCO’s International Institute of Educational Planning in Paris 1999–2005, currently researcher at Fafo Institute and professor at BI Norwegian Business School.

**Kjell Horn**, interviewed on November 2, 2014; primary schoolteacher, youth schoolteacher and principal, teaching inspector, consultant of the Primary School Committee 1972–75, one of the founders and later critics of the Norwegian Humanist Association, supporter of ethics education in primary school, excluded from Labor Party/Socialist Student Union 1958, active in the Workers’ Communist Party (AKP) and the Norwegian Teachers’ Association during the 1970s.

**Unni Johannessen**, interviewed on the phone on November 21, 2014; primary schoolteacher and youth schoolteacher, member of the



Female Teachers' Association, joined the Norwegian Teachers' Association later, in which her husband Trond Johannessen was chair.

**Theo Koritzinsky**, interviewed on November 5, 2014; leader of the Socialist People's Party's youth organization 1965–6, lecturer in political science in Oslo 1969–75, leader of the Socialist Left Party in Oslo 1970–1, lecturer and later assistant professor at Sagene teacher training college and Oslo college 1975–2010, national leader of the Socialist Left Party 1983–7, representative of the Socialist Left Party in parliament 1985–93, chair of the Church and Education Committee 1989–93.

**Lars Roar Langslet**, interviewed on June 23, 2014; editor of the conservative journal *Minerva* 1957–68, represented the Conservative Party in parliament 1969–89, member of the Church and Education Committee 1969–73, 1987–9, and chair 1973–80, minister of culture and research 1981–6, member of Riksmåls Society for the Preservation of Traditional Standard Norwegian, member of the Norwegian language council 1972–6, president of the Norwegian Academy for Language and Literature 1995–2011.

**Kari Lie**, interviewed on December 10, 2014; primary schoolteacher, member of Oslo's council of the Female Teachers' Association 1964–74, chair of the organization in Oslo 1970–4 (the Oslo chapter remained independent from 1966 to 1968, and joined the Norwegian Teachers' Association as a separate chapter in 1968), secretary of the Norwegian Teachers' Association 1972–5, vice-chair for two years, chair 1978–85, not a party member.

**Tore Lindbekk**, interviewed on June 25, 2014; chair of the Norwegian Student Society (*Det Norske Studentersamfund*) 1962, editor of the conservative quarterly journal *Minerva* 1962–7, professor of sociology at the University of Trondheim from 1969, active in the Conservative Party as vice-chair of Trondheim *Høyre* 1972, member of Trondheim City Council 1976–83, member of Sør-Trøndelag County Council, has focused on education and science sociology in his work.

**Per Lønning**, interviewed on June 25, 2014; ordained 1951, PhDs in theology and history of political thought, secondary schoolteacher at Oslo teaching school 1954–64, member of parliament and member of parliamentary Church and Education Committee for the Conservative Party 1959–65, chair of Oslo School Committee 1960–3, member of planning committee for the youth school in

Oslo 1960–1, board member and chair of conservative journal *Minerva* 1957–64, chair of the Norwegian Church's Priests' Association 1962–4, bishop of Borg 1969–75, professor in Oslo and Strasbourg, bishop of Bjørgvin 1987–94.

**Per Arne Sæther**, interviewed on July 31, 2014; secondary school-teacher at *realskole/gymnas* and youth schools 1973–87, workplace representative of the Association of Norwegian Secondary Schoolteachers (*Norsk Lektorlag*, from 1983 NUFO/ Norwegian Educational Association) 1974–82, local union leader and vice-chair of the executive committee in Vestfold 1976–81, chair of the Norwegian Educational Association's branch in Vestfold 1982–4, member of the organization's advisory committee for the youth school 1981–3, member of central executive committee 1984–6, senior union consultant 1988–2013, not a party member.

**Torild Skard**, interviewed on October 25, 2014; leader of Socialist Students' Union 1959, excluded from the Labor Party in 1959, member of Socialist People's Party (SF) from 1961, represented the Socialist Left Party (SV) in parliament 1973–7 and as deputy 1965–9, first female president of one of the parliament's chambers, later high-ranking positions in the United Nations, leader of the Norwegian Association for Women's Rights 2006–14.

**Hans Olav Tunesvik**, interviewed on June 16, 2014; physician and psychiatrist, chair of the Student Language Association (*Studentmållaget*) 1959, board member of the Norwegian Language Society 1962–5 and chair 1965–70, ran for parliament for the Liberal Party in 1971, later member of the Christian Democrats and parliamentary representative 1977–85, member of the Church and Education Committee 1977–81 and chair 1981–3, later director of psychiatric clinic in Skånevik.

## German Experts

**Anke Brunn**, interviewed on August 25, 2015; member of Social Democratic Party (SPD) since 1967, research assistant in Cologne 1966–75, member of NRW parliament for SPD 1970–81 and 1985–2010, member of Berlin parliament 1981–3, NRW minister for science and research 1985–98, chair and vice-chair of the Commission for Educational Planning comprising representatives of the national and federal governments (*Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung*) 1985–98, member of the Association for the Integrated Comprehensive School (*Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft Gesamtschule*).

**Ilse Brusis**, interviewed on April 18, 2015; primary school/lower secondary schoolteacher 1960–9, later vice-principal of a *Hauptschule*, leader of a teacher seminar, school inspector, member of the SPD since 1969, member of the Education and Science Workers' Union (GEW) 1960–95 and chair of the GEW NRW 1975–1981, member of the national board of the Federation of German Trade Unions 1982–90, various ministerial posts in the NRW government 1990–2000.

**Uwe Franke**, interviewed on April 20, 2015; *Hauptschule* teacher from 1969 in Hamm, joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its youth organization 1962, member of the party's social wage-earner wing, joined the teachers' association Education and Upbringing (*Verband Bildung und Erziehung*, VBE) in 1970 (when it had just been founded based on Catholic and Protestant teachers' associations), NRW chair of the Association 1980–95, still active in VBE.

**Reinhard Grätz**, interviewed on May 6, 2015; floor tiler and engineer, member of SPD from 1957, chair of young socialists in Wuppertal 1968–73, member of the board of the SPD Wuppertal 1972–94 and of the board of the SPD region Niederrhein 1974–88, spokesperson for education and media of the SPD's NRW board 1975–94, member of NRW parliament for SPD 1970–2000, member of Parliamentary Committee for Schooling and Culture (later Schooling and Further Education) 1970–85 and its chair 1975–85.

**Wolfgang Heinz**, interviewed on April 28, 2015; journalist, member of the Liberal Party (FDP) since 1964, chair of the FDP Rhein-Sieg-Kreis 1968, chair of the FDP Cologne 1974–8, member of the GEW from 1972, member of parliament for the FDP 1970–80, spokesperson of the parliamentary group for education politics 1970–5, member of the Parliamentary Committee for Schooling and Culture 1970–5 and deputy member 1975–80, parliamentary secretary of the FDP parliamentary group 1973–80.

**Jürgen Hinrichs**, interviewed on June 9, 2015; secondary schoolteacher (*Gymnasium*), member of the FDP since 1955, member of the secondary schoolteachers' association (*Philologenverband*) from 1964 to 1975, active in municipal politics in Herford from 1969 to 1975, member of the NRW parliament for the FDP 1975–80, member of the Parliamentary Committee for Schooling and Culture 1975–80

and educational political spokesperson of the parliamentary group 1975–80.

**Burkhard Hirsch**, interviewed on the phone in May 2015; lawyer, FDP politician, involved in the debate on the cooperative school as NRW minister of the interior 1975–80.

**Walter Hupperth**, interviewed on May 4, 2015; secondary schoolteacher at the *Freiherr-vom-Stein-Gymnasium* in Cologne-Leverkusen from 1965, PhD in classic philology, member of the Association of Philologists (*Philologenverband*) and active there from the 1960s, for example as representative on the personnel board of the *Gymnasium* at district level, chair of the board from 1984 to 1999, sympathizes with the CDU.

**Wilhelm Lenz**, interviewed on May 20, 2015; PhD in philology 1949, managing director of the Association of Public Employees (*Deutscher Beamtenbund NRW*) 1953–84, member of the CDU since 1946, chair of the CDU Cologne 1963–72, member of the NRW Presidium of the CDU 1962–77, representative of the CDU in the NRW parliament 1958–80, chair of the CDU's parliamentary group 1962–70, president of the NRW parliament 1970–80.

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**Hans-G. Rolff**, interviewed on May 28, 2015; sociologist and education scientist, active in SPD's student organization Socialist College Union (*Sozialistischer Hochschulbund*) with a focus on education politics, 1966–7 assistant for education politics at the Federation of

German Trade Unions in NRW, 1967–70 consultant and responsible for planning for the Berlin school senator, professor for school pedagogy in Dortmund since 1970, founder of the Institute for School Development Research at the University of Dortmund 1973, member of GEW, SPD, and the Organization Comprehensive School (GGG).

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